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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between disability and the notions 
of citizenship, human rights and education. It aims to analyse the UK watershed 1978 
Warnock Report on special education and its application and relate them to models of 
disability, citizenship and UN human rights law. Education in England serves as a case study 
to show how these models are expressed in theory and practice and their implication for full 
citizenship for disabled people.  
There are eight chapters in this thesis. Chapter One is the introduction and discusses the 
scope of this thesis. Chapter Two examines the medical and social models of disability. 
Chapter Three discusses the classical and modern notions of citizenship as they relate to 
disability. Chapter Four compares citizenship and human rights concepts and the application 
of UN human rights law prior to 2006 in relation to disability. Chapter Five examines the 
2006 United Nation Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD) legislation 
in detail. Chapters Six and Seven discuss the Warnock Reports of 1978 and 2005 in relation 
to models of disability and citizenship. Chapter Eight is the conclusion. These chapters 
collectively examine the notion of classical and modern citizenship and their consideration of 
disability; the role of human rights in promoting disability and attempt to show their strengths 
and weaknesses in relation to education for the disabled. 
The thesis seeks to establish whether models of disability, citizenship and human rights are 
adequate in providing full citizenship for disabled people. To do so the thesis examines 
models of disability, notions of citizenship and human rights legislation and whether the UN 
sponsored CRPD is a superior way forward for gaining recognition for disabled people rights 
as full citizens.  
This thesis concludes with the view that disabled people have progressed in achieving rights 
of inclusive citizenship, but that the medical, social, political and legislative responses remain 
flawed. Disabled people‘s right to full inclusivity in both educational levels and throughout 
society remain a challenging work in progress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedication 
 
This doctoral thesis is dedicated to my son Mohamed who exposed me to a world of 
disability I did not know existed. And for being the first to make me realize there is no 
difference between disability and ability. Only what we make of them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
Writing a Doctoral thesis may well be a solitary task, but it is rarely completed alone. I have 
many people to thank. 
My sincere thanks and gratitude are due to my supervisor Professor Gary Browning, whose 
whole-hearted assistance and support contributed enormously to the completion of this 
thesis. 
I am also very much indebted to Professor Mary Boulton and Mr. Richard Huggins for their 
unreserved help and support. 
I would also like to express my eternal gratitude for the sacrifices made by my mother 
Samira Arabi without whose love and patience, this thesis would never have been completed, 
for my father Professor Al-Agab Alteraifi who instilled in me the intellectual curiosity to 
always ask ‗why‘ and to challenge the status-quo, for my sister Randa for always being there 
and helping us in every way she can, and last and by no means least I would like to express 
my gratitude, appreciation and love to my children Samir, Maria and Mohamed who have 
always been a source of pride, inspiration and support. Without them, none of this.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
Contents 
 
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………….2 
Dedication………………………………………………………………………………………........3 
Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………………………..4 
Chapter One: Introduction………………………………………………………………………...6 
Chapter Two: The Medical and Social Models of Disability…………………………….....13 
Chapter Three: Models of Citizenship…………………………………………………………61 
Chapter Four: UN Human Rights Instruments …………………………………………….113 
Chapter Five: The Convention on the Rights Of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)…134 
Chapter Six: Models of Disability as Expressed in The Warnock Report…………… 174 
Chapter Seven: Models of Citizenship as Expressed in The Warnock Report………232 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion………………………………………………………………….…266 
Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………………………..275 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Persons with disabilities make up the world‘s largest minority group. They are 
disproportionately poor, are more likely to be unemployed, and have higher rates of 
mortality than the general population. All too often, they do not enjoy the full 
spectrum of civil, political, social, cultural and economic rights. For many years, the 
rights of persons with disabilities were overlooked. 
Kofi Annan, Former Secretary General of the United Nations1 
Summary of Thesis  
In this thesis I analyze how social and political attitudes and models about disability, theories 
of citizenship, UN human rights legislation, and educational reports and legislation have 
been articulated and expressed as they concern disabled people. I maintain that each of 
them fails in adequately addressing the needs of disabled people in some ways and renders 
disabled people as second-class citizens. I argue that the United Nations human rights 
approach, particularly the 2006 Convention of the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD) 
specifically (Article 12 and Article 24), has the potential to resolve issues in catering for 
disability and education and guaranteeing disabled people full citizenship rights and is 
therefore a preferable alternative for disabled people. I review the 1978 Warnock Report on 
special education in England and its application as case studies and suggest how they 
exemplify problems in approaches wedded to the social model of disability and liberal 
notions of citizenship.  
Social and medical models of disability underpin approaches to disabled people and reflect 
society‘s understanding of disability. The notion of citizenship is central to explaining the 
inclusion or exclusion of disabled people from society as a whole and it is crucial in any 
attempt to judge whether policies counter, or indeed erect, barriers to their emancipation.2  
The two main theories of citizenship - liberal and civic republican models of citizenship - 
have different ways of defining membership in a community. When applied to disabled 
people these models do not perceive disabled people as full citizens because their 
membership requirements fall short, particularly for those with intellectual disabilities. 
Moreover, prior to December 2006 and the Introduction of the CRDP, no specific human 
rights treaty expressly fully protected disabled people.3 Prior to 2006, to claim protection 
                                                             
1 The secretary general, message on the international day of disabled Persons, 3 December 2005. 
2 People with disability are amongst the most marginalised in the world and are seen negatively by almost every 
culture, religion and ethnic group. See Pfeiffer, Sam, Guinan, Ratcliffe, Robinson & Stodden, (2004). More than 
alcoholism, criminalist behaviour, depression, or sexual orientation, research shows that the social stigma from 
disability is the most debilitating. See Smith, (2004), p. 10. 
3 Prior to 2006 disabled people‘s human rights were enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
It wasn‘t until a new disability rights convention was agreed at the UN in December 2006 that disabled people had a 
specific disability convention. The UK signed the convention on 30 March 2007 and ratified it on 8 June 2009. See 
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under a United Nations convention a disabled person must either invoke a universal 
provision or embody a separately protected characteristic. The universal provision was in the 
form of seven core UN treaties. 4   Each of the seven core United Nations treaties 5 
theoretically applies to disabled persons in varying degrees, but are rarely applied in practice. 
Compounding this problem, General Assembly emollient laws explicitly referencing disability 
are legally unenforceable. 
The flaws inherent the models of disability, citizenship and human rights prior to 2006 are 
expressed in the writings in the Warnock 1978 and Warnock 2005 educational reports and 
subsequent legislation. None of the models and approaches adopted a holistic application 
which would be helpful to the equality of disabled people at the individual, community and 
educational levels. 
While the Warnock Reports helped all disabled children to access education in England, I 
show the Warnock Report to be contradictory and falling short of equality of treatment. The 
Warnock Report is used in two ways: first to examine how it shows more generally the ways 
in which models of disability and citizenship have informed legislation and thinking about 
disability; and secondly to show how the report does not affect normative issues affecting 
disability and education in the way it reflects models of disability and citizenship both in 
theory and in practice. 
Disability poses the challenge of difference. How can we respect radical difference while 
also promoting equality? The challenge is one of uniting people while also providing for their 
distinct needs. This thesis will examine the development and application of models of 
disability, citizenship, human rights and the Convention on the Rights of People with 
Disabilities (CRPD), and how each of these models operates with different assumptions and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
www.un.org/disabilities/conventions/facts.shtml.   Although it does not specifically refer to disability many 
subsequent conventions at the UN and much legislation passed by member states as a result of the significant 
influence of this 1948 declaration and later UN conventions do. In an introductory document on disability and human 
rights, the office of the UN High commissioner for Human Rights states the four core values of human rights law that 
are of particular importance to disability. The four core values of human rights law are: 1. the dignity of each 
individual, who is deemed to be of inestimable value because of his/her inherent self-worth, and not because s/he is 
economically or otherwise ‗useful;‘ 2. the concept of autonomy or self-determination, which is based on the 
presumption of a capacity for self-directed action and behaviour, (and requires that the person be placed at the 
centre of all decisions affecting him/her); 3. the inherent equality of all regardless of difference; and 4. the ethic of 
solidarity, which requires society to sustain the freedom of the person with appropriate social supports. By 
emphasizing that the disabled are equally entitled to rights as others, this human rights model builds upon the spirit 
of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to which, ‗all human beings are born free and equal 
in rights and dignity.‘ This model‘s emphasis on viewing persons with disabilities as subjects and not as objects, 
thus locating the problem outside the disabled persons, addresses the manners in which the economic and social 
processes accommodate the differences of disability or not, as the case may be. 
4 Equality and freedom from discrimination lie at the heart of all international treaties on Human rights. Most 
constitutions will contain a declaration to the effect that all people are born equal and should receive equal 
protection under the law and this principle is projected in the preamble of the United Nations Charter 1945, which 
‗reaffirms faith in the equal rights of men and women . . .‘ Every person, therefore, has a moral right to be treated 
equally and in particular to enjoy their human rights free from discrimination on grounds such as race, sex, or social 
status; consequently, discriminatory treatment is viewed as an affront to human dignity and worth.  
 
5 Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), are universal in scope. The same is true for the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Although disability is not 
specifically mentioned in any of these treaties, they technically include all human beings within their respective 
provinces. 
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in its understanding and application of disability. This thesis takes an evolutionary approach  
and shows how even as each of these models progressed flaws in the understanding and 
treatment of disability continued and even expanded. It analyses how the limitations, 
features and assumptions of the models of disability, models of citizenship and human rights 
are reflected in theory and practice through analyzing the education policy and practice of 
the disabled in England from the 1970s to 2005. 
Ironically, while attempts at refinement were happening there was a morphing of greater 
differences and gaps in the understanding and treatment of disability. While progress was 
being made in some areas of education for the disabled, inconstancies and gaps were 
accruing in other areas. Even as progress was made in the refinement of terms, categories 
and practice of inclusiveness on disability through theoretical developments and evolving 
legislation, simultaneously there accrued along with old problems, the creation of new 
inconsistencies.  
This thesis provides a philosophical and practical examination and critique of notions of 
disability, citizenship and human rights as they apply to disability. It is not meant to give a 
comprehensive analysis of education in England; rather it achieves this aim through 
analyzing the two ‗watershed‘ Warnock Reports (1978 and 2005) on special education in 
England and the 1981 Education Act. It analyzes and critiques models of disability, notions 
of citizenship and human rights. It criticizes the medical model of disability and the shift to 
the social model and the partial and problematic way the social perspectives are adopted. At 
the same time, it will look at how more contemporary notions of citizenship, while committed 
to greater inclusiveness, do not effectively include all the disabled.  
It is argued here that the UN human rights regime offers a way forward, particularly the 2006 
UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities. The UN human rights regime is a 
development of contemporary citizenship in that it spells out the requirements of inclusion in 
communities and builds on the classic liberal regime of natural human rights. It is more 
specific in spelling out the needs of the defined individuals, such as the disabled, who have 
been left out of the picture.  
With regard to human rights conventions, I specifically examine the 2006 Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), particularly Article 12 which recognizes the right 
of persons with disabilities to equal recognition before the law and the attendant right to legal 
capacity, and Article 24 which address the elimination of disability- based discrimination in 
educational settings, as well as the provision of inclusive education at all levels. The CRPD 
is thought to have transformative potential for the lives of the world‘s largest minority. 
However, the CRPD, like all international instruments, is ultimately a negotiated text. It is 
therefore unrealistic to expect it to reflect a fully coherent or comprehensive exposition of 
disability rights. Ultimately, the CRPD has been most influenced by an uncritical and populist 
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understanding of the social model of disability. There are limits in what it can do.  
Moreover, as rights-based policies allow for many interpretations as to how they are to be 
implemented, there will be on-going debates and differences on what inclusion will mean in 
practice for the disabled. Structures will not be specified by rights, hence, problems over how 
the disabled will be ‗included‘ that are identified by them are not easily resolved. This is 
clearly reflected in education policies for the disabled in England.  
Given the issues identified in the thesis – the problems of the medical and social models and 
the problems in formulating and applying liberal and civic republican models of citizenship 
and human rights conventions to disability – if disability varies and we cannot essentialise it, 
can we say there is a clear-cut path to citizenship for the disabled? The more the topic of 
disability is refined, the more problems and questions are raised. For many problems 
addressed, new ones arise. This is evident in the reports and policies on special education. 
This dilemma/paradox leaves the disabled in vulnerable circumstances and caught amidst 
the attempted ongoing refinements and categories trying to help them. As attempts try to get 
closer to a resolution of the problem, it is never reached because new problems arise. The 
solutions create endless subdivisions and new issues arise creating an infinite regress. The 
development of education policy for the disabled, and of special education although positive, 
continues to reflect the shortcomings of the models of disability, citizenship and human rights 
even today. 
Thesis Structure and Outline of Chapters  
This thesis examines issues on disability in regard to citizenship and human rights. It 
considers models that reach beyond current perspectives on citizenship. In particular, 
it analyses and critiques models of disability, notions of citizenship and human rights 
conventions for the disabled, and questions whether they are sufficiently inclusive of 
citizenship to accommodate disabled people in society. Education in England is used as a 
case study.6 
                                                             
6 Methodology includes looking at many different primary and secondary materials are reviewed and analysed in 
this thesis in order to examine the inter-relationships between disability, citizenship, human rights and education 
policy and practice in England.  
The thesis structure is organized by looking at medical and social models of disability, and how they advance yet fail 
to fully address the issues of the problems of disabled people. Models of citizenship both classic and contemporary 
exclude disabled people from full citizenship. UN human rights regimes attempted to build on models of disability 
and citizenship and in doing so accord disabled people legal protection. However, UN legislation prior to 2006 fails 
to achieve this aim. The 2006 UN CRPD attempts to bridge these gaps by legally binding legislation particularly 
Article 12 and Article 24 but leaves us with the question of how important now are models of disability and 
citizenship after the CRPD highlighted their limitations? Should we abandon all models of disability and citizenship? 
I argue that perhaps the answer to this questions is yes, and the CRPD is all we need to empower disabled people 
in achieving full citizenship rights. However, the reservation the UK government put on Article 24 might make the full 
realization of citizenship rights in education problematic. The general criticism of UN legislation – that structures 
cannot be specified by rights – is also problematic in according disabled people their CRPD rights in practice. 
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Chapter One highlights the purpose, scope and methodology of the thesis and outlines its 
format over the subsequent eight chapters.  
Chapter Two reviews the existing medical and social models of disability, and how the 
medical model serves to relieve society of any responsibility to provide civil rights and to 
accommodate disabled people beyond what is considered necessary as defined and applied 
in the medical world. This chapter analyses the medical model of disability and the shift to 
the social model and the incomplete, limited and problematic way social perspectives are 
adopted.  
It examines the impact of the medical model on the daily lives of disabled people and 
how the disability community is fragmented by medical diagnostic approaches which do not 
address their daily needs and frustrations in coping in civil society. A comparative analysis of 
the social model versus the medical model is then presented. The social model of disability 
has many ambiguities and inconsistencies, and attempts to iron these out create more 
ambiguities and unresolved issues.  
Chapter Three examines different models of citizenship. After considering various 
definitions, a discussion of the classical liberal and civic republican models is presented. 
Following that there is a discussion of modern liberal, civic republican theories, and modern 
‗difference‘ theories.  At the same time, it considers how more contemporary notions of 
citizenship attempt to define an inclusive notion of citizenship that draws on classical liberal 
theory, and also contemporary forms of liberal citizenship and republican theories. Again its 
inclusiveness widens notions of citizenship yet it also highlights problems in that it does not 
effectively include all the disabled. Different notions of citizenship over three centuries are 
discussed—from Locke to Marshall to Rawls—along with feminist writings on citizenship as 
well as alternative frameworks to current notions of citizenship. These writings are 
scrutinized in terms of addressing the position of the disabled in society from each author‘s 
perspective. 
Chapter Four considers the issue of human rights as developed through the United Nations 
and the applications of this perspective to existing rights and to furthering the rights of 
disabled communities. The United Nations Declaration on Disability of 2006 has become a 
landmark declaration on the development of a convention for the recognition and rights of 
disabled individuals and disabled communities. Yet this 2006 declaration contains flaws 
regarding disabled people‘s rights which need to be addressed and resolved. 
Chapter Five examines the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It 
looks at this convention in the context of civil, political, economic, social, customary rights, as 
well as international rights and cooperation. The UN human rights regime is a very 
significant development, which connects contemporary citizenship with the human rights of 
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disabled people and communities. It stipulates and describes the requirements for the 
inclusion of disabled communities in civil societies worldwide and builds on the classic liberal 
regime of natural rights which it claims are in fact human rights. It specifically enumerates 
the needs of the defined individuals, such as the disabled, who have been traditionally 
ignored or marginalized.  
These regime efforts by the United Nations serve to complement and support the work 
of current liberal human rights advocates and agencies across the globe, and serve as a 
focal point for worldwide efforts towards theorizing the requirements of the disabled. 
Furthermore they have led to concrete applications in international and domestic laws and 
also in practice.  
The CRPD has transformative potential for the lives of the world‘s largest minority. The 
CRPD is regarded as having finally empowered the world‘s largest minority to claim their 
rights, and to participate in international and national affairs on an equal basis with others 
who have achieved specific treaty recognition and protection. 
The chapter examines and evaluates the intellectual antecedents of the CRPD and its 
continuity and discontinuity with years of international law and its struggles with disability and 
human rights. It then explores the text of the CRPD, critically examining its potential 
contribution to the realization of the rights of persons with disability. 
Chapters Six and Seven critique the two Warnock Reports of 1978 and 2005 on special 
educational needs in England. These chapters analyze how the two reports express models 
of disability, citizenship and human rights as they relate to education for the disabled both in 
theory and practice. These chapters analyse how the failure of the social and medical 
models, notions of citizenship and human rights are reflected—or not reflected—in education 
policies for the disabled, and how the UN CRPD might offer a better way forward for 
disabled people in education in achieving equal citizenship. 
Both in theory and practice these reports and models show how many disabled groups are 
not accorded the full rights of citizenship in education, and how government has prolonged a 
state of affairs where a particular group of people (the disabled) has been denied their basic 
human rights. Disability is a human rights issue and to be a disabled student in Britain today 
is to be denied the rights of citizenship. The reality of this denial is amply demonstrated 
throughout these chapters. 
Chapter Eight concludes this study with a review of the previous examination of the issues, 
and notes the pattern of paradoxical development regarding notions of citizenship and their 
application to disability education policy. Some of the old problems regarding notions on 
citizenship and disability return during the efforts to refine ideas on citizenship and their 
application.  
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Each model provides a limited understanding of disability and reveals shortcomings in 
accommodating disabled communities and in treating disability. The evolutionary approach 
undertaken in this study demonstrates that each of these models continued to have flaws 
even when efforts were made to cure them. 
For disabled communities and disabled individuals in education, this means that although 
progress in alleviating their marginalization is being made by governments through 
legislation and public awareness campaigns, much work remains to be done. Disabled 
people are still vulnerable as a result of unaddressed issues, and may be exposed by 
setbacks or deterioration in government commitments to keep abreast of the issues 
confronting disability.   
This thesis attempts to show that any progress made by governments in terms of alleviating 
the marginalization of disabled people as citizens, has been accompanied by regression in 
some areas and the creation of new problems, notably in education. It is hoped that such a 
critique will advance the daily lives of both disabled individuals and the community at large, 
and to advance their rights in education systems. The models of disability, citizenship and 
human rights examined in this thesis all aim to respect difference while promoting forms of 
equality. But the models are flawed, and analysing how their failure impacts on and is 
reflected in education policies for the disabled and how the UNCRPD might offer a better 
way forward for disabled people in education is a subject worthy of study. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Medical and Social Models of Disability 
 
The two models of disability (the social model and medical model) examined in this chapter 
aim to respect difference while promoting forms of equality. But they both fall because they 
are incapable of achieving this objective due to their conceptual limitations.  
Each model is important because it underpins many of the assumptions and concepts 
pertaining to citizenship, legislation and educational reports regarding disabled people. One 
must understand the context in which theories of citizenship, legislation and educational 
reports were deliberated and written during the period of the 1978 Warnock Report‘s 
conception as they relate back to basic perceptions delineated in the medical and social 
models. 
The ―medical model‖ of disability holds that disability results from an individual person‘s 
biological limitations, and is largely unconnected to the social or geographical environments. 
The ―social model‖ of disability asserts that contingent social conditions rather than innate 
biological limitations constrain individuals‘ abilities and create a disability category. The 
medical model is part of the wider conceptual framework of ‘medicalization.‘ The social 
model is a process of social change. This chapter analyses how although the medical and 
social models of disability separately fail, their synthesis through incorporating concepts from 
each model can more precisely identify and address issues confronting the disabled. 
Prior to the 1970s, the international ‗emollient laws‘ addressing disability usually focused on 
functional limitations (the medical model). Beginning in the 1970s international and domestic 
law started to adopt and reflect social model precepts and laws in England increasingly 
started to be addressed from the social model perspective. 7  Nevertheless, because 
advocates have limited the social model to formal equality theory, its application is limited 
within the human rights arena and it is argued here that it creates limits for equal citizenship 
for disabled people. 
The Medical Model of Disability 
In the field of disability studies, it is essential to distinguish between the medical and social 
models of disability. The medical model is the traditional model of disability, which sees the 
disadvantage experienced by disabled people as a consequence of their individual 
                                                             
7 The origins of the social model, which is now adopted by the World Health Organisation, primarily originated from 
the British Disability Rights Movements and has been developed to its present status.  The ‗social model‘ in Britain 
can be traced to an essay written by Paul Hunt a disabled Briton ―A Critical Condition‖, published in the Guardian 
newspaper in 1966 calling for the formation of a national consumer group. ―Wednesday September 20th 1972 
‗Severely physically handicapped people find themselves in isolated unsuitable institutions where their views are 
ignored, and they are subject to authoritarian and often cruel regimes. I am proposing the formation of a consumer 
group to put forward nationally the views of actual and potential residents of these successors to the Workhouse.‖ 
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impairments. It is argued here that in twentieth and twenty-first century society, this is still the 
dominant model used by the general population (although most people do not think about 
what ‗model‘ they are using), including the medical profession. This model is also sometimes 
called the individual or personal tragedy model, as it focuses on the individual disabled 
person and on the negative experience of impairment.8  
Under the medical model, disability is caused by impairment and the solution, therefore, is to 
‗cure‘ the impairment. Obviously, even with recent advances in medical science, this is not 
always possible, so according to the medical model disabled people must be treated in an 
effort to make them more ‗normal‘; otherwise, they are seen as dependent, weak, a 
‗problem‘ and a drain on society‘s resources. Disabled people are therefore expected to 
cooperate with all medical procedures recommended by doctors, regardless of their efficacy 
and desirability, in an attempt to reduce the ‗burden‘ on society. Much of our understanding 
of disability has been dominated by the medical model, which sought to compartmentalize 
acute illness into the medical trilogy of sickness, disease and rehabilitation.9  The crux of this 
model is that persons with disabilities are sick and weak in their present state and that it is 
therefore necessary to improve their health so their entire self can be improved. 10  The 
medical model is not only applied as an academic tool at the analytical or conceptual level, it 
also appeals to health care professionals at a practical level. Thus it is not uncommon to find 
comments in the educational literature indicating that the medical model was clearly not 
purely an analytical tool, but related to actual ways of practice. 
The Medical Model and the Role of Professionals 
Support for the medical model has been drawn from our unquestioning attitude towards the 
medical profession as the authoritative group. As Sandra Carpenter argues, what the 
medical model created was:  
 
an essential power imbalance created by the so-called ‗helpers‘ and the ‗helpees‘, or 
by what has come to be known as the ‗mystification of professionalism.‘ This 
mystification of professionalism can be maintained through language or jargon, 
and/or through education or credentialism and through a jealously guarded 
knowledge or expertise11 
 
The belief in the medical profession as the only legitimate source of medical knowledge is 
coupled with society‘s vision of what it means to be healthy, along with societal pressure to 
achieve an acceptable level of healthfulness.12  
                                                             
8 Borsay, 2005 
9 See Talcott Parsons, The Social System 429–79 (1951) (introducing the ―sick role‖ as an institutional role 
―necessary to enable the physician to bring his competence to bear on the situation‖); Talcott Parsons, The Sick 
Role and the Role of the Physician Reconsidered, 53 Health & Society 257, 261–62, 266–77 (1975) (suggesting the 
power inequality of the typical doctor/patient relationship). 
10 See Claire H. Liachowitz, Disability as a Social Construct: Legislative Roots 12 (UPenn 1988); Michael Oliver, 
Understanding Disability: From Theory to Practice 31–32 (1996). 
11 Sandra Carpenter, ―Doing it the Independent Living Way‖ Navigating the Waters Conference, Toronto. 15 June 
2001.  
12 See David Pfeiffer, The Conceptualization of Disability, in Sharon N. Barnartt and Barbara M. Altman, eds, 2 
Research in Social Science and Disability: Exploring Theories and Expanding Methodologies 29, 30–31 (2001); 
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As the medical model defines disability as being contained strictly within the body, ‗the 
model does not represent the social environment as being part of the ―problem‖ of 
disablement, as it fosters and authorizes the assumption that obstacles are given and 
cannot, or need not, be altered in order to accommodate people with disabilities.‘13   
 
The focus on the body as the site of the disability has led the medical theory to conclude that 
remedying the body of the disability was the best possible solution. Therefore rehabilitation 
has played a major role in trying to get a person with a disability to a healthy state, so that 
they may fit in with the rest of society and when this goal could not be accomplished, 
institutions became the answer. During this period, persons with disabilities had no choice 
over how to live their life, as the doctor was the ‗gatekeeper,‘14 acting as the expert who 
could determine the best course of action for resolving the person‘s disability.  Society‘s 
inability to accept difference among its citizens was responsible for ensuring that this 
approach to disability was all encompassing.  
 
Many disabled writers have recorded the lengths to which the medical profession was 
prepared to go, particularly prior to the 1980s, in an attempt to make them ‗normal.‘ Vic 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Mark Priestley, Constructions and Creations: Idealism, Materialism and Disability Theory, 13 Disability & Society 75, 
82–83 (1998); see also Sharon Barnartt, Using Role Theory to Describe Disability, in 2 Research in Social Science 
and Disability at 58–68 (cited in note 19) (discussing disability as a master status); Gerben DeJong, The Movement 
for Independent Living: Origins, Ideology and Implications for Disability Research, in A. Brechin et al, eds, Handicap 
in a Social World 239, 442–47 (Hodder and Stoughton 1981) (describing ―the impaired role‖ of permanent 
dependency). 
13 Jerome E. Bickenbach, Physical Disability and Social Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 90. 
14 Bickenbach, Jerome E. Physical Disability and Social Policy Toronto: University 73.  
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Finkelstein‘s experience of rehabilitation in the 1960s was that if cure was not possible, the 
medical profession became almost obsessed with the aim of enabling disabled people‘s 
functioning to be brought as close as possible to that of non-disabled people, rather than 
accepting that some people would be best served by using wheelchairs or other aids to 
enable them to function differently but effectively. Finkelstein recalls ‗endless soul-destroying 
hours at Stoke Mandeville Hospital trying to approximate to able-bodied standards by 
―walking‖ with callipers and crutches.‘15  
It is clear from the writings of disabled people like Finkelstein in the 1960s and 1970s that 
medical treatment and rehabilitation was imposed on them in a way which was oppressive 
and disempowering, by a medical profession whose professional and social status meant 
that non-compliance was often not a realistic option. For example, Barbara Lisicki wrote: 
I had begun to realise the oppressive nature of the medical model but on a very 
individual level. At that time I did not know any better but they [the doctors] would 
want to do experimental operations and I let them. I just believed them. I didn‘t know 
how to resist.‘16 
The Social Model of Disability 
The social model is a proposed definition of disability that is connected to human 
disadvantage. Stripped down to basics, the model moves responsibility for disadvantage 
from physically and mentally impaired individuals to their built, social, and economic 
environment. Not necessarily moral responsibility, although that might follow, but causal 
responsibility. Either way, the model is powerful within its domain. This is especially true 
when conventional wisdom attributes a disabled life to personal tragedy, or curse, or sin, or 
some other fairly individualized phenomenon. The social model redirects attention to the 
environment surrounding an impaired individual.17 
                                                             
15 Oliver 1996b cited in Borsay 2005 p 60 
16 (Campbell and Oliver 1996, pp 37-38)Disability Politics: Understanding Our Past. Changing Our Future. London: 
Routledge.  
17 Recent restatements of the social model in disabilities legal scholarship include Bagenstos, 86 Va L Rev at 426–
30 (cited in note 9); 
 
 
 17 
 
 
Key to the social model is a distinction between personal impairments and disability.18
 
Akin 
to the sex/gender distinction of the 1970s, the social model indicates that at least some 
impairments disadvantage only because of their interaction with a social setting.19
 
Thus the 
model defines ‗disability‘ as disadvantage caused by the confluence of (a) personal 
impairment and (b) a social setting comprising architecture, economics, politics, culture, 
social norms, aesthetic values, and assumptions about ability. Different scholars stress 
different social factors: some American disability scholars have emphasized stigma and role 
theory, while some British writers concentrate on the mode of production.20 However their 
messages are similar: because social settings change over time and space, disability is not 
an entailment of impairment but at least sometimes an artifact of environment. 21 22 As these 
                                                             
18 See, for example, Oliver, Understanding Disability at 32–33 (cited in note 16); Oliver, The Politics of Disablement 
at 10–11 (cited in note 2) (separately defining impairment and disability); Silvers, Formal Justice at 53–56 (cited in 
note 8) (tracing the development of the conflation of disability and impairment in Western society); see also 
Liachowitz, Disability as a Social Construct at ch 1 (cited in note 16). 
19 Compare Ann Oakley, Sex, Gender, and Society 204 (Harper & Rowe 1972) (comparing gender to socially 
constructed caste). Another strain of thought in disability studies emphasizes that some impairments are caused by 
social systems, like employment and war. See Paul Abberley, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of 
a Social Theory of Disability, 2 Disability, Handicap & Socy 5, 9–13 (1987). I set aside that strain, which is in turn 
different from the claim that traits become ―impairments‖ only after social construction. See Part I.B. 
20 See Pfeiffer, The Conceptualization of Disability at 32–34 (cited in note 19). 
21 See Priestley, Constructions and Creations at 76–82, 89–90 (cited in note 19) (outlining four approaches among 
British and American scholars with an ―individual-social dimension and [a] materialist- idealist dimension‖). 
22 On cultural contingency, see Colin Barnes, Theories of Disability and the Origins of the Oppression of Disabled 
People in Western Society, in Len Barton, ed, Disability and Society: Emerging Issues and Insights 43 (Longman 
1996); Martha L. Edwards, Deaf and Dumb in Ancient Greece, in Lennard J. Davis, ed, The Disability Studies 
Reader 29, 29, 35–36 (Routledge 1997) (suggesting that Ancient Greek elites connected deafness to intellectual 
impairment because the latter was connected to linguistic inability); Ida Nicolaisen, Persons and Nonpersons: 
Disability and Personhood Among the Punah Bah of Central Borneo, in Benedicte Ingstad and Susan Reynolds 
Whyte, eds, Disability and Culture 38, 44–46 (University of California 1995) (explaining that the Punan Bah ―do not 
hold the physically and mentally impaired responsible for their condition‖ because they view these impairments as 
imperfections in the soul of the body part afflicted, and not the soul of the body itself); Aud Talle, A Child Is a Child: 
Disability and Equality Among the Kenya Maasai, in id at 56, 56–69 (finding no disfavored category of ―disabled‖ 
among the Maasai, although certain impairments and deformity are associated with divine punishment or curse). 
See, for example, Minow, Making all the Difference at 12 (cited in note 15); Crossley, 75 Notre Dame L Rev at 654 
(cited in note 8). 
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settings are generated in part by the choices of others, responsibility for a person‘s 
disadvantage cannot be attributed solely to that person‘s impairment. 
The Social Model versus the Medical Model 
As discussed in the previous section, the social model arose in response to the critique of 
the medical model of disability. It has generated a caucus of academic writing, 
predominantly written by academics and activists who themselves have disabilities and is 
the total antithesis to the medical model.23 It is not intended in this section to provide a 
comprehensive review of the medical model but to refer to it in relation to the social model. 
The primary focus of analysis is the manner in which the social model shifts away from 
consideration of the deficits of the functional, physiological and cognitive abilities of the 
impaired individual, to the ability of society to systematically oppress and discriminate 
against disabled people, and the negative social attitudes encountered by disabled people 
throughout their everyday lives. Disability is therefore situated in the wider, external 
environment, and is not explicable as a consequence of an individual‘s physical and/or 
cognitive deficiencies. Thus, in focusing upon the manner in which disability is socially 
produced, the social model gives precedence to the importance of politics, empowerment, 
citizenship and choice. Furthermore, disability is the result of society‘s failure to provide 
adequate and appropriate services. Consequently, the needs of disabled people are not 
adequately accounted for within the contemporary social organization of society. It is 
perceived in attitudinal terms, as a socio-cultural rather than a biological construct. Harlan 
Hahn, writing within the North American context, stated that disability stems from: ‗the failure 
of a structured social environment to adjust to the needs and aspirations of citizens with 
disabilities rather than from the inability of the disabled individual to adapt to the demands of 
society.‘24 
Disability scholars contrast the social model with an ‗individual‘ (or ‗medical‘) model of 
disability. This model focuses on the disadvantaging impact of physical or mental 
impairments rather than that of the environment in which they operate. The impairments 
themselves are thought to be disabling.25
 
If any assistance is appropriate, therefore, it would 
presumably be the delivery of individualized services – hearing aids, wheelchairs, guide 
dogs, personal care attendants, pharmaceuticals, and the like.26 Descriptions of the medical 
model often include a subordination theme as well. Inspired by Talcott Parsons‘ notion of the 
‗sick role‘ in Western society, critics of the medical model associate it with belittling norms 
that relieve impaired persons from social obligations yet demand they abide by professional 
medical judgment.27 Both responsibility and liberty are thereby reduced.28 But it is difficult to 
                                                             
23 See Pfeiffer, The Conceptualization of Disability p .32 
24 Hahn, H. (1986), ―Public Support for Rehabilitation in Programs: The Analysis of US Disability Policy‖, Disability, 
Handicap & Society, 1(2): 121-138. 
25 See Claire H. Liachowitz, Disability as a Social Construct: Legislative Roots 12 (UPenn 1988); Michael Oliver, 
Understanding Disability: From Theory to Practice 31–32 (1996). 
26 Theodore P. Seto and Sande Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U Pa L 
Rev 1053, 1059–62 (2006) (discussing social security as a program based on the ―medical/charity paradigm‖). 
27 
 
See Talcott Parsons, The Social System 429–79 (1951) (introducing the ―sick role‖ as an institutional role 
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find scholars who promote any such ‗model‘ of disability. Parsons was interested in 
describing social equilibria, and disability studies scholars hold out the medical model as 
error. It is their perception of how traditional health and welfare systems (mis)understand 
disability.29 
 
 
 
The common misperception of disability conforms to the ‗medical‘ model, which views a 
disabled person‘s limitations as wholly innate, properly and naturally excluding them from 
participating in mainstream culture. Under this model, people with disabilities are believed 
unable of performing social functions because of medical conditions that hinder numerous 
major life activities. As a consequence of this model, disabled persons are either 
systemically excluded from social opportunity such as receiving welfare benefits instead of 
employment, or are accorded limited social participation such as the case of educating 
disabled children in separate schools.30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
―necessary to enable the physician to bring his competence to bear on the situation‖); Talcott Parsons, The Sick 
Role and the Role of the Physician Reconsidered, 53 Health & Society 257, 261–62, 266–77 (1975) (suggesting the 
power inequality of the typical doctor/patient relationship). 
28 See David Pfeiffer, The Conceptualization of Disability, in Sharon N. Barnartt and Barbara M. Altman, eds, 2 
Research in Social Science and Disability: Exploring Theories and Expanding Methodologies 29, 30–31 (2001); 
Mark Priestley, Constructions and Creations: Idealism, Materialism and Disability Theory, 13 Disability & Society 75, 
82–83 (1998); see also Sharon Barnartt, Using Role Theory to Describe Disability, in 2 Research in Social Science 
and Disability at 58–68 (cited in note 19) (discussing disability as a master status); Gerben DeJong, The Movement 
for Independent Living: Origins, Ideology and Implications for Disability Research, in A. Brechin et al, eds, Handicap 
in a Social World 239, 442–47 (Hodder and Stoughton 1981) (describing ―the impaired role‖ of permanent 
dependency). 
29 See, for example, Gary L. Albrecht, The Disability Business: Rehabilitation in America 67–68 (Sage Draft of April 
22, 2007 7 
30 See generally Kenny Fries, Introduction, in Staring Back: The Disability Experience From the Inside Out 6-7 
(Kenny Fries ed., 1997) (noting that ―the medical view of disability . . . puts the blame squarely on the individual‖); 
Claire H. Liachowitz, Disability as aSocial Construct (1988) (The ―medical/pathological paradigm‖ of disability 
stigmatizes the disabled by conditioning their inclusion only ―on the terms of the able bodied majority.‖). 
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In contrast to the medical model, disability studies scholars have long argued for an 
understanding of disability through a ‗social‘ model.31 This model maintains that the socially 
structured environment and the attitudes reflected in its construction play a central role in 
creating ‗disability.‘ According to the social model, collectively administered decisions 
determine what conditions constitute the bodily norm in any given society.32 Thus factors 
external to a disabled person‘s limitations are really what determine that individual‘s ability to 
function.33 Just as some cultures view females as less capable than males in leadership 
roles,34 most societies have historically assumed disabled persons are less capable than 
nondisabled persons.35 The social model draws attention to the way in which disability is 
culturally constructed.36 
                                                             
31 Disability studies is an academic discipline analogous to that of critical race or feminist theory,. See Gary L. 
Albrecht et al., Introduction: The Formation of Disability Studies, in Handbook of Disability Studies 1, 1-8 (Gary L. 
Albrect et al.eds., 2001). 
32 The medical model starts from a biological and anatomic definition of normal  structure and function of what 
constitutes  ―normal‖, and of the situation of disabled people within it. Apart from the fact that a healthy body is 
usually considered a normal body, it can be argued that health is fundamental to the achievement of all other norms. 
George Canguilhem argues that; Viewed in this way, structure and function can be seen as a key norm for the 
medical model, a necessary factor in the attainment of all other social norms See Osborne 1997.The assumption 
about health is that it was always a problem whose logical solution involved the surveillance and examination of 
individual bodies. While health is classically defined as a state of well-being, its main utility from the nineteenth 
century onwards has been in the maintenance of a newly constructed workforce see Henriques et al. 1984,132. A 
healthy pool of labourors was essential for progress during the industrial revolution and for the development of 
capitalism and capitalist explanation. see A comprehensive discussion of the transition to capitalism and its 
implications for disabled people is provided by Mike Oliver in ―The Politics of Disablement (1990) also see Vic 
Finklestein (1980).  See also Richard K. Scotch & Kay Schriner, Disability as Human Variation: Implications for 
Policy, 148 (1997). 
33 See Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues and Agendas, 4. S. Cal. Rev. 
L. & Women‘s Stud. 97 (1995); Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and the Environment, 23 J. Soc. Phil. 105 
(1992). The framework derives from both British and American disability rights scholars. Some scholars credit 
Michael Oliver with orginating the social model theory. See Michael Oliver, Social Work with Disabled People 23 
(1983) (the social model is ―nothing more fundamental than a switch away from focusing on the physical limitations 
of particular individuals to the way the physical and social environments impose limitations on certain groups or 
categories of people‖). A disabled Political scientist and Law  Professor Jacobus tenBroek made an early 
contribution to the development of the social model of disability in an article, The Right to Live in the World: The 
Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 841, 842 (1966) (demonstrating how people with disabilities were 
historically held to higher duties of care in respect to the law of torts because they were perceived as inherently less 
able to engage in social functions). 
34 See, e.g., A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792) (in which she argues that women are not naturally inferior 
to men, but because they lack education they might appear so.) The First World War provided the first opportunity 
to take on traditional male jobs in the UK so it is not surprising to know that in 1918 women over the age of thirty 
were given the same political rights as men. This change was not a result of war, women have been campaigning 
for decades to be given the right to vote which they saw as a gradual improvement in women‘s rights that had been 
going on throughout the 19th century. Traditionally a woman‘s place was seen in the home. An Oxford university 
study by  the Thomson Routers Foundation shows that women in countries like Afganistan, Congo, Pakistan, and 
Somalia still show that women in these countries are subjected to extreme abuse and practically no rights. 
http://reuterinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk. 
35 See, e.g., Jerome E. Bickenbach, Disability Human Rights, Law, and Policy, in Handbook  of Disability Studies 
supra note 56, at 565, 567 (noting the commonly held assumption that ―disability is an abnormality, a lack, and a 
limitation of capacity‖). The results of a recent study of prevailing attitudes towards individuals with intellectual 
disabilities across ten very different countries reflect this misperception. See Multinational Study of Attitudes Toward 
individuals with Intellectual Disabilities: General Finding and Calls to Action (2003). The report, ―Disabled People‘s 
Attitudes Toward Other Impairment Groups‖, from City University, London, 2007, was compiled from anonymous 
questionnaires by Dr. Mark Deal.  The study‘s author, himself disabled, reports findings that reveal a tendency of an 
established ―hierarchy‖ of disability among both disabled people and wider society. For example, disabled and non-
disabled people regard those with a learning disability or a mental illness as the least desirable groups. The 
research points to a hierarchy of impairment amongst disabled people, ranking Deafness as the most ‗desirable‘ 
impairment followed by Arthritis, Epilepsy, Cerebral Palsy, HIV/ Aids, Down‘s Syndrome and Schizophrenia. These 
prejudices are almost identical to those held by the non-disabled sample, with the only difference being that 
Cerebral Palsy and HIV/Aids were placed in reverse order.  However, a minority of cultures believe people with 
disabilities are especially capable of various functions. In certain Asian countries—for example China—visually-
impaired people are frequently trained and valued as masseuses. Moreover, it is illegal for those with ordinary vision 
to be employed as a masseuse in Taiwan. See DPP City Councilors Say Lein Received Sighted Massage, Taipei 
Times, Sept. 27, 2003, at 3, available at 
htttp://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/09/27/2003069422. Indeed, there are social anthropologists 
who claim that the notion of ―disability,‖ at least as a negative concept, is Western in origin and remains unknown to 
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The social model of disability should not be considered as a monolithic entity, but rather as a 
cluster of approaches to the understanding of the notion of disablement. As will be 
demonstrated below, different variants of the model ascribe differing and relative importance 
to a multiplicity of factors that result in the oppression and discrimination that disabled 
people experience. However, common to all variants of the social model is the belief that, at 
root, ‗disability‘ and ‗disablement‘ are socio-political constructions. It is therefore the 
inhospitable physical environment, in concert with the negative social attitudes that disabled 
people encounter which result in the systematic oppression, exclusion and discrimination of 
disabled people. 
It can therefore be appreciated that the consideration of the theoretical understandings of 
disability is not solely of semantic, academic interest. The manner in which disability is 
popularly perceived has a profound impact upon the way in which ‗stakeholders‘ are 
considered (by disabled persons‘ organizations, policymakers and NGOs alike) to have a 
legitimate role in deciding how resources are distributed. The manner in which disability has 
been variously conceptualized, with the resultant ramifications for the provision of disability 
services, has become a highly emotive and politically charged issue. 
The Shift From a Medical model to a Social Model of Disability and its impact on 
Social Policy 
This experience of oppression and disempowerment by the medical profession, as well as 
the disempowering nature of residential care for some and a total lack of support in the 
community for others, led some disabled people in the 1960s and 1970s to develop what 
eventually came to be described as the social model of disability. Some of the earliest work 
on the social model was undertaken in the 1970s by the ‗Union of the Physically Impaired 
against Segregation,‘ a group of people with physical impairments who realised that they 
were limited more by the oppressive attitudes and actions of those ‗caring‘ for them than by 
their impairments.37 
The Union of the Physically Impaired believes that the reality of our position as an 
                                                                                                                                                                            
certain cultures, including some African societies. See, e.g., Aud Talle, A Child is a Child: Disability and Equality 
among the Kenya Maasai, in Disability and Culture 56(Benedicte Ingstad & Susan Reynolds Whyte eds., 1995); 
Benedicte Ingstad, Mpho ya Modimo—A Gift from God: Perspectives on ―Attitudes‖ Toward Disabled Persons, in 
Disability and Culture, supra, at 246. 
36  Philosopher Anita Silvers provides an eloquent application of the social model of disability in her Formal Justice, 
in Disability, Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy 13 (Anita Silvers et al. 
eds., 1998). She argues that being physiologically deviating from the norm  is viewed as abnormal only because a 
dominant group imposed conditions favorable to its own circumstances, and not because of ―any biological mandate 
or evolutionary triumph.‖ Id. at 73. Accordingly, the social model of disability recognizes the source of disabled 
people‘s relative disadvantage as a hostile environment that is ―artificial and remediable‖ instead of ―natural and 
immutable.‖ Id. at 74-75. ―If the majority of people, instead of just a few, wheeled rather than walked, graceful spiral 
ramps instead of jarringly angular staircases would connect lower to upper floors of buildings.‖ Id. at 74. Thus, a 
wheelchair-user experiences disability through antagonistic surroundings, including lack of access to workplaces, 
educational programs, medical services, and other areas open to the public. Because the accommodations seek to 
eliminate subordination of individuals with disabilities, Silvers argues that the statute implicitly utilizes the social 
model of disability, and as such is a product of formal and equalizing justice. 
37 (Campbell and Oliver 1996, Oliver 1990). 
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oppressed group can be seen most clearly in segregated residential institutions, the 
ultimate human scrap-heaps of this society.38 
By reducing the identity of persons with disabilities to that of a patient only, the ability of 
persons with disabilities to participate in society was greatly restricted. As a result, social 
policy constructed persons with disabilities as an unemployable group, thereby increasing 
their dependence upon others for their survival. Education in England is just one example of 
the results of this narrow-minded understanding.39  
 
By restricting their understanding of disability to the confining medical model, the state has 
been absolved of its responsibility to ensure that society is where all persons with disabilities 
are valued members of their communities.  Furthermore, as the medical model views 
disability as rooted solely within the body, there was no compulsion to ensure that many 
persons with disabilities were part of the education system or society. The response from the 
disability community to this theory has been to argue, ‗this medicalized representation is one 
of the major obstacles they face in the achievement of full participation in society.‘40  As 
Bickenbach argues, the role of a ‗sick‘ citizen came to be reflected in our social policy: 
 
this so-called sick role is based on socially visible, physical differences that would 
usually constitute a form of social deviance, but that instead create a legitimating 
role exempting people from blame and normal role obligations. This exemption, 
however, is conditional: to benefit from the role the sick individual must be a ―good 
patient‖ and actively seek to recover. The sick role, in other words, is premised on 
reversibility.41 
 
Therefore, when applied to the development of social policy, the medical model of disability 
concludes that a person with a disability is relieved of their citizenship duties, notably labour 
market participation as a consequence of their being disabled. The problem with this theory 
is that in turn, persons with disabilities must focus all their efforts on getting better and 
achieving a level of health and normality that is acceptable to society.  
 
Disabled People as an Oppressed Group 
A further central tenet of the social model is that, irrespective of the political, economic and 
religious character of the society in which they live, disabled people are subject to 
oppression and negative social attitudes that inevitably undermine their personhood and 
their status as full citizens. Underlying the notion that disabled people are oppressed is the 
assumption that all societies are characterized by conflict between two competing groups: 
the dominant and the subordinate. Writing within the context of the politics of disability, 
James I. Charlton defined oppression as follows: 
                                                             
38 (UPIAS, 1976b p 2). 
39 See Pfeiffer, The Conceptualization of Disability at 32–34 (cited in note 19). 
40 B Bickebach, J. E. (2001). Disability human rights, law and policy. In G. L. Albrecht, K. D. Seelman & M. Bury 
(Eds.), Handbook of disability studies (pp. 68. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
41 Bickenbach, Jerome E. Physical Disability and Social Policy Toronto: University, 82-83. 
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Oppression is a phenomenon of power in which relations between people and 
between groups are experienced in terms of domination and subordination, 
superiority and control. Those with power control; those without power lack control. 
Power presupposes political, economic and social hierarchies, structured relations of 
groups of people, and a system or regime of power. This system, the existing power 
structure, encompasses the thousand of ways some groups and individuals impose 
control over others.42  
Charlton also maintains that the majority of disabled people have been so psychologically 
oppressed by society that their oppression has become internalized. As a result, they have 
developed a Marxian notion of ‗false consciousness,‘ whereby they come to believe that they 
are less capable than others. Consciousness can be defined as an awareness of oneself in 
the world. It is a process of awareness that is influenced by social conditions, chance and 
innate cognition. With regard to ‗false consciousness,‘ as a lethal mixture of self pity, self-
hate and shame, this state of awareness can: 
... prevent people with disabilities from knowing their real selves, their real needs, 
and their real capabilities and from recognizing the options they in fact have. False 
consciousness and alienation also obscure the real source of oppression. They 
cannot recognize their self-perceived pitiful lives are simply a mirroring of a pitiful 
world order. In this regard people with disabilities have much in common with others 
who have internalized their own oppression.43 
Paul Abberley has also analyzed the concept of social oppression as it applies to disabled 
people. He argued that other groups within society, such as women and ethnic minorities, 
encounter oppression, but that is not possible to construct a monolithic theory that provides 
an adequate explanatory framework to comprehensively analyze the phenomenon for all 
marginalized groups. Social oppression is specific in the manner in which it operates in 
relation to form, content and location, ‗so to analyze the oppression of disabled people in 
part involves pointing to the essential difference between their lives and other sections of 
society, including those who are, in other ways, oppressed.‘ 44  Abberley delineates four 
supplementary defining characteristics of social oppression as it relates to disabled people. 
He stated: 
To claim that disabled people are oppressed involves, however, arguing a number of 
other points. At an empirical level, it is to argue that on significant dimensions 
disabled people can be regarded as a group whose members are in an inferior 
position to other members of society because they are disabled people. It is also to 
argue that these disadvantages are dialectically related to an ideology or group of 
ideologies, which justify and perpetuate the situation. Beyond this it is to make the 
claim that such disadvantages and their supporting ideologies are neither natural nor 
inevitable. Finally, it involves the identification of some beneficiary for this state of 
affairs.45 
                                                             
42 Charlton, J. (1998) p.30, Nothing About Us Without Us: Disability, Oppression and Empowerment, University of 
California Press, Berkeley. 
43 Charlton, J. (1998) p.27, Nothing About Us Without Us: Disability, Oppression and Empowerment, University of 
California Press, Berkeley. 
44 Abberley, P. (1987; 63) ―The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Model of Disability‖, 
Disability, Handicap & Society, 2(1): 5-19.  
45 Abberley, P. (1987; 63) ―The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Model of Disability‖, 
Disability, Handicap & Society, 2(1): 5-19.  
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Social oppression in turn gives rise to institutional discrimination, analogous to that 
experienced with sexual and racial discrimination. Barton (1993) on commenting upon the 
meaning of institutionalized discrimination within the British context stated: 
An extensive range of research findings has demonstrated the extent of the 
institutional discrimination which disabled people experience in our society. This 
involves access and opportunities in relation to work, housing, education, transport, 
leisure and support services. Thus, the issues go far beyond the notion that the 
problem is one of individual disabilist attitudes. These are not free floating but are 
both set within and structured by specific, historical, material conditions and social 
relations. Goodwill, charity and social services are insufficient to address the 
profundity and stubbornness of the factors involved.46 
Disabled people have been subjected to a multiplicity of oppressive social attitudes 
throughout history, which have included ‗horror, fear, anxiety, hostility, distrust, pity, over-
protection and patronizing behavior.‘ 47  Such pejorative attitudes, coupled with an 
inhospitable physical environment such, as inaccessible buildings and unusable transport 
systems, are considered to be the real concerns of disability. It is therefore maintained that 
‗disabled people live within a disabling world.‘48 
Problems and Critique of the Medical Model of Disability by the Social Model 
While the medical model considers pathology, impairment, or dysfunction to cause disability, 
scholars and disability advocates who subscribe to the social model assert that it is society 
that disables people who have impairments. Proponents of the social model of disability 
define disability as a loss or limitation of opportunity brought about by social and physical 
barriers and, therefore, the appropriate solutions are the transformation of policies, laws, and 
public attitudes.  
 
Moreover, advocates of the social model believe that much of the prejudice and 
discrimination experienced by people with disabilities occurs not in spite of the medical 
Model, but because of the medical model. Indeed, Harlan Hahn49 termed the medical model 
of disability a ‗meta handicap,‘ while others state the search for the origins and causes of 
prejudice against people with disabilities inevitably leads back to the medical model. Their 
specific challenges to the medical model include:  
 
1. The medical model relieves society of any responsibility to provide accommodations 
or civil rights to people with disabilities 
                                                             
46Barton, L. (1996, 8), ―The Struggle for Citizenship: The Case of Disabled People‖, Disability, Handicap & Society, 
8(3): 235-248.   
 
48Barnes, C. (1991), Disabled People and Discrimination in Britain: The Case for Anti- Discrimination Legislation, 
Hurst & Co, London. 
49See Hahn, H. (1985). Towards a politics of disability. Social Science Journal, 22(4), 87-105. See also Harlan Hahn 
(1985, 1988, 1993) 
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2. The medical model has guided both legislation and the payment systems for people 
with disabilities and therefore has resulted in the daily-lived lives of people with 
disabilities  
3. The medical model has fragmented the disability community into diagnostic 
categories and thus robbed them of their collective history and memory. 
 
The rather dated criticisms of the medical model of disability, including the pathologization, 
categorization, objectification, and privatization of disability, are once again discussed, but in 
the social model, these shortcomings are viewed as having far-ranging effects, which in 
response to the above concerns include: 
 
1. The medical model of disability relieves society of any responsibility to provide civil rights 
and accommodations 
The medical model has had dominance in shaping the public‘s understanding of disability 
because of the following factors: 
 
a) The long history of the medical model;  
b) Its reliance on the prestigious and authoritative academic disciplines of medicine and 
science;  
c) Its strong explanatory power, and the public‘s intuitive understanding of medical 
diagnoses.  
 
Many disability scholars feel that the dominance of the medical model will continue and 
increase as the profession of medicine evolves into more specializations. According to 
proponents of the social model, society considers disability to be solely a medical concern 
and therefore society has not afforded people with disabilities the right to make claims on 
social justice.50 
 
Indeed, until recently, the medical model itself has been silent on issues of social justice.51 
While no one believes that medical professionals deliberately created injustice and 
discrimination, nonetheless, the result has been injustice. Scholars feel that disability has 
been ‗misrepresented‘ as only a health concern and because of this discrimination and 
prejudice based on disability result, but also frequently remain unrecognized.52 Further, to 
the general public, this discrimination and prejudice does not appear to be prejudice and 
discrimination because it is the medical professions which have been given the mandate to 
respond to all the needs of people with disabilities. Defining disability as solely a medical 
concern that requires high levels of expertise, training, and technology also lends scientific 
                                                             
50 (Liachowitz, 1988; Longmore, 1995 
51 Liachowitz, 1988; Longmore, 1995. 
52 Barnes, C. (1991), Disabled People and Discrimination in Britain: The Case for Anti- Discrimination Legislation, 
Hurst & Co, 
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credibility to the idea that all of the difficulties experienced by people with disabilities are the 
result of their physical abnormalities or physical inferiority. However, many individuals with 
disabilities report that their greatest difficulties have nothing to do with the disability itself. 
Rather, their greatest difficulties are the result of social isolation, prejudice, and 
discrimination.53 
 
A disability scholar, Higgins, summarized this when he remarked that we make people with 
disabilities foreigners in their own country. 54 The well-defined normative basis of disability in 
the medical model also relieves society of any need to provide accommodation. The entire 
focus is on changing the individual (rehabilitation) rather than changing the environment 
(accommodation). In the medical model, impairment is thought to be dysfunction, 
abnormality, pathology, disease, or defect. Simply stated, it is better not to have a disability. 
Disability is deviance, not a valued difference. Therefore, individuals with a disability 
understand that they belong to a devalued group, regardless of their individual attributes, 
achievements, or resources. Often individuals with disabilities eventually accept the disabled 
role of inferiority and deviance. Others, like the deaf culture, refuse the ‗disabled role‘ and 
consider themselves to be a cultural group defined by the use of sign language, rather than 
a disability group.55 
 
Due to the normative basis of the medical model, many individuals with disabilities have felt 
that physicians and other medical professionals have consistently underestimated their 
quality of life. While medical professionals often view disability as an unending, personal 
tragedy, many individuals with disabilities feel that the disability is a valued part of their self-
identity and take pride in their mastery of the disability. Difficulty does not automatically 
translate to tragic. 
 
In addition, the medical model considers the disability to exist solely within the individual and, 
due to this privatization of the source of the disability; the responsibility attribution for the 
treatment of the disability is also privatized, resting solely with the individual and his or her 
family. In the medical model, pathologizing and privatizing disability was another way in 
which to effectively absolve society from any responsibility to deal with disability issues. It 
was the individual who was required to adapt and adjust. 
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2. The medical model of disability has resulted in the daily, lived lives of people with 
disabilities 
The medical model has provided the basis for much of the legislation that mandates services 
for people with disabilities and also guides the reimbursement and payment systems of 
government agencies. 56  Therefore, both the services and funding an individual with a 
disability receives are based on the medical model. The profession of medicine has for 
centuries been based on the two outcome paradigm of cure or death, and vestiges of this 
paradigm are reflected in payment systems. Therefore, after medical stabilization, much of 
the funding is withdrawn, not taking into consideration the individual‘s whole needs. 57 
Nonetheless, disabilities are chronic conditions which require care and not cure. Health 
maintenance, patient education, maintaining the highest quality of life, avoiding secondary 
conditions, and responding to interaction of the disability with the ageing process are all 
medical services that are necessary for someone with a disability, but typically are not 
funded enough. 
 
The cultural identification of the individual is often ignored because the medical model is 
based only on biological, organic needs. Psychiatric disabilities, which are highly dependent 
upon the environment of the individual, are not well funded. Such environmental 
accommodations could render the individual highly functional. 58  It is true that the 
International Classification of Impairments, Disease, and Handicaps (World Health 
Organization 2001) 59  does provide a separate axis or domain on which to code some 
aspects of the individual‘s environment. However,  
 
the user of the ICIDH cannot record or measure the effect that an unaccommodating 
environment has on people‘s lives. The user can record changes in a person‘s level 
of ability, but would have no way of knowing whether that was the result of changes 
to the person (rehabilitation) or changes to the social and physical environment 
(accommodation.) As far as the ICIDH is concerned, the social and physical world is 
immutable and benign.60 
 
3. The medical model has fragmented the disability community into medical diagnostic 
categories 
 
The social model asserts that the medical model, by dividing individuals into groups based 
on diagnostic categories or functional traits, has effectively fragmented people with 
disabilities into competing interest groups. Thus, there are interest and advocacy groups for 
‗the blind,‘ ‗the deaf‘ and for the 
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‗mentally ill‘ and each of these groups must compete with each other for social attention. The 
various disability groups must compete for tangible resources and services. When disability 
groups are polarized, a victory for one category of disability is often viewed as a loss for 
competing groups. 61  The lack of broad coalitions has also deprived individuals with 
disabilities of a collective history or memory. 
 
Physicians and other medical professionals understand the purpose of diagnoses and 
categories as being simply to direct the treatment and intervention plans. Nonetheless, 
people with disabilities are often sensitive to such categorization. Many individuals with 
disabilities resist this categorization because they feel that the different resources and needs 
of individuals with the same diagnosis can differ greatly but, nonetheless, all individuals with 
the same medical diagnoses are treated with uniform procedures. 
 
The Materialist Variant of the Social Model 
Since the 1960s, some disabled people, particularly those aligned with the ‗radical disability 
movement‘ in the UK and the United States, have attempted to develop a theoretical 
understanding of the concept of disablement, from a socio-political perspective. The early 
writers in this field were strongly influenced, as will be demonstrated below, by structuralist 
and Marxist sociology. The theoretical foundations of the social model have developed 
during the ensuing period, embracing other schools of sociological thought. However, it is 
important to review these early writings in some detail, for they provide a basis for 
understanding how the model has subsequently developed. 
Foundational to the materialist understanding of disability is the important conceptual 
distinction drawn between impairment and disability, the formal definitions provided by the 
Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation cited in Box 1 below. 
According to the definition cited above, the social construction of physically impaired people 
as ‗disabled‘ arises, in the first instance, from the specific ways in which society organizes its 
basic material activities (work, transport, leisure, domestic activities and so forth). 
Impairment is simply a bodily state characterized by malfunction of the physical and/or 
cognitive abilities of the individual, as the result of altered physiology or psychology, which 
defines the physicality of certain people. 
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In a very embryonic account of the materialist explanation of disability, commenting upon the 
crucial distinction between disability and impairment, Paul Hunt, on behalf of UPIAS, wrote: 
In our view, it is society which disabled physically impaired people. Disability is 
something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily 
isolated and excluded from full participation in society. Disabled people are therefore 
an oppressed group in society. To understand this, it is necessary to grasp the 
distinction between the physical impairment and the social situation, called ‗disability‘, 
of people with such impairment. Thus we define impairment as lacking part of or all 
of a limb, or having a defective limb, organ or mechanism of the body; and disability 
as the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social 
organization which takes no or little account of people who have physical 
impairments and thus excludes them from participation in the mainstream of social 
activities. Physical disability is therefore a particular form of social oppression.62 
A further tenet of the ‗materialist‘ thesis is that disability is not a fixed, absolute category, but 
has been defined differently throughout history, and in order to understand the contemporary 
position in which disabled people are situated, it is imperative to analyze disability from an 
historical perspective. Furthermore, given the two premises that disability is a socio-political 
construction, and to a large extent is culturally produced, disability theorists such as Oliver 
and Finklestein maintain that the phenomenon of disability can be adequately explained with 
reference to the ‗mode of production‘ and the dominant ideological hegemony. 
Vic Finklestein was one of the pioneers in developing a materialist explanation. He 
postulated that history can be divided into three ‗distinct and sequential phases,‘ and that 
within each phase the manner in which disabled people are socially included or excluded 
within contemporary society differs. 63  Firstly, the period before the European industrial 
revolution was characterized by agrarian feudalism and some cottage industries. During this 
period, there was scant social mobility, and this mode of production did not preclude 
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disabled people from active participation in their local communities. During the second phase, 
spanning the industrial revolution and its immediate aftermath, disabled people were 
effectively excluded from being in paid employment, due to the fact that they were not able 
to maintain the pace set by the factory system. As a consequence, disabled people were 
separated and thereby socially excluded from mainstream social and economic activity. 
Finkelstein maintained that during the third phase, which was just commencing, disabled 
people will witness and experience their liberation from social oppression. 64 This will be 
achieved through disabled people and their allies working collaboratively to achieve 
commonly agreed goals, through the aegis of the disability movement. 
Oliver‟s Analysis of Disablement 
Mike Oliver, a disabled academic, developed the work of the UPIAS in the 1980s and 1990s, 
using a Marxist materialist perspective to explain the social, as opposed to biological, 
construction of disability. In his seminal work, The Politics of Disablement (Oliver,1990) has 
produced a variant of the social model of disability. This construction is considered at some 
length, for it constitutes the foundation for the subsequent development and maturation of 
disability studies, particularly in the UK and the United States.65 The model is constructed 
and expressed in Marxist terms, and assumes that human nature, and the resultant choices 
that individuals can make for themselves, are determined by the structure and ideology of 
society. It is therefore argued that the kind of society in which a disabled person lives has a 
profound effect upon how their disability is experienced and structured. Furthermore, an 
individual‘s personal experience of disability within capitalism is itself defined, to some extent, 
by the structural features of capitalism including ideology, culture and the influence of race 
and gender as well as the activities of key groups and institutions (professionals and 
professionals). The overall purpose of Oliver‘s analysis is to provide conclusive evidence 
that disability ‗as a category can only be understood within a framework which suggests that 
it is culturally produced and socially structured.‘ 66 Oliver began his analysis by questioning 
whether the medicalised, and tragic conception of disability, which he observed to be 
prevalent within Britain in the late 1980s, had been replicated across other cultures and 
societies, and also between historical periods. He concluded that the individualist, 
medicalised and tragic conception of disability was indeed unique to capitalist societies.  
Oliver referred to and quoted the work of two social anthropologists, Hanks and Hanks, who 
showed that within pre-capitalist societies, the spectrum of attitudes encountered by disabled 
people have varied from ‗ruler to outcast, from warrior to priest, from infant to aged.‘ 67 
Oliver‘s analysis of the social structuring of disability is founded upon two concepts; the 
‗mode of production‘ and the central core values, or ideology that are present within any 
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given society. Both interact and determine how disabled people are perceived within their 
local contemporary societies. The former is understood to refer to the type of economy and 
its constituent productive units, as well as the manner in which production is organized – for 
example, through the network of family units, or through the factory system utilizing wage 
labour. The latter concept refers to the basic values upon which a society is premised, which 
could be based upon religion, science and medicine. 
Different ideological premises have profound implications for the explanation of disability. 
Oliver argued that in some societies, the presence of an impairment may not be perceived 
by society in pejorative terms, as it has been seen as a sign of being chosen. Hence, 
Safilios-Rothschild has stated: 
Throughout history, discriminatory practices against the sick and disabled have 
varied greatly from country to country and from century to century; they have ranged 
from complete rejection and ostracism to semideification and the according of 
special privileges and humours.68  
Oliver maintained that the economic structure and ideological hegemony of modern western 
society have had a major detrimental impact upon the lives of disabled people, and also 
other marginalised groups such as those with differing ethnic affiliations, or those with 
homosexual orientations. The rise of the factory system and the introduction of individual 
wage labour transformed the ‗means of production,‘ resulting in the separation of the home 
from the workplace, and in the marginalisation of disabled people, because they were unable 
to meet the demands of capitalist society.69  
Disabled people have become further isolated from their family and communities through the 
establishment of closed and segregated institutions, (which first came into existence in the 
late nineteenth century), whose function was to act as a mechanism for social control. In the 
latter half of the twentieth century, closed and socially isolating institutions still exist which 
‗warehouse‘ disabled people – for example, many so called ‗special schools‘ and sheltered 
training workshops. However, during the past years, throughout western democratic 
societies, there has been a shift in government policy towards ensuring that disabled people 
live in community settings, where the package of ‗care‘ is bespoked to the individual needs. 
Within the UK context, this is referred to as the ‗care in the community programme.‘70 
Oliver further argued that in the wake of capitalism, dominant ideological presuppositions 
and modes of thought became commonly accepted, which again had detrimental 
consequences for the lives of disabled people. Analogous to Gramsci‘s distinction between 
‗organic‘ and ‗arbitrary‘ ideologies, he distinguished between ‗core‘ and ‗peripheral‘ 
ideologies, with the latter being derived from the former. In relation to ideology, it was argued 
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that the rise of capitalism necessitated the separation of work from home (as stated above), 
which in turn gave rise to the ideological construction of individualism, which became the 
‗core‘ ideology vis-a-vis disability. Consequently, the rise of capitalism gave rise to the 
premise that disability is in essence an individual pathology, since a distinction needed to be 
drawn between those considered ‗able- bodied‘ (and by implication able to work), and those 
who were considered disabled. Hence, within the modern capitalist era, ‗disabled people 
could not meet the demands of individual wage labour and so became controlled through 
exclusion.‘71 
This process of individualism gave rise to the peripheral ideologies of categorization and 
medicalisation of disability. In order to make a valid distinction between the deserving and 
undeserving poor, the agencies of the state assigned the medical profession the role of 
deciding who was disabled and who was not. This process, initiated during the nineteenth 
century, continues to have important ramifications for contemporary service provision, where 
it is commonly assumed that the greatest problems encountered by disabled people are 
directly related to their medical conditions. The medical profession still has a great deal of 
influence in the manner in which disabled people live, invariably being seconded by 
agencies of the state to make assessment of their needs and abilities, often in areas which 
have little to do with the application of medical science. Examples falling into this category 
would include the entitlement for financial grants, wheelchairs and other appliances, 
assessing the ability of a person to drive, and selecting appropriate educational provision. A 
possible explanation of the continued and, some would argue, expanding influence of the 
medical profession in the lives of disabled people is that the profession has widened its remit 
within the field of medical science to incorporate rehabilitation. Oliver, in support of this 
thesis, quoted Albrecht and Levy:  
As demand for rehabilitation services increased and insurance benefits expanded, 
there was an incentive for physicians to enter the rehabilitation field. Under the aegis 
of designing comprehensive medical rehabilitation programs, hospitals, and 
physicians began to incorporate rehabilitation services into the medical model. 
Definitions of disabling conditions and appropriate treatment were expanded to 
include medical interventions and physical control.72 
Oliver continued his analysis by arguing that the economic and social structures of society, 
in combination with the dominant ideological hegemony, have resulted in disabled people 
being perceived as ‗dependent.‘ Consequently a great deal of the social welfare legislation 
enacted during the post-war period has compounded this notion. The term ‗dependency‘ is 
used in a two-fold manner. Firstly, welfare states have categorized entire groups of people, 
of which disabled people are but one, who have become dependent upon the state for the 
provision of education, health care, as well as financial support. Secondly, in specific relation 
to disability, attention has focused upon the functional limitations of disabled people who are 
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perceived to be unable to care for themselves. 
There is also a professional basis for the creation of dependency. Many of the services 
provided for disabled people, often within institutionalized settings, engender such a state. 
Traditionally, these services have been established and subsequently managed with little or 
no regard of the needs and aspirations of disabled people. Furthermore, the profession-
client relationship is itself dependency creating, as undue power and influence is vested with 
the professional. The structure of the economy within industrial society has invested 
professionals with the function of acting as gatekeepers of scarce resources, (in terms of 
financial benefits, medical and rehabilitation services) and this inevitably affects disabled 
people‘s lives. 
Despite cosmetic changes that have been made with regard to the professional-client 
relationship, Oliver remained pessimistic about changing this aspect of dependency. He 
therefore stated: 
Economic structures determine the roles of professionals as gatekeepers of scarce 
resources, legal structures determine their controlling functions as administrators of 
services, career structures determine their decisions about whose side they are 
actually and cognitive structures determine their practice with individual people who 
need help - otherwise, why would they be employed to help them? This is not just 
another attack on overburdened professionals, for they are as much trapped in 
dependency creating relationships as are their clients.73 
The task of transforming modern industrial society, so that disabled people do in fact live as 
full and free citizens, free from social oppression and negative social attitudes, is profoundly 
revolutionary. Merely by tinkering with and modifying the institutions of the welfare state, 
irrespective of whether it adheres to the ideological presuppositions of capitalism or 
socialism, will ultimately prove to be inadequate. The dominant hegemony of individualism, 
the medicalisation and categorization of disability, and the resultant dependency of disabled 
people will remain unaltered. Furthermore, the raison d‘etre of service provision needs to 
change from one that is based upon defining needs (principally by able-bodied 
professionals), to one based upon social rights. Such a move would run counter to the 
dominant ideology of individualism that has hitherto pervaded services provision, as well as 
beginning to break the cultural linkage between political and professional dependency. 
In order for this to become a reality, thereby creating a ‗non-disablist‘ society, Oliver 
proposed a three-fold strategy. Firstly, states should enact anti-discrimination legislation, 
thereby making it an offence to discriminate against disabled people in the fields of 
education, employment, housing and so forth. Secondly, within western societies, more 
emphasis should be given to securing freedom of information, so that disabled people can 
have access to information that has previously remained confidential. 
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Thirdly, an infrastructure should be established in which the needs and aspirations of 
disabled people can be met, with the appropriate range of services being provided. This can 
only happen with adequate state funding, to assist organizations of disabled people to 
secure their rights. Hence, it is ultimately disabled people themselves who are defining how 
they wish to live their lives. In the last twenty years, organizations of disabled people have 
been established in the majority of countries throughout the world. The vast majority of these 
adhere to the principles of ‗empowerment, and human rights, independence and integration, 
and self-help and self-determination.‘74 In commenting upon the consequences of adopting a 
human rights approach to disablement, Dimitris Michailakis stated: 
A human rights approach implies legal reasoning. ... The human rights approach 
implies, thus, among other things, the creation of a legislation which shall give 
persons with disabilities and their organizations the lever to ensure that there is 
effective advocacy for their rights. ... Implicit in any application of the human rights‘ 
strategy is structural transformation, involving redistribution of economic and political 
power. As in the struggle against racism, advocates and policy-makers chose to 
combat discrimination against persons with disabilities by reference to human 
rights.‘75 
This human rights approach to disability has been adopted, within the last decade, by the 
United Nations, which in 1993 at its 85th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, passed 
the resolution ‗Standard Rules for the Equalization on Opportunities for Persons with 
Disabilities.‘76 Although this internationally agreed document does not have the status of a 
legally binding document upon any sovereign state, it has nevertheless been very influential 
in the development of disability policy throughout the developed and developing world. In 
explaining the rationale that underpins the Standard Rules, the Resolution stated: 
The term ‗equalization of opportunities‘ means the process through which the 
various systems of society and the environment, such as services, activities, 
information and documentation, are made available to all, particularly to persons 
with disabilities. The principle of equal rights implies that the needs of each and 
every individual are of equal importance, that those needs must be made the basis 
for the planning of societies and that all resources must be employed in such a way 
as to ensure that every individual has equal opportunity for participation. Persons 
with disabilities are members of society and have the right to remain within their local 
communities. They should receive the support they need within the ordinary 
structures of education, health, employment and social services. 77 
Experience, Embodiment and the Social Model 
It is beyond doubt that the genesis and subsequent development of the ‗disability movement,‘ 
underpinned by the theoretical foundation of the social model, both within the United 
Kingdom and throughout the world, has created a quantum shift in the manner in which 
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disability has been perceived, and what is now considered to be the appropriate and 
legitimate manner in which disability policy is to be developed and implemented. It has now 
become the dominant hegemony underpinning policymaking and service provision. In the 
past, and to a significant extent today, it has certainly been the case that disabled people 
have experienced, as have other marginalized groups, ostracism, discrimination and 
oppression, which has resulted in them being classified as ―second class citizens‖ in the 
contemporary societies in which they live. The movement has been successful in raising the 
profile of disability upon the political agenda, by poignantly highlighting the social, economic 
and political structures, as well as the pejorative attitudes that have contributed to disabled 
people being ascribed the status of second-class citizenship. 
Notwithstanding the significant contribution that the structuralist and historical-materialist 
theoreticians have made in constructing a socio-political understanding of disability, recently 
a new generation of disability scholars have emerged, who have attempted to develop and 
build upon the earlier work described above. Two issues are considered to be of central 
importance within the ensuing debate. First, the dualistic Cartesian distinction between 
‗disability‘ and ‗impairment‘ is now beginning to be questioned, in particular Oliver‘s assertion 
that ‗disablement has nothing to do with the body,‘ and that ‗impairment is in fact nothing 
less than a description of the physical body.‘78 It is therefore argued that an individual‘s own 
experience of living with an impairment on a daily basis, sometimes in a state of acute 
physical pain, has an important and valid role in experiencing disablement. Secondly, those 
working in disability studies are now beginning to question to what extent disabled people 
can be considered as a monolithic, homogeneous entity, and to what extent the 
understanding of disablement is contingent upon social and cultural factors. In other words, 
is it possible to construct a ‗grand theory‘ of disablement that is valid and pertinent for all 
impairment groups, across all cultural settings? 
Within the current disability studies literature, most writers would adhere to and acknowledge 
the general principles and axioms of the social model outlined above. However, opinion is 
indeed divided as to what significance should be given to the personal experience of 
individual disabled people within an analysis of disablement. Some within the disability 
movement argue that the discussion of the personal experience of disabled people detracts 
from achieving its main objective – that is to challenge the structure and processes that exist 
within contemporary society that oppress them. It is contended that such considerations 
dilute the potency of the social model to act as a force for political change, for it de-politicises 
the debate. Finklestein  has therefore stated: 
... attitudes and emotions that came from experiencing discrimination ... Writers like 
Jenny Morris have elevated the importance of personal, psychological in 
understanding disability. Such a work encouraged a shift away from thinking about 
changing the real world. Finding insight in the experience of discrimination is just a 
                                                             
78 Oliver M. (1996). Understanding Disability: From Theory to Practice. Basingstoke: Macmillan 4-5. 
 
 
 36 
return to the old case file approach to oppression, dressed up in social model 
jargon.79 
Conversely, other disability theorists, such as Hughes and Patterson, influenced by post-
modern ideas, have argued that engaging with debates concerning the body in relation to 
the notion of disablement in fact strengthens the potency of the explanatory power of the 
social model. They have stated: 
―The social model of disability presupposes an untenable separation between body and 
culture, impairment and disability, while this has been of enormous value in establishing a 
radical politics of disability, the cartesianized subject that it produces sits very uneasily in the 
contemporary world of identity politics. This is an internal critique: It argues not for the 
supersession, but for the expansion of the social model and it proposes embodied, rather 
than a disembodied, notion of disability.80 Hughes and Paterson have thus argued that while 
the social model has provided a penetrating critique of the medical model, it has 
nevertheless left discourses regarding the body and impairment to the domain of bio-
medicine, thus exiling the study of impairment from sociological examination. Furthermore, 
Hughes argues that the social model, as originally conceived, provided a pertinent critique of 
capitalism, but has largely been ineffective in critiquing modernity. Consequently, 
maintaining the rigid distinction between disability and impairment: ‗... restricts the analytical 
power and ‗reach‘ of disability studies: in particular, it confounds the possibility of developing 
a social theory of impairment which is largely dependent upon escape from Cartesian 
categories.‘81 
Writers such as Hughes and Paterson maintain that the relationship that exists between 
disabled people and their bodies is mediated through medicine and therapy, devoid of policy 
and political analysis. Such an approach results in the dualism of a medical analysis of 
disabled peoples‘ bodies and a political analysis of disabled peoples‘ social existence. They 
therefore stated: 
In the social model, the body is rendered synonymous with its impairment or 
physical dysfunction. That is to say, it is defined - at least implicitly - in purely 
biological terms. It has no history. It is in essence, a timeless ontological foundation. 
Impairment is therefore the opposite of disability: it is not socially produced. ... 
Indeed, there is a powerful convergence between bio-medicine and the social model 
with respect to the body. ... Impairment is consequently entrenched in the biomedical 
and reduced to its dysfunctional anatomo- physiological correlates. Yet impairment 
is more than a medical issue. It is both an experience and discursive construction. ... 
The social model of disability has not entertained debates that problematize the 
body.82  
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Deborah Marks has cogently argued that the dichotomizing of disability and impairment, as 
posited by the historical materialist variants of the social model, paradoxically results in the 
social model becoming, in fact, highly individualistic. By excluding a sociological analysis of 
experience and the body, a theoretical vacuum is thereby created.83 
Feminist disability theorists, such as Liz Crow and Jenny Morris, concur with the analysis 
presented by Hughes and Paterson, and have called for the social model of disability to be 
reconceptualised, to incorporate a sociology of impairment.84 Jenny Morris maintained that 
the social model has effectively denied the fact that the physical and emotional pain and 
suffering experienced by disabled people due to their impairments has any impact upon their 
practical daily living.85 The sharp distinction drawn between disability and impairment has 
compartmentalized bodily experience from social experience – pain from politics. In addition, 
Liz Crow has persuasively argued that the social model of disability has not made adequate 
accommodation for the subjective experiences of pain, fatigue, depression, and to an extent, 
the uncertainty that disabled people inevitably experience as a result of their impairment. 
The existence of impairment is indeed an objective reality as well as being subjectively 
experienced. She therefore states that: 
an impairment such as pain or chronic illness may curtail an individuals‘ activities so 
much that the restriction of the outside world becomes irrelevant ... for many 
disabled people personal struggles relating to impairment will remain even when 
disabling barriers no longer exist.86 
Sally French has delineated four definitive factors that have a profound influence upon the 
way disabled people experience the consequences of their impairments: 1) the precise 
period in a person‘s life when they acquired their impairment; 2) the relative visibility of that 
impairment; 3) how ‗severe‘ the impairment is considered to be from the model of other 
people; and 4) whether the impaired individual also has other illnesses. 
Furthermore, while recognizing that the concept of disablement is a socio-political 
construction Bickenbach et al questioned whether sufficient rigor has been given by 
protagonists of the early versions of the social model to establishing the mechanisms of the 
causal linkage between impairment and disability. It is indeed difficult to devise social indices 
that identify and measure this linkage. Bickenbach et al made the following insightful 
comments: 
Despite its intuitive power, the insight that disablement is a complex phenomenon in 
part created by the social environment cannot easily be translated into researchable 
questions. How precisely does the social environment create disablement? Should 
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we expect patterns of disadvantage linked to specific physical or mental conditions? 
How do we identify which aspects of the social environment are responsible for 
disadvantage? Which interventions will make a difference and can we measure the 
improvement? 
The data from these research questions could lay the medical model to rest, and 
provide disability advocates with hard evidence of how the social world ‗disables‘ 
them. Yet these questions are too vague, multifactorial and imprecise for the basis of 
research. As a result, very little empirical research has been done on the 
fundamental question of how intrinsic features of an individual interact with features 
of the social environment to produce disablement.87 
The World Health Organization and the Cultural Understanding of Disablement 
Protagonists of the historical materialist variant of the social model, such as Mike Oliver, 
maintained that irrespective of the category of impairment, all disabled people encountered 
‗oppression.‘ Indeed, oppression was perceived as the common denominator that unites all 
disabled people, notwithstanding differences in socio-economic or cultural background. 
However, it is contended here such an understanding of oppression is problematic, as both 
disability and impairment are socially and culturally constructed. What it means to have an 
‗impairment‘ and experience ‗disability‘ is therefore, by implication, culturally defined and will 
vary between societies. For example, consider the case of an individual who has dyslexia. In 
a predominantly rural agrarian society, such as South India, the fact that an individual cannot 
read and write is not likely to inhibit their ability to work and participate fully in local 
community life, and will not be popularly considered to be disabled, and thereby encounter 
oppression. However, a person who is dyslexic living in a western-based society is more 
likely to be unemployed, for in a myriad of ways, in order to function within society, there is a 
prerequisite for an individual to be literate. 
The Department for Education and Employment, as part as its Labour Force Survey, 
published in Autumn 2009, examined the relationship between disability and employment.88 
The survey found that although disabled people constitute nearly a fifth of the working-age 
population in Great Britain, they nevertheless constitute one-eighth of all those in 
employment. Furthermore, disabled people are over six times as likely as the able-bodied 
counterparts to be unemployed and claiming state benefits. The survey also found the 
employment rates varies accord to type of impairment. Some impairment groups, such as 
those with diabetes, skin conditions and hearing impairments attain relatively high 
employment rates. However, three-quarters of those with mental illness and two-thirds of 
those with learning difficulties are unemployed.89 90 It can therefore be appreciated that the 
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prospects of disabled people gaining employment are far greater in South India than they 
are in a western country such as Great Britain. 
The above also illustrates that the notion of impairment, as conceived by the historical-
materialists, is very ‗physicalist‘ in its understanding. As demonstrated by the disability 
theorists cited above, the notion of an impairment is indeed a more sophisticated 
phenomenon, which can encompass cognitive and psychological manifestations. Those with 
cognitive difficulties and mental illness may in fact have bodies that the majority would deem 
to be ‗normal,‘ but this does not necessarily mean that such individuals do not encounter the 
negative connotations and reality of experiencing impairment. The World Health 
Organization has also begun to recognize the intricate relationship between disability and 
impairment, and that both are socially constructed. Consequently in 1993 they began the 
process of revising their 1976 classification of disability, handicap and impairment. According 
to the newly devised scheme, the multifaceted nature of disablement is essentially 
comprised of three principal components, which interact with each other. These have been 
defined in the following manner: 
Emphasis is now placed upon highlighting the social aspects of disability. The newly devised 
classification has abandoned the word ‗disability‘ and ‗handicap‘ altogether, replacing these 
terms with ‗activities‘ and ‗participation.‘ It emphasizes the dynamic relationship between the 
health condition of the individual, together with their own ‗personal‘ characteristics as well as 
the broader social environment. All these factors are seen as determining how an 
impairment affects the participation of that individual. WHO, commenting on the revised 
classification, stated: 
The new classification that has been devised by the World Health Organization is an 
attempt to measure the multifaceted dimensions of disablement. Furthermore, the 
notion of disablement is not perceived in terms of an attribute of a person, but as a 
complex collection of conditions many of which are created by the social 
environment. Hence, the management of the problem requires social action and it is 
the collective responsibility of society to make the environmental modifications 
necessary for the full participation of people with disabilities into all areas of social 
life. The issue is, therefore an attitudinal or ideological one which requires social 
change, while at the political level it is a matter of human rights.91 
WHO‘s latest conceptualization of disablement constitutes a substantive improvement upon 
the previous classification, for it attempts to take the social dimensions of disablement fully 
into account, indicating a movement along the continuum from a medical to a social 
understand of disablement. It is also aware of the cultural and material factors which 
sometimes have a significant bearing upon a particular individual‘s ability to participate in 
contemporary society. Thus the new classification recognizes that poverty, the lack of 
adequate housing, or inferior environmental factors such as inadequate sanitation, as well as 
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the gender status of a disabled individual, may well affect their ability to participate in 
contemporary society. 
Bickenbach et al identified WHO‘s revised classification of disablement as attempting to 
encompass a ‗biopsychosocial‘ conception, principally by providing a synthesis of the 
medical and social perspectives of disability. In commenting upon the symbiotic relationship 
between the malfunction of the body, and the manner in which society is structured, Dimitris 
Michailakis stated:  
... the person-environment approach implies a view of handicap as something that 
involves the individual‘s functional limitation, as well as his environment will lead to 
another understanding. Handicap is not a property, a characteristic of the individual 
in the first hand, but something that develops between the individual and the 
environment. ... The inability to walk, to talk, to see and so on (functional limitations) 
is clearly distinguished in the person-environment approach from the inability to go 
to school, to work and generally participate in community life. A functional limitation 
becomes a handicap when the environment impedes action and participation. ... The 
implications of functional limitations vary according to sociol-economic 
circumstances of each society and the provisions it makes for its citizens. From a 
person-environment approach, handicap is a problem which exists in relation to 
society and which each society, therefore, has the capacity to reduce or control.92 
Imrie also found the original conceptualization of the social model to be problematical. By 
purporting that the origins of oppression are located exclusively in ‗attitudes,‘ it is difficult to 
determine their social location, and how these in turn result in oppressive action. 93 The 
model is deficient in failing to analyze the socio-political contexts in which attitudes and 
values are constructed, and how they are in turn transformed into oppressive actions and 
practices. 
A further question arises concerning the appropriateness in developing countries of the 
western-based notion of empowerment, which presupposes that rights are exercised and 
that decisions are made in accordance with the preferences and wishes of the individual. 
Such an individualized notion of empowerment, as espoused by the international disability 
movement runs contrary to accepted social customs and practices found within many 
developing countries. In societies such as those found in Asia, it is customary that all major 
decisions – for example, who one should marry or the purchase of property or career 
decisions – are taken not by the individual, but collectively through consultation within 
extended family and kinship networks. This is particularly the case in rural areas, and 
operates irrespective of whether disability is present within the family. Thus, a focus on rights 
and decision-making practices rooted in the ideology of individualism is, in many societies, 
particularly in an African and South Asian context, often at variance with established cultural 
and social norms and practices. It is surely right to question the efficacy of proselytizing 
western-based individualism, which runs contrary to longstanding local practices. 
                                                             
92 Michailikis, D. (1997), ―When Opportunity is the Thing to be Equalised‖, Disability & Society, 12(1): 17-30. 
93 Imrie, R. (1997), ―Rethinking the Relationships between Disability, Rehabilitation and Society‖, Disability and 
Rehabilitation, 19(7): 263-271. 
 
 
 
 41 
A further matter for discussion is the most appropriate strategy for achieving social change 
so as to result in the construction of a non-disablist world. As the previous section has 
shown, one of the principal tenets of the social model is that disabled people experience 
discrimination and social oppression, resulting in disabled people living within a ‗disabling 
world.‘ Upon the supposition that disabled people are indeed an oppressed group, the 
movement has advocated that conflict should be used in combating such oppression and 
discrimination. 
While appreciating the foundation of such sentiments, and without denying the validity of the 
assertion that disabled people do indeed face discrimination and oppression, it is contended 
that disability is a far more complex phenomenon than can be solely and adequately 
explained by social oppression and discrimination. It is my experience that vast numbers of 
people, rather than actively oppressing disabled people, are in fact fearful and ignorant of 
disability, which leads them to relate to disabled people in inappropriate and often 
demeaning ways. In agreement with this position, the feminist disability writer, Jenny Morris 
stated: 
Our disability frightens people. They don‘t want to think that this is something that 
might happen to them. So we become separated from common humanity, treated as 
fundamentally different and alien. Having put up clear barriers between us and them, 
non-disabled people further hide their fear and discomfort by turning us into objects 
of pity, comforting themselves by their own kindness and generosity.94  
Oppression is often of an unwitting nature. If oppression and discrimination were the sole 
factors in the creation of a disablist society, then conflict might be the most appropriate 
strategy to adopt. However, if as is contended here, fear and ignorance also provide a 
significant explanation to societal attitudes towards disability, then a more appropriate and 
pertinent strategy for the creation of a non-disablist society might be through the medium of 
education. It is an undisputable fact that disabled people are in the minority within society, 
albeit a significant one, comprising approximately ten percent of the world‘s population. 
Disabled people, in order to create a society which is indeed non-disablist and which 
secures effective and full citizenship, need to foster and build alliances with their able-bodied 
peers, and this is best achieved through consensus building and education. 
Critique of the Social Model 
The social model of disability, offering as it does a radically different and more empowering 
way to explain and address the difficulties faced by disabled people, has become widely 
used both by disabled people themselves and by those wishing to address the discrimination 
and disadvantage they experience. One downside of this widespread adoption of the social 
model, however, is that it has become widely misunderstood, and this misunderstanding has 
led to its misapplication and to doubt about its efficacy in addressing the range of difficulties 
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experienced by disabled people in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In 
particular, many have questioned the relevance of the social model in addressing the 
experience of disabled people. For example Liz Crow, a disabled academic argues: ‗Most of 
us simply cannot pretend with any conviction that our impairments are irrelevant.‘95 
Thus for all its conceptual potency, or perhaps because of it, the social model has attracted 
challenges. One might have expected them to have come earlier. After all, some social 
model users made strikingly broad claims about disadvantage. Perhaps the emerging 
critiques are a sign of progress for disability studies scholars, who are sometimes ignored by 
those worried that the field is too technical, trivial, or partisan. Whatever the case, three lines 
of critique can be identified. They involve the model‘s scope, the ambiguity of disadvantage, 
and the connections between impairment and social setting. Some of these challenges are 
powerful but none eliminate the model‘s value. 
1. Over claiming the Social Aspect  
The first concern is common. It is that the strongest claims arising from a social model are 
indefensible. Personal traits can be inhibiting by themselves or in addition to a disabling 
social context, albeit depending on the individual‘s goals.96 Furthermore, the degree of this 
independent effect is related to the state of technology. It could be that at time X a physical 
or mental trait is independently disadvantageous, while at time Y inexpensive technology 
greatly reduces the negative effect. Consider the world before and after eyeglasses. We 
might guess that a greater proportion of human disadvantage was attributable to personal 
traits before the invention than afterward – assuming roughly equal levels of stigma suffered 
by poorly sighted and eyeglass-wearing people. Here disadvantage is shifting but not 
because of inclusive social forces (apart from technological change). Similar observations 
can be made about new impairments that are physically debilitating yet not an important 
source of stigma. Perhaps certain repetitive stress injuries associated with the modern 
assembly line and keyboard use are illustrative. Now the balance is shifting in the other 
direction, toward individual impairment as a more significant source of disadvantage. Either 
way, the relative mix of individual and social factors in producing disability will fluctuate over 
time. It makes little sense to claim that all ‗disability‘ is socially constructed, now and 
forevermore. 
This criticism is empirical. It aims at accuracy in measuring the causes of disadvantage and 
so it does not necessarily deny that the social model has value. But concluding that the 
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model can account for only a fraction of all impairment related disadvantage will prompt a 
different concern: critics will begin to question whether the social model contains an 
acceptably broad definition of ‗disability.‘ Once it is granted that some disadvantage happens 
independently of social context, there will be a class of people the model will not attend to 
and who nonetheless suffer from a physical or mental trait.97 
But this critique reveals nothing seriously amiss with a social model of disability. Some 
proponents acknowledge that the model cannot explain everything about disadvantage. 
They have chosen the label ‗disability‘ for a field of study and concern involving socially 
produced disadvantage triggered by individual traits. No one can deny that social systems 
influence disadvantage at least sometimes. The frequency of animus and irrationality as 
causes of disadvantage is not zero, for example. As long as the model can identify real 
social factors that contribute to disadvantage more than occasionally, it is no devastating 
objection that the model has limits. Every model does. Oliver‘s message is perhaps 
responsible for some of the confusion. Even he acknowledges limits, however. After 
declaring that ‗disability is wholly and exclusively social,‘ 98
 
he concedes that ‗the social 
model is not an attempt to deal with the personal restrictions of impairment.‘99
 
 One should 
be aware that social model theorists use the term ‗disability‘ in this manner, and theorists 
ought to concede that the model thereby leaves room for a distinct and perhaps large field of 
inquiry into independently inhibiting personal traits. 
Those who worry that the social model claims too much in terms of causation might have 
been distracted by crude restatements. Those who worry that the model covers too little in 
terms of what is worthy of a policy response are not undermining the model‘s use. These 
critics are probably dedicated to helping people who do not fit the model, but that is a 
separable issue. For the same reason, cost is not an objection to the social model. As will 
become clear below, the model does not generate costs on its own, beyond any cost of 
information collection due to its use. 
2. Vagueness in Disadvantage 
The second challenge is more serious, although it does not seem to have attracted attention. 
Social model adherents are often vague about which notion of ‗disadvantage‘ or ‗the problem 
of disability‘ they are interested in.100 There is more than one plausible specification. Clearly 
social model users are interested in negative consequences produced by traits plus settings. 
For instance, many scholars are troubled by false inferences of mental incapacity too often 
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associated with traits like stuttering and deafness, while mystical powers associated with 
blindness are more likely to be used as evidence of cultural contingency.101 Obviously the 
social model targets bad consequences. But which? 
The options might be separated into absolute and relative disadvantage. First, social model 
users could incorporate a theory of inadequate human wellbeing that does not depend on 
how others are faring. The threshold of inadequacy is difficult to define but this theory is a 
coherent option. It is related to notions of subordination and human necessities.
 
Second, 
model users might view disadvantage in a relative sense. There is more than one available 
baseline, however. The basis for comparison could be the human species norm,102
 
or a 
similarly situated human being the same in every way except for the trait in question, or 
something else.103
 
In addition, decisions must be made with respect to dimensions and 
severity of disadvantage. Perhaps scholarly attention is not warranted for small negative 
effects on particular components of human wellbeing. Rightly or not, disability scholars seem 
uninterested in male baldness or uncommonly short and tall people, although obesity and 
ugliness might attract more of their consideration. 
There is no stock answer to which form of disadvantage is most worthy of attention. But 
these sorts of choices are inevitable. And old. These options begin to suggest the normative 
judgments that surround – and are not made by – a social model of disability. 
Still, vagueness in ‗disadvantage‘ is only a problem of specification and judgment about 
proper emphasis, a gap that can be filled without jeopardizing the social model. Both 
absolute and relative disadvantages can be produced by an individual trait combined with an 
adverse social environment. For instance, social stigma attached to what is seen as 
deformity can result in severe blows to social standing, isolation, and objectively determined 
subordination; but less severe social responses might yield only disadvantage relative to the 
non-deformed, or to the similarly situated non-deformed. Other combinations are possible. 
The upshot is that environmental factors may contribute to all sorts of disadvantage. The 
social model cannot be discarded on account of any undue reticence. 
3. Reconnection 
A third critique targets the boundary between trait and setting. With the development of 
postmodernism, this line of attack should have been predictable. The social model presents 
another conceptual dichotomy within western thought, nearly all of which are deconstruction 
targets. In any case, the critique has some force. 
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To an extent, the two components of the model interact with each other. Physical or mental 
traits recognized by the community as impairments (or as otherwise significant to interaction) 
become part of the social setting. It is hard to believe that such traits can be held constant 
over time, or that changes in their prevalence or features will not affect the social 
environment. This is not to assert either a hopeful evolutionary path or a self-reinforcing 
dynamic of stigma and subordination. The only point is that these two causes of 
disadvantage will often be impossible to completely separate.104 
Similarly, the model might underestimate the social construction it means to emphasize. 
Shelley Tremain contends that ‗impairment‘ is itself a socially ascribed characteristic, an 
outgrowth of practices that demand the identification of difference. To her ‗it seems politically 
naive to suggest that the term ―impairment‖ is value-neutral, . . . as if there could ever be a 
description that was not also a prescription for the formulation of the object.‘105
 
Social model 
users at least implicitly understand that impairment is a subset of all traits. Even setting 
aside their disinterest in common ailments such as arthritis and back pain, disability studies 
scholars seem to prefer a boundary between disability and race or gender studies.106
 
But of 
course race and gender easily fit into a generic connection between traits and social 
reactions. For disability studies to be even partly independent from these inquiries, a notion 
of impairment separate from social construction might be necessary. Yet insofar as both 
impairment and disability are socially constructed, disabilities scholarship might miss 
something important.107
 
When combined, the critiques described in this section suggest that 
the distinction between impairment and disability begins to collapse. 
Still, these deconstruction efforts are hardly at odds with the spirit of the social model. This 
perspective channels attention to surrounding social structures rather than people identified 
as disabled. It doesn‘t eliminate the central insight of the social model, or call for anything 
like the individualized causation story of the medical model. While it is true that the social 
model of disability cannot account for every human ‗disadvantage‘ linked to every individual 
trait, the issue is specification and scope.  
Even its most modest claim—that traits of individual human beings are not always the 
sufficient cause of disadvantage—is powerful when set against a conventional wisdom that 
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physical and mental disability is only a series of personal tragedies. The fundamental 
question is what the social model accomplishes on its field is defined by an interest in stigma 
plus functional impairment, arbitrary academic convention, and/or a reflection of interest 
group politics. 
The Future of Disability Theory: Towards an “Affirmation” Model? 
This chapter has so far outlined the genesis and subsequent development of the social 
model of disability, as well as highlighting some of the difficulties that are inherent in its 
universal application across cultural settings. The social model of disability continues to 
evolve and develop. We are in danger of constructing a ‗straw person‘, it will be suggested. 
After all, no one really takes such an extreme position. The issue of impairment was never 
really ignored. The social model does not really produce such a rigid dichotomy. However 
the contention is that many British activists in their public discourse use exactly this ‗strong‘ 
version of the social model that is critiqued in this chapter. It may be that in private, their talk 
is at odds with the ‗strong social model.‘ Most activists concede that behind closed doors 
they talk about aches and pains and urinary tract infections, even while they deny any 
relevance of the body while they are out campaigning. Yet this inconsistency is surely wrong: 
if the rhetoric says one thing, while everyone behaves privately in a more complex way, then 
perhaps it is time to reexamine the rhetoric and speak more honestly. 
John Swain and Sally French (2000), building upon the intellectual work described above, 
have outlined an ‗affirmation‘ model of disability, which seeks to ‗celebrate the difference‘ 
that characterise the lives of disabled people. It is therefore contended that disabled people 
can be ‗proud‘ of the fact that they are different from the majority of the population.108 Swain 
and French begin their analysis by rejecting the tragedy conception of disability as purported 
by the medical model. They proceed by maintaining that it is not possible to make a stark 
distinction between those who are disabled and those who are not, since all people, to some 
extent have a degree of impairment, but do not necessarily encounter the negative 
consequences of disability. Those who wear glasses to compensate for low vision are a 
case in point. Neither can a stark distinction be maintained between those who encounter 
oppression and those who do not, for it is possible disabled people themselves to be 
oppressors, by having racist, homophobic or sexist attitudes. 
They further contend that the social model of disability has clearly shown how contemporary 
society has oppressed and discriminated against disabled people. However, in contrast the 
majority of disability studies theorists, they maintain that the vast majority of disabled people 
accept the analysis of the social model. They have candidly stated: 
The social model was born out of the experiences of disabled people, challenging 
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the dominant individual models espoused by non-disabled people. Nevertheless, it is 
our experience that many non-disabled people readily accept the social model, albeit 
superficially and at a very basic conceptual level. Non-disabled people can generally 
accept that a wheelchair-user cannot enter a building because of steps. ... Non-
disabled people are much more threatened and challenged by the notion that a 
wheelchair-user could be pleased and proud of the person he or she is.109 
Ascribing to the notion of an affirmative model of disability questions the analysis of early 
variants of the social model, since it is argued that the adoption of the precepts of the latter 
does not necessarily result in a non-tragic view of disablement. Swain and French again 
state:  
While the social model of disability is certainly totally incompatible with the view that 
disability is a personal tragedy, it can be argued that the social model, in itself, 
underpinned a non-tragedy view. First, to be a member of an oppressed group within 
society does not necessarily engender a non-tragic view. There is, or instance, 
nothing inherently non-tragic about being denied access to buildings. Secondly, the 
social model disassociates impairment from disability. It, thus, leaves the possibility 
that even in an ideal world of full civil rights and participative citizenship for disabled 
people, an impairment could be seen as a personal tragedy.110 
Swain and French further develop their thesis by stating that, in contrast to the tragic view of 
disablement, the occurrence and onset of an impairment can result in an improvement of the 
quality of lives of an individual disabled person. Examples are given of disabled people being 
able to ‗escape‘ the underlying social oppressive practices and structures that characterise 
some societies. Thus, disabled people may indeed be liberated from the responsibilities in 
the realms of sexual relations, responsibility within the domestic household, and may be 
more attuned to comprehend the oppression encountered by other minority groups. 
The above demonstrates that it is possible for disabled people to inculcate and project a 
positive identity, thereby celebrating the diversity and richness of the lives that they 
invariably lead. In summarising the philosophy of an affirmative model of disability. Swain 
and French state: 
The affirmative model directly challenges presumptions of personal tragedy and the 
determination of identity through the value-laden presumptions of non- disabled 
people. It signifies the rejections of presumptions of dependency and abnormality. ... 
Embracing an affirmative model, disabled individuals assert a positive identity, not 
only in being disabled, but also in being impaired. In affirming a positive identity, 
disabled people are actively repudiating the dominant view of normality. The 
changes for individuals are not just transforming of consciousness as to the meaning 
of ‗disability‘, but an assertion of the value and validity of life as a person with 
impairment111Swain and French conclude their analysis by stating that embracing an 
affirmative view of disablement in fact strengthens the political leverage of the 
disability movement. Disabled people cannot only look towards a future society 
devoid of structural, environmental and attitudinal barriers, but one that can 
―celebrate difference and values people irrespective of race, sexual preference, 
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gender, age and impairment.112 
The desire to celebrate diversity and difference, and take pride in the positive value of living 
with impairments, has also been expressed by those who are deaf. Some deaf people are of 
the opinion that they are not in fact disabled, but constitute a distinct and coherent social 
minority, complete with their own culture and language. A distinction is drawn between those 
who can hear, and those who cannot. By implication, then, those with a physical disability 
such as paraplegia or cerebral palsy would, in the minds of some of those who are deaf, as 
belonging to the latter category. Ladd and John, in investigating the relationship between the 
deaf community and disabled people have stated: 
... we do not want mainstream society to restructure so that we can be part of it. 
Rather, we wish for the right to exist as a linguistic minority group within society ... 
Labelling us as ‗disabled‘ demonstrates a failure to understand that we are not 
disabled within our own community. ... Many disabled people see Deaf people 
belonging with them outside the mainstream culture. We, on the other hand, see 
disabled people as ‗hearing‘ people in that they use a different language to us, from 
which we are excluded, and see them as being members of society‘s culture.113  
However, the position outlined above has been criticised from within the deaf community 
itself. By claiming that they constitute their own distinctive cultural identity, Mairian Corker 
argues that protagonists of such a position are in fact, accepting as a fait d‘compli, the norms 
and social mores of a disablist society, which is invariably oppressive. She states:  
... the allusion to withdrawal from mainstream society suggests withdrawal from 
something; all accounts suggests that this something is cultural and linguistic 
oppression. But Western society, together with the dominant human services culture 
and its governance and legal systems which at present control to a large extent how 
we live, still view all dead people, including those who are Deaf, in terms of the 
individual/medical model. Hence, though sign language is increasingly 
acknowledged as a viable means of communication, it does not follow that there is a 
widespread cultural acceptance within such frameworks for thinking and service 
development.114 
The Social Model, Social Justice and United Nations Instruments 
Historically, research on justice has focused primarily on equity. However, the modern trend 
has been to incorporate other conceptions of justice. 115  Broadly speaking, justice is 
―something higher than a society‘s legal system. It is in those cases where an action seems 
to violate some universal rule of conduct that we are likely to call it ‗unjust‘116and respond by 
saying ―we need a law against that.‖ In a narrower sense, ―justice is fairness‖. It is action that 
pays due regard to the proper interests, property, and safety of one's fellows.‖ Parties that 
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concern themselves with fairness ―strive to work out something comfortable and adopt 
procedures that resemble rules of a game. They work to ensure that people receive their 
―fair share‖ of benefits and burdens and adhere to a system of ―fair play.‖117 
The social model moves towards a more inclusive notion of society similar to the UN human 
rights instruments. International resolutions relating to disabled persons were initially 
immersed in the medical model. 118  Distinctly influential among post-war international 
instruments was the ‗whole man‘ schema of vocational rehabilitation.119 This modus operandi 
sought to ‗treat‘ disabled persons to facilitate their social participation. In this manner, the 
method further instantiated the medical model‘s notion that people with disabilities, rather 
than society, must change.120 For example, the General Assembly and the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council adopted a series of resolutions during the 1950s and 1960s 
directed both at preventing future disability and at rehabilitating existing disabilities. 121 
Clearly, the title of the Economic and Social Council‘s 1950 resolution Social Rehabilitation 
of the Physically Handicapped express a policy targeting disabled people as the locus of 
treatment, rather than the external environment. 
 
However, beginning in the 1970s international instruments evidenced a gradual shift from 
the medical model to the social model of disability.122 As a consequence, both the 1971 
Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons and the 1975 Declaration on the 
Rights of Disabled Persons acknowledge the equality of disabled individuals.123  Yet these 
instruments possessed vestiges of the medical model by assuming individuals are disabled 
due to ‗special‘ medical problems that require segregated social services and institutions as 
remedies.124  It was the following decade that saw a more thorough adoption of the social 
model of disability in United Nations tools.125  
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Acting on the axiom ‗full participation and equality,‘ the United Nations proclaimed 1981 the 
International Year of the Disabled, and the succeeding decade as the International Decade 
of Disabled Persons.126 More notably, in 1982 the General Assembly also enacted the path-
breaking WPA127. Although this pronouncement reiterated the twin medical model goals of 
preventing and rehabilitating disability, it also advocated equalized opportunities for the 
disabled.128 The latter aspiration was defined as ‗the process through which the general 
system of society, such as the physical and cultural environment‘ is rendered accessible to 
all. 129  Moreover, the WPA emphasized the insufficiency of rehabilitation to achieve this 
purpose. Instead, ‗experience shows that it is largely the environment which determines the 
effect of an impairment or a disability on a person‘s daily life.‘130 
 
Continuing the trend toward full adoption of the social model, the 1990s were ‗a banner 
period for disability law.‘131 Passed in 1993, the Standard Rules remained the central United 
Nations document regarding disabled persons prior to 2006. The Standard Rules build on 
the World Program of Action concerning Disabled people (WPA), both emphasizing the 
equality of people with disabilities and defining disability as a by-product of social 
construction. For example, the instrument underscores the need to change general societal 
misperceptions about the disabled as well as provide sufficient services to support their full 
inclusion. 132  Though the Standard Rules are monitored by a Special Rapporteur, the 
instrument is ‗emollient law‘ and legally unenforceable.133 The Standard Rules nevertheless 
stress that States parties are under ‗a strong moral and political commitment‘ to ensure ‗the 
equalization of opportunities‘ for disabled persons.134 
 
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Vienna Declaration) was also enacted in 
1993.135 It was not directed specifically toward disability rights,136 but it nonetheless stressed 
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the prevalence of disabled persons. Moreover, the Vienna Declaration helped in accelerating 
the trend toward the social model of disability by maintaining that disabled persons ‗should 
be guaranteed equal opportunity through the elimination of all socially determined barriers,‘ 
including any ‗physical, financial, social or psychological‘ obstacles that ‗exclude or restrict 
full participation in society.‘137 
 
Finally, passage of the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) during this period bears special 
notice.138 While domestic in scope, it has to date influenced more than forty countries to 
enact similar and at times nearly verbatim legislation.139 The European Union‘s Employment 
Framework Directive adopts key DDA definitions, 140 and the Draft Articles follow suit.141 
Accordingly, international disability rights advocates point to the statute as a model worthy of 
emulation.142 
 
The social model has also been well supported in the new millennium. The General 
Assembly World Summit on Social Development acknowledged the significance of changing 
the socially constructed environment in agreement with the Standard Rules ‗to empower 
persons with disabilities to play their full role in society.‘143 But perhaps the most progressive 
enunciation in an international instrument is found in the Draft Articles, which recognize ‗the 
importance of accessibility to the physical, social and economic environment‘ as a means of 
‗redressing the profound social disadvantage of persons with disabilities.‘ 144  By this 
recognition, the Draft Articles transcend the social model and adopts a ‗human rights model‘ 
approach, integrating first- and second-generation rights. 
 
Human Rights and Limitations of the Social Model 
The above historical overview affirms the social model‘s effective and powerful influence on 
international and domestic instruments. Nevertheless, because the social model‘s advocates 
have invoked only formal equality theory, the social model encounters two hurdles. First, 
because it expressly relies on notions of corrective justice, the social model must overcome 
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inaccurate but strongly held notions that the world inevitably excludes disabled persons. 
Second, and of greater significance, because it exclusively concentrates on first-generation 
rights, the social model is prevented from invoking a full range of second-generation rights. 
 
In asserting that the socially structured environment creates disabling conditions, the social 
model affirms that altering that environment allows disabled persons to participate in society 
at large. Reasonable accommodation in education settings are a typical example of 
correcting artificially prejudicial conditions previously held out as ‗neutral.‘ Providing 
accommodations in education changes existing hierarchies, ultimately suggesting a lack of 
inevitability in the structure and conception of a particular school. By removing unnecessary 
barriers to participation, accommodations bring about equality as conceived by formal justice. 
 
However, because the social model is based exclusively on this notion of corrective justice, it 
must overcome the deeply rooted misconception that society justifiably excludes disabled 
persons due to their inherent limitations. 145  In seeking to win this fight, social model 
advocates have taken an over-inclusive position of rejecting all, instead of many or most, 
disability-related exclusions as arising from arbitrarily selected biological norms. 146   This 
effort is unnecessary because correcting exclusionary conditions and the attitudes 
supporting them need not be contingent on the application of first-generation rights alone. 
Instead, social inclusion is better facilitated under a human rights model that applies civil and 
political rights that equalize treatment in combination with economic, social, and cultural 
rights (that equalize opportunity). 
 
This brings forward the second, and more significant, problem: while the social model‘s 
precepts are essential to civil rights assertions, they ultimately fall short within the human 
rights field. The social model draws an inclusive, yet firm line at equal treatment of equally 
situated individuals,147 thereby effectively excluding additional second-generation support for 
disabled persons not contingent on narrower corrective justice notions. 148  By contrast, 
second-generation rights recognize that all disabled persons are entitled to equal 
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opportunities because of their equal humanity, not because they reach levels of functional 
sameness,149 and thereby allows for individual differences among people with disabilities. 
 
In so doing, second-generation rights cover two circumstances. They encompass 
entitlements that benefit persons with disabilities who fall outside standard sameness 
arguments. This is because some individual variations are not accounted for, even when 
using broad and inclusive principles, for instance those contained in the architectural 
concept of Universal Design.150 Second-generation rights also include measures that are 
necessary to effectuate first-generation rights. Thus, while first-generation rights may prohibit 
discrimination in education and employment, second-generation rights make labour market 
participation possible by providing health care, education, and employment preferences and 
quotas.  
First-generation rights correspond to freedom (liberté) and entail civil and political rights that 
protect individuals from state power. These rights are primarily individualistic, however a few 
are collectively expressed, such as freedom of association, and the right to assembly. Civil 
and political rights include protection from proscribed discrimination, freedom of thought and 
conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the right to participate in civil society 
and politics. Second-generation rights, those relating to equality (égalité) encompass 
economic, social and cultural rights. They ensure the right to be employed, the right to equal 
working conditions, the right to social security, the right to education, the right to cultural 
participation and the right to unemployment benefits. 
By limiting their advocacy to first-generation rights, social model proponents have neglected 
further empowering possibilities.151  
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Conclusion 
The above analysis of the medical and social model should lead to an adequate social 
theory of disability which would include all the dimensions of disabled people‘s experiences: 
bodily, psychological, cultural, social, political, rather than claiming that disability is either 
medical or social.  
The claim here is that the British version of the ‗strong‘ social model has outlived its 
usefulness. Rather than developing piecemeal criticisms or supplying alternative arguments 
to fill the gaps and compensate for the inadequacies of the social model, it is time to put the 
whole thing to one side and start again. The dangerous tendency to equate the social model 
with purity and orthodoxy in disability politics and disability studies has to be rejected. After 
all, it is only in Britain that the social model has played this role. In the USA and other 
countries, civil rights and social change have successfully occurred in the absence of the 
‗strong‘ social model of disability.  
Indeed, in Britain itself, the UPIAS-led social model approach was not the only perspective at 
the beginning of the disability movement. For example, the Liberation Network of People 
with Disabilities developed the concept of disabled people as an oppressed minority group 
without needing to define disability as social oppression: Allen Sutherland, a member of the 
Network, wrote the pioneering Disabled We Stand without drawing upon the social model in 
his argument for a radical politics of disability.152 
Feminist commentators argue that the social model has traditionally either avoided or 
excluded the issue of impairment. As French suggested, this seems mainly to have been for 
reasons of radical rhetoric. It sounds much better to say ‗people are disabled by society, not 
by their bodies‘ than to say ‗people are disabled by society as well as by their bodies.‘ But 
the result is that impairment is completely bracketed, just as sexual difference was the taboo 
subject for the women‘s movement in the early 1970s. In properly rejecting the causal role of 
the body in explaining oppression, disabled radicals have followed their feminist precursors 
in denying difference entirely: after all as Anne Phillips argues: 
Once feminists admit the mildest degree of sexual difference, they open up a gap 
through which the currents of reaction will flow. Once let slip that pre-menstrual 
tension interfered with concentration, that pregnancy can be exhausting, that 
motherhood is absorbing, and you are off down the slope to separate spheres.153 
It is argued here that the denial of difference is as big a problem for disability studies, as it 
was for feminism. 
Experientially, impairment is salient to many. As disabled feminists have argued, impairment 
is part of their daily personal experience, and cannot be ignored in social theory or political 
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strategy. Politically, if the analysis does not include impairment, disabled people may be 
reluctant to identify with the disability movement, and commentators may reject our 
arguments as being ‗idealistic‘ and ungrounded. They are not just disabled people, they are 
also people with impairments, and to pretend otherwise is to ignore a major part of their 
biographies. As Linda Birke argued in the case of gender: ‗Feminist theory needs to take into 
account not only the ways in which our biology is interpreted, but also the very real ways in 
which biology does in practice affect our lives.‘154 
Analytically, it is clear that different impairments impinge in different ways. That is, they have 
different implications for health and individual capacity, but also generate different responses 
from the broader cultural and social milieu. For example, visible impairments trigger social 
responses while invisible impairments may not—the distinction which Goffman draws 
between ‗discrediting‘ and ‗discreditable‘ stigma.155 Congenital impairments have different 
implications for self-identity than acquired impairments. Some impairments are static, others 
are episodic or degenerative. Some mainly affect appearance, others restrict functioning. All 
these differences have salient impacts at both the individual and psychological level, and at 
the social and structural level. This is not an argument for disaggregating all disability, and 
referring solely to clinical diagnoses, but for recognising that the different major groupings of 
impairment, because of their functional and presentational impacts, have differing individual 
and social implications.  
Moreover, denying the relevance of impairment has some unfortunate consequences. Thus, 
the disability community has often criticised the mainstream emphasis on ‗cure‘ for 
impairment, and have opposed the maximising of functioning. For example, Oliver and 
others have argued against conductive education for people with cerebral palsy.156 There 
has been a backlash from people directly involved, arguing that some of the Peto 
interventions can generate significant outcomes for people with these impairments.157 Why is 
it so wrong to maximise functioning and seek to reduce the impact of disease? Clearly, some 
of these interventions cause more harm than good. Equally, the obsession of many clinicians 
with cure is misguided. Yet, at the same, it would be to commit an equivalent error if we 
discounted all possibility or benefit of impairment-avoidance and reduction.  
A special case of this argument applies to genetics. Many activists have opposed all 
attempts to reduce the incidence of genetic conditions. Yet, while here I would have major 
criticisms of contemporary genetic rhetoric and practice, I cannot see a problem in seeking 
to avoid serious and debilitating conditions. The woman who takes folic acid in her 
pregnancy is being sensible, not being oppressive to people with spina bifida. While I would 
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oppose blanket selective screening of all impairments, there are times where it seems 
appropriate and desirable to take advantage of genetic technologies. Impairments such as 
Tay-Sachs disease and anencephaly are both terminal and very unpleasant and most 
people would want to avoid them if at all possible.  
Social model theory in the UK rests on a distinction between impairment, an attribute of the 
individual body or mind, and disability, a relationship between a person with impairment and 
society. A binary division is established between the biological and the social. 158  This 
distinction is analogous to the distinction between sex and gender, as it was established by 
feminists such as Ann Oakley.159 As with second-wave feminism, the move enables disability 
studies to illustrate that disability can only be understood in specific socio-historical contexts, 
and that it is a situation which is dynamic and can be changed. 
Yet, within feminism, the sex/gender distinction has largely been abandoned (see for 
example Butler, 1990). Theorists and activists do not thereby root woman‘s being in biology, 
as the patriarchal tradition has done. Instead, it is observed that sex itself is social. 
Everything is always already social. John Hood-Williams concludes his discussion of the 
problems of dualism by saying: 
The sex/gender distinction dramatically advanced understanding in an under-
theorised area and, for over twenty years, it has provided a problematic which 
enabled a rich stream of studies to be undertaken, but it is now time to think beyond 
its confines.160 
The same, surely, applies to impairment. Impairment is not a pre-social or pre-cultural 
biological substrate as Tremain has critiqued the untenable ontologies of the impairment-
disability and sex-gender distinctions.161 The words used and the discourses deployed to 
represent impairment are socially and culturally determined. There is no pure or natural 
body, existing outside of discourse. Impairment is only ever viewed through the lens of 
disabling social relations. As a crude example, one could cite the labels used to describe a 
particular impairment. ‗Idiocy,‘ ‗mongolism,‘ ‗Down‘s syndrome,‘ ‗trisomy-21,‘ are all words 
which have been used to describe the same impairment situation. Yet their connotations 
differ, as does a generic term such as ‗person with learning difficulties‘ which might be 
preferred by many people with that condition. Therefore I agree with Mike Oliver, when he 
seeks to deal with the problem of impairment by arguing that a social model of impairment is 
needed alongside the social model of disability.162 While his recognition of the importance of 
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impairment, and the limitations of the social model is welcome, it would be not be 
straightforward to make the distinction between impairment and disability that he takes for 
granted. 
The unsustainable distinction between impairment (bodily difference) and disability (social 
creation) can be demonstrated by asking where does impairment end and disability start? As 
Corker and French argue not only can sensory conditions include pain, but pain itself is 
generated through the interplay of physiological, psychological and socio-cultural factors.163 
While impairment is often the cause or trigger of disability, disability may itself create or 
exacerbate impairment. Other impairments, because invisible, may not generate any 
disability whatsoever, but may have functional impacts, and implications for personal identity 
and psychological wellbeing. 
Of course, some impairment/disability distinctions are straightforward. If architects include 
steps in a building, it clearly disadvantages wheelchair users. If there is no sign language 
interpreter, deaf people are excluded. Yet, it could be suggested that the ‗barrier free 
environment‘ is an unsustainable myth (a fairy tale, such as in Finkelstein).164 For a start, 
removing environmental obstacles for someone with one impairment may well generate 
obstacles for someone with another impairment. It is impossible to remove all the obstacles 
to people with impairment, because some of them are inextricable aspects of impairment, 
not generated by the environment. If someone has an impairment which causes constant 
pain, how can the social environment be implicated? If someone has a significant intellectual 
limitation, how can society be altered to make this irrelevant to employment opportunities, for 
example? Does mainstream sport disable impaired athletes by imposing oppressive criteria 
such as being able to run to play football? Some of these examples may seem ridiculous. 
But they point to the problem of pushing the social model to its implications, and highlight a 
flaw in the whole conception. 
Again, Paul Abberley has been one of the pioneers in pointing out this limitation.165 He 
suggests that a barrier-free utopia, in which all disabled people can gain employment, is not 
viable. He points out that however much investment and commitment and energy is devoted 
to making work accessible, there will always be a residuum of people who, because of their 
impairment, cannot work. However, again I would disagree with his solution to the problem. 
While displacing work as the central social value would be an undoubtedly important social 
development, it is not the most obvious solution to a problem which is generated mainly by 
the limitations of social model reasoning. I see no reason why we cannot accept that not 
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everyone will be able to achieve inclusion into the economy, and argue instead that a mature 
society supports everyone on the basis, not of the work they have done, but of the needs 
they have. 
Impairment and disability are not dichotomous, but describe different places on a continuum, 
or different aspects of a single experience. It is difficult to determine where impairment ends 
and disability starts, but such vagueness need not be debilitating. Disability is a complex 
dialectic of biological, psychological, cultural and socio-political factors, which cannot be 
extricated except with imprecision. 
Much opposition to the ‗medical model‘ is an opposition to being defined solely on the basis 
of impairment, or having clinicians rule the lives of disabled people. Yet it is possible to 
challenge these processes, without having to resort to the equally crude determinism of the 
social model. Disability should not be reduced to a medical condition. It should not be 
overlaid with negative cultural meanings. Neither should it be reduced to an outcome of 
social barriers alone, however important these might be in people‘s lives. 
It remains vital to distinguish between the different levels of intervention, as Oliver also 
argues.166 Sometimes it is most appropriate to intervene at the medical or individual level. 
For example, a newly spinal-injured person will almost inevitably require spinal stabilisation, 
rehabilitation, and possibly counselling. Yet subsequently, alterations to their personal 
environment will be important. In a broader sense, anti-discrimination measures will be vital 
to their future quality of life. Intervention at physical, psychological, environmental and socio-
political levels is the key to progressive change, yet one cannot be a substitute for the other. 
Social change remains the most expedient measure to remove the problems presented by 
impairment and its consequences: this emphasis encapsulates the distinction between 
disability studies and medical sociology.167 
The ubiquity of impairment is an empirical fact, not a relativist claim. I am not trying to say 
that short-sightedness is equivalent to blindness, or that being unfit is a similar experience to 
being paralyzed. Clearly, the limitations which individual bodies or minds impose (always in 
specific contexts) vary from the trivial to the profound. There are important differences to 
which theory and practice should be sensitive, but these differences cannot be 
straightforwardly allocated to two distinct ontological statuses. The point is that everyone has 
limitations, and that everyone is vulnerable to more limitations and will, through the ageing 
process, inevitably experience functional loss and morbidity. Many of us will be supportive of 
attempts to minimize or eliminate these limitations, where possible, which does not mean 
‗cure at all costs.‘ 
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Moreover, while all living beings are impaired—that is, frail, limited, vulnerable, mortal—we 
are not all oppressed on the basis of this impairment and illness. Only a proportion of people 
experience the additional disabling processes of society. Put another way, societies have 
evolved to minimize the problems of the majority of people with impairment, but have failed 
to deal effectively with the problems of a minority of people with impairment. In fact, societies 
have actively excluded, disempowered and oppressed (‗disabled‘) this minority. Of course, 
the size and nature of this minority changes. It is very difficult to achieve a core definition of 
‗disabled people,‘ because it is not clear who counts as disabled or not. This is because 
different societies treat particular groups of people with impairments in different ways. For 
example, in the medieval period, being unable to read was not a problem, because social 
processes did not demand literacy: learning difficulties only became salient and visible once 
a complex social order required literate workers and citizens. 
Rather than trying to break the definitional link between impairment and disability, we should 
expose the essential connection between impairment and embodiment. After all, as 
Shakespeare (1994) also argues, part of the psychological origins of hostility to disabled 
people may lie in the tendency of non-disabled people to deny their vulnerability and frailty 
and mortality, and to project these uncomfortable issues onto disabled people, who they can 
subsequently oppress and exclude and ignore. The continuum of impairment and 
embodiment is translated into a dichotomy between ‗able-bodied people‘ and ‗disabled 
people,‘ as Davis (1995) and others have demonstrated. Understanding these processes of 
exclusion and discrimination is where the core focus of an empowering disability studies 
should lie. 
The central argument of this chapter has been that the British social model has been an 
excellent basis for a political movement, but is now an inadequate grounding for a social 
theory. This social model was a modernist project, built on Marxist foundations. The world, 
and social theory, has passed it by, and we need to learn from other social movements, and 
from new theoretical perspectives, particularly those of post-structuralism and post-
modernism. It is believed here that the claim that everyone is impaired, not just ‗disabled 
people,‘ is a far-reaching and important insight into human experience, with major 
implications for medical and social intervention in the twenty-first century. I entirely concur 
with the political imperative to remove disabling barriers. I also believe that the overwhelming 
stress on medical research, corrective surgery and rehabilitation at all costs is important.  
Equally important, and a priority, should be social change and barrier removal, as social 
models of disability have suggested. Yet there is no reason why appropriate action on 
impairment—and even various forms of impairment prevention—cannot co-exist with action 
to remove disabling environments and practices. People are disabled both by social barriers 
and by their bodies. This is straightforward and uncontroversial.  
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I would also claim that a modernist theory of disability—seeking to provide an 
overarching meta-analysis covering all dimensions of every disabled person‘s 
experience—is not a useful or attainable goal. For disability is the quintessential post-
modern concept, because it is so complex, so variable, so contingent, so situated. It 
sits at the intersection of biology and society and of agency and structure. Disability 
cannot be reduced to a singular identity: it is a multiplicity, a plurality.  
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                                                            Chapter Three 
 
Models of Citizenship 
 
The previous chapter examined how disability poses the challenge of difference. How the 
two models of disability individually dealt with the challenge of uniting people while also 
providing for their distinct needs and how they each failed to respect radical difference and 
issues over how difference and equality are to be interpreted. This chapter on citizenship 
deals with models of citizenship, both classical and recent, and how they fall down precisely 
because they do not achieve this aim. The notion of citizenship is central to explaining the 
inclusion or exclusion of disabled people from society as a whole and it is crucial in any 
attempt to judge whether policies counter, or indeed erect, barriers to their emancipation.168  
 
This chapter examines past and current perceptions and notions of disability in civic 
republican, liberal and difference models of citizenship theory by analysing perceptions 
according to their social and historical context. It is an exploration of the way in which civic 
republican and liberal models of citizenship conceive of disability. These models of 
citizenship pose norms and values, which are dominant in society and arise from particular 
conceptualizations of reality. It is argued here that these citizenship models and their 
application have limitations for full citizenship for disabled people. These models have 
strongly influenced current debates on social justice, equality and citizenship for disabled 
people, which highlight the extent to which these notions are currently underpinned by 
exclusive medical notions169 of ‗normality.‘170 Medical discourses define individuals by their 
deficits, rather than by external factors,171 they are criticised for being heavily patriarchal172 
and dismissing disabled people under a single metaphysical category, which buries 
personalities 173  it is suggested that medical discourse also individualises disabilities as 
‗attributes‘ and professionalises them by making them part of a person‘s technical trouble174. 
                                                             
168 People with disability are amongst the most marginalised in the world and are seen negatively by almost every 
culture, religion and ethnic group see Pfeiffer, Sam, Guinan, Ratcliffe, Robinson & Stodden, (2004). More than 
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Society‘ since 1993) Volume 1 (2) pp. 173-8, 1986). 
174 Fulcher (1989) Fulcher, 1989Disabling policies?: A comparative approach to education, policy, and 
disability, Falmer Press  (London and New York) 
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Medical discourse as reflected in both ‗civic republican‘ and ‗liberal‘ models of citizenship, 
through its language of ‗body, patient, help need, irrationality, cure, rehabilitation, and its 
politics that the doctor knows best‘175 has dominated disabled people‘s lives and rendered 
them second class citizens.176 
 
The models of citizenship examined in this chapter are classical notions of civic republican 
and liberal models of citizenship. The classical civic republican model deals with Kant, 
Rousseau and Hume. The classical liberal model examines Locke, who although he pre-
dates the model, is considered to be the founder of liberalism, and his contributions in his 
essay An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, presented the most influential 
distinction to date between ‗idiots‘ and ‗madmen‘ which were related to the care and 
treatment of disabled people.177 
 
Contemporary analysis focuses on Marshall‘s social theories on citizenship and the post-
welfare state and Rawls notion of citizenship. Rawls is discussed because of his connections 
with the classical and liberal model of Locke and with the civic republican model of Kant. In 
the 1970s, Rawls incorporates Locke‘s, Kant‘s and Rousseau‘s civic republican models 
regarding ideas on citizenship and disability. Continuity amongst them is shown. They view 
disability as having a place in citizenship, albeit second tier and peripheral to the mainstream. 
The civic republican models and liberal models of citizenship, although preferring different 
starting points, overlap in relation to their central notion of the ‗rational citizen and the 
‗irrational‘ citizen.  The chapter examines how the ‗irrational‘ citizen (the intellectually 
disabled) is constituted in opposition to the ‗rational‘ citizen in classical citizenship theory, 
analysing the problem of conflating ‗physically‘ and ‗mentally‘ disabled persons in these 
same texts. These concepts and negative images in texts are woven into notions of 
citizenship.        
 
Marshall‘s writings reveal important insights post the welfare state. 178  It analyses how 
contemporary models have challenged the classic models exclusion of the disabled from full 
citizenship, but have not yet fully discarded the negative self-images of earlier models. The 
‗difference‘ model is not without its limitations for disabled people. However Section Two 
argues for a reconstruction, rather than abandonment, of medical discourses, giving disabled 
people power over their own bodies and healthcare through the ‗difference‘ model of 
citizenship. 
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What is Citizenship?  
Citizenship is a complex concept. There is no definite theory of citizenship. The term has 
different meanings in various historical periods, traditions, ideologies, theories and 
languages. In recent years, much has been written about citizenship and its connection to 
minority groups, gender, race and disability. Consequently, a range of different perspectives 
has emerged.179 It emerges from an individual‘s multiple social and political relationships in a 
stable or political community.180 
To be a citizen is to be able to take part in decisions that create the different aspects of 
society, and to be able to participate in key functions such as work, leisure, political debate, 
travel and consists of religious observance.181 The contrary of citizenship is social exclusion, 
those who choose not to exercise their right to participate in some or all of these activities or, 
as in the case of some disabled people, those who are unable to exercise their right.182 For 
example the only two citizen populations in England that aren‘t allowed to vote are convicted 
criminals and individuals with intellectual disabilities or mental illness.183 
Citizenship is a central concept in philosophy, law, and public policy which marks out those 
individuals to whom we owe special attention, those who have the right to determine their 
society‘s shape, and those who can command the full set of entitlements made available by 
the state. Many members of society continue to lack the full status of citizenship, because 
they do not possess the full set of citizenship rights, or, because, economic forces and social 
norms tend to push people to the margins. Achieving the goal of full citizenship continues to 
be a crucial social struggle.184  
 
The framework of citizenship has been applied to specific marginalised groups and has 
particularly challenged the liberal tradition of rights. It has provided a framework for 
marginalised groups to claim a sense of acceptance and membership as equal partners in 
the community. This sense of acceptance was applied by Lister to the poor, Smith and Ram 
Paul to minority racial groups and Lister, Jones, Walby and Young drew attention to the 
second class status of women. Oliver, Barnes, and Jenkin highlighted the issue of citizenship 
in relationship to disability. Jenny Morris made a case that disabled women are highly 
neglected and Jan Walmsley addressed the complex issue of relating citizenship to people 
with learning difficulties.  
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In the case of disability, these citizenship structures are transgressed by the evolving 
disability movement. As social concepts, both citizenship and identity provide a broad 
framework within which to explore the material and cultural exclusion of people with 
disabilities in the western world.  As Miles 185  has observed, accurate and credible 
information about disability outside of a Western context is vital but rare. The notions of 
citizenship and identity need to be recognized for their inability to easily translate beyond this 
milieu and into the contexts of non-Western cultures.186 The established division between 
citizen and outsider has acted as a formative dimension of the disability rights movement 
and its quest for empowerment and autonomy, inclusion, valued citizenship and a positive 
identity.  
 
On Citizenship 
The classical definition of citizenship, based on Aristotle‘s account, separates the public 
realm from the private one. Aristotelian ideal of citizenship is a definition of the human being 
as an active, moral, and political being, however it was accessible only to a small group of 
males. The conception of public is a higher arena than the private one. It is the public that 
man exercise his highest capacities as a political animal The modern liberal version of 
citizenship started with Hobbes and Locke in the Western political tradition, whereas 
democratic-participatory conceptualization was first developed by Rousseau and put into 
practice after French Revolution. The modern concept of citizenship constructed on 
Rousseau‘s notion of self-determination is represented by a contract between the people 
(free and equal) and to form a government. In the course of time, citizenship meant more 
than political membership but possession of certain civil rights. It gained a pluralist content in 
addition to membership into a democratic homogeneous community. 
Modern citizenship consists of three features: (1) a judicial status which confers rights and 
obligations vis-à-vis a political collectivity; (2) a group of social roles for making choices in 
the political arena (political competence); (3) an ensemble of moral qualities required for the 
character of the ―good‟  citizen.187 
Citizenship conceptualizations concern the questions of national identity, civic allegiance, 
and membership. Three theoretical perspectives can be distinguished in the contemporary 
literature on citizenship: liberal (with its emphasis on individual identity in a political 
                                                             
185 Miles (2006), Hevey, D. (1993). The tragedy principle: Strategies for change in the representation of disabled 
people. In J. Swain, V. Finkelstein, S. French & M. Oliver (Eds.), Disabling barriers-- enabling environments (pp. 
116-121). London ; Newbury Park, Calif: Open University. 
186 (see for example Ghai, 2002), Kymlicka, Will (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
187 (Leca, 1992: 17-18), Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London and    
New York: Verso. 
 
 
 
 65 
community), communitarian (with its emphasis on cultural or ethnic identities), republican 
(with an emphasis on civic identity). In some of the classifications the communitarian model 
is included in republican one or vice versa. Liberal and republican models, in fact, have 
some common denominators: (1) the state is embedded in legal-rational authority; (2) state 
power should be framed by rule of law; and (3) protection of basic rights and freedom. 
The Classic Models of Citizenship 
The classical tradition of civic republicanism and the liberal tradition are the two main strands 
in the theory of citizenship. The current dividing lines in citizenship theory emerge from these 
two traditions of citizenship.188 Each signifies a different understanding of what it means to 
be a citizen. The civic republican theory developed prior to the liberal tradition, however the 
latter has been dominant during the past two centuries.189 Liberal citizenship is much less 
demanding of the individual than the republican tradition in that it is focused on individual 
rights which are honoured by the state.190 
 
The Classic Civic Republican Tradition 
The original understanding of citizenship derives from the civic republican tradition and the 
political experience of the Greek city-states, in particular democratic Athens. 191  The 
Republican tradition had its origins in Rome, in the writings of Cicero. It was revived in the 
Renaissance, in the constitutional thinking of Machiavelli, and played an important role in the 
self-conception of the northern Italian republics. Its language dominated the politics of the 
modern West during the English Civil War, and in the period leading up to the American and 
French Revolutions.192 In contrast to liberals‘ emphasis on rights, republicans underline the 
role of duties and active participation as the constitutive elements of citizenship. In fact, they 
reverse the relation between rights and politics as it is understood in liberalism: rights are 
regarded as the products of the political process by republicans, rather than its 
presuppositions. 193  Republicans define the moral framework of politics by a duty to 
participate in collective decision-making. Citizenship meant participating in a direct 
democracy. Civic republicans had an ideal of citizenship in which the character of individual 
citizens was very important.194 A good citizen was active in politics, fought bravely for his 
country, and cared for the public good more than his private interests. This ideal contrasted 
with the liberal view, to be explored below, that citizenship was primarily a legal and 
                                                             
188 Introduction to political theory, Ignatieff, Michael (1995) ‗The Myth of Citizenship‘, pp. 53–78 in Robert Beiner 
(ed.) Theorizing Citizenship. Albany: State University of New York. 
189 (Heater, 1999). What is Citizenship? 1999, publication: Polity Press 
190 Faulks, Keith. Citizenship. London: Routledge, 2000. 
191 Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995. 
192 (Pettit, 1997: 19). 
193 (Bellamy, 2000: 177), Bellamy, R. (2008). Citizenship : A very short introduction. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
194 Staven. R.Smith,(2005)Equality Identity and the Disability Rights Movement: from policy to practice and from 
Kant to Nietzsche in more than one uneasy move. Critical Social Policy. (Sage Publications)  
 
 
 66 
administrative status. Early liberals did also restrict citizenship to men of property, but the 
reasons for excluding the poor and women were somewhat different. 
Classic Civic Republican and Disability Jean Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant 
The civic republican model of citizenship depends not only upon participation but upon 
‗reason.‘ Reason, for Jean Jacques Rousseau, does not define the rights of citizens so much 
as the general will of the people or demos.195 The distinction between Rousseau and Locke‘s 
political theories has been famously described by Isaiah Berlin as the distinction between 
negative and positive freedoms. Locke thought of liberty as (negative) rights that cannot be 
violated by the state—citizens require reason in order to consent to the social contract and to 
decide if their rights are being protected by the state or, if not, whether to dissolve it.196 
Rousseau believed freedom was rooted in the moral capacity to govern oneself in 
accordance with reason (positive freedom); citizens require reason in order to form the social 
contract and political society. Thus, while reason defines the citizen for Locke, it defines 
what it is to be human or a person for Rousseau.197  
Classic Civic Republican and Disability and Immanuel Kant 
Immanuel Kant takes up Rousseau‘s theory of the self-governing rational citizen. In the 
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals198 Kant builds on Rousseau‘s insights 
into ‗freedom‘ by providing a metaphysical foundation.199 As such, Kant‘s theory of reason, 
like Rousseau‘s, is decidedly non-instrumental.200 Rawls comments, ‗Kant‘s aim is to deepen 
and to justify Rousseau‘s idea that liberty is acting in accordance with a law that we give to 
ourselves. And this leads not to a morality of austere command but to an ethic of mutual 
respect and self-esteem. Kant sought to give a philosophical foundation to Rousseau‘s 
general will. Kant‘s moral theory protects human dignity through the mutual recognition of 
others as rational self-legislating ‗persons,‘ and he famously argues that persons must act in 
accordance with a universal duty to see all rational beings as ‗ends in themselves.‘201 Kant 
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198 Immanuel Kant. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals (Lenox, M: Hard Press, 2006). 
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refers every maxim of the will, regarding it as legislating universally to every other will and also to every action 
towards oneself, and this not on account of any other practical motive or any future advantage but from the idea of 
the dignity of a rational being, obeying no law but that which he himself also gives. Immanuel Kant. Fundamental 
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concludes, ‗Autonomy then is the basis of the dignity of human and of every rational 
nature.‘202 Consequently, those who are not rational are by definition not ‗autonomous‘ and 
strictly speaking not ‗persons‘ and therefore not due the ‗dignity‘ accorded to ‗rational beings.‘ 
For Kant, what commands respect is our status as rational agents, capable of directing our 
lives through principles. Thus Kant‘s formulation excludes many mentally disabled people 
from the politics of equal dignity. 
Problems in Kant‘s Civic Republican Argument 
Kant‘s formulation excludes many ‗mentally‘ disabled people from the politics of equal dignity, 
because he defines personhood by the capacity for reason. We are then forced to define 
those incapable of ‗rationality‘ as outside the normal meaning of personhood, for they only 
have the potential to be human and are thus ‗postulated‘ persons, who are incapable of 
realizing their potential in the ‗normal way.‘ Kant‘s theory provides us with the basis for ‗our 
intuitions of equal dignity ever since. For Kant what commanded respect in us was our status 
as rational agents, capable of directing our lives through principles.‘203 Kant‘s moral theory in 
relation to disability is problematic for a number of reasons. First, the use of abnormal and 
the deprecating self-images imply disabled people are to be stigmatised and expunged from 
modern political thought. Second, the term ‗rationality‘ which defines features of personhood 
is problematic. In accepting this understanding of ‗person‘ the mentally disabled are 
excluded from what is meant by human.  
 
The Classic Liberal Theory of Citizenship  
In liberal democracies, effective participation requires that individuals and groups possess 
some minimum conditions related to politically relevant knowledge and skills. Those who 
possess such knowledge and skills will be ‗competent members of society,‘ and they will 
have access to social and economic resources by exercising civil, political and social rights. 
But those who lack the minimum of politically relevant knowledge and skills will be 
marginalized. Not only has this classification contributed to a life long struggle but it 
highlights the narrow definition of ‗full citizenship‘ within liberal thought, which in turn raises 
questions about the formation and application of disability policies. 
 
Classical Liberalism 
Widely known as the father of liberalism, 204  John Locke in his Two Treatises of Civil 
Government205 notes that every man has rights which are God given; they should have free 
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and equal right to preserve life, liberty and estate, but it is the duty of the state to ensure 
their protection.206 Citizens should also have a right to vote and have a right of protection 
and just treatment by the law. Individualism is expressed morally through the typical liberal 
belief in individual ‗natural‘ or ‗human‘ rights.207 
Classical Liberal Theory, Disability and Full Citizenship; John Locke 
It is argued here that John Locke was incorrect when he wrote, in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, that personhood is a concept that we articulate rather than a 
condition that exists in nature which we discover. He would acknowledge that there are 
some constraints upon our ability to ascribe the attribute of personhood to any particular type 
of entity. Locke says, for instance, that the term person ‗belongs only to intelligent agents 
capable of law, happiness and misery.‘208 More specifically, a person is ‗a thinking intelligent 
being that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as a self, the same thinking 
thing in different times and places, which it does only by that consciousness which is 
inseparable from thinking, and essential to it.‘209 
 
For Locke, personhood status has been applied only to those actual or theoretical beings 
who possess or can develop a sense of right and wrong and hence possess the capacity to 
participate as moral agents in a moral community. Beings without this capacity, such as 
animals, foetuses, and the profoundly demented, learning disabled may be, by virtue of their 
capacity to experience pain, appropriate objects of moral concern, but not members of the 
moral community with rights and duties.210 Some disabled people therefore would not qualify 
for citizenship or even personhood on those grounds. 
 
Locke considered human beings to possess certain capacities, and to be persons because 
of their capacity for self-consciousness and organisation of a concept of right and wrong, 
rather than simply having a body of a particular form or genetic composition. It is the same 
continuing consciousness, which constitutes the criterion for the identity of persons. In 
Locke‘s words: 
 
Since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is, that makes every one 
to be, what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking 
things, in this alone constitutes personal identity, i.e., the sameness of a rational 
Being. And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past 
Action or Thought, so far reaches the identity of that Person; it is the same self now 
                                                             
206 (Locke, 1962, 87). Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding Books II and IV. Open Court Classics 
[Locke] Mary Whiton Calkins, Editor 
Published by La Salle, Illinois, USA: Open Co, 1962 
207 (Gray, 1986; Bellamy, 1992; Vincent, 1992: Ch. 2; Freeden, 1996: Part II). 
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as it was then; and ‗its by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, 
that Action was done.211 
 
Locke commented that some human beings have irretrievably lost or will never have the 
capacity for personhood at any given moment, or for personal identity over time. Mental 
health patients, and many intellectually disabled people, do not qualify on Lockean grounds. 
The brains of such people will never develop or have suffered sufficient trauma or 
degeneration so as to preclude self-consciousness and rationality. Thus both categories of 
people are permanently unconscious because they have no functioning higher brain to the 
acceptable normal level and will thus never have a capacity for personhood. Based on these 
views, it can therefore be argued that disabled people are not full citizens.  
 
Permanent insanity ‗Idiots‘ vs. Temporary Insanity ‗Lunatics‘ 
Locke distinguishes between the permanent incapacity of idiots and the temporary nature of 
lunacy, repeating the same logic found in his Essay, he says only the former are 
permanently deficient whereas madness may be temporary. Because the idiot lacks reason 
he cannot be sovereign of any law, possess property, comprehend the law of nature, or own 
his very body. He is never free.  Here the Greek meaning of idiot-as-private-person is 
nestled within Locke‘s notion of the idiot as cognitively deficient: because the idiot is 
incapable of reason, he is entirely removed from the public realm and is enfolded into the 
private sphere. In essence, the idiot‘s life is depoliticised and his very body dissolves into the 
property of his sovereign and transgress the moral bounds of God‘s duty.  
 
While Locke clearly demarcates between paternal and political power—as his theory in fact 
hinges on the difference—elsewhere he describes paternal power as absolute. In Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke depicts the different degrees of parental power 
depending on the child‘s level of maturity.  
 
For Locke, ‗the less reason they have of their own, the more are they to be under the 
absolute power and restraint of those, in whose hands they are.‘212 Younger children should 
be taught to ‗fear and awe‘ their fathers and to see them as ‗their lords, and absolute 
governors.‘ Idiots, who have no reason for Locke, are permanently subjected to absolute 
parental power. And because idiots are entirely isolated in the private realm, they are 
detached from anyone who could presumably intercede on their behalf. Although the Second 
Treatise repeatedly emphasises the importance of the right to appeal and the need for public 
laws, children, idiots and lunatics—because they are entirely under the purview of parental 
                                                             
211 There is, of course, an important distinction in this absolute power exercised in the domestic sphere over slaves 
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power—lack all means of resistance. Unable to own his own body, the idiot has no recourse 
to justice.213 
 
Although deficiencies in consciousness may logically preclude a man from civil law, the 
empirical difficulty of discerning unconsciousness requires that all persons be treated as fully 
sovereign to prevent the law from being perverted. This curious state of being both outside 
and within the law ensnares Locke‘s idiot: his cognitive deficiency absolves his moral 
standing but the law forbids any absolution.  
 
Locke‘s treatment and construction of idiocy is irreconcilable with his theory of human 
equality. Waldron concedes that ‗among the very grossest differences in mental capacity, 
Locke is evidently not committed to any thesis of equality.‘214 Because Locke‘s conception of 
equality hinges on the necessary power of abstraction—without which men cannot 
comprehend God—idiots are legitimately excluded. Waldron presumably assumes that 
Locke‘s limitation on human equality poses no threat to his larger political project; in fact, he 
argues that Locke‘s foundation of equality demands it. In contrast, I argue that Locke‘s 
dehumanization of idiocy unravels the regulative norm of human equality as well as its 
concomitant tie to morality.  
 
Physical Disabilities vs. Intellectual Disabilities according to John Locke‘s Citizenship Theory 
The hierarchy of disabilities expressed in Locke‘s writing‘s, where idiots are being excluded 
from personhood due to their inability to learn, is significant to Locke‘s theory of a person. 
The other component of human understanding for Locke is ―Reflection‖ which he describes 
as ―the Perception of the Operations of our own Minds within us, as it is employed about the 
Ideas it has got‖215  
 
In the Essay, Locke accorded different significance to physical, sensory and mental 
disabilities, presuming that only the last undermines personal and political standing. 
Cognitive deficiency, unlike other disabilities, directly undoes our capacity to consent. While 
we are all equally prone to incapacity, incapacities are not all equal. This criticism, however, 
misconstrues two different types of equality: equal treatment and respect for equals. 216  
The second reason for exclusion, the assurance of benevolent care, surfaces in the Second 
Treatise when Locke addresses the problem of idiocy in his chapter on paternal power. 
Locke maintains that political accountability is only expected from a person who possesses 
‗a state of maturity wherein he might be supposed capable to know that law, that so he might 
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keep his actions within the bounds of it.‘ 217Hence, children are denied freedom until they 
reach the age of reason. If anyone is permanently defective in reason, according to Locke, 
he is never capable of being a free man, he is never let loose to the disposure of his own will 
(because he knows no bounds to it, has not understanding, its proper guide), but is 
continued under the tuition and government of others, all the time his own understanding is 
incapable of that charge. And so lunatics and idiots are never set free from the government 
of their parents.  
 
In contrasting Locke with Rousseau, Barbara Arneil argues that ‗while reason defines the 
citizen for Locke, it defines what it is to be human or a person for Rousseau.‘218 Arneil 
separates two modern discourses that stigmatized disability: liberal strains that limited 
citizenship and republican that curtailed human membership. In the latter group, theorists 
like Rousseau and Kant exemplify radical dehumanization. My analysis, however, shows 
that Locke prefigured this development. Locke‘s reliance on reason isn‘t confined to politics, 
but draws the bounds of human equality.  
 
Problems in Locke‘s Notion of Liberal Equality 
The continued exclusion of those with intellectual limitations into the early twentieth century 
based on their inability to reason or benefit from education is indicative of the barrier to 
liberal citizenship for those who do not conform to the norm. The justification for the 
exclusion is for benign reasons, according to Locke. Rationality guarantees moral status 
because it presumably implies a distinct relationship between men and God which enables 
men to understand and abide by moral codes.  
 
David Hume, Disability and Citizenship 
Like Locke, David Hume distinguishes between those in society who should be governed by 
justice and those he describes as ‗inferior in body and mind‘ who ought to be governed by 
the principle of ‗gentle usage:‘ 
Were there a species of creature intermingled with men, which, though rational, 
were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were 
incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make us 
feel their resentment; the necessary consequence, I think is that we should be 
bound by the laws of humanity to given gentle usage to these creatures, but should 
not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice towards them.219 
Justice, for Hume, is rooted in his principle of ‗rough equality‘ because individuals will only 
be willing to work out principles to govern themselves if they recognize that others are 
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equally capable of resistance. Those deemed ‗incapable‘ of such resistance are subject to a 
different set of rules. Once again, the disabled are defined by their ‗incapacity,‘ are seen as 
objects of ‗pity‘ and ultimately excluded from the principles of justice, governed instead by 
‗gentle usage‘ or charity. 
The idea of ‗charity,‘ defined in opposition to ‗justice‘ in both Locke and Hume‘s thought, is 
important for two reasons: first—unlike the later nineteenth century scientific images of the 
disabled as fundamentally different or ‗abnormal‘ degenerates who need to be separated out 
from ‗normal‘ people, institutionalized, and/or sterilized—Locke and Hume argue that the 
disabled are part of humanity but like all human beings fall short of the ideal image of God. 
They remain part of the community and ought to be treated with kindness by others (in 
accordance with Christian principles) rather than excluded. But the principle of charity also 
constructs the disabled as objects of pity and outside the remit of justice, an image that will 
last well into the twentieth century in both theory and practice as the disabled become 
represented, through the vehicle of numerous charitable campaigns, as dependent, tragic, 
and pitiable. 
Problems with Hume‘s Notion of Citizenship for Disabled people 
One of the most perplexing aspects of Hume‘s description of disability quoted above is his 
conflation of physical and mental disabilities within the principle of ‗gentle usage,‘ even 
though he states at the outset that it is ‗rationality‘ that defines the species ‗man‘ and puts 
them into the original condition of ‗rough equality.‘ It is unclear, within Hume‘s own account, 
why those with an ‗inferior body‘ (the physically disabled) should be governed by ‗gentle 
usage‘ since they presumably have the capacity to resist and make their resentment felt 
towards others as much as ‗able-bodied‘ humans. Hume‘s conflation of physical and mental 
disabilities is critically important, not only because Rawls incorporates it into his own theory 
but also because it suggests that there is something about disability itself and not simply the 
principle of ‗irrationality‘ that leads some liberal theorists to exclude all disabled people from 
their principles of justice. Even if one accepts that ‗reason‘ defines ‗personhood,‘ why should 
physically disabled people be deemed ‗incapable‘ of realizing their potential? The conflation 
of physical and intellectual disability in political theory is not so simply explained or 
dismissed, as this problem permeates contemporary political theory. The tendency to 
conflate both kinds of disability is critically important, for if the physically disabled are 
systematically excluded from political theories ostensibly rooted in rational agency, it 
suggests there is something about disability itself (beyond a simple categorical antonym to 
‗reason‘ as we have been suggested so far) that explains the long-standing exclusion and 
discrimination of the physically disabled. 
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Complementary Features in the Classic Civic Republican and Liberal Models of 
Citizenship  
These two different orientations to citizenship are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For 
example, it is not unusual for those on the right to combine a classical liberal conception of 
citizenship rights with an emphasis on the paid work obligations of poorer citizens, reflecting 
both ideas of contract and the combination of neo-liberal and neo-conservative strands in 
new right thought. 220 Conversely, in the UK, the Labour leaders articulation of a Left view of 
citizenship has emphasised not only rights but also the duties that individuals owe to one 
another and a broader society.221 How they are conflated today limits the full citizenship of 
many disabled people.222  
 
On Cultural Pluralism 
The rising interest in citizenship in political theory is the result of an increasing cultural 
diversity in contemporary societies. Given the fact that there is a crisis of national identities 
in Western societies, cultural pluralism is proposed as a model for the construction 
of political identities. The identities referred by cultural pluralism are based on sub-national 
or transnational elements such as language, ethnicity, religion, race and ability. With the 
advent of cultural pluralism, certain transformations are happening in the life practices of 
plural societies. For example, education systems become less sufficient for the minorities, so 
structures are arranged in more pluralist ways—in terms of cultural differences, languages, 
ability, religious values and opinions. 
We can speak of a number of political problems arising from cultural pluralism. First of all, 
the new social movements (the feminist movement, black movements, the disability 
movement, nationalist movements, the gay and lesbian movements, and the ecological 
movement) are based on a sense of absolute and prescribed identity (such as race, ethnicity, 
gender, age and sexual practices and ability), rather than a position in the social contract (in 
the labor market, for example). Thus, these movements demand representation to establish 
their autonomy on a metaphorical terrain in which identity is non-negotiable.223 Secondly, 
                                                             
220  King, 1995, Theorizing citizenship, state University of New York Press, Albany, 1995 State University of New 
York, Page 45-46 
221 see Blair, 1994, p4 
222 To give an example, John Major‘s Conservative government promoted the Citizen‘s Charter as part of 
encouraging a market approach to public services, the citizen was defined as consumer and it was the promotion of 
the consumer‘s right to choice which, together with privatization, was considered to be the solution to the identified 
problem of inefficient public services. The Citizen‘s Charter was therefore situated within the liberal political tradition 
in which a limited state guarantees the freedom and formal equality of the individual. On the other hand, Tony Blair‘s 
Labour government, while also emphasizing consumer choice in the context of public services, has in addition 
launched a whole raft of policies aimed at encouraging people to be ‗active citizens‘. Here the emphasis, rather than 
being on the rights of individuals, is on the obligations that must be fulfilled in order to assure the health and stability 
of local communities and the wider society. Therefore as society continues to become more reliant on employment 
and participation as prerequisites of citizenship, there is a dangerous probability that a key disability group will find it 
increasingly difficult to operate equitably in society. This reflects what Maurice Roche (1992) has dubbed a duties 
discourse, which is becoming increasingly influential in Western European (and US) social policy (Kremer, 1994). 
Roche points to the influence of new social movements (in particular greens and feminists) in the development of 
this duties discourse. A key issue for some feminists is how care fits in to any configuration of citizenship obligations 
(Kremer, 1994; Bubeck, 1995). 
223 Leca, 1992: 25 
 
 
 74 
cultural fragmentation causes societies to appear as a mosaic of compartmentalized 
solidarities, each with its own political community. 
Some scholars, such as Iris Marion Young, praise the advantages of cultural fragmentation 
in the name of the ‗politics of difference.‘ The idea behind this is to provide inclusion for 
traditionally excluded and marginalized groups. Her point of departure is the modern political 
assumption that the universality of citizenship ‗implies a universality of citizenship in the 
sense that citizenship status transcends particularity and difference.‘224 She claims that while 
equality is conceived as sameness, universality is defined as in opposition to particular, and 
these misconceptions, in turn, perpetuates oppression and disadvantage. Besides its 
advantages, pluralism poses a threat to the idea of citizenship by causing individuals to stick 
together within their group identity and let them to ignore a larger common culture that is 
what Beiner calls ‗groupism.‘225 
When citizens become fixated on cultural differences, it is difficult to maintain a common 
ground for the members of the society. An absolute liberal citizenship would lessen the 
distinctiveness of a group. It can even promote oppression by not letting them to pursue their 
distinctiveness. On the other hand, it is not easy to find a compromising foundation in the 
republican notion. 
Recent Models of Citizenship 
Liberal citizenship conceptualization, based on individual freedom and equality and setting a 
bundle of individual rights against the state, failed to accommodate cultural pluralism raised 
in the late twentieth century. T. H. Marshall‘s notion of citizenship was concerned with the 
civil, political and social (welfare) rights bestowed by the state to the individual citizens in 
conformity with the principle of formal equality.226 This understanding failed to recognize 
distinct identities and cultures within a liberal state. John Rawls developed a political 
concept of justice that would be the basis of political arrangements of a liberal 
democracy. Reading Rawls on how he has constructed citizenship is important 
for understanding how liberal citizenship conceptualization is interwoven with the grounding 
political philosophy. Throughout his studies (from 1971 to 2001) his liberalism evolved to 
embody the requirements of a plural society. Nevertheless, Kantian liberal 
conceptualizations of citizenship have been criticized by scholars from different strands of 
political philosophy including communitarians, conservatives, radical democrats, and 
feminists. This section examines recent and contemporary perceptions and notions of 
disability in citizenship theory. It is an exploration of the way in which civic republican, liberal 
and ‗difference‘ models of citizenship conceive of disability. It is argued here that these 
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citizenship models continue to have limitations for full citizenship for disabled people. 
Contemporary Civic Republican Model of Citizenship 
Contemporary models of civic republican discourse advocate that a citizen should undertake 
duties and responsibilities and be loyal to the state rather than to individual interests. Central 
to the civic republicanism notion of citizenship is a conception of individuals as not being 
logically prior to society. 227  Communitarians object to the social concept of the self in 
liberalism as the liberal self is seen as both socially constructed and embedded in a cultural 
contex.228. Civic republicanism, like communitarianism has focused on the need to create a 
political community and a common bond between citizens, which closes the differences of 
class, religion, and culture.229  
 
There has been a revival of republican notions in response to the rights based notions found 
in liberalism.230 These discourses view citizenship as an activity or as practice, not just a 
status. It is in the civic republican tradition that we find the source of today‘s duties discourse. 
The market-oriented conceptualisation of social citizenship rights exemplified by the Citizen‘s 
Charter231 is nicely complemented by the Right‘s growing emphasis on citizenship obligation 
and in particular the obligation to undertake paid employment.232 
 
It is the right of those who have deliberately challenged the existing rights discourse and who 
have done most to shift the fulcrum of the citizenship paradigm. Most of the key texts 
contributing to this shift originate in the US, including influential works by Mead233  and 
Novak 234  which identify engagement in paid work as the prime obligation by welfare 
recipients to support their families. Few would dispute that responsibilities as well as rights 
enter into the citizenship equation. The question is: what is the appropriate balance and 
relationship between the two and how does that balance reflect power relations? One helpful 
formulation, which attempts to encapsulate a reciprocal relationship between rights and 
obligations (although it does not really capture the dimension of environmental obligation), is 
that put forward by Geraint Parry of a mutual society based on the familiar principle from 
each according to his or her ability; to each according to his or her need for the conditions of 
agency.235 
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Liberty within civic republican citizenship models is understood in terms of freedom to 
participate in the political and social institutions of society as an equal member.236 However, 
participation is defined in a narrow sense through a normative stance where participation in 
only certain types of activities is considered to be citizenry. In contemporary times, these 
activities have come to be known as the three M‘s: participation in the institutions of 
marriage, military and the marketplace.237 Those who cannot participate are not considered 
full citizens. 
 
Such a definition of participation reflects a gendered abilist norm as it reflects activities in the 
military and to an extent in the marketplace that are likely to be more representatives of able-
bodied male activities. It also reflects a heterosexist norm as couples in same-sex 
relationships are not always free to participate in the institution of marriage.238 Many disabled 
people, who in most cases are not free to participate in any of these activities, would 
therefore be constructed as second-class citizens within this ablest view of participation. 
 
The freedom to participate is also conceived within a normative stance as including only 
those citizens who possess certain ‗virtues‘ own the freedom to participate. These virtues 
were historically defined as those of ‗disinterestedness in making decisions for the public 
good;‘ ‗independence;‘ and ‗rational mindedness.‘ Thus, women were excluded as citizens 
through a construction of women as ‗emotional‘ and ‗dependent,‘ as were black people for 
being ‗incapable of reasoning.‘ To varying degrees, women and black people have fought 
against these exclusions, while some disabled people continue to be constructed as ‗second 
class-citizens‘ and excluded through the use of a similar type of rationale. 
 
The self that emerges in this model of citizenship is both relational as well as active. One‘s 
membership in society depends on an acknowledgment of other members belonging to that 
society; it is not simply an individuated exercise.239 However, due to its normative stance, the 
‗active‘ self is limited within normative constructions of what it means to be active.240 
 
This represents an impoverished version of citizenship in which individual citizens are 
reduced to atomised, passive bearers of rights whose freedom consists in being able to 
pursue their individual interests and citizenship becomes less a collective, political activity 
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than an individual, economic activity. 241  Others have been attracted by the portrayal of 
citizenship as active political participation, while remaining critical of some of its other key 
tenets.242 
 
Limitations of Contemporary Civic Republican Discourse for Disabled People 
Notions of active citizenship require people to take their responsibilities seriously as well as 
claiming their rights. This poses problems for people who are different or in competing 
communities, such as people with disabilities. Modern states are not socially and culturally 
homogenous, so that ideas of civic responsibility vary according to each state and culture.243 
Civic republicanism is not a rights-based manner of thinking and its discourse tends to 
assume that citizens possess the knowledge and skills, the level of wellbeing, amount of 
time, and the freedoms of speech and association that are all necessary for the practice of 
citizenship which is reflective of how a person with a disability would find it difficult to achieve 
citizen subjectivity as the tenets within this discourse are founded upon the unproblematised 
highly rationalised and able subject. This is further highlighted through the way in which civic 
republicanism stresses a rough economic equality among citizens.244 
As people with disabilities experience a range of injustices at both the socio-cultural and 
political-economic levels, this discourse of citizenship will find it difficult to create a space for 
disability or a person with a disability, as the genesis of the ‗citizen‘ is an undifferentiated 
individual. Using the example of current labour market structures, it would be questionable 
whether alleged common employment history or common bonds experienced within the 
workplace are similar for both a person with a disability. 
Contemporary Liberal Citizenship Model of Citizenship 
Liberty for Rawls is understood in the negative sense, as freedom from interference by the 
state as citizens pursue their self-interest. Human beings are constructed as self-made and 
self-making individuals, whose deepest impulse is the free pursuit of individual self-
interest.245 This vision of freedom is a deeply individualist one, where liberty is understood in 
terms of autonomy, which literally translated means ‗governed by one‘s own law.‘246 The fact 
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that historical relationships that also ‗make‘ of us what we are, are overlooked within this 
theory which can be problematic for disabled people. 
 
Problems of Liberal Citizenship in Application to Disability 
A tension exists in the contractual, liberal model. This friction occurs between the individual 
and the collective, as freedom is understood, through a narrative of self-determination 
against the perceived tyranny of the collective or community.247 The citizen‘s gender, race, 
age, psychological and emotional characteristics amongst others are either ignored or, as in 
the case with Rawls, are considered irrelevant to an articulation of the rights of freedom. By 
not recognizing race as a marker for differential experiences of citizenship, it overlooks the 
experiences of people who are racially different. Black people, for example, may not in fact 
experience freedom in this individualist sense unless it is through a collective expression of 
freedom as reflected in the case of black people engaged in the civil rights movement.248 I 
would add that it also reflects an abilist norm where some disabled people who are more 
likely to live interdependent lives are also not reflected in this interpretation of liberty. 
 
Finally, although Rawls argues for citizenship activities and for liberty which is understood in 
a negative sense, the self that emerges within the classical and social justice model of 
citizenship rights is a passive one.249 The rights of liberty and equality that this self owns are 
innate or inherent in nature. The citizen does not have to do something in order to merit 
these rights, nor is the ownership of rights dependent on the activities in which a citizen may 
or may not engage.250 
 
Contemporary Liberal Conception Of Citizenship Marshall‟s Formulation 
Thomas H. Marshall is the first who focused on the conflict inherent in modern industrial 
societies: the tension between equality, as an assumption of the notion of citizenship, and 
inequality, as a consequence of class structure of capitalist system. Marshall‘s point of 
departure in analyzing the relation between citizenship and social class, in his 1949 essay 
Citizenship and Social Class, is the possible conflict of citizenship (as a system of equality) 
with capitalism (as a system of inequality).251 
Marshall raises three questions related to the problems of post-war English context. Firstly 
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he asks whether the basic equality, represented in the formal rights of citizenship, is 
consistent with the inequalities of social class. He suggests that the two are compatible. The 
second question he raises is that whether it is true that basic equality can be created and 
preserved without invading the freedom of the competitive market? His answer is ‗obviously 
it is not true.‘ Thirdly, he asks what are the consequences of the shift of emphasis from 
duties to rights?252 
Marshall believes that the modern drive towards social inequality is the latest phase of an 
evolution of citizenship that has been in continuing progress for some 250 years. In order to 
prepare a ground for his analysis he goes back to the historical development of citizenship in 
British society. He divides citizenship into three parts or elements: civil, political and social. 
The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom: liberty of 
person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid 
contracts, and the right to justice. The institutions most directly associated with civil rights are 
courts of justice. The political element is the right to participate in the exercise of political 
power. The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government. By 
the social element he means the whole range from the right to economic welfare and 
security to the right to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in 
the society. The related institutions are the educational system and the social services. 253  
He mentions that these three elements of citizenship were developed separately, because 
they depended on distinct institutions. He assigns formative periods to each element: civil 
rights to the eighteenth century; political rights to nineteenth century; and social rights to 
twentieth century with an overlap between last two.254 Marshall‟ s historical analysis reveals 
that: civil rights were held to belong to all adult members of a community in the eighteenth 
century in England. At first, the terms freedom and citizenship were interchangeable in the 
towns. Then, when freedom became universal, citizenship transformed from a local into a 
national institution. Although, freedom and citizenship gave legal powers, class prejudice and 
lack of unity were obstacles to their use. In the early nineteenth century, the formative period 
of political rights began, when civil rights (attached to the status of freedom) had already 
associated with a general status of citizenship. The nineteenth century was a period in which 
the foundation of social rights were laid (in the case of education and factory legislation) but 
the principle of social rights as an integral part of the citizenship status was either denied or 
not clearly admitted.255 
Marshall argues that the right to education is a genuine social right of citizenship, because 
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the aim is to shape the future adult. For him, it should be regarded ‗not as the right of child to 
go to school, but as the right of the adult citizen to have been educated.‘256 The growth of 
public elementary education during the nineteenth century was the first attempt for the 
reestablishment of the social rights of citizenship in the twentieth century. Civil rights, which 
were intensely individual in origin, harmonized within the individualist phase of capitalism. 
However, unlike civil rights, the political rights of citizenship have posed a threat to the 
capitalist system. One of the important achievements of political power in the nineteenth 
century was to enable the workers to use their civil rights collectively by means of trade 
unionism. Marshall comments that: ‗This was an anomaly, because hitherto it was political 
rights that were used for collective action, through parliament and local councils, whereas 
civil rights were intensely individual, and had therefore harmonized with the individualism of 
early capitalism.‘ 257  Therefore, trade unionism created a set of secondary industrial 
citizenship. By the twentieth century, citizenship and the capitalist class system have been in 
an obvious conflict. 
The demand for diminishing economic inequality between social classes has been met by 
incorporating social rights in the status of citizenship. The aim of social rights was ‗class 
abatement‘ by creating a universal right to real income which is not proportionate to the 
market value of claimant.258 Apart from equalizing incomes, social services aimed at an 
equalization between the more and the less fortunate (between the healthy and the sick, the 
employed and the unemployed, the old and the active) as individuals.259 Marshall stresses 
that there are limits inherent in the egalitarian movement. For him, the movement is a double 
one: it operates together with citizenship and  the economic system. The purpose in both 
cases is to eliminate the illegitimate inequalities, but the standard of legitimacy is not the 
same: ‗In the former it is the standard of social justice, in the latter it is social justice 
combined with economic necessity.‘ 260  Thus, Marshall conceptualized capitalism as a 
dynamic system in which social and political life determined by the tension between 
egalitarian citizenship and unequal economic relations. 
Brain Turner criticizes the work of Marshall in certain respects. First of all, he argues 
Marshall‘s theory was undeveloped in the sense of a state theory (Turner claims that a 
theory of citizenship must also produce a theory of the state). Secondly, for Turner, Marshall 
failed to explain how the resources which are necessary for welfare are to be generated and 
redistributed by the sate to claimants. Thirdly, in defining the state as a stabilizer, Marshall 
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did not emphasize the role of violence or threats of violence in the growth of citizenship.261 
Turner underlies the fact that Marshall‘s theory is no longer relevant to a period of 
disorganized capitalism. He associates the decline of the welfare system with the decline of 
organized working class communities which also makes the articulation of interests more 
problematic.262 It is obvious that Marshall‘s analysis was based on the economic relations of 
a specific phase of capitalism. On the other hand, he developed his theory with reference to 
a nation-state immune from global pressures. His account of citizenship is a typical passive 
or private citizenship263 guaranteed by a liberal democratic welfare system.  
Problems with Marshall‘s Contemporary Liberal Model  of Citizenship 
Contemporary models of liberal citizenship often begin with an analysis of T.H. Marshall‘s 
post-war conception of citizenship which focuses on a number of citizenship rights. These 
models concern the rights of disabled people in post-1950s society. His influential theory will 
be briefly outlined and discussed in relation to its strengths and weaknesses vis-a-vis 
minority groups and to disabled people. The concept of liberty is fundamental in defining 
both citizenship claims as well as notions of the citizen‘s self in contesting theories.  
 
Marshall holds that citizenship is a matter of ensuring that everyone is treated as a full and 
equal member of society.264 He offers a tripartite view of citizenship, dividing it along the 
lines of civil, political and social, and is concerned with notions of liberty and equality, 
achievable through civil and political rights which grant full and equal membership. Marshall 
observes: ―Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. 
All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the 
status is endowed.‖ 265 
Marshall‘s argument in the statement—‗citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are 
full members of a community‘266—evokes a level of duty and responsibility necessary to 
receive the benefits of citizenship. What is the criterion that defines full membership? Full 
members of society are individuals who are employed, who are involved in their community, 
and as Marshall states: ‗all who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and 
                                                             
261 Turner, Bryan S. (1992) ‗Outline of a Theory of Citizenship‘, pp. 33–62 in Chantal Mouffe (ed.) Dimensions of 
Radical Democracy. London: Verso. 
262  Turner, Bryan S. (1992) ‗Outline of a Theory of Citizenship‘, pp. 39 in Chantal Mouffe (ed.) Dimensions of 
Radical Democracy. London: Verso. 
263 (Kymlicka and Norman,1994: 354), Kymlicka, Will (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
264 Marshall (1950, ), Marshall, T. (1950). Citizenship and social class and other essays. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. McRuer, Robert. 2006. Crip theory : Cultural signs of queerness and disability. Cultural front; 
cultural front 
265 (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 354), Kymlicka, Will (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
266  Marshall (1950, ), Marshall, T. (1950). Citizenship and social class and other essays. Cambridge: Cambridge  
 
 
 82 
duties with which the status is endowed.‘ 267  What is fundamental about this societal 
membership is that members must participate at a level in society that is deemed acceptable 
by other members prior to having their societal rights of citizenship confirmed. Marshall 
assumes that individuals automatically possess the ability and the means to join their 
community and to be accepted which is not the case for many disabled people.  
For Marshall, the fullest expression of citizenship requires a liberal-democratic welfare state 
so civil, political and social rights can be guaranteed to all. The welfare state in Marshall‘s 
view ensures that every member of society operates like a full member and is able to 
participate in and enjoy common life.268 When any of these rights are withheld or violated, 
people will be marginalised and unable to participate.  
While Marshall did not specifically engage with disability, he believed that social rights 
enabled what he termed ‗the disadvantaged‘ to enter mainstream society and effectively to 
exercise their civil and political rights. Social rights for Marshall range from the right to a 
modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social 
heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the 
society.269 
The key elements are membership of a community (itself an increasingly contested concept); 
the rights and obligations which flow from that membership and equality. In each case, we 
are talking not simply about a set of legal rules governing the relationship between 
individuals and the state in which they live but also a set of sociological relationships 
between individuals and the state and between individual citizens. 
 
There are both classical liberals who would confine citizenship to the formal (negative) civil 
and political rights necessary to protect individual freedom; and, those who, following 
Marshall, would also include social rights as necessary to the promotion of a more positive 
notion of freedom.  
 
Limitations of Marshall‘s Citizenship for Disabled people; 
Marshall‘s liberal view of the citizen is inherently problematic for people with disabilities on a 
number of complex levels. 
First, the key site of rendering the disabled subject invisible is that the universal notion of 
citizenship as a ‗status‘ and as a set of ‗rights‘ confers the subject as equal outside of 
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societal structures. This poses a series of problems for people with disabilities, as it is often 
the societal structures, which render them oppressed. An individual cannot achieve full 
participation if the means to achieve participation are contributing to the very exclusion they 
wish to overcome.  
In other words, if we use Marshall‘s notion that to withhold rights renders the individual 
unequal and unable to participate as a citizen (therefore no longer possessing the necessary 
full status), this assumes that equality precedes the rights universally granted, and only by 
removing such given rights does a person become marginalised.  
Once such rights are granted, the status itself is free of both socio-cultural, political-
economic inequalities. This is problematic for the individual who is unable to participate in 
any citizenship realm due to their citizen ‗status‘ being inherently bound in socio-cultural and 
political-economic injustices. What of the individual who is further marginalised by attempts 
to grant them full participation? 
To enable a person to be granted full and equal rights, whatever is being granted must be 
value free. People with disabilities within a liberal framework cannot achieve such value free 
justice, nor full equality, nor can they ever achieve the status of ‗citizen,‘ for the reference 
point remains an unproblematised abled bodied individual with capacities assumed to be 
equal. Within such a framework, the implication of granting social rights (thereby assuming 
ability to equally participate in civil and political rights) is in itself problematic and requires 
further deconstruction: such rights overlook the fact that it is societal and economic 
structures themselves, which are a site for injustices. In the example of social security—
which is a social right according to Marshall and a means for achieving access to the political 
and civil realms—the ability to access and obtain social security benefits does not remove 
the multiple and complex barriers which a person with a disability faces. Social rights 
therefore do not in themselves enable the disabled subject to compete equally in civil and 
political society. Marshall‘s theory of social citizenship does not allow us to picture a society 
such as this, as his very definition of citizenship entails a citizen who is employed.  
Furthermore, central to Marshall's argument is the statement, ‗citizenship is a status 
bestowed on those who are full members of a community.‘270 This evokes a level of duty and 
responsibility necessary to receive the benefits of citizenship. But what is the criterion that 
defines full membership?  A full member of society is an individual who is employed, who is 
involved in their community and as Marshall states ‗all who possess the status are equal with 
respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed.‘271  What is fundamental 
about this societal membership is that one must participate at a level in society that is 
deemed acceptable by other members prior to having their societal rights of citizenship 
confirmed. Marshall assumes that individuals automatically possess the ability and the 
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means to join their community and to be accepted.  This idea of community has held 
different meanings throughout history and, during the time period that Marshall was writing, 
communities were smaller and there were often common links, such as farming or religion 
that tied individuals to one another.  Currently, with the shrinking of the world‘s economy and 
joining of political forces, it could be argued that maintaining a sense of community has 
become difficult, yet the idea of community still exists today as evidenced by the numerous 
religious, ethnic, racial and social justice communities that have all reached the same 
conclusion: that building an identity through a community is a fundamental step towards 
gaining full social rights from the remainder of society. As Jenson argues: ‗it is only by 
naming themselves that groups and individuals can identify themselves and their interest 
and hope to gain recognition from others.‘272  By building strong communities that share 
fundamental aspirations for recognition, groups are able to present a united and strong 
presence to the rest of society and will hopefully begin to influence society and gain social 
rights as a result.  
The relationship between citizenship and social class has been the focus of much of 
Marshall‘s writing and in comparing these two elements, Marshall has stated that citizenship 
is a system of burgeoning equality, whereas the basis of social class is inequality. 273  
Combining these two elements within the spectrum of capitalism, Marshall recognizes that 
although they work as opposing forces, they still co-exist and operate as a basis for the 
capitalist system. To benefit from Marshall‘s work, we must remember the context in which 
Marshall was writing (the end of the 1940s) and researching (the beginnings of capitalism in 
the nineteenth century). Marshall argues that there were various intersecting forces that 
made the co-existence of citizenship rights and social class inequality possible, namely the 
focus on developing civil rights and the attempt by the state to lessen the poverty 
experienced by the lower class. As Marshall argues, the development of civil rights was 
‗indispensable to a competitive market economy.‘274  Furthermore, civil rights ‗gave to each 
man the power to engage as an independent unit in the economic struggle and made it 
possible to deny to him social protection on the ground that he was equipped with the means 
to protect himself.‘275  Therefore, employment was the force that determined ones ability to 
care for their own social needs and the wage became the tool that was the prerequisite to 
societal participation. Furthermore, it was the underdevelopment of social rights that 
supported this system in which employment was the only option to improve one‘s social 
class position. Unfortunately, these circumstances remain the force that determines one‘s 
ability to improve their social class standing and their ability to practice the social rights that 
did eventually sprout.  
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Placing Marshall‘s theory in a contemporary setting, it is obvious that it is blind to the position 
of persons with disabilities in our society as he refuses to highlight any barriers, aside from 
social class, that may hinder an individual from actively participating in their own community. 
Marshall‘s silence on these individuals has contributed to the long-standing acceptance in 
our society that certain people are incapable of actively contributing to our society. Further to 
this, there have been widespread efforts to forcefully erect barriers that ensure that attempts 
by persons with disabilities, women and other minority groups to participate are defeated. 
For Marshall, social rights included the ‗right to live the life of a civilized being according to 
the standards prevailing in society.‘276 However, his definition of societal standards needs to 
be expanded to specify what these standards are. For example, are life opportunities and 
choices such as marriage, owning a home, having personal savings and cohabitation 
included as social rights?  The idea of societal standards implies that members of our 
society should have the same opportunity to pursue and experience the life choices that are 
defined by the standards of our society. However, Marshall‘s theory does not explicitly detail 
the barriers that have perpetually prevented a large segment of our society from actively 
pursuing the societal standards that are recognized by our society.    
Writing at the end of World War Two, when minority groups were excluded from theoretical 
questions, Marshall focused solely upon working white men.  At the foundation of Marshall‘s 
citizenship lies his conception of the ideal citizen: a white able-bodied male, who is capable 
and willing to sell his labour on the capitalist market. Furthermore, this ideal citizen needs to 
expend a level of duty and obligation that is reflective of the standards set by his society. 
This is one of the fundamental problems faced when considering the relevance of Marshall‘s 
work for contemporary theorists, as Fraser and Gordon argue that Marshall theorized ‗only a 
minority of the population.‘277 Therefore his theory needs to be expanded to consider how 
people who do not meet this criterion can be in receipt of the three elements of citizenship.  
In tracing the historical development of the idea of citizenship, Marshall states that 
‗citizenship has been a developing institution in England since at least since the latter part of 
the seventeenth century, then it is clear that its growth coincides with the rise of capitalism, 
which is a system not of equality, but of inequality.‘278 Aside from Marshall‘s recognition that 
inequality is inherent in capitalism, participating in the capitalist market has nevertheless 
been the ideal approach for completing the duty of citizenship. As Marshall states, quite 
simply in ―Citizenship and Social Rights‖ and with apparently little regard for individuals who 
are unable to compete in the environment created by capitalism that ‗to have and hold a job 
is quite simple.‘ 279   The assumption that citizens can participate equally in an unequal 
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environment has perpetuated the belief that paid work is the only tool that can measure 
one's ability to expend the duties of citizenship in return for the rights of citizenship. 
Moreover, Marshall assumes that employment is not only a viable option for all, but that 
gaining employment is an easy path for all citizens to navigate. Marshall has argued that 
‗equality of status is more important than equality of income,‘280 however in our society, our 
status is dictated by income; the two are indivisible. 
The basis for Marshall‘s development of degrees of citizenship is embedded in the belief that 
relying upon government assistance removes the individual or family from the rights and 
benefits associated with his initial conception of citizenship. These degrees of citizenship are 
indicative of the intensive focus and pressure that Marshall‘s theory places upon being 
socially and economically responsible for oneself and one‘s family through paid employment, 
rather than relying upon social assistance schemes. Dwyer identifies a contemporary growth 
in the conception of the ‗active citizen,‘ as an individual ‗who recognizes that (s)he must 
accept, first and foremost, responsibility for their own (and their family's) welfare. Recourse 
to limited state provision is viewed as a last resort.‘281  For those unable to join the ranks of 
the active citizenry and who as a result rely upon social assistance schemes, an identity of 
second-class citizenship is attached. This moniker stems from the insistence of government 
and society that if one receives social income assistance that they must in return accept 
some level of limitation placed upon how they can live. As Marshall illustrated, with historical 
reference to the Poor Laws, ‗the stigma which clung to poor relief expressed the deep 
feelings of a people who understood that those who accepted relief must cross the road that 
separated the community of citizens from the outcast company of the destitute.‘282   
Marshall‘s only attempt to recognize difference among citizens stems from his interpretation 
of the social class system. He makes the argument that the ‗inequality of the social class 
system may be acceptable provided the equality of citizenship is recognized.‘ 283   This 
statement only holds true for Marshall's ideal citizen, as equality of citizenship has rarely 
been applicable to, a result of the differentiation set by our society that persons with 
disabilities are a group that needs to be segregated from the rest of society. However, rather 
than acknowledge that inequalities greatly impede one‘s ability to be an active citizen, 
Marshall argues that inequalities among citizens are justifiable if they provoke the individual 
to better themselves.284   
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Marshall roots the problem of inequality with the individual and their inability to adapt 
themselves to the standards set by society, rather than faulting society for not adapting to 
the demands of its citizens. Much like the biomedical definition of disability, citizens are 
unable to challenge the inequalities that they face because they have been stripped of the 
power needed to force societal change. It is therefore necessary to begin to seriously work 
towards a redefinition of citizenship that embraces difference, empowers citizens and is 
representative of the diversified abilities of citizens.  
Marshall‘s theory does not allow much space for disabled people. He appears to be saying 
that the existence of rights, and of equality in respect of them modifies the nature of the 
relationship between people, and determines the fundamental character of society. Equality 
of rights and recognition of common belonging to society conversely stimulates the feeling of 
such belonging. If true this is directly relevant in the analysis of a possible reformulation of 
citizenship. In the case of many persons with disabilities, they are viewed as unemployable, 
where employment and productivity are seen as prerequisites for citizenship membership; 
therefore, the category of non-citizen has been attached to them. They are largely 
suspended from social obligations, but in turn, must dedicate themselves to improve their 
health by following medical advice. They are viewed as an ‗economic cost that must be 
factored into society-wide economic policy decisions.‘285 
The goal of social policy is to counteract the lost productivity, created as a result of disability, 
in the most efficient manner possible. Social policies try to develop vocational training 
programmes to create employment opportunities for disabled persons to increase their 
productivity, and to lessen their dependence upon social welfare programmes. It is assumed 
that disabled people are incapable of working as productive employees in our traditional 
understanding of the labour market. Economic experts use a cost-benefit rationale to 
determine the most cost-efficient scenario: ‗Disablement entitlements are entirely derivative 
from and conditional upon some level of macro- economic analysis founded ultimately in 
considerations of efficiency.‘ 286 Therefore, these entitlements are not the result of any right 
to use the social welfare system, but rather are the result of desire for the efficiency of the 
state.  
However, all members of society act on different levels and this interaction cannot be 
measured solely in terms of productivity and labour market participation. There are members 
of our society who will never be able to be employed in the traditional labour market, but they 
are still able to make positive contributions and to participate socially through volunteering, 
social activities, going to a community centre or to a park.  
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Despite advances in opportunities for persons with disabilities, their citizenship membership 
continues to be at best vague. The idea of second-class citizenship prevails. As the 
understanding of disability has been confined to the body and UK economic policy strives 
towards ever increasing efficiency, some people have been able to ignore the social 
conditions that aggravate the inability of a person with a disability to function in the ‗normal‘ 
world.287 
 
Locke, Rawls and Rousseau, Hume and Kant and Marshall all present concepts which 
disregard the intellectually disabled and severely physically disabled and paves the way for 
more expansive exclusions and limited citizenship.  
 
Citizenship Based on Rawls‟s Concept of Liberal Justice 
John Rawls wants to make liberal democracy more responsive to difference. His point of 
departure is deep disagreement on the arrangement of a constitutional democracy in such a 
way that the basic rights and liberties of citizens (as free and equal persons) are secured. He 
conceives of this disagreement as a conflict within the tradition of democratic thought, 
between ‗the liberties of the moderns‘ (the tradition derived from Locke) and ‗the liberties of 
ancient‘ (the tradition derived from Rousseau).288 ‗Justice as fairness‘ tries to adjudicate 
between these traditions. 
Given the wide range of diversity in conceptions of the good among citizens of liberal 
societies, to find a basis of political agreement is a crucial need for liberal democracies. 
Rawls‘s attempt in A Theory of Justice (1971) is a response to this need. He introduces the 
concept of justice as a means of narrowing the range of public disagreement and 
maintaining social co-operation. He tries to do this by deriving principles of justice in a way 
that it does not suppose any particular conception of the good. His aim is to work out a 
theory of justice as an alternative to the classical utilitarian and intuitionist conceptions of 
justice. 
He presents the main idea of justice as fairness as a theory of justice that generalizes and 
carries the traditional conception of the social contract (as found in Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau and Kant) to a higher level of abstraction. However, he does not think of the 
original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form of 
government. He designs an initial situation that incorporates certain procedural constrains on 
arguments constructed to lead to an original agreement on principles of justice. The 
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principles of justice would be accepted in an initial position of equality by free and rational 
persons who are concerned to promote their own interests. These principles of justice are to 
regulate all further agreements. Rawls calls this way of regarding the principles of justice as 
‗justice as fairness.‘ His study not only returned political theory to the ground level study of 
the ‗desirable,‘ but also original in neglecting established disciplinary boundaries and 
developing an argument for the feasibility of the particular proposals put forward: that is, the 
feasibility of the two principles of justice.289 The central organizing notion of Rawls‘s justice 
concept is the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation. Two fundamental ideas 
follow this central idea. First, the idea of citizens (those involved in cooperation) as free and 
equal persons.290 Second, the idea of a well-ordered society that is designed to advance the 
good of its members when it is also effectively regulated by a public conception of justice. It 
is a society in which (1) everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same 
principles of  justice, and (2) the basic social institutions generally satisfy these principles.291 
In this situation, men acknowledge a common point from which their claims may be 
adjudicated, while they may put forth excessive demands on one another. Because, the 
general desire for justice limits the pursuit of other ends, ‗Those who hold different 
conceptions of justice can, then, still agree that institutions are just when no arbitrary 
distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties...‘292 
By justice Rawls refers to social justice, the primary subject of which is the basic structure of 
the society that is the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights 
and duties, and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation. For instance, 
the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive market, 
private property in the means of production, and the monogamous family are the major 
social institutions concerned by him. The major institutions are important in the sense that 
they define men‘s rights and duties and influence their life prospects. In other words, justice 
as fairness is framed to apply to what he calls the basic structure of a modern constitutional 
democracy (or democratic regime). Rawls does not consider whether justice as fairness can 
be developed to a general political conception for different kinds of societies other than 
Western democracies.293 
Rawls‘s Contractrian Strategy 
For Rawls, a conception of social justice is to be regarded as providing a standard whereby 
the distributive aspects of the basic structure of society are to be assessed. He characterizes 
justice as one part of social ideal, although he argues that the theory he proposed extends 
its everyday sense. The first assumption of Rawls‘s contractrian strategy is that when asked 
what we would choose, we should be concerned with what we choose under a ‗veil 
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of ignorance‘ that screens out self-interest.294 That is, the persons in the original position are 
unaware of what their position is in the society. They decide on the principles of justice 
without any knowledge of their own situation: whether they are female or male, black or 
white, rich or poor, theist or atheist. This is the original position of contract. On the other 
hand, the persons in the original position have a picture of all the general truths about 
human beings and social organization in their minds. That is, they are aware of the 
economic and social inequalities, prejudices and power relations in the society. 
The choice that they make would be feasible in the light of that general information. The 
people in the original position are individuals rather than institutional persons. All parties in 
the original position can be expected to vote in the same way, since each is assumed to be 
equally ignorant (of their situation in the society) and rational (since they would not want to 
be harmed in any case). Thus a randomly selected individual in the original position would 
choose the basic structure of the society. 
As Rawls intends to define a fair agreement between free and equal persons, he wants to 
find some point of view which is not distorted by the particular circumstances of the 
background framework. The original position with the feature of ‗veil of ignorance‘ serves this 
aim. By this way he tries to overcome the handicaps of social contract doctrines: ‗The idea is 
to use the original position to model both freedom and equality and restrictions on reason in 
such a way that it becomes perfectly evident which agreement would be made by the parties 
as citizen‟ s representatives.‘295 
It is not easy to understand how a person is able to choose among alternatives who is 
independent of his or her conception of good that give meaning and value to life. Rawls 
insists that the original position is to be seen as a ‗device of representation‘ and hence any 
agreement reached by the parties must be regarded as both hypothetical and nonhistorical. 
Here the difficulty he faces is: since hypothetical agreements cannot bind, what is the 
significance of  the original position? His answer is by the role of the various features of the 
original position. For him, the fact that we occupy a particular social position is not a good 
reason for us to accept a conception of justice that may favor those in that position. Rawls 
claims that the idea of original position serves as a means of public reflection and self-
clarification. However, he does not fully explain why the participants in the original position 
would choose two principles of justice. Furthermore, why the social contract takes the 
particular form he defines? Even under the veil of ignorance, people might choose other 
options such as to have no society at all; or removal or withdrawal from the circumstances; 
or they may choose to accept injustice or risk of injustice.296 
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Two Principles of Justice 
First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty of others. Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone‘s advantage, and (b) 
attached to positions and offices open to all.297 He calls this second principle the ‗difference 
principle.‘ These are to govern the assignment of rights and duties, and to regulate the 
distribution of social and economic advantages. They presuppose that the social structure 
can be divided into two distinct parts, the first principle applying to the one, the second to the 
other. They distinguish respectively those aspects of social system that define and secure 
the equal liberties of citizenship and those that determine and establish social and economic 
inequalities. As citizens of a just society are to have the same basic rights, liberties of 
citizenship are all required to be equal by the first principle. The second principle, on the 
other hand, arranges social and economic inequalities in a way that everyone benefits. 
Rawls asserts that these principles are to be arranged in a serial order with the first principle 
prior to the second. This is a very important point in his understanding of liberalism since the 
aim is to prevent the compensation of the social and economic advantages for equal liberty 
of citizens. This is the impact of Kant who argued that the empirical principles, such as utility, 
were unfit to serve as basis for the moral law. An instrumental defence of freedom and rights 
leaves rights vulnerable, and also fails to respect the inherent dignity of persons. 
Like most of the contemporary liberals, Rawls believes that certain fundamental rights 
cannot be sacrificed for the general welfare. He claims that all values (liberty and opportunity, 
income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect) are to be distributed equally unless an 
unequal distribution of any of these is to everyone‘s advantage. Then he defines injustice as 
the inequalities that are not to benefit of all. 
Justice as a Political Concept 
During the decades following A Theory of Justice , Rawls has changed his views on a 
number of points. He tried to avoid the certain metaphysical and philosophical claims such 
as claims to universal truth, or claims about the nature and identity of persons. Rawls 
asserts that he failed to stress ‗justice as fairness‘ as a political concept. His idea is that a 
public conception of justice in a constitutional democracy should be independent of 
controversial philosophical doctrines.298 The main point is that no general moral conception 
can provide a publicly recognized basis for a conception of justice in a modern democratic 
state. Political justice must allow the plurality of conflicting doctrines. 
For Rawls, the basis of public agreement is to be a new way of organizing familiar ideal and 
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principles into a conception of political justice so that the claims on conflict are seen in 
another light.299 Thus, justice as fairness serves a practical need of a liberal society. In this 
sense it is a practical political conception not metaphysical or epistemological. Justice as 
fairness, as such, aims to found a political agreement that supports the goods of all citizens 
as free and equal persons. Rawls appeals to this practical conception since he believes that 
philosophy (or morality or religion) cannot provide a workable and shared basis. His aim of 
avoiding disputed philosophical questions is not for the sake of neutrality (as most of the 
liberals do) but he thinks that there is no way to resolve them politically. By this method of 
avoidance he hopes that ‗existing differences between contending political views can at least 
be moderated, even if not entirely removed, so that social cooperation on the basis of mutual 
respect can be maintained.‘300 
In his 1993 book Political Liberalism, Rawls reevaluates some of his ideas from A Theory of 
Justice concerning justice as fairness as a form of political liberalism. He takes for granted 
following the ‗missing pieces:‘ (1) the idea of  justice as fairness as a free standing view and 
that of an overlapping consensus as belonging to its account of stability; (2) the distinction 
between simple pluralism and reasonable pluralism, together with the idea of a reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine; and (3) a fuller account of the reasonable and the rational worked 
into the conception of political (as opposed to moral) constructivism, so as to bring out the 
bases of the principles of rights and justice in practical reason.301  
 Reasonable Citizen as an Alternative to Rational citizen 
The most important contribution of Political Liberalism is the introduction of concept 
of reasonableness. Rawls derives the distinction between reasonable and rational from W. M. 
Sibley‘s basic distinction: ‗knowing that people are rational we do not know the ends they will 
pursue, only that they will pursue them intelligently. Knowing that people are reasonable 
where others are concerned, we know that they are willing to govern their conduct by a 
principle from which they and others can reason in common; and reasonable people take 
into account the consequences of their actions on others‘ well being.‘ To be reasonable is 
neither derived from nor opposed to the rational but it is incompatible with egoism.302 
For Rawls the reasonable is an element of the idea of society as a system of fair cooperation. 
Reasonable persons are supposed to be not moved by the general good as such but desire, 
for its own sake, a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others. 
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They insist that reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits along with 
others. However, the rational applies to a single unified agent (individual or corporate person) 
with the powers of judgement and deliberation in seeking ends and interests of its own. 
Rationality is a capacity to define and act in accordance with a set of priorities governed by a 
conception of the good. Rational agents lack a kind of moral sensibility that underlies the 
desire to engage in fair cooperation. Another difference between them is that the reasonable 
is public in a way the rational is not. On the other hand, the reasonable and rational are 
complementary ideas, they cannot stand without the other. In a reasonable society, Rawls 
claims, all have their own rational ends they hope to advance, and all propose fair terms that 
others may reasonably be expected to accept. 
A reasonable doctrine is, first of all, an exercise of theoretical reason: it covers the major 
religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human life. Secondly, it is an exercise of 
practical reason: it singles out which values to count as significant and how to balance them 
when they conflict. Thirdly, it belongs or draws upon a tradition of thought and doctrine. 
Although stable over time, it evolves slowly in the light of what it sees as good and sufficient 
reasons. 
Rawls asserts that being reasonable is part of a political ideal of democratic citizenship that 
includes the idea of public reason. This ideal encompass what free and equal citizens (as 
reasonable) can require of each other with respect to their reasonable comprehensive views. 
Contrary to the rational, the reasonable addresses the public world of others. Throughout 
Political Liberalism reasonableness and rationality are simply attributed to citizens. Rawls 
does not give a reason how they got there. He does not ask how they can be produced or 
maintained.303 
Political liberalism, proposed by Rawls, does not question the correctness or truth of 
comprehensive doctrines because a constitutional regime does not require an agreement on 
a comprehensive doctrine. However, by questioning their reasonableness, it actually implies 
the suppression of ‗irrational‘ and ‗unreasonable‘ world views. This is a necessary condition 
for Rawlsian liberalism, to maintain the stability of the system what he calls ‗well ordered 
society.‘ Rawls admits comprehensive doctrines as far as they do not threat the democratic 
regime. 
Citizen as the Political Conception of the Person 
Rawls identifies citizens in the original position as free persons in three respects. First, 
citizens are free in that they conceive of themselves and one another as having the moral 
power to have a conception of the good. They have both political and nonpolitical aims and 
commitments. They affirm the values of political justice and want to see them embodied in 
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political institutions and social policies. These two kinds of commitments and attachments—
political and nonpolitical—specify moral identity and give shape to a person‘s way of life. 
Rawls claims that in a well-ordered society supported by an overlapping consensus, citizens‘ 
political values and commitments, as part of their non institutional or moral identity, are the 
same. Second, citizens regard themselves as self-authenticating sources of valid claims. 
They regard themselves as being entitled to make claims on their institutions in order to 
advance their conceptions of the good. Third, they are viewed as capable of taking 
responsibility for their ends and this affects how their various claims are assessed. He notes 
that citizens conceive of themselves as free in these three ways in the public political culture 
of a constitutional democratic regime.304 In this formulation, citizens are free as long as they 
think and act in conformity with the liberalism defined by Rawls. Citizens are capable 
of choosing and rationally pursuing their good, and have the right to promote their self-
interests to the extent that they are aware of and respect that the others have the same right. 
General Criticisms of Rawls‘s Theory 
Rawls‘s theory contains both of the basic components of liberal theory namely the 
commitment to the freedom of the individual in terms of civil liberties, and the belief in 
equality of opportunity and a more egalitarian distribution of resources which supports a 
redistributive welfare state. For this he has been criticized by both libertarians and 
communitarians. For libertarians the distributive aspect of Rawls‘s theory shows that he does 
not take individuals and their freedoms seriously enough, while for communitarians he gives 
a priority to individuals over their community because of his stress on individual liberties.305 
From a communitarian stand, Tom Bridges criticizes Rawls‘s attachment to a formalistic and 
monological conceptions of reason which distances his liberalism from civic values and civic 
culture.306 Michael Sandel argues that Rawls‘s conception of the self is an ‗unencumbered' 
self that is not constituted within a community and do not permit to develop a constitutive 
community na community that would constitute the identity of the individuals.307 It only allows 
for an ‗instrumental community‘ in which individuals promote their self-interests. From a 
leftist point of view, Paul Treanor regards Rawls as being conservative since he advocates 
stability and public order.308 Treanor argues that Rawls‘s theory legitimizes the ‗nation state‘ 
through his contractarian strategy. A hidden assumption of Rawls‘ theory is that citizens are 
the members of a nation, thus nationhood is the determinant of membership to a political 
community.309 
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Problems with John Rawls‘s Modern Conflation of Civic Republican and Liberal models of 
Citizenship for Disabled People 
John Rawls makes use of both the classic and contemporary models of citizenship. He 
weaves the two major threads of modern political thought (liberal and republican) together in 
his monumental A Theory of Justice.310 Rawls builds upon Kant‘s moral insights regarding 
the dignity of human beings but replaces Kantian metaphysics with Lockean contract and 
Humean ‗rough equality‘ as the basis for his own theory of justice.  However, whether these 
two major models are separate or conflated, neither work when addressing full citizenship for 
disabled people. Rawls once again, defines disabled people by their ‗incapacity.‘ They are 
seen as objects of ‗pity‘ and ultimately excluded from the principles of justice, governed 
instead by charity.311 Methodologically, Rawls begins, as did Locke and Kant, with a society 
made up of free and equal individuals where freedom is inextricably linked to reason and 
equality with cooperation. He concludes that since one needs to be a ‗fully‘ cooperating 
member of political, disabled people are excluded from the original position. 
 
Rawls starts from the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation, and assumes that 
persons as citizens have all the capacities that enable them to be normal and fully 
cooperating members of society.312 This does not imply that no one ever suffers from illness 
or accident; such misfortunes are to be expected in the ordinary course of human life: ‗For 
our purposes here I leave aside permanent physical disabilities and mental disorders so 
severe as to prevent persons from being normal and fully cooperating members of society in 
the usual sense.‘313 Given the centrality of the original position to Rawls‘s theory of justice, 
excluding the disabled (including physically disabled) from the principles of justice is deeply 
problematic. 
Rawls‘s argument suffers from his Kantian conception of person which limits the meaning of 
‗normal‘ to those deemed ‗rational.‘ Also because he relies on Hume‘s theory of cooperation 
to define cooperation, and adds on a Lockean social contract as the basis for his original 
position, which further requires that those who make the rules, must be exactly the same 
people as those governed by them. The omission of disabled people from the initial choice of 
basic political principle has large consequences for their equal citizenship. This lack of 
equality means that the use of the social contract theory is flawed. 
 
Today, when the issue of justice for people with disabilities is prominent on the agenda in 
many societies, their lack of participation in the situation of basic political choice looks 
problematic. It is not only the omission from participation that is problematic but the negative 
conceptualization of disability—that is, the negative self-images upon which it rests—that 
need to be recognized and excised. Peter Handley comments on these negative images in 
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Rawls‘s understanding of disability, arguing that Rawls‘s equation of disability with 
abnormality, loss and the diminution of one‘s quality of life reveal the extent to which he 
assumes that models of disability and corresponding policy responses to disability do not 
address wider structural and attitudinal factors regarding disability.314 
 
Rawls‘s reference to disabled people as not being ‗normal‘ requires examination in relation 
to the historical origins of ‗normalcy.‘ Rawls recognizes that the exclusion of disabled 
persons from the original position is problematic. His solution, that disability can be dealt with 
at the legislative stage, is also flawed, as it suggests that the principles of ‗justice‘ are not 
really applicable to the disabled but principles of ‗charity‘ may be applied in how goods will 
be distributed. Rawls similarly uses the original distinction drawn by Locke and Hume 
between the principles of justice to govern rational ‗citizens‘ and that of ‗charity‘ to govern the 
disabled. 
 
The idea of ‗charity,‘ defined in opposition to ‗justice‘ for Locke is important for two reasons. 
First, unlike the later nineteenth century scientific images of the disabled as fundamentally 
different or ‗abnormal‘ degenerates who need to be separated out from ‗normal‘ people, 
institutionalized, and/or sterilized, Locke argues that the disabled are part of humanity but, 
like all human beings, fall short of the ideal image of God. They remain part of the 
community and ought to be treated (in accordance with Christian principles) with kindness by 
others rather than excluded. But the principle of charity also constructs the disabled as 
objects of pity and outside the remit of justice, an image that will last well into the twenty first 
century in both theory and practice as the disabled become represented, through the vehicle 
of numerous charitable campaigns, as dependent, tragic, and pitiable. 
 
Hume‘s conflation of physical and mental disabilities is critically important, not only because 
Rawls incorporates it into his own theory but also because it suggests that there is 
something about disability itself and not simply the principle of ‗irrationality‘ that leads some 
liberal theorists to exclude all disabled people from their principles of justice. 
 
 
Problems with Rawls Theory, Disability and Normalcy 
For those who are abnormal and ‗fully co-operating members of society,‘ Rawls urges a 
moderate redistribution of resources to ameliorate such ‗disadvantage‘ in the name of social 
justice and equality.315 Over and above this, though, it seems that Rawls considers a more 
active role for disabled people as neither possible nor perhaps even appropriate. Rawls‘s 
equation of disability with abnormality, loss and the diminution of one‘s quality of life reflect 
the extent to which both presume an individual medical model of disability and the correlative 
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policy responses to disability that this generates. However by reducing disability to biology 
and ‗personal tragedy‘ wider structural and attitudinal factors that relate to disability are 
unquestioned. 
 
Rawls‘ language which he uses to describe the disabled, is not only shaped by the broad 
historical language described earlier, but also by his decision to use a Kantian framework. 
The meaning of normal or potential only makes sense in relation to Kant‘s specific moral 
claims. Because Kant defines personhood by the capacity for reason, Rawls is forced to 
define those incapable of ‗rationality‘ as outside the ‗normal‘ meaning of personhood. They 
only have the potential to be human and are thus ‗postulated‘ persons, who are incapable of 
realizing their potential in the ―normal way.‖ Rawls use of Kant to anchor his moral theory in 
relation to disability is problematic for a number of reasons.  
 
The use of the word normal requires enormous critical reflection,316 as disability scholar 
Lennard Davis has argued, if the implicit moniker of ‗abnormal‘ and the depreciating self-
images implied for disabled persons are to be recognized and ‗purged‘ from contemporary 
political thought.317 The language of ‗normalcy,‘ only begins in the nineteenth century, with 
the rise of eugenics,318 statistical science,319 and evolutionary theory,320 as disabled human 
                                                             
316 Henri Jacques Stiker in his celebrated The History of Disability argues in the early modern era (seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries) in Europe, disability is generally seen as an ―affliction‖ to be borne by the individual as part of 
God‘s will. Disabled people are seen abnormal and as lacking in relation to the ideal image of God (as all human 
beings are but only more so) and to be treated, in accordance with Christian principles, with charity by the family 
and community. By the nineteenth century, the language shifts to that of human ―deficit,‖ with terms such as ―infirm, 
feeble-minded, invalid, cripple or being incapable.‖ Under the influence of social evolutionary theory and statistical 
science, disability becomes a product of ―nature‖ rather than God, and dis- abled people are increasingly seen as 
―abnormal‖ and ―deviant‖ (in opposition to a ―normal‖ human being). Thus, human beings are no longer seen as 
lacking in different degrees in relation to God but are bifurcated into two categories of humanity: normal and 
abnormal. 
317 Disability scholar Lennard Davis describes how the rise of statistical ―norms‖ in the nineteenth century inevitably 
constructs disability as deviance: ―The norm pins down that majority of the population that fall under the arch of the 
standard bell-shaped curve . . . any bell curve will always have at its extremities those characteristics that deviate 
from the norm. So, with the concept of the norm comes the concept of deviations or extremes. When we think of 
bodies, in a society where the concept of the norm is operative, then people with disabili- ties will be thought of as 
deviants.‖ Lennard J. Davis, ―Constructing Normalcy: The Bell Curve, the Novel, and the Invention of the Disabled 
Body in the Nineteenth Century,‖ in The Disability Studies Reader, ed. Lennard J. Davis (New York: Routledge, 
1997), 9-28, 10. 
318 In the last part of the 19th century, a growing number of scientists, writers and politicians began to interpret 
Darwin‘s theories of evolution and natural selection.  The Social Darwinist idea of ―survival of the fittest‖ and ―natural 
selection‖ considered many poor and disabled people to be worthless REF.  It was believed that even without 
government interference; survival of the fittest would emerge and level out the unfit through the struggle for 
existence see (Paul 1998 p. 95). 
319 The insertion into the language of the developing concept of normality was furthered by the emerging field of 
statistics. Statistics was to provide a system of measurement to link the inculcation of values with the supposedly 
objective, value-neutral mechanisms of the evolving human sciences see (Hacking 1991). The ability to quantify the 
division between what was desirable and what was not, proved to be a potent tool in the administration of 
populations. The French statistician Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1847) situated the norm by linking it to the bell curve, 
the graph which shows the ―normal distribution‖, the majority and its margins, of any population. When Baynton 
(2001) discusses the nature of this majority, he points out that ‗although normality ostensibly denoted the average, 
the usual, and the ordinary, in actual usage it functioned as an ideal and excluded only those defined as below 
average. It was in this way that the rising arch of the curve seemed to, paradoxically, denote the superiority of the 
unexceptional.  
 
320 For thousands of years many philosophers had argued that life must have been created by a supernatural being 
/ creator / God due to the incredible complexity of Nature (in particular, we humans and our minds). Thus it is 
remarkable that Charles Darwin (and others) tried to explain our existence by means of Evolution from Natural 
Selection. Darwin‘s theory of evolution is based on five key observations and inferences drawn from them. These 
observations and inferences have been summarized by the great biologist Ernst Mayr as follows:1) Species have 
great fertility. They make more offspring than can grow to adulthood. 2) Populations remain roughly the same size, 
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beings are measured against the ‗normal; curve and found to be ‗abnormal,‘ ‗deviant,‘321 or 
even ‗degenerates‘ in relation to human evolution.  
 
Second, Rawls continues Locke‘s use of ―rationality‖ as the defining feature of ‗personhood.‘ 
Accepting this understanding of ‗persons,‘ by definition, excludes the mentally disabled from 
what is meant by being human. Third, even if one accepts that ‗reason‘ defines ‗personhood,‘ 
why should physically disabled people be deemed ‗incapable‘ of realizing their potential, as 
Rawls implies in his use of the generic word handicapped? Some might argue that he did not 
mean to include the physically disabled in his description, and the problem would be solved 
if one simply amended the sentence to refer to ‗mentally handicapped‘ only. But the 
conflation of physical and mental disability in political theory is not so simply explained or 
dismissed. The tendency to conflate both kinds of disability is critically important, for if the 
physically disabled are systematically excluded from political theories ostensibly rooted in 
rational agency, it suggests there is something about disability itself (beyond a simple 
categorical antonym to ―reason,‖ as we have been suggesting thus far) that explains the 
long-standing exclusion and discrimination of the physically disabled. 
 
Whether these two major classic or contemporary models of civic republican and liberal 
citizenship are separate or conflated, neither allows for disabled people‘s full citizenship 
rights. 
 
Problems of Liberal Citizenship in Application to Disability 
Liberty for Rawls is understood in the negative sense, as freedom from interference by the 
state as citizens pursue their self-interests. Human beings are constructed as self-made and 
self-making individuals, whose deepest impulse is the free pursuit of individual self-
interest.322 This vision of freedom is a deeply individualist one, where liberty is understood in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
with modest fluctuations. 3) Food resources are limited, but are relatively constant most of the time. From these 
three observations it may be inferred that in such an environment there will be a struggle for survival among 
individuals. 4) In sexually reproducing species, generally no two individuals are identical. Variation is rampant. 5) 
Much of this variation is heritable. From this it may be inferred: In a world of stable populations where each 
individual must struggle to survive, those with the ―best‖ characteristics will be more likely to survive, and those 
desirable traits will be passed to their offspring. These advantageous characteristics are inherited by following 
generations, becoming dominant among the population through time. This is natural selection. It may be further 
inferred that natural selection, if carried far enough, makes changes in a population, eventually leading to new 
species.  
321 In addition to incompetence and dependence, eugenicists drew upon another key rationale for exclusion: 
deviance. Deviance had not been used extensively prior to eugenics as a reason to exclude those with intellectual 
disabilities. However, deviance was an established reason to deny rights and linking feeblemindedness with 
deviance thereby extended this rationale to those labeled feebleminded. Citizenship is a moral construction, 
defining those worthy of rights see (Mink, 1990; Brubaker, 1992; Riesenberg, 1992). Deviants and criminals in 
particular are seen as violators of the moral boundaries of proper citizenship and the state is believed to hold a 
legitimate interest in sacrificing the rights of deviants for the public good. Eugenicists argued that the feebleminded, 
like criminals, had no understanding of morality, no will to avoid seduction or trouble, and ultimately could not be 
trusted to uphold the moral sentiment of the nation see (Bliss, 1916; Kenyon, 1914). In essence, eugenicists set 
about to criminalize the feebleminded in order to parallel their exclusion from rights to that of criminals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 99 
terms of autonomy, which literally translated means ‗governed by one‘s own law.‘323 The fact 
that historical relationships that also ―make‖ of us what we are, are overlooked within this 
theory which can be problematic for disabled people. 
 
A tension exists in the contractual, liberal model. This friction occurs between the individual 
and the collective, as freedom is understood, through a narrative of self-determination 
against the perceived tyranny of the collective or community.324 The citizen‘s gender, race, 
age, psychological and emotional characteristics amongst others are either ignored or, as in 
the case with Rawls, are considered irrelevant to an articulation of the rights of freedom. By 
not recognizing race as a marker for differential experiences of citizenship, it overlooks the 
experiences of people who are racially different. Black people, for example, may not in fact 
experience freedom in this individualist sense unless it is through a collective expression of 
freedom as reflected in the case of black people engaged in the civil rights movement.325 I 
would add that it also reflects an abilist norm where some disabled people who are more 
likely to live interdependent lives are also not reflected in this interpretation of liberty. 
 
Finally, although Rawls argues for citizenship activities and for liberty which is understood in 
a negative sense, the self that emerges within the classical and social justice model of 
citizenship rights is a passive one.326 The rights of liberty and equality that this self owns are 
innate or inherent in nature. The citizen does not have to do something in order to merit 
these rights, nor is the ownership of rights dependent on the activities in which a citizen may 
or may not engage.327 
 
Criticisms of Rawls, Locke, Rousseau, Hume and Kant‟s Treatment of Disability 
The ‗rational‘ citizen or ‗person‘ at the heart of these political theories is repeatedly 
constituted in direct opposition to the disabled ‗other,‘ who is defined as less than ‗normal,‘ 
outside the ‗usual‘ way of being, only ‗potentially‘ human, and governed by the principle of 
charity rather than justice.  Since equality is a ‗background commitment that underlies many 
different policy positions,‘ shouldn‘t understanding the relationship between theories of 
equality and policy consequences heighten our sense of alarm when we realize that Locke‘s, 
Kant‘s and Rawls‘ concepts disregards the cognitively disabled and paves the way for more 
expansive exclusions? What are the consequences on policies for the disabled? Does a 
theory of equality that is complicit with the exclusion of the cognitively disabled render policy 
                                                             
323 (Nedelsky, 1989, p. ) Nedelsky, J. (1989) Reconceiving autonomy, Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, 1, pp. 7–
36. 
212 (ibid 
213 (Lister, 1997). Lister, R. (1997) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (New York: Macmillan) 
Lister, R., Citizenship Towards a feminist synthesis, în Feminist Review, No. 57, Autumn 1997. 
323 (Raphael, 1967; Winston, 1989). Raphael, D. D. (1967) Human rights, old and new, in: D. D. Raphael (Ed.) 
Political Theory and the Rights of Man (Bloomington, IN: University Press)., Winston, M. (1989) Introduction: 
understanding human rights, in: M. Winston (Ed.) The Philosophy of Human Rights (Belmont: Wadsworth). 
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decisions in their favour dubious? Whether we are speaking of paying for personal 
assistants or education for disabled people, funding for the disabled will be competing with 
funding for medical care, public education, wilderness preservation, clean air, street repairs, 
and so forth. Choices will have to be made and priorities set. 
 
Furthermore, is distributive justice, growing out of a Lockean, and also Kantian and Rawlsian, 
principle of charity and a Rawlsian difference principle perspective or helpful? Is the form of 
benefits and services for the disabled enough? Or, rather is it the manner in which such 
distribution takes place which determines whether disabled people are treated as dependent 
‗clients‘ or autonomous citizens that matter. Some contemporary theorists like Ball argue: ‗It 
is impossible to lead a good human life in the absence of the freedom and opportunity to 
exercise personal autonomy the capability to make important life decisions and choices.‘328 
 
Ball is addressing the politics of self-image and wants to replace the language of ‗charity‘ or 
‗dependency,‘ long associated with the disabled person as ‗client‘ or ‗victim‘ with a language 
of autonomy and choice normally associated with the liberal citizen. 
 
If autonomy is defined as ‗self-rule‘ or ‗self-legislation‘ in the Kantian sense and the basis 
upon which to define a ‗good life,‘ it leads back to a definition of ‗personhood‘ that is limited 
to those with the capacity for reason. Only those capable of making important ‗life decisions 
and choices‘ can have a ‗good human life‘—a conclusion that excludes those with serious 
cognitive or mental impairments. Autonomy may work well for many disabled people to 
empower them as citizens, but it continues to create negative language for the intellectually 
disabled in relation to their capacity to be human. 
 
Locke, Rawls and Rousseau, Hume and Kant, all present concepts which disregard the 
intellectually, cognitively and severely physically disabled and pave the way for more 
expansive exclusions. The theories of equality that are complicit with the exclusion of the 
intellectually, cognitively and severely physically disabled lead to egalitarian policy decisions 
in their favour which can be seen as dubious. Providing education for disabled people, or 
including them in mainstream society, funding for the disabled will be competing with funding 
for NHS medical care, state education, museums and other cultural institutions, wilderness 
preservation, clean air, street repairs, and so forth. 
 
Difference Model of Citizenship  
Difference-centred models of citizenship are grounded in theories which have arisen from 
what have been called the ‗new social movements,‘ such as post-colonial, anti-racist, gay, 
lesbian, bisexual and transgendered, feminist, disabled people and other social movements. 
                                                             
328Kant Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Moral1788, Kant Critique of Pure and Practical Reason 
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Based on the insights garnered from these movements, difference-centred theorists envision 
citizenship in terms of a ‗radical, democratic conception of citizenship.‘329 Difference-centred 
theorists reject the normative stance that exists in liberal models of citizenship where the 
citizen‘s self as a ‗rights-bearer‘ or as ‗virtuous‘ is understood in singular and universal terms. 
Nor is it understood through singular identity positions such as gender or race, as is found 
within singular social identity theories such as some feminist theories.330 Rather, difference-
centered theorists take a more fluid and pluralist approach to citizenship that is situated in a 
politics of solidarity, a transversal politics 331  where citizens occupying multiple subject 
positions such as class and gender and race come together in solidarity to resist a common 
oppression. 
 
Difference-centred theorists envisage citizenship in terms that are not dissimilar to civic 
republican citizenship models. They do so by recognizing the role of difference as it relates 
to citizens‘ experiences of belonging and participation, outside of the conceptual articulation 
of a universal individual with a single set of rights. 
 
Social justice visions are rooted in a vision of social change that is transformative at heart,332 
and which includes a transformation of both the individual‘s sense of self, through self-
empowerment, and a transformation of power relationships in society.333 Power relations are 
seen as having both a material basis, for example, in the hierarchical nature of employment 
opportunities that exist on the basis of gender and race and ability, as well as a non-material 
basis in the beliefs, norms and assumptions of social institutional practices.334 
 
There is an overlap in literature defending the rights of many underprivileged and 
discriminated groups. The disabled are included in this collection of discriminated groups. 
This is seen as discrimination in the writings of feminist writers,335 post-colonial and anti-
racist theorists,336 and gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered theorists.337 
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Feminist Perspective on Citizenship 
Difference-centred theorists challenge the non-participatory/participatory divide through 
which individualist and participatory liberal models define themselves, by challenging how 
participation is interpreted within both these perspectives. By situating their analysis within 
the lived realities of communities of ‗difference,‘ difference-centered theorists point out that 
the assumption of the citizen as passively inheriting the rights of liberty and equality is simply 
not reflective of the lived experiences of citizens who are ‗different.‘  
 
The traditional characteristics seen as synonymous with being a citizen include being able 
bodied and masculine. Standard notions of citizenship see individuals as embedded within 
the mainstream society as participants, even disabled people.  
 
Lister, reflects on the experiences of women arguing that women have never had the 
privilege of having their rights recognized as being ‗inherent.‘338 Instead, they have always 
had to fight for their rights. Drawing on the arguments of some European and black feminist 
writers, 339  Lister concludes that one cannot conceive of women‘s rights outside of the 
participation that people of difference have engaged in to form particular constructions of 
civic and political rights. Hence, in the case of communities of ‗difference,‘ formed through 
organized activism, their rights are not distinguishable from their formal and participatory 
aspects.340 
 
However, difference-centred theorists challenge the definition of participation as it exists 
within liberal theories by broadening the meaning of participation beyond the private/public 
split through which it is formed. The notion of participation as individuated autonomous 
decision-making is contested by pointing out that the law addresses all aspects of citizens‘ 
lives.341 Anti-racists and feminists have broadened civic republican notions of participation 
within the ‗public‘ arena to include care-related duties as well as local and collective 
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participation within neighborhood boards as also being another form of political 
participation.342 
 
There are two ways by which difference-centred theorists re-define the citizens‘ sense of self. 
The first is to introduce the idea of the citizen as being ‗active‘ selves, as having agency.343 
The second is to define the citizen‘s self as relational, as a dialogical self, that gains a sense 
of self through relationships with the ‗other.‘344  
 
Black feminist writers like Patricia Hill Collins,345 Patricia Williams,346 and Audre Lourde347 
have theorized about the relationship which exists between the self and participation in 
communities of organized resistance against oppression. The relationship between an 
individual sense of self and collective action enables disabled people to participate against 
discrimination. 
 
As Lister says: 
 
Citizenship as participation represents an expression of human agency in the 
political arena, broadly defined: citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents. 
Moreover, citizenship rights are not fixed. They remain the objects of political 
struggles to defend, reinterpret and extend them. Who is involved in these struggles, 
where they are placed in the political hierarchy and the political power and influence 
they can yield will help to determine the outcomes. Citizenship thus emerges as a 
dynamic concept in which process and outcome stand in a dialectical relationship to 
each other.348 
Lister makes two important points. First that active participation in political and welfare 
institutions should be redefined as a stronger notion of citizenship which incorporates ideas 
of diversity to better accommodate differences. Second, Lister proposes that a 
reconceptualization of citizenship should be formulated through synthesising the rights and 
participatory traditions via the notion of human agency.349 Lister suggests that by embracing 
elements of the two main historical citizenship traditions, citizenship can emerge as a 
dynamic concept in which ‗process and outcome stand in a dialectical relationship to each 
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other.‘ Lister suggests that the idea of human agency as citizenship is conceived as both a 
status involving a wider range of rights, and as a practice involving political participation.350  
This theory is certainly beneficial for people with disabilities as it begins to address how it is 
not just the postulation of rights that is important (as in the case of liberal and civil republican 
views), but also the means through which full citizenship is achieved. The disability 
movement is engaged in a constant struggle to obtain and to reaffirm rights and to promote 
means for participation, and feminist movement and is a logical explanation. These feminist 
arguments can be used to support the disability movement. 
Contractual views of equality, consistent with their individualist and formal stance, are 
interpreted as the legal rights of all members of society to be treated with equal dignity and 
respect under law. Dworkin suggests it as: 
 
The weaker members of a political community are entitled to the same concern and 
respect of their government as the more powerful members have secured for 
themselves, so that if some men have freedom of decision whatever the effect on 
the general good, then all men must have the same freedom.351  
 
Equal respect and concern for all human beings derive from the Kantian notion that man 
(Kant only used the male pronoun) of all creatures in nature is endowed with reason and a 
sense of morality. This makes him the master of his own destiny and of equal worth with 
other human beings.352 
 
The right to the ‗same respect‘ is thereby defined in formal terms as entitlement to an equal 
redistribution of rights and privileges.353 Social liberals define equality in a more substantive 
way by examining the social conditions that enable citizens to participate more equally in 
society.354 Yet because participation is understood in formal terms, equality is defined as 
‗equality of opportunity‘ rather than ‗outcome‘ and is also understood as equality of status 
rather than in structural terms.355 
 
Parallels between the Feminist Movement and Disability Movement 
The parallels are spawned by similar underlying conditions, such as a history of oppression 
by the purported majority population; denial of civil rights; a neglect of relevant issues by 
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public policymakers; portrayal of stereotypes in popular culture and disparate employment 
rates, wage levels, educational opportunities, and other social and economic indicators. 
Being members of other minority populations such a being black or gay, further increases 
discrimination. Perhaps not surprisingly, this similar experience has created similar issues 
and goals for the movements, such as civil rights‘ protection; respect by service providers, 
particularly the medical community; equal employment and educational opportunities; and 
autonomy in the legal system.   
 
Feminist attitudes towards rights stretch from their embrace by liberal feminists as central to 
any reform program, to their dismissal by radical feminists as merely representing the 
expression of male values and power.356 Those writing in a socialist tradition are wary of the 
individualistic nature of rights; a number of feminist theorists have counterpoised an ethic of 
care against an ethic of justice or rights and feminist legal theorists tend to caution against 
placing too much faith in rights, whilst also counselling against outright rejection.  
 
The extension of women‘s rights to other groups, which has been demanded by different 
social movements, represents a triumph for feminist discourses for comprehensive civil 
rights demands in the politics of needs interpretation.357 Held has made the case for such an 
extension to other groups, identify seven clusters of rights corresponding to seven key sites 
of: Power, Health, Social, Cultural, Civil, Economic, and political.358 He contends that these 
are key to the entrenchment of the principle of autonomy and to the facilitation of free and 
equal political participation.  
 
Carol Gould argues that the right of participation in decision-making in social, economic, 
cultural and political life should be included in the nexus of basic rights.359 
 
Carol Pateman‘s explanation of patriarchal institutions criticizes the concept of universal 
citizenship in classical political theory and has been widely influential in enabling spaces 
within citizenship discourses. The reasoning in her inclusion of women as a sexually 
defferinciated citizenship is equally applicable to disabled persons.360 Pateman maintains 
that women should be included as citizens based upon their caring work and that women 
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should be incorporated into citizenship discourses as ‗women‘—rather than having a gender-
neutral citizenship. Citizenship, for Pateman needs to be rethought from the viewpoint of the 
female citizen. Pateman argues that if both sexes are to be full citizens ‗the meaning of 
sexual difference has to cease to be the difference between freedom and subordination.‘361 
Patemen‘s theory is problematic for people with disabilities—and in particular for women with 
disabilities—as it presumes that women are a homogenous category, firstly capable of 
‗caring‘ tasks, and secondly willing to do such work.362  
Mary Dietz states that so long as feminists only focus on social and economic concerns 
around children, family, schools, work or wages, they will not articulate a truly political vision 
or address the problem of citizenship.363 A gendered discourse of citizenship is problematic 
for women, who are not mainstream, such as women with disabilities. The double 
oppression which disabled women face has been well noted364 and thus a gendered theory 
of citizenship contributes further to the injustices which people with disabilities face. 
Meekosha and Dowse argue that feminist analysis which separates the private from the 
public has not incorporated an examination of people with disabilities.365  
People with disabilities often inhabit a unique space somewhere between the private and the 
public, while seen as remaining a ‗burden‘ in both. People with disabilities are conceived as 
having neither familial responsibility nor public presence and are not constituted in traditional 
‗masculine‘ terms or embraced by feminist critique which equates care-giving with 
responsibility. 
Vogel argues that citizenship has been confined to the masculine area. She argues that the 
exclusion of women and disabled people should be seen as an example of citizenship to 
excluding individuals who deviate from the masculine able-bodied male ideal of the citizen. 
Although Vogel sees T.H. Marshall‘s approach as generally advantageous in that it places 
social rights as its core, she argues that in outlining the theoretical construction of the post-
war welfare state, Marshall condemned women and minority groups to a marginalized 
second-class citizenship. Central to this marginalization was the presumption that minority 
groups especially disabled people, would naturally take on paid employment.366  
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Criticisms of Feminist Literature and Disability                                                                                                                                                         
For people with disabilities, the ability to exercise human agency itself is at the core of the 
struggle for full citizenship and therefore a deconstruction of standard notions of agency is 
necessary preceding its use to attain citizenship. Furthermore, the concepts of ‗status‘ and 
‗participation‘ which Lister utilises have not been sufficiently deconstructed from their original 
flawed roles within the liberal and civic republicanism traditions. It is questionable whether 
the socio-cultural and political-economic injustices which underpin such concepts can be 
overcome through binding them with human agency. It is also debatable as to whether the 
synthesis of two historically problematic theories will actually create one unproblematic 
theory. For people with disabilities who have been excluded from the very definitions of 
status and participation, and whose human agency is challenged and constrained on a 
range of levels, more than a synthesis of existing citizenship discourses is required to enable 
a space for their own subjectivity.  
It is the structural conditions that contribute to rendering people with disabilities as less than 
full citizens. Models of citizenship which privilege ‗female tasks‘ such as private caring, or an 
unproblematised notion of human agency, exclude important group differences. The 
exclusion from key citizenship debates of the historical and social circumstances of 
individuals has been taken up by Iris Marion Young who offers a radically alternative view of 
citizenship. In Young‘s view, citizenship requires the development of a theory based not on 
the assumption of an undifferentiated humanity but rather on the assumption that there are 
group differences and some groups are actually or potentially disadvantaged. 367  Young 
believes that the best way to realise the inclusion and participation of everyone in full 
citizenship is by the concept of differentiated citizenship.368 This approach to citizenship has 
been supported by other feminists as it rearticulates the inclusivity of diversity and difference 
in citizenship. Young‘s theory attempts to be inclusive not just of women, but other 
oppressed groups, including the disabled.369 
Young In Relation to Disability  
Young importantly raises the point that rights and rules which are universally formulated are 
blind to differences of race, culture, gender, age or disability and thereby perpetuate rather 
than help eliminate oppression. This is the evident problem in both liberal and civil 
republican discourses of citizenship. Young believes that the universal notions found in 
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contemporary theories of citizenship are problematic as they place citizenship above 
particular group and individual differences.370 
For Young universality is defined according to what citizens have in common as opposed to 
how they differ. Second, such groups can be denied the equal opportunities to participate in 
the socio-cultural and political-economic realm. Young further notes how such groups have 
found it necessary to affirm that there are often group-based differences which make the 
application of a strict principle of equal treatment, especially in competition for positions, 
unfair because such differences put those groups at a disadvantage.371 Young gives the 
example of how there has been some success in winning special rights for people with 
physical and mental disabilities in the past twenty years and suggests this is a clear case of 
where promoting equality in participation and inclusion requires attending to the particular 
needs of different groups.372  While Young‘s differentiated citizenship theory has much to 
offer oppressed groups and individuals—and in particular for people with disabilities it offers 
a substantial base for obtaining subjectivity—some key problems persist.  
Nancy Fraser criticises Young for having a limiting, single conception of group 
membership.373 Fraser maintains a single conception which encompasses several disparate 
modes of collectivity (such as gender, race, ethnic groups, sexualities and social classes) 
may result in the loss of important conceptual distinctions. For a person with a disability, the 
assumption of homogeneity overlooks differences within disability. 374  Often disability is 
wrongly viewed as an overarching category, however there are significant variations in the 
type, degree and experiences of disability and these distinctions are underpinned by 
difference in gender, class, race and/or sexuality. 
Fraser suggests that a group differentiation perspective can lead to one of the modes of 
collectivity being implicitly dominant where its characteristics will be projected as the 
characteristics of all social groups. This latter point is crucial for a person with a disability as 
often it is the disability which is seen first and foremost, and other characteristics, such as 
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gender, sexuality or class are subsumed, and finally an inclusive theory of citizenship for 
people with disabilities cannot reside upon simply ‗group differentiation.‘375 
Problems and Limitations of a Difference Model of Citizenship 
There are many divisions in society based on gender, race, religion, class, ethnicity, 
sexuality, disability, urban/rural etc. these are sometimes called ‗political cleavages.‘ There 
are many ways in which we are different from each other and these differences usually find 
some group expression. Furthermore, these differences all have the potential to express 
themselves politically, even if their political expression can come in many different forms. As 
individuals in society we belong to many groups at the same time—a woman, a racial 
minority, a Muslim, an urban dweller, a mother of three children, a mother of a disabled child 
and a holder of certain values or ideology. One has multiple identities and loyalties. 
Feminists, disabled people, and other minority groups must not forget that they have multiple 
identities and other issues going on in their life that are as important and possibly more 
important than being a feminist or a disabled person. There are other important issues that 
cannot be achieved by assuming a feminist or disabled identity, and they should feel free to 
switch back and forth according to the issues at stake and their relevance to them personally. 
Minority groups can be empowered and can be equally represented at some point in time. It 
is something most minority groups would like to see but not at the cost of other life shaping 
decisions. Disability is just one of many identities which operate in the person. 
Said notes, ‗No one today is purely one thing. Labels like Indian, or woman, or Muslim, or 
American are no more than starting-points, which if followed into actual experience for only a 
moment are quickly left behind.‘376 
Disability politics, by its nature, often rests on a fairly unreflexive acceptance of the 
distinction disabled/non-disabled distinction. Leadership among the disabled is vital. 
But Liggett argues:  
From an interpretative point of view the minority group approach is double edged 
because it means enlarging the discursive practices which participate in the 
constitution of disability. […] In order to participate in their own management 
disabled people have had to participate as disabled. Even among the politically 
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active, the price of being heard is understanding that it is the disabled who are 
speaking. 377 
Liggett follows those post-structuralist authors who point out the costs of participation in 
identity politics. To be an activist—whether as a gay person, or a woman, or a disabled 
person—is to make the label into a badge, to make the ghetto into an oppositional 
culture. Yet what about those who wish to be ordinary, not different?378  
 
Many disabled people do not want to see themselves as disabled, either in terms of the 
medical model or the social model. They downplay the significance of their impairments, 
and seek access to a mainstream identity. They do not have a political identity, because 
they do not see themselves as part of the disability movement either. This refusal to define 
oneself by impairment or disability has sometimes been seen as internalised oppression or 
false consciousness by radicals in the disability movement. Yet this attitude can itself be 
patronising and oppressive. People have a choice as to how they identify, within obvious 
limitations. What is wrong with seeing yourself as a person with a disability, rather than a 
disabled person, or even identifying simply as a human being, or a citizen, rather than as a 
member of a minority community? After all, identity politics can be a prison, as well as a 
haven.  
 
The unwillingness to identify as disabled—either in a political sense, or in a medical sense—
is very evident in a research with children with impairments (the ‗Life as a disabled child‘ 
project, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council). They started with the 
intention of imposing the social model perspective on the lives of the children. Yet, because 
the researchers were also following the precepts of the new sociology of childhood, and 
treating children as agents, and their testimony as reliable, they were forced to rethink their 
adult-oriented social model assumptions. The children easily identified the social barriers 
which they experienced, and were often vociferous in complaining about the treatment which 
they received. But most of them wanted to be seen as normal, though different, and actively 
resisted definition as disabled. 379  It has been argued that many people with learning 
difficulties resist being defined as disabled or different.380 A similar hypothesis is that the 
same might apply to older people with impairments or chronic illnesses who make up the 
majority of ‗disabled‘ people in Britain.  
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There is also the issue of multiple identities. While some people with impairment resist 
identification as disabled, because they want to see themselves as normal, others are 
more likely to identify in terms of alternative parts of their experience. For example, 
gender may be more salient, or perhaps ethnicity, or sexuality, or class, or marital status. 
Research on disabled sexuality has found gay people, for example, who prioritise their 
sexual identity, and ignore their experience of impairment.381 Social model perspectives 
have not proved very effective in reconciling the dimensions of gender, race and 
sexuality within or alongside disability.382 Most people are simultaneously situated in a 
range of subject positions. To assume that disability will always be the key to their 
identity is to recapitulate the error made by those from the medical model perspective 
who define people by their impairment. Any individual disabled person may strategically 
identify, at different times, as a person with a particular impairment, as a disabled person, 
or by their particular gender, ethnicity, sexuality, occupation, religion, or football team. 
Identity is no longer straightforward, but has become a matter of choice.  
 
Conclusion: An Alternative Framework of Citizenship? 
The idea of a universal citizenship was significant for the institutionalization of the liberal 
claim that individuals are free and equal. However, in the course of time, citizenship was 
reduced to a legal status. Moreover, liberalism insistence on the principles of individual 
freedom and equality let to a lack of a common concern and civic activity. In liberal politics, 
values conceived of belonging to a private realm and to ethical considerations are excluded 
from the political realm, thus, politics is reduced to interests. Republicans criticized liberalism 
because of the absence of a substantive common good and the separation of politics and 
morality. Contrary to the liberal priority of rights over goods, republicans favor the priority of 
common good over the rights. Because the sense of a common good, gained through the 
political participation, is the source of a sense of right and justice. 
This chapter critiqued the normative stance of mainstream citizenship theories of rights and 
the interpretations of liberty and equality that emerge from citizenship models. Both classical 
and recent civic republican and liberal models of citizenship by their medical  ‗irrational‘ 
clause (whether articulated directly or implied as in the case of Marshall) limit the full 
citizenship of many disabled people. Furthermore they all argue that work and participation 
in the community in some productive way is a prerequisite for full citizenship. The inability of 
some disabled people to participate in society in those acceptable social norms renders 
them as second-class citizens.  
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Similarly, the classical liberal notion of citizenship and its ‗rational‘ clause formulated by 
Locke excludes many people with cognitive disability and it remains unclear in the writings 
by Locke, Kant, Rawls and Marshall that the other forms of disability qualify for full 
citizenship. Both classical and contemporary models of civic republican and liberal notions of 
citizenship are limiting for disabled people. As Lister observes, because they are not able 
fully to participate in the key criteria in mainstream society, which defines able and 
participatory citizens, they remain on the periphery.383 
 
The equal but different model of citizenship is also problematic because liberal societies do 
not differentiate between citizens. The citizen is universal, to incorporate difference is 
arguing with the core liberal notion of the universal citizen, which can be problematic.  
 
In conclusion, the theories of citizenship should not be treated as mutually exclusive 
alternatives. An alternative framework could be offered by which to reconsider disabled 
people‘s citizenship rights through an application of UN human rights, particularly the 2006 
UN CRPD. This alternative is not seen as being definitive; rather, it comprises a starting 
point in a discussion which hopefully will be generative in re-visioning disabled people‘s 
citizenship rights. 
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Chapter Four 
UN Human Rights Instruments 
 
The previous two chapters have examined how models of disability and models of 
citizenship deal with the way disability poses the challenge of difference and to what extent 
we can respect radical difference while also promoting equality. The challenge is one of 
uniting people while also providing for their distinct needs. As discussed, the models of 
disability and citizenship both aim to respect difference while promoting forms of equality. 
But they both fall because they did not achieve the objectives of addressing the disabled‘s 
needs. This chapter argues that UN human rights legislation has been more successful than 
historical models of citizenship in addressing the issues of disability, citizenship and full 
inclusivity. However, even UN human rights legislation prior to 2006 was inadequate in 
meeting the needs of disabled people. In the next chapter it is argued that the 2006 CRPD 
legislation has the potential to resolve issues in catering for disability and education.  
This chapter has two purposes. In Section 1 the relationship between UN human rights 
legislation and notions of citizenship is examined. Although UN human rights are an 
extension of citizenship theories of rights, 384  they cannot logically be a theoretical 
underpinning for citizenship, regardless of how citizenship may be conceptualized. This is 
because UN human rights discourses are located within a universalist frame of reference, in 
contrast to that of citizenship discourses, which are located within a more particularist frame. 
Human rights are conceptually distinct from citizenship, and the conflation of human rights 
with citizenship theories is not only conceptually incoherent, but may actually obstruct the 
empowerment of disabled people. Disabled people need to be guaranteed full rights based 
on their humanity. They are failed by citizenship theories which grant rights only to the 
‗autonomous‘ and ‗rational.‘ 
The purpose of Section 2 is to look at to what extent UN human rights legislation solves the 
limits and problems of disabled peoples‘ citizenship. I examine how prior to December 2006 
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and the Introduction of the CRDP no specific human rights treaty expressly fully protected 
disabled people.385 Prior to 2006, to claim protection under a United Nations convention a 
disabled person must either invoke a universal provision or embody a separately protected 
characteristic. The universal provision was in the form of seven core UN treaties.386 Each of 
the seven core United Nations treaties theoretically applies to disabled persons in varying 
degrees, but was rarely applied in practice.387 Compounding this problem, General Assembly 
emollient laws explicitly referencing disability are legally unenforceable. 
This changed when an international convention specifically protecting the human rights of 
disabled persons was considered by the General Assembly in 2006 and ratified in the UK in 
2009. I see the CRPD as a development of contemporary citizenship in that it spells out the 
requirements of inclusion in communities and builds on the classic liberal regime of 
natural/human rights and is more specific in spelling out the needs of the disabled who have 
been left out of the picture. Hence the UN liberal human rights can contribute to a focused 
way of theorizing what is required for the disabled. What drawbacks there are will be 
considered in the next chapter. 
 
Section 1  
 
A Theoretical Understanding of Human Rights 
Contemporary conceptions of human rights have their philosophical roots in eighteenth 
century western European philosophical theory framed in terms of the rights of the individual 
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provinces. 
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against the state.388 It has been argued that the source of human rights is the individual‘s 
moral nature, where human rights are a consequence of ‗the inherent dignity of the human 
person.‘389 Whilst international human rights‘ instruments clearly have been developed in 
response to, and indeed reflect, particular contemporary socio-political concerns and events, 
they nevertheless reflect a particular philosophical understanding of what it means to be a 
human being. For example, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to the 
human rights of all human beings, linking it to the idea of the dignity of the human person. 
Article 1 states that ‗All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,‘ implying 
that such rights are ‗natural‘ in virtue of being human. In addition, Article 2 explicitly states 
that everyone is accorded such rights, regardless of nationality.390 Hence human rights are 
conceptualized in terms of a particular understanding of what it means to be a human being: 
that is, to be a human being is essentially a moral experience.  
The Origins of Human Rights 
The theory of natural rights based on reason (rational rights) developed by Kant and others, 
was used for the philosophical justification of the French Revolution and of the other 
bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, becoming an important 
instrument of the bourgeoisie in their fight against the feudal system and of the absolutist 
state and for the state law. Later on, natural rights have found their materialization in the 
fundamental rights of man and citizen on which the modern state law is based.391 It should 
also be noted that Rawls acknowledges the importance of ‗human rights‘ as well. He writes: 
‗A just world order is perhaps best seen as a society of peoples, each people maintaining a 
well-ordered and decent political (domestic) regime, not necessarily democratic but fully 
respecting basic human rights.‘392   
 
The protection of human rights through legal instruments which transpose those rights as 
legal provisions, has become a necessity of the postwar international community—a 
consequence of the atrocities committed by the Nazis, and later, also as a consequence of 
the continuous practice of violating human rights in states with totalitarian regimes. 
Regulations with a universal or regional character soon followed the signing of the UN 
Charter on the 26 June 1945. 393  The most fundamental of these was the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed and adopted by the UN General Assembly on the 
10 December 1948. It is the first document with universal vocation in this field and 
establishes a unitary conception of the international community about the rights and 
freedoms of man, opening the way towards a system of international protection of the human 
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rights.394 
After the adoption of this document, the UN General Assembly has adopted in this field over 
sixty conventions and declarations through which it has also taken into consideration the 
establishment of some specific mechanisms for the protection of those rights.395  
The philosophy of the natural law also inspires the modern doctrine of human rights, this way 
transforming the philosophical idea of the universality of the natural law inherent to the 
human nature, into a public institution.396 Montesquieu and others have approached in a 
different manner the idea of the human rights considering that they remain valid whatever 
the historical, social and political circumstances. The theories of the ‗social contract‘ 
(Rousseau), and of the separation of powers in state (Montesquieu and Locke), are 
expressions of the ideas of cohabitation in a society, of democratic organization of the moral 
life.397 
People who are marginalized from the economic and political processes, will eventually be 
removed also from the process of spreading their conceptions concerning human rights. 
Despite Kant‘s efforts of defending common universal responsibility, of defending the needy 
ones from the economic difficulties, he entrusted, in the revolutionary spirit of his times, only 
active citizens—property owners, men—with the right to vote, exactly the opposite of the 
passive citizens, meaning men and women without properties. The question about who 
would fit as active citizen has produced debate and social rollover during and after the 
Enlightenment. Indigenous people from the European colonies, slaves from Africa, the 
people without properties, women, Hebrews and their defenders have also asked full rights 
under the dome of universalism.398 
The relations between a philosophy of natural rights and their legality has been addressed 
by Locke, Montesquieu, as well as Rousseau; they were convinced that the life of people, in 
its natural state, is peaceful, violence and war being the products of the social life.  
Man, gifted with intelligence and with free will, systematically violates the natural 
order which is established for him, because he is exposed to the ‗ignorance and 
error, as well as all finite intelligences‘ and that he is exposed to a thousand 
passions: ‗Once people are in the society, they lose the feeling of their weakness; 
the equality between them stops and the state of war begins. Each particular society 
comes to feel its force, which produces a state of war from one nation to another. 
Individuals, in each society, begin to feel their force; the try to turn in their advantage 
the main advantages of this society; which determine, between them, a state of war. 
These two ways of the state of war determine the establishment of laws among 
                                                             
394 Suresh, H., All rights are Fundamental Rights, Universal Law Publishing Company, 2010. 
395 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent, Univ. of 
Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania, 1999.   
396 Ezell, Margaret, ‗John Locke‘s Images of Childhood: Early Eighteenth-Century Responses to ―Some Thoughts 
Concerning Childhood‖‘, Eighteenth-Century Studies 17, 2 (1983-84), 139-155. 
397 Id. 
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people.399  
This idea is supported, on the basis of some different arguments, in modern writings, from 
Grotius to Kant. 
The quintessence of the political lightening from the modern age was the unity 
between human rights, the separation of powers and democracy. The real efficiency 
of human rights manifests itself in justice, and then in the principle of the separation 
of powers. Because only then the sovereign is related to a law, he also can be 
related to human rights. But he is related only to the laws from the system of the 
separation of powers, there where the executive is imposed rules by the 
constitutional bodies and by the legislative ones and where the independent judges 
watch to the respect of the rights. (...) The development of human rights means the 
existence of a democratic system, the freedom of the people to elaborate its laws 
and to control the three powers of the state. The circle closes: the separation of 
powers and democracy result from the idea of human rights and end with it. These 
three elements: human rights, separation of powers and democracy represent an 
institutional unity of law. Their political reality is the condition of the respect of the 
unity and justice, of freedom and of human dignity. If one of these three elements is 
detached from the others, none of them could no longer exist.400 
Therefore, we can affirm that fundamental rights are at the basis of democracy, and the 
democratic system promotes, in turn, fundamental rights. It is clear that the problem of 
human rights has become a subject of modern philosophy which is debated from different 
perspectives, but which is considered central for the understanding of what man is in the 
world that he creates for himself.  
Whatever the philosophical debates, universal human rights legislation is a reality and can 
be seen as having transcended past and recent models of citizenship. This is not to say 
notions of human rights have not in part been inspired by such models, but is important to 
untangle the two and appreciate the distinction. 
Arguments for the Distinction between Human Rights and Citizenship  
It is important to draw the distinction between human rights as, on the one hand, a 
necessary component of citizenship and, on the other, the theoretical underpinning of 
citizenship. There is an important distinction between a more universalist approach and an 
approach where citizenship is defined in political terms. It is important to note that these 
terms of reference do not make the theoretical mistake of conflating universalist ethical 
understandings of the individual with political understandings of the individual. 
I will consider the proposition that human rights should be a theoretical underpinning for 
citizenship for each of the categories of citizenship. I argue that it is logically incoherent to 
propose that human rights should be a theoretical underpinning for citizenship. This is the 
case regardless of how citizenship is conceptualised—whether morally, legally, in terms of 
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identity or participation, or indeed even when conceptualised more universally as 
‗cosmopolitan‘ citizenship. This is because, fundamentally, citizenship is always defined in 
terms of membership within a political community, in contrast to human rights, which are 
based on membership of common humanity, or in other words, an ethical community. 
Furthermore, where citizenship is constructed as active and participatory, the conflation of 
human rights and citizenship may actually obstruct the empowerment and active 
participation of individual citizens. This is because human rights stress legal definitions of the 
individual in universal terms and do not substantively address or include issues relating to 
identity. As such, neglecting identity is hugely problematic in the context of active 
participatory citizenship, given that such forms of citizenship necessarily depend on its 
citizens being able to identify with the larger political community if they are to participate. 
In the first category of conceptions of citizenship, where citizenship is constructed primarily 
in moral terms, it could be argued that a values approach to citizenship could be 
underpinned by human rights given the shared moral aspect. However, it must be 
remembered that a values approach to citizenship deals nevertheless with ‗shared values‘ 
within a political rather than an ethical community. Moreover, reaching shared values 
requires the notion of identification with the community, whereas human rights are based on 
universal membership of common humanity. 
With regard to the second category of conceptions of citizenship, formulation of citizenship 
would suggest that human rights derive from the state, or that having human rights are a 
characteristic of belonging to a certain political community. This notion of human rights 
deriving from possessing nationality, however, is contradictory to the idea that human rights 
are accorded to all human beings based on their universal membership of common humanity. 
As such, the idea of universal human rights as a theoretical underpinning of citizenship is 
incoherent.  
Citizenship conceptualized as active and participative requires an identification of individual 
citizens with their community. This focus on identity and culture is necessarily particularist as 
opposed to universalist, as in theories of liberalism and legal conceptions of citizenship. 
Furthermore, conceptions of citizenship that focus on participation and active involvement 
cannot, therefore, be underpinned by human rights, which are universalist, based on the 
notion of all human beings belonging to an ethical rather than a political community. The 
relationship is a complex one, however, as the converse could be argued: that active 
participation within a community may be important in promoting the practice of human rights. 
Lastly, with regard to cosmopolitan conceptions of citizenship, whilst national identification is 
weakened, there is nevertheless identification with a political community as opposed to a 
universal community of all humanity, although this political community may not be at the 
national level. As such, I would argue that even in the case of more universally constructed 
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conceptions of citizenship, such as ‗global‘ citizenship, discourses on human rights and 
discourses on citizenship should not be treated as synonymous. 
Section 2 
Section 1 argued that human rights though a development of citizenship models are 
distinctively different from citizenship and should not be treated as synonymous. This section 
will describe how UN legislation has the potential to resolve issues in addressing disability 
and education. This legislation noticeably fills in the gap where the citizenship models have 
failed. Where notions of citizenship are influenced by medical models and are criticized for 
restrictively categorizing disabled people, which dismisses individuality and dignity, and 
which has rendered them second-class citizens based on their perceived irrationality, lack of 
mental capacity or physical disabilities.  
This section, on the other hand, examines how UN human rights legislation accords all 
human beings equal rights and freedoms, implying that such rights are ‗natural‘ in virtue of 
being human. It goes on to examine the practical limitations of pre-2006 UN legislation in 
addressing the rights of disabled people, and finally introduces the CRPD and suggests it 
may be a positive step forward in the provision of human rights for the disabled. (Discussion 
of the CRPD is then taken up in more detail in the next chapter.) 
Who can Possess Human Rights? 
Even if there were agreement upon a foundation for human rights, there remains another 
fundamental question: who can possess human rights? One may simply assert that all 
humans hold all human rights; after all, human rights are said to be those benefits to which 
we are entitled simply by being human. But what is meant by being `human' is vague since 
the life cycle of homo sapiens ranges from conception to death and decay. There is profound 
controversy over how and when a human acquires and then loses human rights between 
those two periods. Even before conception, sperm and eggs exist that contain human 
genetic material. One may decide easily that these are human cells but not `human beings', 
because they contain incomplete sets of human genes. After conception, however, 
controversies arise about the status of the developing foetus. From a mass of 
undifferentiated cells, the embryo quickly grows into a recognizably human entity. Many 
distinguish foetuses from babies that have emerged from their mothers and say that 
separate human life only begins with ‗birth'. This can be an arbitrary distinction since a very 
premature baby is at much the same stage of development whether inside or outside the 
womb; the differences center on how a baby receives nutrition and oxygen. One can specify 
an arbitrary point for the acquisition of rights, such as conception, neural development, 
viability, or emergence from the womb. But this approach is bound to erupt in controversy, 
because not everyone will agree on a given point. Abortion is such a divisive issue precisely 
because various groups hold different beliefs about when human life starts. 
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Alternatively, one can argue that there is some special quality of human life that provides a 
basis for possessing rights; when that quality is acquired, so are rights. This approach is 
favoured by many, since it allows for the distinction between humans and other animals. 
Human rights are rights particular to human beings, thus the basis of the claim to rights 
should be something that differentiates humans from other animals. With a sharing of an 
enormous proportion of genetic material between humans and primates, the distinction is 
usually drawn on the basis of some quality of human life not shared by other animals rather 
than physiological characteristics. Specifically human qualities are usually identified from the 
capacity for intellectual, moral, or spiritual development.  
The difficulty with trying to assign rights on the basis of some quality of human life is that not 
all human beings may possess such an attribute for example some people with intellectual 
disabilities. Locke, Kant, Hume and Rawls401 have articulated this argument, Douglas Husak 
has also written a poignant critique of the notion of human rights based on his objection that 
some human beings merely exist.402 Some mentally disabled lack any basis for purposive 
agency; they are seemingly unaware of their surroundings, incapable of rationale thought, or 
unable to distinguish right from wrong. But, his most telling arguments arise from comatose 
patients, notably those with no known chance for recovery. Husak distinguishes between 
humans and persons, and he points out that some humans, such as the comatose, are non-
persons. Persons are human beings with capacities beyond mere existence that produce a 
quality of life. Non-persons simply lack the qualities of life that one wishes either to protect or 
use as the key to acquiring rights. The distinction between humans and persons is often 
used to justify aborting foetuses, because the human foetus is not considered by many to be 
a person. In the end, Husak argues that the phenomena called human rights are really rights 
of persons: ‗There are no human rights.‘403 
This debate over the qualification of a human creature to possess human rights is 
fundamental to a number of topics particularly for disability. The rights of the mentally 
disabled may depend greatly upon what foundation one adopts for the possession of rights. 
Similarly, the existence of rights to life in abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia are directly 
related to what status one accords to undeveloped foetuses, mutant newborns, or terminally 
comatose adults.  
If human rights are justified on some characteristics of the human species, can those rights 
be held by individual humans who lack these species traits? To answer this question we 
should start by distinguishing between possessing rights and exercising them. Thus a 
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disabled person may possess the full range of human rights, but be unable to exercise them, 
particularly rights of an intellectual nature. Others may find this distinction too convenient an 
answer and contest the very existence of rights that cannot by exercised by their holders. 
Lack of United Nations Core Disability Treaties prior to 2006 for Disabled People  
Since its formation after the Second World War,404 the United Nations has promulgated 
seven core legally enforceable human rights treaties.405 Each of these core laws implicitly 
protects persons with disabilities, but to varying degrees. To invoke these protections, 
disabled persons must either fall under a universal provision or possess a separately 
protected characteristic in addition to his or her disability. Up until one year after the second 
Warnock Report of 2005,406 no United Nations human rights treaty expressly applied to 
individuals on the basis of a disability-related characteristic.407 Similarly, disabled persons 
are not explicitly included in non-treaty United Nations instruments. For example, both the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights promote 
human rights, but neither expressly references disability.408  
 
Two components of the International Bill of Human Rights,409 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)410 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 411  are universal in scope. 412  The same is true for the 
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independent understandings of their application. 
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Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT).413 Although disability is not specifically mentioned in any of these treaties, 
they technically include all human beings within their respective provinces.414 
 
In addition to these three universal treaties, the General Assembly has enacted four core law 
treaties protecting people based on specific identity characteristics unrelated to disability.415  
In chronological order, these are: the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD);416 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); 417  the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC);418 and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (ICPMW). 419 The CRC alone among these treaties 
contains a specific disability-related article; it requires that States parties recognize the rights 
of children with disabilities to enjoy ‗full and decent‘ lives and participate in their 
communities.420 However, the relative financial constraints of States parties tempers the 
obligation421.  
 
Moreover, the CRC does not mandate children with disabilities be treated or considered 
equal to children without disabilities.422 Hence, except for the CRC‘s limited concern for 
                                                             
413 . Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 
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422 See CRC, supra note 24, at art. 23, paras. 1-3 (―[T]he disabled child has effective access to and receives 
education, training . . . preparataion for employment and recreational opportunities in a manner conducive to the 
child‘s receiving the fullest possible social integration and individual development.‖). The equality of disabled 
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disabled children, persons with disabilities were not yet a group with specific protection. In a 
1993 report, a Special Rapporteur cautioned that in the absence of specific treaty protection, 
human rights abuses against the disabled would likely continue without redress. 423 
Unfortunately, this prediction has largely been borne out. In the decade following the report, 
seventeen disability related complaints have been asserted under core United Nations 
instruments. Of these claims, thirteen were declared inadmissible by their respective 
monitoring committees.424  The larger implication is that before 2006 six hundred million 
persons with disabilities worldwide had implied but not actual human rights protection. The 
Salamanca Statement on disability and education is an example of how this started to 
change.  
 
UN Salamanca Statement and Framework for Action 1994 and Education for the 
Disabled 
The Salamanca Statement was the first international document to cite the direct connection 
between education for children with special needs and human rights.425 It is a significant 
international framework on disability, education and development, and arose from the 1994 
United Nations Education Science & Culture Organisation (UNESCO) World Conference on 
Special Needs Education: Access and Quality, held in Salamanca (henceforth known as the 
Salamanca Statement). At the time of its formation, less than one percent of the global 
population of children and young people with disability attended school in developing 
countries and the international community recognised the need to redress this inequality, 
particularly given the climate of the Education For All movement. 426  The Salamanca 
Statement signified a change in the direction of international thinking about education for 
children with special educational needs. It affirmed the need for government commitment to 
provide education for people with special educational needs and advocated that the best 
way to do this is within existing regular education systems.427 
The Salamanca Statement encouraged creative problem solving about educational 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Nations Commission on Human Rights. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm‘n on Human 
Rights, Rights of the Child, para. 22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/75 (Apr. 25, 2001); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council 
[ECOSOC], Comm‘n on Human Rights, Rights of the Child, para. 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/85 (Apr. 27, 
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Nations human rights treaty bodies. See Office of the U.N. High Comm‘r for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2006). The decisions of the three relevant monitoring committees can be accessed through 
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difficulties and anticipated that the creative solutions could ultimately benefit all of the 
students in the form of a richer learning environment based on child-centered learning.428 It 
put respect for differences and diversity at the center of debates about education, society 
and culture and proposed that schools implement philosophical, practical and strategic 
changes.429 The practices and philosophies recommended by the Salamanca Statement are 
known as an Inclusive Education philosophy.430 
The Salamanca Statement also called on the international funding agencies including the 
World Bank and UN agencies like UNICEF, UNESCO and the United Nations Development 
Program ‗to endorse the approach of inclusive schooling and to support the development of 
special needs education as an integral part of all education programmes.‘  It called for the 
international community to promote, plan, finance and monitor progress on inclusive 
education within their mandates for education.   
 
Yet this call to action is nowhere to be found in the global agenda for education that did get 
established a few years later with the Dakar Framework for Education for All and the 
Millennium Development Goal for universal primary education. 
 
Problems with the Salamanca Statement   
Since the Salamanca Statement education has come to be seen as a global human right 
that states must provide, and most now support the norm of universal educational access 
and equal opportunity, even given individual variations in ability. 431 Responding to these 
principles, in the last decade of the twentieth century, many states and nongovernmental 
organizations around the world have committed themselves to ‗education for all‘ and to 
inclusive education.432 In 1994, the UK Government signed up to the Salamanca Statement, 
drawn up by UNESCO, which called upon all governments to: 
 
adopt as a matter of law or policy the principle of inclusive education, enrolling all 
children in regular schools, unless there are compelling reasons for doing 
otherwise.433  
 
In the 1997 Green Paper Excellence For All Children Meeting Special Educational Needs, 
the New Labour Government gave public support to the UN statement on Special Needs 
Education 1994 which ‗calls on governments to adopt the principle of inclusive education‘ 
and ‗implies a progressive extension of the capacity of mainstream schools to provide for 
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children with a wide range of needs.‘434 By doing so, it aligned the English education system 
for the first time with the international movement towards inclusive education.  
 
In the context of children and adolescents with special needs, The Salamanca Statement, 
produced under the leadership of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) in 1994, remains a cornerstone document in the discourse of 
inclusion. The first section of the Statement is an expression of identity: a definition of the 
text‘s speaking position, of collective expertise, global scope, commitments to education, 
and wishes for the future life of its recommendations: authority, consensus, commitment, 
and hope are embedded in the text as operational identities, as the speaking subject of the 
text. The second section outlines what the signatories ‗believe and proclaim,‘ namely that  
 
1. Every child has a fundamental right to education, and must be given the opportunity 
to achieve and maintain an acceptable level of learning; 
2. Every child has unique characteristics, interests, abilities and learning needs; 
3. Education systems should be designed and educational programmes implemented 
to take into account the wide diversity of those characteristics and needs; 
4. Those with special educational needs must have access to regular schools which 
should accommodate them within a child-centred pedagogy capable of meeting 
these needs; 
5. Regular schools with this inclusive orientation are the most effective means of 
combating discriminatory attitudes, creating welcoming communities, building an 
inclusive society and achieving education for all; moreover, they provide an effective 
education to the majority of children and improve the efficiency and ultimately the 
cost-effectiveness of the entire education system.435 
 
This section of The Salamanca Statement is particularly of interest because it is self-
conscious of itself as discourse: that the signatories ‗believe‘ and ‗proclaim‘ suggests that 
they both harbour a consensus-based knowledge and publicly put this knowledge forward as 
truth. Their position is authoritative; their beliefs and proclamations set the terms of the 
discursive formation of inclusive special needs education. These beliefs and proclamations 
take their initial premise from the first point, that ‗every child has a fundamental right to 
education.‘436 Each of the points that follow does so based on this initial invocation of rights: 
if every child possesses such rights, they must be met appropriately. 
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Children are figured not just as those who possess rights, but as ‗unique.‘ Education 
systems are understood as requiring design, program implementation, and an understanding 
of diversity. Within the multiplicity suggested by ‗wide diversity‘ are children with special 
educational needs. These children must have their needs met both through ‗access‘ to a 
particular setting (‗regular schools‘) and ‗accommodation‘ via a ‗capable pedagogy‘ that is 
‗child-centred.‘ Finally, the Statement makes a series of statements about inclusive 
education: it will produce social justice, provide appropriate education for all, and be cost-
effective. The discourse of inclusive special needs education can be summarized thusly: it is 
grounded in rights; characterized by diversity; demanding of systemic change, access, and 
accommodation; and will create fiscal efficiency and justice. 
 
The impact and import of the Salamanca Statement should not be lessened by the 
discussion that comes next—the Statement itself set a global standard, changed the terms 
of debate, and provided cogent ways forward for special needs education, while 
simultaneously highlighting its starring role in social justice and fiscal responsibility. But the 
Statement itself can only provide so much discursive accommodation. What, for example, 
exactly is an ‗inclusive orientation?‘ And what is an ‗inclusive society?‘ 437  The first is 
relatively easy to answer. The Statement‘s companion document, the Framework for Action 
on Special Needs Education states that an inclusive school necessarily focuses on the 
following: ‗curriculum, buildings, school organization, pedagogy, assessment, staffing, school 
ethos and extra-curricular activities.‘ But the term ‗inclusive society‘ remains undefined in the 
document—it is used twice, and, on both occasions, special needs education is figured as 
producing an ‗inclusive society.‘438 And it is on exactly these grounds that inclusive education 
has been robustly critiqued: as a discourse, with attendant policies, legislation, funding 
models, and practices, it is seen to fail in adequately addressing the social basis of inequality.  
 
The Salamanca Statement suggests that inclusive education represents ‗the most effective 
means of combating discriminatory attitudes, creating welcoming communities, building an 
inclusive society and achieving education for all.‘439 First of all, this seems to be a rather 
heavy load for the education system to carry, a weighty responsibility. And although the 
Statement makes provisions for national-based programs to eradicate discriminatory 
attitudes, this is figured as a small piece of the puzzle (falling under the rubric of ‗School 
                                                             
437 17 UNESCO, 21. 
18 UNESCO, ix, 6-7. 
19 UNESCO, ix. 
20 UNESCO, 21. 
21 Qtd. in Derrick Armstrong, ―Reinventing ‗inclusion‘: New Labour and the cultural politics of special 
education,‖ Oxford Review of Education 31.1 (2005), 136. See Roger Slee, ―‗Inclusion in Practice‘: does 
 
438 438 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), The Salamanca Statement and 
Framework for Action on Special Needs Education(Paris: UNESCO, 1994), 
439 439 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), The Salamanca Statement and 
Framework for Action on Special Needs Education(Paris: UNESCO, 1994), 
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Factors‘),440 and, in any case, locates discrimination in ‗attitudes‘ rather than social forces. In 
the view of Derrick Armstrong, inclusive education for children and adolescents with special 
needs continues to participate in a humanitarian discourse that has what Roger Slee calls ‗a 
deep epistemological attachment to the view that special educational needs are produced by 
the impaired pathology of the child.‘441 442 
 
Inclusive education is a philosophy which requires commitment and deliberate action to meet 
its goals.443 Two critiques of the movement are given here. The first is that although the 
international community acknowledges inclusive education as the way to achieving the 
fullest educational objectives for children with disability, educational practice frequently 
belies the rhetoric of equality of opportunity it purports to support.444 Legislature, policies, 
conceptual changes and practical educational changes are all needed to move towards 
inclusive education and there are often gaps between policy and practice.445 In response to 
this critique, Wong et al reminds that anti-discrimination law tends to precede public 
attitudinal change rather than respond to it.446 
 
The second critique discussed here is the fear that this will place further strain on the 
workload of teachers, thereby weakening the education system, and holding back the 
potential academic success of some students. Broadening teacher training in catering for 
diverse populations is an important consideration when looking at educational reforms.447 
However, like Vygotsky,448 Florian believes that teachers need not learn any new inclusive 
pedagogy, but rather can learn how to include all children into existing education 
pedagogies.449 Furthermore, there is strong anecdotal evidence that the benefits of inclusive 
education practices (such as flexible teaching styles, and the ability to individualise learning 
where appropriate to meet the students‘ level of ability) are accessed by the wider school 
population.450 
 
 
                                                             
440 440 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), The Salamanca Statement and 
Framework for Action on Special Needs Education(Paris: UNESCO, 1994), 
441 22 Armstrong, 140, 143. 23 Armstrong, 136. 24 Armstrong, 144.25 Rosemarie Garland, Extraordinary Bodies: 
Figuring Disability in American Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 6. 
442 Slee ‗In practice make perfect?‘ Educational Review 53.2 (2001). 
443 (UNESCO, 2009). 
444 (Smith, 2004; Wong et. al, 1999). 
445 (Eklindh & Brule-Balescut, 2005 Price et al., 1999; UNESCO, 1994) 
446 see Wertheimer, A. (1997) Inclusive education: a framework for change. National and international perspectives. 
Leicester: Centre for Studies on Inclusive Education. 
447 Hardman & Nagle, 2004, Tomlinson, S (1982) A sociology of special education. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. 
448 Read, J. (2004) Fit for what? Special education in London, History of education, 33(3) 283–298. 
449 1999 
450 AusAID, 2008; UNESCO, n.d. 
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Additional Problems: Lack of Legal Enforcement of United Nations Declarations and 
Resolutions „Emollient Laws‟ Referencing Disability 
In contrast to UN core law treaties which do not enumerate specific disability protections, a 
number of emollient laws expressly provide for disabled individuals. 451  These include 
General Assembly designations of the International Year of the Disabled in 1981,452 and the 
International Decade of Disabled Persons from 1982-1991.453 The United Nations has also 
passed resolutions such as the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons,454 
and the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons. 455  Additionally, the General 
Assembly adopted a World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons (WPA) to 
encourage the development of national programs directed at achieving equality for people 
with disabilities.456 
 
Most significant among the emollient laws are the Standard Rules on the Equalization of 
Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (Standard Rules),457 which are monitored by a 
Special Rapporteur.458 In education the Salamanca statement was the most notable459. As 
previously discussed, one of the most significant frameworks with regard to disability and 
education is the Salamanca Statement. At the time of its formation, less than one percent of 
                                                             
451  An overview of the basic documentation is maintained by a special unit of the Division for Social Policy and 
Development from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. See United Nations Enable 
Webpage, www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable. 
452 31. International Year of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 36/77, at 176, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess.,Supp. No. 77, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/36/77 (Dec. 8, 1981). 
453 Implementation of the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, G.A. Res.37/53, at 186-87, 
para. 11, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/53 (Dec. 3, 1982). 
454 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. Res. 2856 (XXVI), at 93, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 
29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (Dec. 20, 1971). 
455 34. Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447 (XXX), at 88, U.N. GAOR,Supp. No. 34, U.N. 
Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975). 
456 World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 37/52, at 185, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 
Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/52 (Dec. 3, 1982) [hereinafter World Programme]. 
457 Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons With Disabilities, G.A. Res. 48/96, at 202, U.N. 
GAOR, 48th Sess, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/96 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Standard Rules]. 
458 The first Special Rapporteur for Disability, Bengt Lindquivist of Sweden, was appointed in 1994, and had his 
commission renewed in 1997 and in 2000. See United Nations Enable, The Special Rapporteur on Disability of the 
Commission for Social Development, http://www.un.org/ esa/socdev/enable/rapporteur.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 
2006). The Special Rapporteur for Disability is Sheikha Hissa Al Thani of Qatar. Id. For an insider‘s perspective on 
the role of the Special Rapporteur, see Bengt Lindqvist, Standard Rules in the Disability Field—A New United 
Nations Instrument, in Human Rights and Disabled Persons, supra note 20, at 63. 
459 One of the most significant frameworks with regard to disability and education is the Salamanca Statement. The 
Salamanca Statement and Framework for Action 1994 is a significant international framework on disability, 
education and development arose from the 1994 United Nations Education Science & Culture Organisation 
(UNESCO) World Conference on Special Needs Education: Access and Quality, held in Salamanca (henceforth 
known as the Salamanca Statement). The Salamanca Statement was the first international document to cite the 
direct connection between education for children with special needs and human rights (Eklindh & Brule- Balescut, 
2005). At the time of its formation, less than one per cent of the global population of children and young people with 
disability attended school in developing countries and the international community recognised the need to redress 
this inequality, particularly given the climate of the Education For All movement see Price et al., 1999. The 
Salamanca Statement signified a change in the direction of international thinking about education for children with 
special educational needs. It affirmed the need for government commitment to provide education for people with 
special educational needs and advocated that the best way to do this is within existing regular education 
systems ,see also Eklindh & Brule-Balescut, 2005; Price et al., 1999; UNESCO, 1994. The Salamanca Statement 
encouraged creative problem solving about educational difficulties and anticipated that the creative solutions could 
ultimately benefit all of the students in the form of a richer learning environment based on child-centred learning 
(Eklindh & Brule-Balescut, 2005). It put respect for differences and diversity at the centre of debates about 
education, society and culture and proposed that schools implement philosophical, practical and strategic changes 
see Eklindh & Brule-Balescut, 2005. The practices and philosophies recommended by the Salamanca Statement 
are known as an Inclusive Education philosophy. 
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the global population of children and young people with disability attended school in 
developing countries and the international community recognised the need to redress this 
inequality. 460  Although the Salamanca Statement signified a change in the direction of 
international thinking about education for children with special educational needs and 
affirmed the need for government commitment to provide education for people with special 
educational needs and advocated that the best way to do this is within existing regular 
education systems,461 it was not legally binding. The drawback to all these emollient laws is 
that, as resolutions, they lack legally binding power.462 
New Hope? The CRPD 
Due to the difficulties in drafting suitable legislation and in enforcement, the Ad Hoc 
Committee for what became known as the CRPD realized that specific legislation addressing 
disabled people‘s needs worldwide was required. They rightly saw that international human 
rights legislation prior to 2006 contains numerous limitations which do not adequately 
address the needs of disabled people. The drafting of the 2006 UN CRPD for full inclusion of 
all kinds of disabled people as citizens, including the intellectually disabled, brought hope 
that this objective full and equal inclusivity was now gaining international momentum.  
How the 2006 CRDP Enhances The Preceding UN Conventions  
Acting on previous proposals to address the lack of specific human rights protection for 
disabled persons, 463  in December 2001 the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc 
Committee to consider enacting a disability-based human rights instrument.464 The Ad Hoc 
Committee in turn authorized a working group to draw up a human rights treaty proposal.465 
On January 16, 2004, the working group issued ‗Draft Articles;‘ on August 25, 2006, the last 
day of its eighth session negotiating and amending the proposed treaty, the Ad Hoc 
                                                             
460 see Price et al., 1999. 
461 see also Eklindh & Brule-Balescut, 2005; Price et al., 1999; UNESCO, 1994. 
462 See, e.g., The Protection of Human Rights in the Context of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), U.N.C.H.R. Res. 1997/33, U.N. ESCOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1997/150 (Apr. 11, 1997); The Protection of Persons with Mental Illnesses and the Improvement of Mental 
Health Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, at 188, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (Dec. 17, 1991). 
463 Notably, in 1987, Italy proffered a convention draft during the forty-second session of the General Assembly. See 
U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/42/SR.16 (Oct. 19, 1987). Sweden did the same two years later 
at the General Assembly‘s forty-fourth session. See U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.16 
(Oct. 24, 1989). 
464 Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights and 
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 56/168, U.N GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 168, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/56/168 (Dec. 19, 2001). A detailed description of the political process behind the United Nations decision to 
go forward with a disability human rights convention is set forth in the (United States) National Council on Disability 
(NCD), Newsroom, UN Disability Convention—Topics at a Glance: History of the Process, 
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/history_process.htm. 
465 Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Prot. & Promotion of the 
Rights & Dignity of Pers. with Disabilities, Report of the Working Group to the Ad Hoc Committee, para. 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.265/2004/WG.1 (Jan. 27, 2004). The working group included twelve nongovernmental organizations (―NGOs‖). 
See id. at para. 2. The inclusion of NGOs at this stage was unprecedented in the normal course of treaty 
development at the United Nations, and can be interpreted as acquiescence to NGOs‘ assertion of ―nothing about 
us without us.‖ Nonetheless, a countersignal was also sent to the disability community by locating the working group 
in New York— the location of United Nations expertise on soft laws—rather than in Geneva, where core human 
rights treaties are deliberated. 
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Committee adopted the revised Draft Articles.466 The Draft Articles reaffirm the seven core 
treaties467  and operationalize their content. In the pertinent part, the Articles state their 
purpose as being ‗to promote, protect, and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities,468 and enunciate essential 
principles guaranteeing disabled individuals ‗individual autonomy and independence,‘ ‗full 
participation,‘ and ‗inherent dignity and worth.‘469  Thus the Draft Articles include both first- 
and second-generation rights,470 and expressly call attention to their indivisibility.471 By way 
of enforcement, the proposed instrument mandates collecting statistics and submitting 
reports to domestic monitoring bodies,472 developing national policies for disabled citizens,473 
generally promoting positive attitudes toward persons with disabilities,474 and establishing a 
treaty body similar to those of the existing seven core conventions.475 Unfortunately, the 
Draft Articles left several central terms, including ‗disability‘ and ‗accessibility,‘ conspicuously 
undefined476 because of political motivations.477  
 
However, the Draft Articles do expansively define ‗discrimination‘ as ‗any distinction, 
exclusion or restriction‘ that affects ‗the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.‘478 The Draft Articles, and 
the definitions included therein, indicate a significant shift in how the international community 
                                                             
466 See Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Prot. & Promotion of the 
Rights & Dignity of Pers. with Disabilities, Draft Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Draft 
Optional Protocol (2006), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc8adart.htm [hereinafter Draft Articles]. 
467 Id. at pmbl., para. d. 
468 Id. at Article 1. The Draft Articles state this goal is to be brought about through the use of ―international 
cooperation.‖ Id. at para. j; see also CRC, supra note 24, at annex, pmbl. (―[r]ecognizing the importance of 
international co-operation‖); CEDAW, supra note 23, at 194 (―[a]ffirming that the strengthening of . . . mutual 
cooperation among all States‖ is necessary for effectuation). 
469 Draft Articles, supra note 42, at pmbl. (l), (k), (a). 
470 Among the first- and second-generation rights enumerated are: rights to life, equality, expression, privacy, 
education, employment, health, habilitation and rehabilitation, social benefits, political and social participation, 
access to public venues, mobility independence, recreation, as well as freedom from discrimination, torture and 
abuse. Id. at arts. 10, 12, 21, 22, 24, 27, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 9, 18, 30, 15-16. For a discussion of how these rights 
intersect and are harmonious with the capabilities approach, see infra Part III.B 
471 47. Draft Articles, supra note 42, at pmbl., para. c (―Reaffirming the universality, indivisibility and 
interdependence of all human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . .‖) (emphasis omitted). 
472 See id. at art. 31 (―States parties undertake to collect appropriate information, including statistical and research 
data.‖); id. at art. 33 (States parties are responsible for establishing systems for monitoring implementation). 
473 See id. at art. 4, para. B; art. 33. 
474 See id. at art. 8. These measures include instigating ―public awareness campaigns,‖ 
mainstreaming public education, and ―encouraging‖ positive images of the disabled in the mass media. 
Id. at art. 8, para. 2 (a)-(c). 
475  Draft Articles, supra note 42, at art. 34. 
476  See id. at art. 2 (definitions). 
477 Specifically, to secure broad support in the General Assembly, several of the Working Group members believed 
these definitions should be purposely left vague so that States parties could interpret them according to their own 
legal and social cultures. Put another way, there was strong feeling among the participating government bodies that 
human rights enforcement is chiefly a local issue. As related in the NCD newsroom, the United States took an even 
more removed position, asserting that the matter of disability-related rights, in any form, was a ―largely domestic 
mission‖ that individual states ought to pursue on their own initiatives. See Nat‘l Council on Disability (NCD) 
Newsroom, supra note 40 (quoting Ralph Boyd, former U.S. Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights). For that 
reason, the United States rarely participated in the convention process and does not intend to ratify any resultant 
instrument. See id. (U.S. would ―‗participate in order to share our experiences . . . [but] not with the expectatoin that 
we [the U.S.] will become party to any resulting legal instrument.‖). 
 
478 See Draft Articles, supra note 42, at art. 2. 
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views human rights, suggesting a willingness to rethink the sparse human rights protections 
specifically provided to persons with disabilities.479  
 
The Convention was drafted by an international committee with differing approaches to 
disability, so the language does not reflect the model the UK government would prefer. The 
full title of the convention is the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but 
within the UK it is often called the UN Convention on the Rights of Disabled People thus 
reflecting a social model rather than a medical model of disability. 
The Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD) is the first convention which 
explicitly accords all human rights to people with disability. The CRPD is the most recent 
United Nations convention; its development started in 2001, it was adopted in 2006 and 
came into force on 3rd May 2008.480 It is a stronger document legally than the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, in that governments have a duty to ratify the CRDP. The 
CRPD has been signed by 137 countries and ratified by 80481 and in doing so governments 
are signed up to implementing it in law and practice. The purpose of the convention is ‗to 
promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms by all persons with disability and to promote respect for their inherent 
dignity‘ (Article 1). 
The main aims of the CPRD are to ensure that: 
Persons with disability and their family members should receive the necessary 
protection and assistance to enable families to contribute towards the full and equal 
enjoyment of the rights of persons with disability482  
And 
To make a significant contribution to redress the profound social disadvantage of 
persons with disability and promote their participation in the civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural spheres with equal opportunities, in both developing and 
developed countries.483 
The obligations of the State outlined in the Convention include: developing appropriate 
legislation to address disability issues as human rights issues; raising public awareness; 
providing access to the physical public environment; not excluding its citizens from the 
general education system or highest standard of health care; providing adequate living 
standards; providing social protection; and allowing persons with disability to participate in 
                                                             
479 I return to this in more detail in chapter eight of this thesis. 
480 (UN, 2008). Woodhouse, Barbara Bennett, Johnson, Kathryn A., The United Nations Convention on The Rights 
of the Child: Empowering Parents to Protect Their Children‘s Rights, în vol. Martha Fineman, Karen Worthington 
(edit.), What Is Right for Children?: The Competing Paradigms of Religion and Human Rights, Ashgate Publishing, 
Burlington, 2009. 
481 Turner, Bryan S., Vulnerability And Human Rights, The Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, Pennsylvania, 2006. 
482 (Preamble, section x.) 
483  (Preamble, section y.) 
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political, public, cultural, and recreational life.484  
Through becoming signatories to the CRPD, states acknowledge the right to education that 
people with disability have and their own obligation in providing an inclusive education 
system. The provision of education to children with disability alongside their peers is 
necessary in order to fully realise their abilities, talents, creativity and personality, out of 
respect for diversity, and for the greater recognition of human rights. Article 7 of the CRPD 
focuses on children with disability and states that they must be supported to enjoy their full 
human rights and fundamental freedoms on an even basis with other children. It upholds 
acting only in the best interests of the child and advocates for child participation in its support 
of giving children with disability (as with all children) the right and means to express their 
views freely on all matters concerning them bearing in mind the child‘s age and maturity, and 
to have those views considered. 
There are no new rights in the CRPD, but the idea of redressing the social disadvantage 
faced by people with disability introduces the idea of providing extra support (positive 
discrimination) in enabling people with disability to access the same rights as everyone else. 
The CRPD is the first convention in the international human rights framework which includes 
reference to international cooperation (Article 32) thereby obligating duty bearers at a trans-
national level.485 
This again supports the notion that disabled people‘s human rights are ‗natural‘, rather than 
being derived from the state. In terms of practice, however, as opposed to theory, clearly the 
possession and exercise of human rights cannot occur outside of a political community. Yet 
the state is obliged to provide, protect and promote participation for all, regardless of formal 
citizenship status.  
Notwithstanding the thorny issue of whether disabled people are citizens or citizens-in-
waiting there is a theoretical confusion regarding whether these CRPD rights refer only to 
‗human rights‘ to be accorded to all individuals regardless of citizenship status. This 
confusion arises because of the inclusion of ‗participation‘ or civic rights. Participation or civic 
rights are a theoretically different kind of right to other rights documented in the CRPD, such 
as the right to life (Article 6), the right to freedom of religion (Article 14) or the right to 
education (Article 28).486 Civic rights, in contrast to human rights, are based on membership 
of a political community rather than membership of common humanity. Due to the relevance 
of the UN CRDP to the central argument of this thesis, the next chapter analyses the CRPD 
in more detail. 
                                                             
484   (UN, 2006).   United Nations. (2006). Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Retrieved May 16, 
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Conclusion 
I have proposed that human rights cannot logically be a theoretical underpinning for 
citizenship, regardless of how citizenship may be conceptualized. Whilst it is important to 
acknowledge the important role of human rights within the practice of active citizenship and 
to recognize that the practice of human rights occurs within a political community, it is 
problematic to conflate the two concepts. This is because human rights discourses are 
located within a universalist dialogue, in contrast to citizenship, which is located within a 
more specific discourse. Underpinning human rights is the notion of common humanity, 
based on ethical conceptualizations of the individual. In contrast, citizenship rights are 
underpinned by their relation to a political community, based on political conceptualizations 
of the individual. Human rights are conceptually distinct from citizenship rights, and the 
conflating of human rights with citizenship not only is conceptually incoherent but may 
actually obstruct the empowerment of disabled people. 
Furthermore the omission of specific references to disability within key international 
initiatives based on the international human rights framework such as the Millennium 
Development Goals and Education For All has been criticized. Even where specific 
references have been made—most notably in the 1994 Salamanca Statement—there 
remained problems regarding enforceability. The development of the CRPD is one response 
to that concern and this thesis now turns to a detailed analysis of the Convention. 
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Chapter Five 
The Convention on the Rights Of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
On 13 December 2006, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and an associated Optional Protocol. The 
formulation of the CRPD has been hailed as a great landmark in the struggle to reframe the 
needs and concerns of persons with disability in terms of human rights. The CRPD is 
regarded as having finally empowered the world‘s largest minority to claim their rights, and to 
participate in international and national affairs on an equal basis with others who have 
achieved specific treaty recognition and protection. It is argued here that the CRPD and its 
optional protocol offer a way forward for disabled people. The previous chapter argued that 
the UN 2006 CRPD could perhaps be a way forward for disabled people and that it could 
enhance models of citizenship and models of disability as they relate to disabled people.  
This chapter interrogates the intellectual antecedents of the CRPD and its continuity and 
discontinuity with years of international law and its struggles with disability and human rights. 
It explores the text of the CRPD, critically examining its potential contribution to the 
realization of the rights of persons with disability. As discussed in previous chapters, models 
of disability, citizenship and human rights prior to the 2006 CPRD aimed to respect 
difference while promoting forms of equality. But they fell down precisely because they did 
not achieve this aim.  
Introduction 
On 13 December 2006, the General Assembly (GA) of the United Nations (UN) adopted the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and an associated Optional 
Protocol (CRPD Optional Protocol).487 The UN CRPD applies human rights to a specific 
category of vulnerable persons, namely persons with disabilities. It reaffirms, reformulates, 
articulates and sometimes extends the rights of persons with disabilities.488 Along this the 
Convention calls for a shift of paradigm in the human rights scene setting: it demands a 
change from a medical and paternalistic approach to a social model of disability. 
The CRPD is the first United Nations human rights treaty to be adopted in the twenty-first 
century 489  and is reputed to be the most rapidly negotiated ever. 490  The international 
community has also received the CRPD with unprecedented early enthusiasm. Eighty-one 
                                                             
487 The CRPD and the CRPD Optional Protocol were adopted during the 61st Session of the General Assembly: see 
GA Res. 61/611, 13 December 2006, A/61/611; 15 IHRR 255. See Disabilities Handbook on the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, (Geneva: OHCHR, 2007) 
488 Mégret 2008 
489 The International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 2006, GA Res. 
61/177, 20 December 2006, A/61/488, was adopted by the GA one week later. 
490 Official Statement of the UN Secretary-General, Secretary General Hails Adoption of Landmark Convention on 
Rights of People with Disabilities, 13 December 2006, SG/SM/ 10797, HR/4911, L/T/4400, available at: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/ sgsm10797.doc.htm [last accessed 13 November 2007].  
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states and the European Union491 signed the CRPD at its opening ceremony on 30 March 
2007: the highest number of opening signatures recorded for any human rights treaty.492 
Forty-four states also signed the Optional Protocol. As at the end of December 2007, 120 
states had signed the CRPD and 67 states had signed its Optional Protocol.493 The CRPD 
will enter into force thirty days after the twentieth instrument of ratification is lodged with the 
Secretary-General, and its Optional Protocol will enter into force thirty days after its tenth is 
lodged, provided of course that the CRPD is already in force.494 As at the end of December 
2007, fourteen instruments of ratification had been deposited in relation to the CRPD and 
seven instruments of ratification had been deposited in relation to its Optional Protocol.495 
Although an in-depth explanation of the CRPD‘s background is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it is important to provide a brief synopsis of the different aspects of this information to 
better understand how it proposes to move forward disabled peoples equal citizenship 
particularly with regards to the education of the disabled. 
The Significance of the CRPD for Disabled People 
In England disability discrimination law gives disabled people protection against most forms 
of discrimination. It also gives disabled people rights to reasonable adjustments, and it 
allows employers and service providers to treat disabled people more favorably than non-
disabled people (for example reserving parking bays outside an office for disabled 
employees) since this is often necessary to deliver equality in practice. The Human Rights 
Act also provides important protection against discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights it 
sets out; such as not to be discriminated in the way the right to respect for family life is 
protected.  
 
However the Convention is broader than current British discrimination law. The formulation 
of the CRPD has been hailed as a landmark in the struggle to reframe the needs and 
concerns of persons with disability in terms of human rights. The Secretary General of the 
United Nations, noting that the date of the CRPD‘s adoption fell, in the Western Christian 
calendar, on the day of St Lucy, patron saint of blindness and light, claimed that it heralded 
                                                             
491 The CRPD and its Optional Protocol are the first UN human rights treaties to be signed by the European Union. 
Under Article 44 of the CRPD and Article 12 of its Optional Protocol the European Union may act on behalf of its 
members in relation to the treaties to the extent of its mandate, which must be the subject of a formal declaration, 
deposited with the Secretary-General. While the European Union may also ratify the treaties, only the direct 
ratifications of its member States count towards the treaties coming into force.  
492 Report of the Secretary-General as to the Status of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
the Optional Protocol, 14 August 2007, A/62/230, at para. 4, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/docs/A.62.230.en.doc [last accessed 13 November 2007]. See also 
UN Press Release, Record number of countries sign UN treaty on disabilities on opening day, 30 March 2007, 
available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/ story.asp?NewsID1⁄422085&Cr1⁄4disab&Cr11⁄4 [last accessed 13 
November 2007]. 
493 The United Nations maintains an up-to-date register of nations that have signed and ratified the treaties on its 
UN Enable website, available at: http://www.un.org/disabilities/countries. asp?navid1⁄412&pid1⁄4166 [last accessed 
13 November 2007].  
494 Article 45, CRPD and Article 13, CRPD Optional Protocol respectively.  
495 Jamaica ratified the CRPD at its Signature Opening Ceremony on 30 March 2007. Since then the CRPD has 
been ratified by Panama, Hungary, Croatia, Gabon, Cuba and India. So far,   Panama, Hungary and Croatia have 
ratified the Optional Protocol, see supra n. 6.  
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the ‗dawn of a new eras an era in which disabled people will no longer have to endure the 
discriminatory practices and attitudes that have been permitted to prevail for all too long.‘496 
The President of the European Disability Forum, speaking for the International Disability 
Caucus (IDC),497 returned to the metaphor of light emerging from darkness at the CPRD‘s 
Signature Opening Ceremony, quoting Bertolt Brecht: 
Some there are who live in darkness While the others live in light We see those 
who live in daylight.  Those in the darkness out of sight. This is a convention to bring 
those in darkness into light.498 
Reiterating the claim made many times by national and non-government delegations in the 
course of CRPD negotiations, Ambassador MacKay, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee 
that developed the CRPD text, characterised the CRPD as embodying a ‗paradigm shift‘ 
away from a social welfare response to disability to a rights-based approach.499 The UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has also characterised the CRPD as enshrining this 
paradigm shift in attitudes. She has conceptualised the CRPD as rejecting the ‗view of 
persons with disabilities as objects of charity, medical treatment and social protection‘ and 
as affirming persons with disability as ‗subjects of rights, able to claim those rights as active 
members of society.‘500 
The paradigm shift also involves the perceived centrality of persons with disability and their 
representative organisations in the CRPD negotiation process. The CRPD negotiations are 
reputed to have involved the highest level of participation by representatives of civil society, 
overwhelmingly including persons with disability and disabled persons organizations, of any 
human rights convention in history.501 
Indeed, the formulation and future implementation of the CRPD has been framed repeatedly 
both by governmental and nongovernmental actors as a continuing partnership between the 
UN and disabled persons throughout the world, based on the principle of ‗nothing about us 
                                                             
496 Statement of the UN Secretary-General, supra n. 3. 
497 The International Disability Caucus was a coalition of international, regional and national   non-government 
organisations (principally disabled peoples‘ organisations) accredited as observers to the GA Ad Hoc Committee 
responsible for the development of the CRPD. It claimed a participating membership of more than 70 such 
organisations.  
498 UN Press Release, supra n. 5, quoting Yannis Vardakastanis for the International Disability Caucus. These 
words are an English translation of lines from ‗The Ballad of Mack the Knife‘ from The Threepenny Opera, 1928.  
499 Ambassador Don MacKay, Permanent Representative of New Zealand in the UN and Chair of the Ad-Hoc 
Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Commentary at a High-Level Dialogue held in association with the 
Signature Ceremony of the Convention, From Vision to Action: The Road to Implementation of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, New York, 30 March 2007, available at: http://www. 
un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id1⁄4160 [last accessed 13 November 2007].  
500 Statement by Louise Arbour UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Ad Hoc Committee‘s adoption of 
the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 5 December 2006 
501ManyofficialsmadethispointinaddressestotheOpeningforSignatureCeremony,andinthe associated Press 
Conference. For example, Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo, Mexico‘s Under- Secretary for Multilateral Affairs and 
Human Rights, said ‗the negotiating process had been unprecedented in the history of the United Nations because 
disability-rights activists and representatives of non-governmental organisations had participated in the talks on a 
nearly similar footing as Member States.‘ See UN Press Release, Press Conference by High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on Signing of Convention, 30 March 2007, 
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without us.‘ 502  The CRPD is regarded as having finally empowered the ‗world‘s largest 
minority‘503 to claim their rights, and to participate in international and national affairs on an 
equal basis with others who have achieved specific treaty recognition and protection.504 
Perhaps it is not unusual for new human rights treaties to be drenched in hyperbole and 
hopefulness. Even so, the claims made in relation to the CRPD seem extraordinary by any 
standard. In this chapter, we explore the text of the CRPD, critically examining its potential 
contribution to the realization of the rights of persons with disability and introduce a 
discussion by interrogating the intellectual antecedents of the CRPD and its continuity and 
discontinuity with years of international law and its struggles with disability and human rights. 
There is no reason to be pessimistic about the CRPD‘s prospects, the analysis in this 
chapter will begin to bring a level of realism and strategy to what will no doubt be an ongoing 
interpretive and implementation dialogue. 
The Mandate for a Convention 
The constituency for an international convention on the rights of persons with disability 
developed into a unique international political environment for a human rights treaty. In 2001, 
the Government of Mexico spearheaded another campaign to secure a mandate from the 
GA to develop a human rights convention in relation to persons with disability. This 
campaign was framed in terms of social development and used as its backdrop the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)505 formulated by the UN in 2000, which aim, among 
other things, to halve global extreme poverty by 2015. Persons with disability were not 
identified as a specific target group for action in the MDGs, even though this group is 
significantly over-represented amongst the world‘s so-called ‗poorest of the poor.‘506 The 
basic thrust of the Mexican campaign was that in light of this omission a specific human 
rights instrument was required to ensure that persons with disability were not left behind in 
global development efforts. 
This framing of the human rights agenda for persons with disability in terms of social 
                                                             
502 See, for example, Statement by Hon Ruth Dyson, Minister for Disability Issues, New Zealand Mission to the UN, 
for Formal Ceremony at the Signing of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability, 30 March 2007: 
‗Just as the Convention itself is the product of a remarkable partnership between governments and civil society, 
effective implementation will require a continuation of that partnership.‘ The negotiating slogan ‗Nothing about us 
without us‘ was adopted by the International Disability Caucus 
503  The UN estimates that there are 650 million persons with disability in the world. This estimate is based on a 
population incidence of 10%. Reported population incidence varies widely from 51% (eg Yemen 0.5%) to more than 
30% (eg Norway 33% in urban population and 39% in rural populations), see DISTAT, The United Nations Disability 
Statistics Database, Human Functioning and Disability, 
504  See, for example, statements made by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, and the 
Permanent Representative of New Zealand and Chair of the Ad-Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral 
International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 
Ambassador Don Mackay, at a Special Event on the Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities, convened 
by the UN Human Rights Council, 26 March 2007 
505 See further Annan, UN Press Release, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the   21st Century, 
GA/9704, 3 April 2000,  
506 The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that, of the 650 million persons with disability in the world, 80% 
live in the developing world: WHO, ‗Global Programming Note 2006- 2007: Call for Resource Mobilisation and 
Engagement Opportunities‘, (2006) Disability and Rehabilitation, available at: 
http://www.who.int/nmh/donorinfo/vip_promoting_access_health care_rehabilitation_update.pdf.pdf [last accessed 
13 November 2007].  
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development resulted in a groundswell of support from many of the world‘s developing and 
transitional economies, and even from countries that have not traditionally demonstrated a 
strong commitment to human rights.507 When the issue was raised for debate at the 56th 
Session of the GA in December 2001, a resolution to develop a human rights instrument in 
relation to persons with disability was adopted by consensus, without a vote being 
necessary.508 In the same resolution, the GA established an Ad Hoc Committee to take 
negotiations forward.509 The Ad Hoc Committee operated on an opt-in basis, allowing any 
member state with an interest to participate. The Economic and Social Council of the UN 
(not, interestingly, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) acted as the 
Committee‘s secretariat.510 The Ad Hoc Committee met in eight two- or three-week sessions 
between its establishment in December 2001 and the adoption of the CRPD and its Optional 
Protocol in December 2006. 
In its First and Second Sessions, 511  the Ad Hoc Committee considered and resolved 
tensions around its mandate and programme of work. A number of delegations interpreted 
the mandate as limited to considering whether a convention was required. Australia argued 
that a convention was not required in this area, as it would lead to duplication and confusion 
in the application of human rights. It suggested that the issues would be better dealt with in 
another Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.512 The European Union also argued that it was 
open to the Committee to determine the type of instrument that ought to be recommended to 
the GA.513 However most delegations considered this issue settled and took the view that the 
Ad Hoc Committee‘s mandate was to develop the text for a convention. This included 
Mexico, which provided a draft text for consideration at the opening of the First Session.514 
At the end of its Second Session, the Ad Hoc Committee established a Working Group to 
develop an initial draft text.515 It met in January 2004 and developed a draft text for the 
substantive elements of the convention. This document is known as the Working Group Draft 
                                                             
507 Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Morroco, Nicaragua, Pamama, Phillipines, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa and Uruguay sponsored the Resolution on a comprehensive and integral international Convention to promote 
and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities, GA Res. 56/168, 19 December 2001, A/56/ 583/Add.2, 
508 Ibid. 
509 The term ‗Ad Hoc‘ simply means a specific purpose, time-limited committee to distinguish it from the many 
standing committees that operate under the GA.  
510 This appears to be the result of the initial framing of the Convention in social development 
511 The First Session was held in July/August 2002 and the Second Session in June 2003. 
512 The Australian delegation made several interventions to this effect in the First and Second   Sessions of the Ad 
Hoc Committee. 
513 Comprehensive and integral international Convention to promote and protect the rights and   dignity of persons 
with disability: Position paper by the European Union, 2002, A/AC.265/ WP.2, 
514 Comprehensive and integral international convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons 
with disabilities: Working paper by Mexico, 2002, A/AC.265/WP.1, 
 
515 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 3 July 2003, A/58/118 and Corr. 1, Part IV (15) 1, 
available at: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/ enable/rights/a_58_118_e.htm [last accessed 13 November 2007]. The 
Working Group was made up of 27 UN member State representatives divided proportionally between each UN 
region, 12 representatives of disabled persons‘ organisations, and one representative of national human rights 
institutions.  
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Text.516 Over its next six sessions the Ad Hoc Committee undertook an extensive First and 
Second Reading of the Working Group Draft Text.517 In October 2005, following the Sixth 
Session, the Chair of the Committee released a text that synthesized the proposals, known 
as the Chair‘s Draft Text, along with a detailed letter of commentary. This text then became 
the basis for negotiations from the Seventh Session.518 
In the course of the Seventh Session, the Chair also released a draft proposal for the 
convention‘s international monitoring framework.519 The pro- posed international monitoring 
framework was one of the most challenging areas of negotiation. Some delegations strongly 
opposed the proposal to establish a new treaty body and separate monitoring framework for 
the convention on the basis that this was inconsistent with current treaty-body reform 
initiatives.520  In an effort to resolve these tensions, the Mexican delegation led informal 
discussions. The result was a decision to disaggregate proposed individual complaint and 
inquiry procedures from the CRPD into a separate Optional Protocol.521 At the end of the first 
sitting of the Eighth Session, the Ad Hoc Committee adopted the draft texts for the CRPD 
and Optional Protocol, subject to a technical review. In December 2006, following the 
technical review by the Drafting Group,522 the Ad Hoc Committee held a second sitting of the 
Eighth Session to formally adopt the proposed text for the CRPD and Optional Protocol. It 
then referred these documents to the GA for adoption. 
The CRPD Text 
The GA mandate under which the CRPD was developed stipulated that the negotiating 
Committee was not to develop any new human rights, but was to apply existing human rights 
to the particular circumstances of persons with disability.523 Accordingly, the Chairman of the 
negotiating committee has conceptualised the CRPD as ‗an implementation convention‘; one 
that ‗sets out a detailed code [for how existing rights] should be put into practice‘ with respect 
                                                             
516 Report of the Working Group to the Ad Hoc Committee, Draft Articles for a comprehensive and integral 
international Convention on the protection and promotion of the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities, Annex 
I, A/AC.265/2004/WG/1, 
517 The 3rd (May/June 2004), 4th (August/September 2004), 5th (January/February 2005), 6th (August 2005), 7th 
(January/February 2006) and 8th (August 2006).  
518  Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Chairman to all members of the Ad Hoc Committee on a comprehensive 
and integral international Convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities, 14 
October 2005, A/AC.265/2006/1, 
519 Revisions and amendments at the Seventh Session of the Ad Hoc Committee, Discussion Texts presented by 
the Chair, 
520 Australia, China, Russia, Sudan and the USA, among others, were notable objectors to a new treaty body: see 
Inclusion International, 8th Daily Updates 
521 A consensus was also developed that broader treaty-body reform efforts ought not to delay the entry into force of 
the convention, nor should they result in an inferior implementation and enforcement regime being established 
under the CRPD.  
522 Draft Interim Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a comprehensive and integral international Convention on the 
protection and promotion of the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities on its 8th Session, 1 September 2006, 
A/AC.265/2006/L.6. The drafting group was tasked with ensuring uniformity of terminology throughout the text of the 
draft Convention, harmonizing the versions in the official languages of the UN 
523 This point was made repeatedly in the course of negotiations, was a feature of the rhetoric associated with its 
adoption and opening for signature, and now also permeates formative implementation dialogue and planning. 
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to persons with disability. 524  Consistent with this view, the United Nations CRPD online 
information continues to assure the reader that the CRPD does not create any new rights or 
entitlements, ‗[rather it] express[es] existing rights in a manner that addresses the needs and 
situations of persons with CPRD disabilities.‘ 525  Given that the raison d‘etre for the 
development of the CRPD was that existing human rights instruments have failed persons 
with disability, to say the very least, it is paradoxical to propose that these instruments 
nevertheless provide the necessary scope and content from which to derive a blueprint that 
will secure their rights in future. However, despite the logical incoherence of this proposition, 
this was the unchallenged526 political/administrative framework within which the CRPD was 
developed.527 
The GA mandate under which the CRPD was developed called for proposals for a 
‗comprehensive and integral international convention‘, and indeed, these concepts featured 
in its working title up until the final stages of negotiation.528 This initial working title for the 
convention incorporated important meanings. The word ‗comprehensive‘ signified an 
instruction to the negotiating committee to take a holistic approach to the formulation of the 
convention, incorporating social development, human rights and non-discrimination elements. 
The word ‗integral‘ signified an intention for the convention to become a core constituent of 
international human rights law, rather than a subsidiary of existing law. The CRPD therefore 
has the same status as the other core human rights conventions. 
In spite of its professed adherence to a social model of disability, it will be immediately 
apparent that the CRPD perpetuates, and perhaps now irrevocably entrenches, the 
contemporary conceptual confusion between impairment and disability. As we have 
discussed, according to the social model, ‗disability‘ is the limitation that results from 
discrimination and social oppression. Impairment is a characteristic, feature or attribute of an 
individual (for example, blindness, deafness, spinal cord injury). There is no deterministic 
relationship between persons with an impairment and disability, because a society free from 
discrimination and oppression can exist, at least theoretically. However, it is only persons 
with impairments who may be subject to disability. The CRPD typically uses the term 
‗persons with disabilities‘ where conceptually ‗persons with impairments‘ is meant, and 
additionally, it uses the term ‗disabilities‘ instead of ‗disability‘, including in its title, which is 
incorrect from both an ontological and phenomenological perspective. 529  It is therefore 
                                                             
524 UN Press Releases,‗Chairman says draft convention sets out ‗detailed code of implementation and spells out 
how individual rights should be put into practice‘, 15 August 2005, SOC/4680, available at: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/soc4680.doc.htm 
525Frequently Asked Questions regarding the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, available at: 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid1⁄422&pid1⁄4151#qg 
526 Although both State and non-government observer delegations advanced many text propo- sals that were 
inconsistent with this constraint, none explicitly challenged it.  
527 In reality, this constraint was only applied to ‗close‘ controversial issues, like proposed exten- sions to the right to 
life that would have referred to pre-birth negative selection.  
528 105  Resolution 56/168, supra n. 85. The reference to a ‗comprehensive and integral international convention‘ is 
retained in para. (y), Preamble to the CRPD 
529 Disabilitycanonlydescribeoneformofoppression.However,persons with impairments may be subject to more than 
one form of oppression, for example, women may be subject to disability oppression and gender oppression. 
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difficult to construe the CRPD strictly in accordance with the social model. 
It also logically means that the human rights protection provided by the CRPD is not 
triggered by impairment, but disability; that is, protection is post facto only available to those 
persons with impairments who are already subject to discrimination and oppression, rather 
than those persons who may be at risk of it. This latter group would logically include those 
persons with impairments who do not experience disability because of the nature of their 
present social environment or because appropriate adjustments are available to them. For 
example, Article 14 provides that ‗disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty.‘ 
Presumably, the intention is to prevent deprivation of liberty on the basis of a personal 
characteristic, such as intellectual impairment, whether or not that person is experiencing 
disability. Similarly, Article 23 provides that ‗in no case shall a child be separated from 
parents on the basis of disability of either the child or one or both of the parents‘ where again, 
presumably, the intention must be to prevent family separation merely because of a personal 
characteristic, such as a parent‘s psycho-social impairment. 
In part this conceptual problem arose because the Ad Hoc Committee sought to distinguish 
between impairment (which they conceptualized as ‗disability‘) and a characteristic of 
impairment (such as an inability to control impulse, mood or maintain accurate perception 
that poses a risk of harm to others), which they incorrectly conceptualized as external to 
impairment and disability. They sought to prevent interference with the individual on the 
basis of impairment, while preserving the right of the State to intervene, if necessary, in 
relation to conduct perceived to be external to impairment. However, correctly understood, 
such conduct is often the manifestation of impairment, or of the disability the person with 
impairment experiences in interacting with the social environment. For example, a person 
with brain injury may engage in violence towards others due to an inability to control impulse 
in the context of environmental factors that cause severe stress and frustration.530 
The drafting of these and other provisions therefore appears to achieve the opposite of that 
which was intended, failing to effectively protect from state interference persons with 
impairments who are not experiencing disability, and apparently preventing any form of state 
intervention in relation to persons with impairment engaging in conduct manifesting disability 
that may actually present a risk of harm to others. This is clearest in Article 23, where the 
Committee clearly sought to preserve the state‘s capacity to intervene in a family situation 
where the conduct of a parent presented a risk of harm to a child. However, a literal reading 
of the article suggests that a parent can never be separated from a child on the basis of 
disability, even if the result of that disability (used in its correct sense) is harm to the child.531 
It will therefore be necessary to take a broad purposive approach to the interpretation of 
provisions such as this, attempting to construe what the drafters intended, rather than what 
                                                             
530 This was a principal issue in Purvis v State of New South Wales (2003) 217 CLR 92. 
531 OnepossiblepositiveconsequenceofthisdraftingisthatitplacesanabsoluteonusonStates to provide the 
accommodations parents with disability may require to appropriately parent   their children.  
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they wrote. 
The CRPD and its Optional Protocol 
The CRPD comprises of a Preamble and fifty articles and its Optional Protocol comprises 
eighteen articles. While its articles vary considerably in length, the CRPD is, overall, the 
densest exposition of human rights by the UN to date. In part as a response to this density, 
the CRPD is also the first United Nations human rights convention to contain titles for each 
article as an aid to its accessibility.532 
The Preamble to the CRPD is especially detailed, comprising of twenty-five paragraphs (‗a‘ 
to ‗y‘). Unlike the other parts of the CRPD, the Preamble does not contain binding legal 
obligations. However, it contains many elements that will play an important role in the 
interpretation of the CRPD, only a few of which can be noted here.533 
The questions of a definition of ‗disability‘ and ‗persons with disabilities‘ were among the 
most controversial that were dealt with by the Ad Hoc Committee and ultimately could not be 
resolved.534 Among state delegations, the principal reason for this was concern about the 
distributive impact of such definitions. Most participating non-governmental organizations 
and some states were determined to ensure that the convention applied to all persons with 
disability (by which they appeared to mean all impairment groups). A large number of states 
were concerned that this would ‗open the floodgates,‘ compelling them to recognize in 
domestic implementation efforts a large number of impairment groups not traditionally 
understood as persons with disability within their societies (such as persons with psycho-
social disability and those with blood borne organisms causing disease—for example, 
persons with HIV/AIDS). 
However, it was not only state delegations that objected to a definition of disability being 
incorporated into the CRPD. The IDC also objected on the basis that any definition would 
inevitably derive from the medical model, and would be externally imposed and 
disempowering (at various points in the debate, IDC spokespersons sought to assert a right 
to ‗self determine‘ identity as a ‗disabled person.‘)535 The IDC also argued that understanding 
of ‗disability‘ as a social category is evolving over time, varied between societies, and that 
the incorporation of a definition of disability ran the risk of time-locking the CRPD, and of 
imposing a western view of disability on non-western cultural systems. In its first aspect, 
paragraph (e) of the Preamble accedes to the IDC‘s view of disability as an ‗evolving 
concept.‘ 
                                                             
532 The Ad Hoc Committee made this decision during the first sitting of the 8th Session. The  Optional Protocol 
does not incorporate Article titles.  
533On the use of preambles in interpreting treaties, see Article 31,Vienna Convention on the Law   of Treaties 1969, 
1155 UNTS 31.  
534 The question of such definitions was discussed in the Ad Hoc Committee‘s 2nd, 4th, 7th and 8th Sessions, and 
in the Working Group. 
535 Supran.30. 
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This view is affirmed by the description of persons with disability provided in Article 1 of the 
CRPD, or at least that appears to be its intention. Persons with disabilities (sic) are 
described as ‗including those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments.‘ The taxonomy of impairment types is open-ended and indicative, rather than 
closed. This is reinforced by the first paragraph of Article 1 which asserts that the purpose of 
the convention is to ‗promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities.‘ Nevertheless, Article 1 
does limit the application of the CRPD to persons who have ‗long-term‘ impairments, which 
would certainly exclude those persons with short-term impairments arising from traumatic 
injuries and disease, and it may also exclude persons with episodic conditions (for example, 
mood disorders, asthma). 
Additionally, while reference to all persons with disabilities in paragraph 1 certainly has 
rhetorical power, it ultimately produces an element of circularity. Apart from the impairment 
categories listed, it is not self-evident what other impairment groups fall within the 
boundaries of the category. The treaty body will no doubt ultimately develop jurisprudence in 
this area, but, in the meantime, the boundaries of the category of persons to benefit from the 
CRPD will be determined domestically, potentially depriving some impairment groups of 
human rights protection. 
One potential solution to this problem is to construe the category of persons protected by the 
CRPD by relying upon the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health 
(ICF).536 Certainly, the drafters of the ICF envisaged such a role.537 However, for reasons we 
will explain shortly, the relationship between the CRPD and the ICF is ambiguous to say the 
least, and any attempt to use the ICF to interpret the CRPD will inevitably be fraught with 
controversy. 
Leaving the question of definition to one side, in its‘ second aspect, paragraph (e) of the 
Preamble makes it clear that disability is to be understood according to the precepts of the 
social model. ‗Disability‘ is conceptualized as the product of the interaction of persons with 
impairments with environmental barriers that hinder their full and effective participation in 
society on an equal basis with others. This conceptualization is also affirmed by the 
description of persons with disability in the second paragraph of Article 1, and in the virtually 
absolute emphasis placed by the substantive human rights Articles on the removal of 
barriers and provision of accommodations that will facilitate participation and inclusion of 
persons with disability within society. In fact, this is one of the most notable discontinuities 
between the CRPD and the United Nations‘ prior work in the areas of disability and human 
rights. With only one limited exception, the CRPD does not refer to prevention or treatment 
                                                             
536 World Health Assembly Res. 54.21, 22 May 2001.  
537 Ibid. at 6. The introduction to the ICF states that the ‗. . . ICF provides an appropriate instrument for the 
implementation of stated international human rights mandates and national   legislation‘.  
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of impairment.538 
Paragraph (f) of the Preamble brings into focus this issue of continuity and discontinuity of 
the CRPD with the United Nation previous expositions of the human rights of persons with 
disability and related programmatic activity. Despite its benign appearance, it is intensely 
politically charged. The World Programme of Action concerning Disabled Persons and the 
Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities of Persons with Disabilities are explicitly 
acknowledged as antecedents to the CPRD but the 1971 Declaration, the 1975 Declaration 
and the Principles are not. These omissions were intensely pursued by the IDC, which 
sought to negate any relationship between these instruments and the CRPD, and thereby to 
limit any future reliance upon them for the objections were focused on these instruments‘ 
perceived derivation from the medical model and their approval or acceptance of 
institutionalization, substitute decision-making, and the compulsory treatment of persons with 
disability. 
Perhaps even more significantly, paragraph (f) also fails to refer to the ICF, in spite of its 
contemporary prominence as a statistical, analytical and planning tool, including within 
United Nations and other multilateral agencies. The IDC vehemently opposed reference to 
the ICF on the basis that it reflected a medical model of disability. From the IDC‘s point of 
view, the ICF was part of the human rights problem faced by persons with disability that the 
CRPD was to overcome through its exposition of the social model of disability. Consequently, 
any attempt to use the ICF to interpret the boundaries of the class of persons protected by 
the CRPD is likely to be extremely controversial, at least within the civil society movement of 
disabled persons. The future relationship between the ICF and the CRPD, and indeed the 
future of the ICF itself, are at this stage crucial unanswered questions. 
Family Members 
With very limited exceptions,539  the CRPD does not refer to family members and other 
associates of persons with disability, and it does not confer any rights upon them 
independent of those conferred on persons with disability. Even when the CRPD does refer 
to the family, it implicitly positions the person with disability in an instrumental rather than 
dependent role,540 or alternatively it imposes obligations on states to assist families in their 
effort to realize the human rights of persons with disability the family member with disability 
is the primary beneficiary.541 
                                                             
538 Article 25(b), health, requires States to provide ‗services designed to minimize and prevent   further disabilities . .  
539 Preamble (x), Article 16, freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse; Article 23(4), respect for home and the 
family; and Article 28(1), 2(c), adequate standard of living and social protection. 
540 For example, in Article 23, respect for home and the family, persons with disability are accorded the instrumental 
role of making decisions concerning the founding a family and the number and spacing of their children.  
541 Article 8(1)(a), awareness-raising; Article 23(5), respect for home and the family; and Article 28(1), 2(c), 
adequate standard of living and social protection. Article 8(1)(a), for example, spe- cifically requires states to raise 
awareness at the family level of the rights and dignity of per- sons with disability, and their capabilities and 
contributions, to combat stereotypes and prejudices that reinforce the belief that perbons with disability are a burden 
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The question of whether the CRPD should recognize the needs and rights of family 
members of persons with disability, and, if so, in what manner, were issues keenly argued in 
the Ad Hoc Committee. Ultimately, the central question was answered in the negative, on 
the basis that in most societies family needs and rights tend to be privileged above those of 
persons with disability and, notwithstanding the enormous importance and contribution of 
families to the realization of the rights and dignity of persons with disability, it is sometimes 
family members who are principally responsible for, or collude in, human rights violations 
against them.542 The CRPD privileges the rights of persons with disability over those of 
family members, and challenges the construction of persons with disability as passive 
participants in family life and as ‗burdens‘ on other family members. 
Paragraph (x) of the Preamble delicately poses this issue. Consistent with previous 
instruments it affirms the family as the natural and fundamental group unit of society, and the 
entitlement of the family to protection by society and the state. However, it applies this 
principle in a way that recognizes that both persons with disability and their family members 
should receive protection and assistance from the state. It clearly positions persons with 
disability as having an active, instrumental role in family life. It also makes it clear that the 
protection and assistance provided to families is for the purpose of enabling them to 
contribute to the realization of the rights of persons with disability. Such assistance is not 
cast as compensation for the ‗burden‘ of caring for a person with disability. 
Interpretive Provisions 
Articles 1 and 2 of the CRPD are interpretive. Article 1 sets out the general purpose of the 
convention, which is to ‗promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disability, and to promote 
respect for their dignity.‘ It sets out three levels of obligation in relation to CRPD rights with 
which States must ultimately comply: to promote (foster recognition), protect (prevent 
interference with) and ensure (enable the realization of) the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of persons with disability. Article 2 defines five key terms used repeatedly 
throughout the convention which have very specific meanings and implications for 
implementation of CRPD rights ‗communication,‘ ‗language,‘ ‗discrimination on the ground of 
disability,‘ ‗reasonable accommodation‘ and ‗universal design.‘ 
 Reasonable Accommodation 
‗Reasonable accommodation‘ is defined as ‗necessary and appropriate modifications and 
adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular 
case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with 
                                                                                                                                                                            
to their family and society.  
542 For example, by arranging for the sterilisation on women and girls with disability, or by institutionalising persons 
with disability. 
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others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.‘ Importantly, the definition of 
discrimination on the basis of disability includes the ‗denial of reasonable accommodation.‘ 
This is reinforced in Article 5, which also requires states to ensure that reasonable 
accommodation is provided.543 
The incorporation of a state obligation to ensure that reasonable accommodations are made 
to facilitate the exercise by persons with disability of CPRD rights is perhaps the most 
fundamental instrumental element of the convention. Nevertheless, its formulation is very far 
from optimal. The obligation ceases at the point where the adjustment required constitutes a 
‗disproportionate or undue burden.‘ The terms ‗disproportionate‘ and ‗undue burden‘ appear 
to have been intended by the Ad Hoc Committee as alternatives, but have been drafted as 
additive, effectively creating a two element test that may allow the obligation to be evaded at 
the lower of either threshold (which may vary according to context). Moreover, the thresholds 
themselves appear insufficiently challenging to penetrate to the core of exclusionary 
practices affecting persons requiring significant structural adjustments. They appear more 
likely to produce results for persons who require relatively marginal changes to the prevailing 
social environment. It will also be observed that the terminology ‗undue burden‘ is most 
unfortunate in that it activates precisely the construction of persons with disability as 
‗burdens‘ on the community that the CPRD otherwise attempts to overcome. 
General Obligations 
Articles 3 to 9 of the CRPD are general obligations. They contain overarching or crosscutting 
principles and measures to be applied in all aspects of the implementation of the convention. 
Article 3 enunciates the general (or normative) principles upon which the CRPD is based, 
which include respect for the inherent dignity of persons with disability, non-discrimination, 
and the full and effective participation of persons with disability in society. It provides what 
one senior commentator has referred to as the CRPD‘s ‗moral compass.‘544 Article 4 sets out 
the general obligations states assume on ratification or accession to the CRPD. This 
includes, for example, the obligation to incorporate the terms of the convention into national 
laws, policies and programs, and to repeal national laws that are inconsistent with the 
convention. Article 6 (Women with Disabilities) and Article 7 (Children with Disabilities) 
require states to implement the CRPD in a manner that will ensure that women and children 
with disability are able to exercise and enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms 
on an equal basis with men and other children. These gender and age equality measures 
are reinforced in the CRPD‘s Preamble and at a number of key points in its specific 
                                                             
543 This has very important implications for Australian disability discrimination law in light of the High Court of 
Australia‘s decision in Purvis v NSW (Department of Education and Training) (2003) ALR 133 to the effect that s5(2) 
(direct discrimination) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) imposes no positive duty to provide reasonable 
accommoda-tion: per Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ (in the majority) at paras 217-218 and per Kirby and 
McHugh JJ (dissenting) at para. 104.  
544 Quinn, Key Note Address to German European Union Presidency Ministerial Conference: Empowering Persons 
with Disabilities, The UN Convention on the Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Trigger for Worldwide Law 
Reform, Berlin, 11 June 2007, available  
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obligations. 
Articles 8 and 9 present what are undoubtedly two of the greatest challenges to the 
international community. Article 8 requires states to promote a fundamental change in 
societal attitudes, by fostering respect for the rights and dignity of persons with disability and 
by combating stereotypes and prejudice. Article 9 requires states to ensure that the 
‗environment‘ is accessible to persons with disability so that they may live independently and 
participate fully in all aspects of life. It is important to observe that the environment is very 
broadly conceptualized, and not only includes built structures, but also transportation, 
information and communications (including the Internet). The Article also specifically adverts 
to a principle of geographic equity, requiring equivalent levels of environmental accessibility 
in both urban and rural areas. The principle of geographic equity also underpins a number of 
the CRPD‘s economic, social and cultural rights. 
Specific Obligations 
Articles 10 to 30 of the CRPD contain specific obligations. They set out, mostly in some 
detail, the specific human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by the convention. 
Civil and Political Rights 
Broadly speaking, Articles 10 to 23 and Article 29 are based in civil and political rights. In 
some cases there are new or amplified applications or extensions of these rights. For 
example, Article 11 extends the right to life and survival to situations of emergencies. States 
are required to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disability in situations of risk, 
including armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters. 545  Article 13 
significantly extends the traditional right of equality before the law into a positive obligation to 
ensure access to justice.546 Article 16 extends the traditional right to freedom from torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment to freedom from all forms of exploitation, violence and 
abuse.
 
547 
Articles 17, 19 and 20 significantly extend the traditional right of liberty and security of the 
person in ways that are unexpected and difficult to predict. Article 17 is particularly directed 
towards non-interference with both the physical body and the mind, and is the product of 
very vigorous advocacy against compulsory treatment by activists with psycho-social 
impairments. It is the first time the concept of ‗integrity of the person‘ has been included as a 
                                                             
545 The CRPD was developed against a backdrop of unprecedented challenges in the interna- tional environment, 
which impacted in aggravated ways on persons with disability. This included the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States of America, wars in Iraq, Israel-Palestine and Lebanon, the Asian Tsunami, severe 
earthquakes in south Asia, and hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
546 This is the first time access to justice has appeared as a substantive right in a UN human rights instrument. A 
more traditional formulation of the right to equality before the law is found in Article 12, CRPD.  
547 Thisarticlealso,oralternatively,derivesfromArticle19,CRC.  
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standalone Article in a core United Nations human rights treaty.548 Article 19 equates the 
right to liberty with the right of persons with disability to live in and be a part of the 
community. It will operate as a prohibition on institutional models of supported 
accommodation for persons with disability, and require national investment in community 
based living options. Article 20 equates the right to liberty with the maximum personal 
mobility of persons with disability. It will also require national investment in mobility aids, 
assistive technologies, and forms of live assistance for persons with disability. From an 
implementation perspective, it is intriguing that these Articles are, despite their appearance, 
civil and political rights, subject to the standard of immediate realization.549 
Limits Of The CRPD 
These Articles contain some extraordinary innovations and applications of civil and political 
rights to persons with disability. However, their formulation is not without limitations. Despite 
considerable agitation of the issue by particular non-government observer delegations to the 
Ad Hoc Committee, Article 10 (Right to Life), remains silent on genetic science aimed at the 
elimination of impairment-related human diversity, and on pre-birth negative selection of fate 
with identified or imputed impairment. The failure of the CRPD to speak directly to this and 
some other bioethical issues may come to be regarded as its greatest failing.550 
Article 17 is also very disappointing. It was perhaps the single most contentious Article 
negotiated by the Ad Hoc Committee, and, in large part as a consequence of this, its text is 
the most limited of the substantive human rights Articles. The Article is confined to a simple 
statement of principle with no specific application of this principle to the human right 
violations it purports to address. At the urging of the IDC in general, and the World Network 
of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (WNUSP) in particular, the Ad Hoc Committee 
abandoned an earlier proposal that would have required the strict regulation of compulsory 
treatment. The IDC and WNUSP sought the ultimate goal of the CRPD ‗outlawing‘ all forms 
of compulsory assistance, but, when this proved impossible to achieve, they adopted the 
alternative lobbying stance that there ought to be no reference to compulsory treatment in 
the CRPD as this would provide it with legitimacy. Ultimately, this was the outcome of the Ad 
Hoc Committee‘s deliberations, although this appeared to be more to avoid conflict with the 
IDC and WNUSP, than because of any underlying commitment to the principle on which this 
opposition was based. The result is that one of the most critical areas of human rights 
violation for persons with disability the use of coercive State power for the purpose of 
‗treatment‘ remains without any specific regulation in the CRPD. 
 
                                                             
548 This concept does, however, appear in Article 3, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the   European Union 2000, 
OJ (C 364) 1, 7 December 2000, available at: www.europarl.europa.   eu/charter/default_en.htm 
549 This means that nations have an immediate obligation to respect and ensure these rights.   Economic, social 
and cultural rights are subject to progressive realisation. See further, below p. 30.  
 
550 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),   art. II ( I ).  
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Articles 24 to 28 and Article 30 are based in economic, social and cultural rights.551 These 
Articles place overriding emphasis on inclusion and participation by persons with disability in 
the mainstream education system and labour market, supported by the accommodations 
and other positive measures required by persons with disability to realize these rights. The 
right to health is particularly directed towards ensuring that persons with disability enjoy non-
discriminatory access to comprehensive general and specialist health services in the local 
communities in which they live. Article 26 extends the traditional rights to health, work, 
education and social security to the right to habilitation and rehabilitation, which features for 
the first time in a core United Nations human rights treaty. It is directed to ensuring that 
persons with disability have access to developmental learning and rehabilitation 
programmes that will enable them to develop (or recover) their maximum potential. Again, 
the emphasis is on inclusion and participation of persons with disability in the community 
both during the process of habilitation and rehabilitation and as an outcome of it. 
Article 28 deals with the right to an adequate standard of living and social protection. The 
concept of social protection is arguably significantly broader than the traditional right to 
social security. The Article also incorporates obligations in relation to poverty reduction, the 
provision of specialist disability services, and assistance with the extra costs of disability. 
Finally, Article 30 deals with the rights of persons with disability to participation in cultural life, 
recreation, leisure and sport. Again, primary emphasis is placed on access by persons with 
disability to cultural and leisure facilities, and their participation in cultural and leisure 
programmes and events on an equal basis with others, supported by the accommodations 
and other positive measures necessary for them to effectively realize these rights. However, 
the Article also recognizes the specific cultural and linguistic identity of persons who are deaf, 
and guarantees recognition of sign language and deaf culture. 
The overall thrust of these Articles, taken together, is to require states to incorporate a ‗twin-
track‘ approach to meeting the economic, social and cultural rights of persons with disability, 
which involves, first, incorporating disability sensitive measures into mainstream service 
delivery, and second, ensuring the provision of necessary specialist services and special 
measures in a manner that facilitates the inclusion and participation of persons with disability 
within the general community. The CRPD very specifically, and very comprehensively, 
delegitimizes segregated specialist service delivery to persons with disability. 
How the CRPD Enhances International Law Protections 
Generally speaking, disability has been an invisible element of international human rights 
                                                             
551 Seegenerally,McCorquodateandBaderin(eds),EconomicandSocialRightsinAction,(Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
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law. Campaign postcards distributed by non-government organizations during the first 
session of the Ad Hoc Committee attempted to persuade delegates that disability rights were 
a ‗missing piece‘ of the human rights framework.552 Persons with disability have not been 
explicitly recognized in the binding instruments of international human rights law. None of the 
equality clauses of any of the three instruments comprising the International Bill of Rights 
(the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948,553 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR),554and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR)555) mention persons with disability as a protected category. 
Nor, with one exception, do the thematic conventions.556 The Convention on the Rights of 
the Child 1989 (CRC) does refer to ‗mentally and physically disabled‘ children in Article 
23.557 This Article sets out a range of obligations designed to ensure that children with 
disability receive ‗special care‘ in relation to their ‗special needs‘ with a view to them 
‗achieving the fullest possible social integration and individual development.‘  
The article is a significant step forward from classic and contemporary models of citizenship 
which look seek to prepare children for ‗independence‘ and ‗participation‘ the ‗fullest possible 
social integration‘ and ‗individual development‘ hold no underlying assumption or benchmark 
for any level of normality to be achieved. Article 23 does not define the child as a citizen in 
traditional views of ‗competence.‘  
However, there are significant difficulties in the formulation of this Article (particularly in its 
emphasis on ‗special care,‘ which ultimately derives from a medical model of disability, and 
its application only to ‗mentally and physically disabled‘ children). Article 23 has also tended 
to be interpreted and applied as if it circumscribed State obligations to children with disability, 
inhibiting the mainstreaming of disability measures.558 
Up to the development of the CRPD, the United Nations system had attempted to deal with 
this visibility problem in two ways. First, by trying to interpret and apply existing ‗core human 
rights ‗instruments to persons with disability, and second, by developing a series of lesser 
policy and programmatic documents focused on the needs and rights of persons with 
disability. 
In 1994, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) 
                                                             
552 These postcards were produced by the Landmine Survivors Network (on file with authors). 
553 GA Res. 217 A(III), 10 December 1948. 
554 999UNTS171. 
555 993 UNTS 3.  
556 Other than the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC), 1577 UNTS 3, the thematic Conventions prior 
to the CRPD are the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965, 660 
UNTS 195; the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979, 1249 
UNTS 13; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984, 
1465 UNTS 85; and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families 1990, 2220 UNTS 93; 12 IHRR 269 (2005).  
557 There is also a prohibition on discrimination on the ground of disability in Article 2, CRC.  
558 In 2006, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) issued General Comment No. 9: The rights 
of children with disabilities, HRI/GEN/1/Rev 8, Add.1 at para. 34, which attempts to address this problem by 
detailing recommended actions in relation to the full range of CRC obligations.  
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assumed responsibility for supervising disability issues within the area of its competence. In 
its General Comment No. 5,559 the ESCR Committee recognized that while the ICESCR 
does not explicitly refer to persons with disability, Article 2(2) required that the rights 
‗enunciated . . . be exercised without discrimination of any kind,‘ whether on the basis of 
certain specified grounds, ‗or other status.‘ In the ESCR Committee‘s view, this clearly 
encompassed discrimination on the ground of disability. The ESCR Committee also noted 
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that ‗all human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights‘ and that this obviously included persons with disability.560 
General Comment No. 5 recognizes that: 
both de jure and de facto discrimination against persons with disability have a long 
history and take various forms.‘ They range from invidious discrimination, such as 
the denial of access to educational opportunities, to more ‗subtle‘ forms of 
discrimination such as segregation and isolation achieved through the imposition of 
physical and social barriers.561 
General Comment No. 5 was also the first United Nations document to broadly define 
disability-based discrimination: 
For the purposes of the Covenant, ‗disability-based discrimination‘ may be defined 
as including any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference, or denial of 
reasonable accommodation based on disability which has the effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of economic, social or cultural 
rights.562 
Unlike the ESCR Committee, the Human Rights Committee has not issued a specific 
interpretive statement in relation to the application of the ICCPR to persons with disability. 
Nevertheless, in its General Comment No. 18,563 which deals with the right to equality and 
non-discrimination under the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee rejected the concept of 
formal equality in the human rights context in favor of substantive equality. It recognized that 
equal treatment does not always mean identical treatment, and that states have a duty to 
take steps to eliminate conditions that perpetuate discrimination.564 For the reasons already 
discussed, this has important implications for achieving equality and non-discrimination in a 
disability context. 
A Shift from the Traditional UN Human Rights use of a Medical Model to a Social 
Model in the CRPD 
These initiatives have been important increments towards the broader recognition of the 
                                                             
559 HRI/GEN/1/Rev 8, Add.1.  
560 Ibid. at para. 34. 
561 Ibid. at para. 15. 
562 Ibid.  
563 10 November 1989, HRI/GEN/1/Rev 8, especially at para. 10.  
564 Ibid. at para. 8.  
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rights of persons with disability in the CRPD. 565  However, in and of themselves, they 
achieved very little by way of improving recognition and respect of the human rights of 
persons with disability. One of the principal reasons why this is so is that, to a significant 
extent, the traditional human rights paradigm is based on an ‗able-bodied‘ norm. In most 
cases it is not self- evident how traditional human rights are to be interpreted and applied in 
a manner that will penetrate to the specific human rights violations to which persons with 
disability are subject. 
Disability as an issue of law, both domestically and internationally, has traditionally been 
addressed as an aspect of social security and welfare legislation, health law or guardianship. 
Persons with disability were depicted not as subjects with legal rights but as objects of 
welfare, health and charity programmes.566 The recognition of disability as a fundamental 
human rights issue has developed slowly from the early 1970s. Most developments in 
disability rights at the international level have been in non-binding, ‗soft law,‘ and the early 
instruments still tend to reflect this medical/welfare approach. When the GA adopted the 
Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons 1971 (1971 Declaration)567 and the 
Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons 1975 (1975 Declaration),568 persons with 
disability may have become explicit subjects of international human rights law, but this status 
was heavily qualified by the individual model of disability within which they were couched. As 
a result, these instruments tend to be paternalistic, and legitimize segregation through 
specialized services and institutions.569 
In 1982 the United Nations adopted the World Programme of Action concerning Disabled 
Persons (WPA), which established as one of its goals the equalization of opportunities for 
people with disability. The WPA defined ‗equalization of opportunities‘ as: 
the process through which the general system of society, such as the physical and 
cultural environment, housing and transportation, social and health services, 
educational and work opportunities, cultural and social life, including sports and 
recreational facilities, are made accessible to all.570 
This marked the beginning of a significant shift away from an individual/medical model of 
disability to a focus on rights and equality. In 1984, the UN followed the WPA with a 
comprehensive study on the relationship between human rights and disability, with the Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities appointing a 
Special Rapporteur to conduct the research. In his 1993 report, the Special Rapporteur 
                                                             
565 For completeness, it should also be noted that in General Recommendation No. 18: Disabled  Women, 10th 
Session, 1991, HRI/GEN/1/Rev 8 at 301, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women urges 
States to provide information on the status of disabled women in their periodic reports.  
566 Degener and Quinn, Human Rights and Disability: The Current Use and Future Potential of United Nations 
Human Rights Instruments in the Context of Disability, 2002, HR/PUB/02 at 1.  
567 GA Res. 2856/26, 20 December 1971, A/RES/2856.  
568 GA Res. 3447/30, 9 December 1975, A/RES/3447.  
569 For example, Article 4, 1971 Declaration, continues to provide qualified support for institutional accommodation 
for persons with disability; and Article 1, 1975 Declaration, incorporates a personal deficiency based 
conceptualisation of disability.  
570 GA Res. 37/52, 3 December 1982, A/RES/37/51, 37th Session Supp. No. 51 at para. 12. 
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made it clear that disability is a human rights concern, in which the United Nations bodies 
should be involved.571 
In 1991, the GA adopted the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and 
the Improvement of Mental Health Care (Principles). 572  The Principles establish mental 
health care standards and procedural guarantees for the protection of persons with mental 
illness against human rights abuses in mental health facilities, such as excessive or 
prolonged use of physical restraint or involuntary seclusion, sterilization on the grounds of 
mental illness, psychosurgery and irreversible treatment. However, the continued focus on 
treatment and protection has meant the Principles have been controversial, particularly 
among psychosocial impairment user groups, for their perpetuation of a medical model of 
disability. 
During the 1980s there were three unsuccessful attempts to persuade the international 
community to develop a human rights convention in respect of persons with disability.573 The 
reasons these initiatives failed are multifactorial, but included the belief that the rights of 
persons with disability were adequately dealt with in universal human rights instruments; the 
inability to convince the international community that persons with disability experienced 
specific and aggravated forms of human rights violation; and, diminishing support for civil 
right-based approaches to human rights (in which these initiatives were framed), particularly 
among developing states. 
As a compensatory alternative, the GA eventually adopted the non-binding United Nations 
Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (Standard 
Rules) in 1993.574 The Standard Rules firmly build on the WPA, and clearly accentuate 
equality, stating: 
The principle of equal rights implies that the needs of each and every individual are 
of equal importance, that those needs must be made the basis for the planning of 
societies and that all resources must be employed in such a way as to ensure that 
every individual has equal opportunity for participation.575 
The Standard Rules developed the work of the WPA in situating impairment as an incident of 
human diversity and urged states to incorporate a disability perspective into policy and 
planning. The Standard Rules make very clear statements about the rights of persons with 
                                                             
571 Report by Special Rapporteur, Leandro Despouy, of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, Human Rights and Disabled Persons, 1993, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/31 
572 GA Res. 46/119, 17 December 1991. 
573 Proposals were sponsored by Italy in 1982 and 1897 and by Sweden in 1989, see Degener and   Quinn, supra n. 
70 at 30.  
574 GA Res. 48/96, 20 December 1993, A/RES/48/96, Supp No. 49, Annex at 202^11, available at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r096.htm [last accessed 13 November 2007]. See Degener, ‗Disabled 
Persons and Human Rights: The Legal Framework‘, and Lindqvist, ‗Standard Rules in the Disability FieldçA New 
United Nations Instrument‘, in Degener and Koster^Dreese (eds), Human Rights and Disabled Persons: Essays and 
Relevant Human Rights Instruments (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) at 40 and 63 respectively.  
575 Standard Rules, supra n. 79. 
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disability and promote an accessible environment in which these rights may be exercised. 
However, they still focus on medical treatment and (somewhat naively in terms of genetic 
testing), prevention, as preconditions for equal participation. This has been heavily criticized 
by disability activists for its failure to accept disability as part of human diversity, and to 
respect the inherent dignity of persons with disability. 
In any event, irrespective of their textual strengths and weaknesses, these soft law 
instruments are not binding on states, and their impact has, overall, been very limited. This 
led disability activists to the view that a binding international instrument that set out a 
normative framework for the promotion and protection of the human rights of persons with 
disability was essential. 576  It was also argued that international law had to adjust to 
incorporate a disability rights paradigm. Proponents emphasized that a convention on the 
human rights of persons with disability would give shape to the nature specific content to, 
human rights as they apply to persons with disability, and in turn, provide a substantive 
framework for the application of rights within domestic law and policy.577 
How The CRPD Enhances The Social Model of Disability 
This section briefly recaps from chapter two of this thesis on the medical and social models 
of disability. This will allow me to show how the CRPD enhances the limitations of the social 
model. As discussed in Chapter Two, central to contemporary concepts of disability is the 
notion of systemic disadvantage, according to which persons with disability are discriminated 
against by social structures that segregate or exclude them from participating fully in society 
(social model). ‗Disability‘ is understood and experienced as oppression by social structures 
and practices. This oppression works both on the individual, denying or diminishing 
personhood, 578  and systemically, on those who share the label ‗disabled,‘ denying or 
diminishing citizenship and civic participation.579 
In light of this, the human rights definition of persons with disabilities contained in Article 1 of 
the CRPD offers a holistic approach to defining disability. Article 1 provides that: 
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may 
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.580 
The definition in Article 1 moves away from the historically dominant medical model of 
disability and towards the social model understanding of disability. In this understanding,  
                                                             
576 Many of the statements to the Ad Hoc Committee from the IDC and disabled persons organisations stressed the 
need for a binding instrument see, for example, Disabled Peoples International, Position Paper regarding a New 
International Human Rights Convention for Disabled People, 25 February 2003, 
577 Degener and Quinn, supra n. 71. 
578 For example, in popular culture persons with disability may be referred to as ‗vegetables‘, ‗monsters‘, and ‗freaks‘.  
579 For example, in many countries persons with intellectual and psycho-social impairments have been, and may still 
be, denied democratic voting rights.  
580 Article 1 CRPD 
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disabled people experience disability as a social restriction, whether those 
restrictions occur as a consequence of inaccessibly built environments, questionable 
notions of intelligence and social competence, the inability of the general population 
to use sign language, the lack of reading material in Braille or hostile public attitudes 
to people with non-visual disabilities.581 
A definition which is based on the individual mode, is more capable of accurately framing 
discussions which are relevant to disabled people, identifying hidden sources of 
discrimination and improving our understanding of human rights.582 As a result of defining 
disability in a way that takes into consideration the impairment of the individual and the 
barriers that hinder their social participation (for example, environmental, built or human 
barriers), Article 1 of CRPD entitles a broad range of people.  
This analysis is a different way of looking at the experiences of persons with disability to that 
with which most people are familiar. Historically, persons with disability have been treated as 
objects of pity and as burdens on their families and societies. According to this view, 
disability is a ‗personal tragedy.‘ Persons with disability are victims of great misfortune who 
are variously perceived as socially dead or better off dead, as passively coming to terms with 
a condition that will forever limit their activities, or as bravely and triumphantly overcoming 
these limitations by great mental or physical effort.583 The focus is on the ‗affliction‘ caused 
by the particular condition or impairment and the provision of cure, treatment, care and 
protection to change the person so that they may be assimilated to the social norm.584 This is 
broadly referred to as the medical model of disability, which has arguably been the most 
powerful influence on the conceptualization of disability in modern history. 585  As one 
commentator has observed, the medical model ‗... has guided and dominated clinical 
practice with the resulting assumption that both problems and solutions lie within people with 
disabilities rather than within society.‘586 
These ‗images of disability‘ (as Michael Oliver terms them) strongly reinforce the idea that it 
is the impairment itself that causes the limitation, without recognizing the role of the social 
                                                             
581 R. K., ―Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act‖, Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor 
Law, Vol. 21(1), 2000, p. 215. 
582  
583  See generally Oliver, Understanding Disability: From Theory to Practice (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1996); and 
Finkelstein, Attitudes and Disabled People: Issues for Discussion (New York: World Rehabilitation Fund, 1980), 
584 Michael Oliver locates the origins of disability as a socially constructed category at the begin- ning of the 
Industrial Revolution. He argues that one of the most important differences between the pre- and post-industrial 
revolution is the replacement of the notion of impair- ment as something conferred by an external, often 
supernatural, force with rational and scientific explanations. The Industrial Revolution resulted in a classification of 
people accord- ing to their ability to contribute to the forces of production. The boundaries of the concept of normal 
were restricted by the individual‘s capacity to participate in economic life. Impaired persons were seen as 
unproductive with little social value or individual human worth and were exiled from the productive centre into 
institutions and an existence outside society where their only claim to social resources was in the charity of others. 
This resulted in an environment constructed on an able-bodied, productive norm. See Oliver, supra n. 20; and 
Finkelstein, supra n. 20.  
585 The medical model views disability as a deficiency or deviation from the norm, located in the individual, and 
carries an action implication to treat or change the person so that they can conform to existing social processes and 
structures. This treatment is typically provided in service systems and settings isolated from the general community. 
The medical model is not confined to the health domain, but for many persons with disability, has pervaded all areas 
of life. Examples include institutional residential services, special education systems and sheltered employment. 
586 French, ‗What is Disability?‘, in French (ed), On Equal Terms - Working with Disabled People (Oxford: 
Butterworth-Heinemann, 1994) at 4. 
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environment in disabling persons with impairments. As discussed in Chapter Two, these 
images have dominated policy responses to persons with impairments, resulting in a 
disabling culture that perpetuates negative attitudes and discriminatory practices that 
ultimately oppress and exclude persons with impairments.587 
By contrast, the social model of disability locates the experience of disability in the social 
environment, rather than impairment, and carries with it the implication of action to dismantle 
the social and physical barriers to the participation and inclusion of persons with disability. 
The social model of disability is a generic term for a broad theory of disability that began to 
emerge from the mid 1960s principally from within the disability rights movement in the 
United Kingdom.588 It involved disability activist academics reinterpreting ‗disability‘ as social 
oppression,589 and radically refocusing the agenda away from cure, treatment, care and 
protection to acceptance of impairment as a positive dimension of human diversity, and to 
the problematisation and rejection of a social norm that results in exclusion. Social model 
concepts were rapidly popularized590 and internationalized, and have become a dominant 
frame of reference both for disability studies and disability rights advocacy. This duality of 
the social model as a theory of disability and as a disability rights manifesto has important 
implications. 
As a theory of disability, the social model is continuing to evolve, particularly under the 
influence of critical disability studies, which have drawn attention to the shortcomings of its 
classical formulation as a heuristic for explaining the total experience of disability. Its core 
thesis that limitations result from disability not impairment has been critiqued for its failure to 
recognize and address the genuine issues that individuals face due to impairment, and not 
disability, in terms of health, wellbeing and individual capacity.591 However, this critique has 
been controversial within the broader disability rights movement,592 and, consequently, it has 
                                                             
587 Finkelstein and Stuart, ‗Developing New Services‘, in Hales (ed.), Beyond Disability: Towards an Enabling 
Society (London: Sage Publications, 1996) at 175^6.  
588 The concept emerged in the mid 1960s through the reflections and writings of Paul Hunt, a British disability rights 
activist. It crystalised in 1976, when Hunt and his colleagues within the UK organisations Union of the Physically 
Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) and The Disability Alliance published Fundamental Principles of Disability ^ 
Being a Summary of the Discussion Held on 22 November 1975, November 1976, available at: http://www.leeds. 
ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/UPIAS/fundamental%principles.pdf [last accessed 14 November 2007], which 
claimed that disability is ‗the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organisation 
which takes little or no account of people who have physical impairments and thus excludes them from participation 
in the main- stream of social activities.‘ See also Finkelstein, Reflections on the Social Model of Disability: The 
South African Connection, 13 April 2005, 
 
589 See Oliver, supra n. 20 and n. 21; Finkelstein, supra n. 20; Barnes, Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination 
(London: Hurst and Co, 1991); Abberley ‗The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of 
Disability‘, (1987) 2 Disability, Handicap and Society 5; and Quinn, ‗The Human Rights of People with Disabilities 
under EU Law,‘ in Alston, Bustelo and Heenan (eds), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999) at 281.  
590 The very simplicity of the idea that ‗people are disabled by society‘ has been enormously effec- tive in 
highlighting systemic discrimination and mobilising political action for social change. 
591  See Shakespeare and Watson, ‗The Social Model of Disability: An Outdated Ideology?‘, (2002) 2 Research in 
Social Science and Disability 9and Corker and Shakespeare (eds), Disability/Postmodernity:   Embodying Disability 
Theory (London: Continuum, 2002).  
592 See, for example, Light, ‗Social Model or Unsociable Muddle?‘ at Disability Awareness in Action   web site, 
available at: www.daa.org.uk/social_model.html [last accessed on 26 October 2007], where critical disability studies 
are positioned as ‗harmful,‘ ‗repeated attacks‘ on the social- model, as offering ‗no acceptable alternative‘ to persons 
with disability, and critical scholars are accused of forgetting that the ‗social model originated with us [that is, 
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had little impact on the social model as a disability rights manifesto. Indeed, the social model 
as disability rights manifesto appears to have moved in an opposite direction theoretically, 
closer to a radical social constructionist view of disability, in which impairment has no 
underlying reality. 593  As we shall discuss later, the social model has had an enormous 
influence in the development of the CRPD. However, it is important to understand that the 
primary influence has come from this populist conceptualization of the social model as a 
disability rights manifesto and its tendency towards a radical social constructionist view of 
disability, rather than from its contemporary expression as a critical theory of disability.594 
The social model illuminates the limitations of traditional theories of equality in relation to 
persons with disability. The fundamental purpose of equality measures is to challenge the 
equation of difference with inferiority. Originally, this produced formal equality measures that 
aimed to free individuals from discrimination based on their membership of a particular social 
group. Formal equality measures pursued a colour blind and gender-neutral society, where 
merit was assessed without regard to irrelevant characteristics, and individuals could thrive 
free from stereotypical assumptions.595 
However, by requiring that everyone be treated the same, formal equality entrenches pre-
existing patterns of social disadvantage in a number of fundamental ways.596 In particular, as 
Fredman explains, formal equality fails to recognize that much discrimination cannot be 
attributed to individual acts by specific perpetrators, ‗but flows, instead, from the institutions 
and structures of society.‘ It also assumes that individual merit can be quantified in an 
objective way, abstracted from the social context in which it is located, when ‗in fact, of 
course, merit is itself a social construct.‘597 In other words, formal equality assumes a benign 
social norm, and focuses on the elimination of perverse personal behavior. It does not seek 
to change the fundamental structure of the norm. The central premise of formal equality is 
the disregard of differences particularly problematic in a disability context for another reason. 
Perhaps more so than for any other disadvantaged group, treatment of persons with 
disability ‗equally‘ will often require specific recognition and accommodation of their 
difference; that is, ‗different‘ treatment. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
disabled persons], and that we still have use for it.‘  
593 This was particularly evident in the Ad Hoc Committee debate concerning a definition of dis- ability. As we shall 
discuss later in this paper, on a number of occasions the International Disability Caucus intervened in the debate 
claiming the right to ‗self-determine‘ a disability identity, and rejecting ‗externally imposed definitions.‘ The 
implication of this view is that there are no intrinsic, objectively ascertainable characteristics upon which to base a 
defini- tion: Kicki Nordstrom, former President, World Blind Union, Intervention in debate on behalf of the 
International Disability Caucus with respect to Article 2: Definitions, 7th Session of the Ad Hoc Committee on a 
Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 31 
January 2006, authors‘ direct observation.  
594 This is most evident in the outcome of the drafting of Article 12 and Article 17, CRPDçwhich border on a 
complete denial of instrumental limitations associated with cognitive impairments.  
595 Fredman, ‗Disability Equality and the Existing Anti-Discrimination Paradigm - European Discrimination Law‘, in 
Lawson and Gooding (eds), Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) at 
211.  
596 Fredman, ‗Providing Equality: Substantive Equality and the Positive Duty to Provide‘, (2005) 21 South African 
Journal of Human Rights 163.  
597  Fredman, supra n. 32 at 204. 
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Substantive equality attempts to remedy these problems by compensating for historical 
disadvantage, and by requiring alteration of the norm to better reflect human diversity. Key 
substantive equality measures include the designation of quotas or institution of affirmative 
action policies to increase minority group participation in education or employment, and the 
imposition of a requirement to make structural adjustments to accommodate personal needs 
(for example, flexible work hours to accommodate family responsibilities). Essentially, 
substantive equality underpins contemporary non-discrimination law in the area of disability 
in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States (as examples).598    
In the disability context, the obligation to make reasonable accommodations for impairment 
and disability-related 599  needs is a crucial substantive equality measure. Although it is 
individually referenced (in that the obligation operates on a bilateral basis between the 
person to be accommodated and the person or institution required to make the 
accommodation), reasonable accommodation has the potential to result in fundamental 
structural transformations of the norm. However, in spite of its fundamental significance as a 
disability equality measure, the obligation to make accommodations is typically constrained, 
in practice, by a ‗hardship‘ defence or limit on the obligation,600 which may be negative or 
diminish its structural impact. If the threshold at which the obligation ceases is set too low or 
if the obligation is easily evaded, reasonable accommodation may result in little or only 
marginal changes to an exclusionary norm. 
The approach to achieving substantive equality reflected in contemporary disability non-
discrimination law is what Fredman refers to as a ‗minority rights approach.‘601 It involves the 
identification of a class of persons entitled to protection from discrimination and to special 
measures to compensate for disadvantage. This approach also has a number of other 
fundamental problems. First, it assumes it is possible and desirable to identify the class of 
persons entitled to the benefits conferred. In fact, defining disability has proved notoriously 
difficult and controversial.602 Second, a minority rights approach tends to pit the protected 
class against others in claims for scarce social resources, and may therefore be unable to 
overcome pre-existing power relationships. The individually referenced, bilateral nature of 
the obligation to make reasonable accommodation is particularly prone to this dynamic, and 
this tends to result in downward pressure on the threshold of obligation. A minority rights 
approach also tends to emphasize difference and deviance from the norm, rather than social 
                                                             
598 The Australian Disability Discrimination Act 1992 also has some substantive equality elements, but it is 
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diversity and membership of the whole.603 
The imposition of an obligation to take reasonable steps to accommodate impairment and 
disability-related needs was viewed as a critical foundation or pre-condition for the 
attainment of equality for persons with disability in CRPD negotiations. Indeed, the CRPD 
contains a web of duties to make such accommodations woven through both its general and 
specific obligations. However, notwithstanding the undoubted importance of the obligation to 
accommodate to the realization of substantive equality for persons with disability, as we shall 
discuss later, these efforts may ultimately have fallen victim to the central problems with 
minority right approaches. 
The limitations of traditional approaches to equality are stimulating the development of a new 
disability equality paradigm. The fundamental tenet of this formative approach is 
universalism, that of radical modification of the social norm to reflect human diversity.604 The 
universalist approach is based on the concept of impairment as ‗an infinitely various but 
universal feature of the human condition.‘ 605  According to this view ‗no human has a 
complete repertoire of abilities, suitable for all permutations of the physical and social 
environment,‘606or put another way, ‗the issue of disability for individuals . . . is not whether 
but when, not so much which one, but how many and in what combination.‘607 In particular, a 
universalist approach does not discriminate between individuals based on their intellectual or 
other ability or contribution. As Rioux explains: 
… all persons of distinguishable groups have the same needs for equality; . . . the 
capacity to exercise a right is not a distinguishing characteristic for the purpose of 
recognizing or denying that right; . . . equality is consequent on the equal value, 
benefit and rights possessed in differences from the norm, not on overcoming 
natural characteristics and becoming as much like the norm as possible.608 
 A universalist approach to equality focuses on ensuring that legislation, social policies and 
environments reflect the full range of ‗repertoires‘ that exist in society.609 Laws and policies 
promote full participation in society by everyone, regardless of personal characteristics or 
group membership, challenging common stereotypes about group characteristics that can 
underlie law or government action. 610  Equality provisions are not activated by direct 
knowledge of personal characteristics but on the assumption that all characteristics will be 
encountered. Simply put, if formal equality was essentially about ignoring difference, a 
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universalist approach is about expecting difference. As we shall see, this universalist 
approach has been particularly influential on the CRPD, especially with respect to its 
emphasis on the accessibility of the environment and in its mandate of universal design. 
Also central to contemporary theories of disability and disability rights is the concept of 
citizenship. 611  Claiming citizenship, and the dignity and equality it entails, is viewed as 
fundamental to overcoming dehumanization and exclusion. For persons with disability, the 
effective denial of citizenship is a continuing multidimensional wrong, which may include the 
explicit negation of democratic rights on the basis of impairment,612 as well as the denial of 
the opportunity,613 or an accessible means,614 to participate in public policy formulation and 
decision-making that affects their lives. The effective exclusion of persons with disability from 
public policy formulation and decision-making processes has a profound distributive impact, 
denying them the opportunity to argue for their needs and rights in the contest for social 
resources, and for the reform of oppressive laws. This ‗wrong‘ is intensified by the exercise 
of overt and covert executive power over the lives of many persons with disability by means 
of compulsory assistance (or coercive treatment),615 or, more subtly, through effective control 
over the social resources that sustain persons with disability.616 
This history of disempowerment and paternalism has produced a deep mistrust of executive 
power and the demand for radical participation, which is encapsulated by the credo ‗nothing 
about us without us‘: now a virtually universal claim of the disability rights movement 
internationally and fundamental to the disability equality paradigm. It has had an enormous 
influence in building the constituency for a disability rights convention, and in shaping the 
framework, process and outcomes of its negotiation. It will play an equally important role in 
the implementation and monitoring of the CRPD, which is discussed later in the chapter. 
Next I discuss further how the CRPD enhances notions of citizenship. 
How the CRPD Enhances The Models of Citizenship; Article 12 Of The CRPD 
One of the main arguments in this thesis is that the United Nation CRPD is a recent 
development of models of citizenship and disability and can be considered to be a significant 
improvement in acknowledging the rights of disabled people and augments their citizenship 
                                                             
611 See Oliver, supra n. 20 at 43^77. Oliver demonstrates the ways in which persons with disabil-  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 161 
status. I argue that Article 12 of the CRPD extend citizenship rights previously denied to 
disabled people by classic and contemporary models of citizenship and disability (as 
discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three of this thesis) and therefore the CRPD is well 
equipped to supersede previous legislative and model efforts.  
Article 12 is one of the most difficult but interesting and innovative aspects of the CRPD. 
Article 12 provides that: 
1. States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition 
everywhere as persons before the law.  
2. State Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on 
an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. 
3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with 
disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.  
4. States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal 
capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in 
accordance with international human rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure that 
measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and 
preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue influence, are 
proportional and tailored to the person's circumstances, apply for the shortest time 
possible and are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and 
impartial authority or judicial body.617 
One of the major differences between the CRPD and models of disability and citizenship is 
the way Article 12 of the CRPD recognizes the right of persons with disabilities to equal 
recognition before the law and the attendant right to legal capacity. Under Article 12 Persons 
with disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law. They 
enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. Thus, all persons 
have full legal capacity. They have the right to make and act on their own decisions and to 
have those decisions legally recognized.618 
Article 12 enhances the limitations of models of citizenship for disabled people with regards 
to the problematic way models of citizenship dealt with the issue of mental capacity and 
personhood. As discussed in Chapter Three, the liberal and civic republican models of 
citizenship both fell short of providing people with disabilities, particularly those with 
intellectual disabilities and mental health issues full citizenship because of their conceived 
lack of ability to make rational decisions. And therefore were denied personhood.619  
                                                             
617 United Nations, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Article 12 
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In order to facilitate the understanding of the obligations under the CRPD Article 12 and how 
it might offer an alternative to models of citizenship it is essential to understand its legal 
application. 
Construction of Legal Capacity in Article 12 
Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) raises many 
questions. Some of these questions are as follows: How has legal capacity been constructed 
in the CRPD? Does it include both the capacity to have rights and the capacity to act? If yes, 
then has this legal capacity been extended to all persons with disabilities or have certain 
persons been excluded? If not, will it be permissible for a State to enter reservations on 
those parts of the Article which guarantee universal legal capacity? 
Legal capacity consists of two integral components: the capacity to hold a right and the 
capacity to act and exercise the right, including legal capacity to sue, based on such rights. 
Both these elements are integral to the concept of legal capacity hence recognition to the 
legal capacity of any group or individual mandates recognition of both these elements. It has 
been found that denial of legal capacity to any individual or group has also meant negation 
of both the right to personhood and the capacity to act. During the study of municipal 
legislations, it has also been found that whenever such discriminatory laws have been 
challenged, they have been at first replaced by legislations which accord symbolic 
recognition to the rights of the excluded group, thus whilst the capacity to hold rights is 
recognized, the capacity to exercise those rights continues to be denied.620 
In comparison international human rights law, which has often been adopted to counter 
discriminatory municipal legislations, constructs legal capacity to include both the elements 
of identity and agency. Article 15 of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination of 
Women (CEDAW) is a case in point. 
Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities states that the 
purpose of the Convention is ‗to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities.‘621 This purpose 
has to be furthered by all the provisions of the CRPD including the Article on legal capacity, 
and the text of Article 12 would need to be informed by this objective. 
By paragraph 1 of Article 12 State Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the 
right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law. This paragraph of Article 12 
addresses the identity requirement of legal capacity and recognizes the personhood of 
persons with disabilities. 
Paragraph 2 of article 12 provides that ‗States Parties shall recognize that persons with 
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disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.‘622 A non-
disabled citizen who owns real estate, or a car, a horse or a book is entitled to sell the 
house, to hire the car, gift the horse or lend the book. All these and similar dispositions as an 
owner are a part of his or her legal capacity. Paragraph 2, by extending the same rights to 
persons with disabilities, fulfills the agency requirement of legal capacity. The non-negotiable 
nature of this commitment is evidenced by the inclusion of individual autonomy, non-
discrimination and equality of opportunity in the list of General Principles which the States 
are under an obligation to uphold. This obligation would require that the States both refrain 
from actions that undermine the principles and initiate efforts which would promote them. 
That paragraph 2 of article 12 provides for the agency requirement of legal capacity is further 
borne out by the remaining paragraphs of Article 12. Thus paragraph 3 of Article 12 requires 
States Parties to ‗take appropriate measure to provide access by persons with disabilities to 
the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.‘623 Article 12 (4) concerns 
itself with the need to guard against the abuse of such support and does so by making 
provision for appropriate and effective safeguards. Article 12 (5) explicitly mentions that 
persons with disabilities should be able to inherit, manage financial affairs and own property. 
Thus both on a purposive and a textual interpretation of Article 12 it can be concluded that 
legal capacity in the CRPD has been constructed like CEDAW to include both the capacity 
for rights and the capacity to act. 
Article 12 of the CRPD has a great potential to create positive change. The fact that many 
states continue to deny or restrict the legal capacity of persons with intellectual difficulties 
through court action is very problematic.624 It has led to the restriction of basic rights without 
justification or review. For example, as the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency has 
reported, the majority of European Union Member States link the right to political 
participation to the legal capacity of the individual. In view of the impact that the restriction of 
legal capacity can have on a person‘s exercise of their human rights, two questions are of 
central importance to understanding the scope of Article 12. 
First, does Article 12 require State Parties to grant all persons with disabilities the legal 
capacity to act even where they are considered to lack in capacity? If so, would this increase 
the risk of some persons with disabilities being vulnerable to people who would take 
advantage of their lack of capacity? And second, would there be a problem of persons with 
disabilities being vulnerable to people who would take advantage of their lack of capacity? 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 12 provide guidance on these questions. Article 12(3) requires 
that states must put in place appropriate measures. The first thing that a political authority 
should look to do is to put in the supports to enable individuals to make decisions, rather 
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623 United Nations, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Article 12 
624 For an example on how legal capacity is denied or restricted is the Czech Republic, see Inclusion Europe, Legal 
capacity and guardianship procedures, Czech Republic. 
 
 
 164 
than take away this opportunity and do the easier measures which support persons with 
disabilities in exercising their legal capacity; thus it is plain that Article 12 applies to all 
persons with disabilities regardless of the form of disability.625 In cases of severe mental or 
intellectual impairment, appropriate measures may include electing a personal 
representative to support the person in taking decisions and exercising their legal capacity. 
Further, Article 12(4) provides that in such cases safeguards must be put in place to prevent 
abuse occurring within the exercise of legal capacity. So Article 12 requires State Parties to 
engage with the legal capacity issue positively by leaning toward supportive inclusion rather 
than than take away this opportunity. 
Therefore Article 12 confronts the perceptions that persons with incapacity should not have a 
right to take decisions that may have a substantial effect on their lives. This, according to 
Gabor Gambos: 
Goes against a 2000 year old deep-rooted prejudice-based paradigm which says 
that there are people who are so disabled in their cognitive decision-making 
functions that they cannot exercise their autonomy, or their right to make their own 
choices, and that this right should be delegated to another person who will make 
decisions on their behalf.626 
The right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law required by Article 12(1) 
challenges the historical legacy of models of citizenship and disability in pervasive 
stereotyping, prejudice and stigma which has caused discrimination against disabled people. 
What is more, acting in combination with other provisions of the CRPD, for example Article 
29,627 Article 12 has the potential to play an instructive role in guiding legal reform and policy 
development. Article 12 offers a concrete set of standards which remolds the relationship 
that persons with disabilities have with society by sending a clear message that persons with 
disabilities ‗enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.‘ 
Universal Legal Capacity 
On the question whether the CRPD guarantees legal capacity to all persons with disabilities 
it would be necessary to note that a definition of disability has not been incorporated in 
Article 2 of CRPD. However an inclusive definition finds place in Article 1. Such definition 
includes persons who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments. 
Evidently the CRPD has employed the strategy of explicitly naming certain groups in the 
definition in order to highlight their higher discrimination and the greater need for strategies 
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of empowerment. If national legislations and state practices are examined, it is found that it 
is these groups of persons with disabilities who are denied legal capacity. The deliberations 
surrounding the Convention show that the need for a separate convention for persons with 
disabilities was felt because the extant human rights conventions were not disability inclusive 
and could not provide the requisite justification to challenge exclusionary national laws. In 
the face of this overarching commitment to the goal of inclusion in the Convention, it is 
logical to conclude that Article 12 would have been drafted in consonance with this larger 
objective of the CRPD. 
Upon examination of the preparatory papers, the adoption of the paradigm of universal legal 
capacity was questioned because it was feared that it did not adequately address the 
concerns of persons with high support needs. It was due to this apprehension that paragraph 
(3) placed an obligation on State Parties to make provision for support and paragraph (4) 
was drafted to encompass a range of safeguards against abuse of support. Persons with 
high support needs may have been one group of persons who could have been denied full 
personhood and legal capacity, if the provision for support had not been made in Article 12. 
However, the combined reading of the definition of disability and the duty to provide support 
leads to the conclusion that article 12 has been formulated to bring within its aegis all 
persons with disabilities. This support could be of personal assistants or peers or may even 
be simply a written declaration of the preferences of the person with disability. What the 
Convention requires is that the support should be based on trust and not against the will of 
the person with disabilities. 
Reservations 
Could states enter reservations against article 12? Article 46 of the CRPD and article 14, 
paragraph 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention, do not permit reservations that are 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the CRPD. Equality and non-discrimination 
along with respect for dignity, individual autonomy and freedom to make one‘s own choices 
have been recognized as the general principles of CRPD. The general principles were 
included to render the object and purpose of the Convention explicit. A reservation on Article 
12 is antithetical to each of these principles and hence not permissible by Article 46 of the 
Convention. 
Further if a reservation is entered to either circumscribe the meaning of legal capacity or to 
limit the persons with disabilities included under the provision the limitation will not be 
confined to Article 12 alone but will also extend to the other rights guaranteed under 
CRPD—be it the right to education or the right to work or freedom of speech and expression 
or political participation. Such a consequence would be destructive of both the letter and 
spirit of the CRPD and hence unimaginable. 
The CRPD, by devising the supported decision making model of legal capacity, has made an 
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innovative effort to recognize the aspirations of all persons with disabilities; this makes the 
CRPD a better alternative for disabled people than models of disability and citizenship in 
achieving full and equal citizenship by moving beyond the narrow definition of ‗natural rights‘ 
and ‗natural law‘ based on individual capacity and reason.628  
Article 12 therefore marks an important paradigm shift, as historically many societies have 
deprived people of their legal capacity simply on the basis of their disability. During the 
negotiations of the CRPD many disabled people spoke passionately about the terrible 
consequences faced by those deprived of their ability to exercise their legal capacity, and 
though some delegations expressed reservations, ultimately the AHC found the personal 
testimony compelling enough to warrant pursuit of a new approach.  
This new approach calls for States Parties to focus not on denying people their legal 
capacity, but instead on the provision of supports, where necessary, to enable persons with 
disabilities to exercise their legal capacity. Thus, instead of a ‗spectrum of legal capacity,‘ 
with those who have it at one end and those who do not at the other, there is envisioned a 
‗spectrum of measures to support exercise of legal capacity,‘ with those requiring no such 
support at one end and those requiring one hundred percent support at the other. Measures 
to protect against abuse of support provided are similarly scaled and proportionate to the 
amount of support required. 
Whilst Article 12 does not explicitly prohibit guardianship laws, it is anticipated that many 
States Parties will move away from traditional guardianship approaches, and/or utilize such 
procedures only in rare circumstances where an individual is in need of extensive or ‗one 
hundred percent support.‘ It is therefore reasonable to expect that a number of client 
countries will need assistance in engaging in legislative reform initiatives to effect these 
changes, as well as assistance in developing programmes and policies to implement the 
obligation to provide supports to those requiring assistance to exercise their legal capacity. 
In addition, the provisions of Article 12 ensuring the equal right of disabled persons ‗to 
control their own financial affairs and to have equal access to bank loans, mortgages and 
other forms of financial credit,‘629
 
have potential development implications, as they may help 
facilitate the participation of persons with disabilities in micro-credit, small business, and 
other income-generating initiatives. 
How the CRPD Enhances Citizenship and Disability Models; CRPD Article 24 A Right 
to Inclusive Education  
While the Salamanca Statement was the first global instrument explicitly calling for the 
inclusion of children with disabilities in regular education, it no longer stands alone. In 
December 2006, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the CRPD, in which Article 
                                                             
628 See my discussion of Locke, Kant, Aristotle, Hume, Rawles and Marshall in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
629 CRPD Article 12(5). 
 
 
 167 
24 secures the right to an inclusive education in international law. However, the CRPD does 
not simply recognize the right to inclusive education as an entitlement. It presents a 
framework of goals for inclusive education systems. It establishes obligations for 
governments and international agencies to provide the supports and conditions required to 
make quality inclusive education successful for all children and youth with disabilities.   
The prevailing trend is that children and adults with disabilities usually have much less 
access to education than their non-disabled peers. As noted by Stephen Lewis, the former 
UN Secretary General‘s Special Envoy to Africa on AIDS, ‗universal primary education is the 
ultimate vector of human progress,‘
 
and as was highlighted by many delegates to the AHC, 
the exclusion of disabled persons from education results in life-long barriers to meaningful 
employment, health, and political participation. For this reason, the main focus of Article 24 
is on the elimination of disability-based discrimination in educational settings, as well as the 
provision of inclusive education. Article 24 additionally focuses on access of persons with 
disabilities to the general education system, rather than separate or segregated educational 
settings. Although a few DPOs noted during the negotiations that flexibility should exist for 
those individuals still wishing to opt-out of mainstream settings. 
Article 24 provides a positive move forward from the Salamanca statement.630 The need for 
a convention with clearer and broader inputs to build upon the weaknesses of the 
Salamanca Statement was felt and led to a legally binding instrument, the UN CRPD, which 
entered into force on 3 May 2008. Article 24 of the UN CRPD aims at applying the principle 
of non-discrimination in education with regard to every human right and to interpret it in the 
correct way in every context of human beings‘ existence. The UN CRPD is legally binding 
and therefore its articles will pave the way to the future political developments in the 
disability sector. 
Article 24 exceeds the Salamanca Statement by placing an obligation on the government 
and relevant authorities to provide inclusive education, which means that disabled children 
and adults can access education with the right support. Article 24 says: 
 
1. Governments must ensure the education system at all levels is inclusive and 
geared towards supporting disabled people to achieve their full potential and 
participate equally in society. 
2. Disabled people should be able to access free, inclusive primary and 
secondary school education in the communities in which they live. 
3. Disabled people must not be excluded from the general education system 
(at any level) because of their disability. 
                                                             
630 (Eklindh & Brule- Balescut, 2005). See also ,Suresh, H., All rights are Fundamental Rights, Universal Law 
Publishing Company, 2010. 
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4.  Disabled people have the right to reasonable adjustments and extra support 
to take part in education. 
5. Governments must also promote the learning of Braille, sign language and 
use of appropriate forms of communication for disabled learners. 
6. This involves promoting the linguistic identity of Deaf people and ensuring 
enough teachers are trained in different communication methods. 
 
The CRPD states that every child with a disability has the right to be able to choose an 
inclusive option. This means that education systems must be willing and able to welcome 
students, regardless of their disability, and provide them with the supports they need, with 
the default always a regular class with non-disabled peers. What has been missing since 
Salamanca are two things: first, a shared analysis of the systemic barriers that maintain 
exclusion (meaning generations of people with intellectual disabilities have been denied 
education rights and opportunity, with lifelong consequences); and second, any legal 
obligations for governments (that is, governments have not been accountable).  
However, as has been elucidated in this chapter, the CRPD now provides both the 
framework and the obligations, a roadmap for completing what Salamanca began. 
Article 24 guarantees all disabled learners a right to participate in every kind of mainstream 
education with appropriate support. When the UK Government ratified this UNCRPD in June 
2009 it decided to place a number of restrictions on its UNCRPD obligations. Two of those 
restrictions relate to Article 24. The first was an Interpretative Declaration which clarifies the 
UK Government definition of a ‗general education system.‘ The Interpretative Declaration 
text states that: 
The United Kingdom Government is committed to continuing to develop an inclusive 
system where parents of disabled children have increasing access to mainstream 
schools and staff, which have the capacity to meet the needs of disabled children. 
The General Education System in the United Kingdom includes mainstream, and 
special schools, which the UK Government understands is allowed under the 
Convention.631  
The UK Government also placed a reservation against Article 24 in order to protect itself 
from future commitments and obligations. 
Such reservations are problematic because they cut against efforts to expand inclusive 
citizenship rights and a concurrent commitment along with other governments to ensure 
greater and ultimately full inclusivity of disabled people in their societies.  
 
 
                                                             
631 UK Interpretative Declaration: ―Education – Convention Article 24 Clause 2 (a) and (b) 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Limitations of Article 24: Problems with UK Reservation 
Of all the states which have ratified the Convention so far only the United Kingdom has 
‗reserved‘ on Article 24: 
The United Kingdom reserves the right for disabled children to be educated outside 
their local community where more appropriate education provision is available 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, parents of disabled children have the same opportunity as 
other parents to state a preference for the school at which they wish their child to be 
educated.632  
This effectively means that the Government of the UK does not agree to abide by the CRPD 
obligations to develop a fully inclusive education system in the UK.   
The Right to Education under the UNCRPD goes beyond Article 7 (Children) and Article 24 
(Education). UNCRPD does not look at each article in isolation, it reiterates at every step 
indivisible, interrelated and interdependence of each article. Equality and human rights is 
perceived in and through education. The State cannot merely provide educational services 
with possibilities of discrimination where there are no accessible facilities, no sign language 
interpretation, Braille books, and other equipment.  
  
The UK is still the only country to place restrictions against Article 24. The Equality and 
Human Rights Commission and disabled people‘s organizations in the UK opposed these 
statements on grounds that they were not necessary and not compatible with the 
Convention‘s firm commitment to inclusion. Article 24 (Education) is an overarching 
challenge to governments to fulfill the human rights of disabled people, regardless of 
whether they are civil, political, social or economic. It often requires states to take steps 
which result in significant public expenditure. But it should be emphasized that the social and 
economic rights of disabled people are indivisible from all other human rights and are 
necessary in order to overcome the historical disadvantage of persons with disabilities. 
Consequently, the public expenditure argument must not be allowed to justify the failure to 
promote and fulfill these rights.  
Implementation and Monitoring 
The CRPD consists of fifty articles addressing the full array of civil and political, economic, 
social, and cultural rights. The Convention does not seek to create new rights for disabled 
persons, but rather elaborates and clarifies existing obligations for countries within the 
disability context. It establishes a committee of experts to monitor its implementation at the 
international level, and it also provides for the operation of independent national level 
monitoring mechanisms. The CRPD is also joined by an Optional Protocol that recognizes 
‗the competence of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to receive and 
consider communications from or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals subject to 
                                                             
632  UK Interpretative Declaration CRPD Article 24 Clause 2 (a) and 2 (b) 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its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of the provisions of 
the Convention.‘ 633  The CRPD is therefore comprehensive not only in terms of its 
substantive content, but also in the manner in which monitoring and implementation at all 
levels is addressed. 
Articles 31 to 40 of the CRPD set out arrangements for implementation and monitoring of the 
convention at both the national and international levels. At the national level this includes the 
establishment of focal points and coordination mechanisms to facilitate cross-sector 
implementation measures. At the international level, it includes the establishment of a new 
treaty body to monitor implementation of the convention, and to receive complaints about 
violation of CRPD rights. Under the Optional Protocol the treaty body is also empowered to 
receive complaints about violations of CRPD rights from individuals and groups of individuals 
where they have exhausted domestic remedies.634 The Optional Protocol also establishes an 
inquiry procedure in relation to gross violations of CRPD rights.635 
International Cooperation 
Article 32 (International Cooperation) was one of the most hotly contested Articles in the 
development of the CRPD and its inclusion remained subject to challenge up until almost the 
last moment of negotiations. Essentially, this controversy related to a concern among many 
developed countries (particularly the European Union) that the Article would give rise to an 
expectation from developing and transitional states of increased aid to implement the CRPD. 
Consequential to this was the further concern that the Article would facilitate developing 
states adopting the stance that the CRPD could not be implemented domestically in the 
absence of additional aid. This controversy accounts for the rather tortured drafting of the 
chapeau of paragraph 1 of the article. In brief, Article 32 places a strong emphasis on 
national responsibility to realize the purpose and objectives of the CRPD, but recognizes the 
importance of international cooperation in support of these national efforts. 
Although Article 32 was forged around the issue of ‗north-south‘ wealth transfer, it would be 
a serious mistake to interpret the article only in those terms. There is enormous scope and 
need for cooperation between developed states in the harmonization of standards providing 
for accessibility, in the regulation of international non-state actors that impact on the lives of 
persons with disability, and in the elimination of structural barriers to equality that have an 
international dimension (for example, in civil aviation and copyright law). This is imperative in 
the context of increasingly globalized economic and social systems. 
Does CRPD Foster New Human Rights? 
Despite what might be characterized as the ‗official fiction‘ that the CRPD does not set down 
                                                             
633 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 1(1). 
634 Article1,CRPDOptionalProtocol. 129 Article 6, CRPD Optional Protocol. 
635 Article 6, CRPD Optional Protocol. 
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any new human rights, it would seem clear that it has, in fact, modified, transformed and 
added to traditional human rights concepts in key respects. The CRPD does contain entirely 
new or amplified formulations of human rights, including a number of collective or social 
group rights, such as the right to research and development,636 awareness raising,637 social 
protection and poverty reduction,638 and to international cooperation, including co-operation 
in international development programmes639 (sometimes called ‗third-generation rights‘). The 
CRPD also incorporates a number of ‗universal‘ equality measures, such as the right to an 
accessible environment, 640 which have the potential to benefit many persons, not just 
persons with disability (sometimes conceptualized as ‗fourth-generation rights‘). Article 30 
also contains an extensive exposition of rights to leisure, tourism and recreation (sometimes 
conceptualized as ‗fifth-generation‘ rights). 
Additionally, the CRPD incorporates highly disability specific interpretations of existing 
human rights, which transform formerly essentially non- interference based rights (or 
‗negative‘ rights) into positive state obligations. For example, the right of non-interference 
with personal opinion and expression is transformed into a positive state obligation to 
provide public information in accessible formats and to recognize sign languages, Braille, 
and augmentative and alternative communication.641 Similarly, the non- interference based 
guarantee of equality before the law is extended or amplified into a positive obligation to 
ensure access to justice for persons with disability.642 In these and other respects, the CPRD 
blends civil and political rights with economic, social and cultural rights, not only within its 
overall structure, but also within its individual articles. To this extent, the traditional distinction 
between those rights subject to immediate realization and those subject to progressive 
realization which is generally preserved in Article 4 of the CRPD, appears to be effectively 
abandoned.643 It is also noteworthy that under the Optional Protocol all CRPD rights are 
potentially justiciable, not just its civil and political rights. 
Conclusion 
Until December 13, 2006, when the Convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly, 
persons with disabilities had been tucked away in savings clauses and sidelined in a few 
                                                             
636 Forexample,Article4(1)(f)and(g),GeneralObligations,CRPD.  
637 Article 8, Awareness-raising, CRPD.  
638 Article28(2)(b),Adequatestandardoflivingandsocialprotection,CRPD. = 
639 Article 32, International Cooperation, CRPD, which is not a new concept in international   human rights law (cf 
Article 45, CRC), but its expression in the CRPD supersedes pre-existing   formulations. 
640 Articles 3, General principles (f), and 9, Accessibility, CRPD. 
641 Article 21, Freedom of expression and opinion, and access to information, CRPD. 
642 Article13,Accesstojustice,CRPD. 
643 Article 4(2), CRPD retains the distinction between the basic obligations of State Parties to   each of the 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (see Article 2(i) of each 
Covenant). Whereas civil and political rights must be guaran- teed immediately, the same is not generally the case 
with economic and social rights. Article 4(2) of the CRPD reads:  With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, 
each State Party undertakes to take measures to the maximum extent of its available resources and, where needed, 
within the framework of international cooperation, with a view to achieving progres- sively the full realisation of these 
rights, without prejudice to those obligations con- tained in the present Convention that are immediately applicable 
according to international law.  
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resolutions and declarations. This contributed significantly to the invisibility of persons with 
disabilities in human rights discourse, which was highlighted by the Millennium Development 
Goal‘s (MDGs) failure to mention persons with disabilities explicitly.  
 
The adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities by the UN General 
Assembly in December 2006 set off the process of signing and ratifying by UN Member 
States—and entities such as the European Union—as well as subsequent application and 
implementation at the national level.  
The CRPD has been described as ‗a paradigm shift‘ in relation to how human rights are to 
be understood in the twenty-first century.644 This would be a significant burden to bear for 
any piece of international law, let alone a law which protects the rights of individuals who 
have for so long been overlooked in society. Yet in the short period since its entry into force, 
the impact of the CRPD offers much promise. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities spells out clearly and unconditionally that persons with disabilities have equal 
access and a right to full and effective enjoyment of all human rights—the removal of 
barriers explicitly termed as a condition for access and the enjoyment of equality.  
Without doubt, the CRPD provides a transformative potential for the lives of the world‘s 
largest minority. 645  Its passage into international law ought rightly to be a cause for 
celebration. By any measure, the CRPD is a high water mark not only in the area of disability 
rights, but also in the development of international human rights law concepts and 
implementation measures more generally. However, enthusiasm for the CRPD must be 
tempered with realism and strategy.  
The CRPD, like all international instruments, is ultimately a negotiated text. It is therefore 
unrealistic to expect it to reflect a fully coherent or comprehensive exposition of disability 
rights. Ultimately, the CRPD has been most influenced by an uncritical, populist, 
understanding of the social model of disability. At times this understanding approaches a 
radical social constructionist view of disability, in which impairment has no underlying reality. 
In doing so it ignores the last decade of critical disability studies which—while not rejecting 
the central tenet of the social model of disability as social oppression—has reemphasized 
the realities of impairment as a dimension of the ontological and phenomenological 
experience of disability. Therefore, if there is truly to be a shift to a coherent new disability 
rights paradigm in international law, it will be important that CRPD interpretation and 
implementation efforts penetrate beyond populist social model ideas to a more sophisticated 
                                                             
644 Raz, Joseph, Human Rights without Foundations, în Samantha Besson, John Tasioulas (edit.), The Philosophy 
of International Law, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford,  
645 Raz, Joseph, Human Rights without Foundations, în Samantha Besson, John Tasioulas (edit.), The Philosophy 
of International Law, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, also see Rehman, Javaid, International Human Rights Law, 
Pearson Education Harlow, 2010. 
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understanding of impairment and disability in its social context. 
Whether the CRPD will be able to fulfill its promise will depend on how national authorities 
grapple with complex issues such as legal capacity during implementation. In any case, the 
energy and vision that the CRPD has imparted on the struggle for equality for persons with 
disabilities should not be underestimated. The CRPD is therefore a crucial buttress and 
facilitator of a disability rights agenda, but it is not a proxy for that agenda. Some disability 
rights issues still remain untouched or undeveloped in international human rights law. 
Consequently, it will be important that disability human rights activists neither undervalue, 
nor overestimate, the role and scope of the CRPD and its potential contribution to securing 
the human rights of persons with disability into the future. 
The CRPD is proving to be a key instrument for promoting law reform and requiring states to 
re-examine how persons with  disabilities are perceived. Often it has asked  fundamental 
questions of the paternalistic  welfare policy adopted by most European  countries towards 
disabled persons. Nonetheless, paternalistic rhetoric still  underpins disability law, policy and 
practice. Consequently, these strategic developments  will only lead to effective equality for 
persons  with disabilities in key areas such as education, healthcare, criminal justice and 
political  participation, once the initial enthusiasm and good will shown to the CRPD is 
transformed through the difficult task of putting in place practical solutions for the challenges 
encountered by persons with disabilities. 
It is the contention of this thesis that a human rights approach, as exemplified in the CRPD, 
transcends models of disability and models of citizenship, and offers a better way forward for 
disabled people particularly those with intellectual disabilities. This can be seen in the 
provisions of Article 12 which are universal—in stark contrast to citizenship models which 
have excluded disabled people in the past.  
In regard to education for disabled people, Article 24 provides a better platform than 
Salamanca, and offers a way for states to fully include all disabled people in education. 
However, in the case of the UK, the British government‘s reservations threaten to severely 
limit its provisions and undermine its purpose. Given the state of education for disabled 
people in England this is unfortunate. Education theory and practice in England during the 
last three decades, under the sway of the 1978 Warnock Report, has relied on flawed 
models of citizenship and disability and hasn‘t fully included disabled students in the 
education system. This is the topic of the next two chapters. 
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Chapter Six 
Models of Disability as Expressed in The Warnock Report 
A Case Study 
 
Chapters Six and Seven take the watershed 1978 Warnock Report on ‗special education‘ 
and the subsequent legislation and the 2005 Warnock Report as case studies. The Warnock 
Reports are shown to express and exemplify the strengths and weaknesses in approaches 
wedded to past models of disability and citizenship.  
In this chapter I look at whether the flaws of the models of disability are expressed in the 
reports and subsequent acts, and if the medical and social models of disability helped 
enhance or minimize the citizenship status of disabled people in education, both in theory 
and practice.646  
In the 1970s the social model of disability has prompted arguments for inclusion in education 
and changing the environment to fit the needs of the students in ordinary classes rather than 
trying to fix the child. The accompanying legislation and how models of disability and models 
of citizenship and human rights were expressed through the Warnock report reveals the 
political, legal and social processes responsible for the changes in special education. It 
shows the criteria by which one can judge how much change has in fact been made towards 
the education of disabled pupils and their equality towards full citizenship and rights.  
 
Furthermore the limited financial funding for the implementation of the recommendation of 
the Warnock report in the 1981 Education Act together with the governments‘ definition of 
citizenship raises questions and concerns for the attainment of equal and full citizenship for 
disabled people in education (models of citizenship and the Warnock report are analysed in 
the next chapter - chapter7).  
 
What is unique and important in using the Warnock Report as a case study in this chapter, is 
that it sets out the stages of change in education policies; after the social model of disability 
was introduced, the report shifted the analysis from an individual medical model to a social 
model of disability and a more inclusive notion of citizenship in education.  
 
                                                             
646 Warnock suggested that:  ‗up to one in five children during their school career will require some form of special 
educational provision‘ see DES, 1978, p41. Most of the recommendations in the report referred to children with 
‗severe, complex and long-term disabilities‘ DES, 1978, p45. Warnock‘s central message was libertarian, 
proclaiming the ‗right of the handicapped to uninhibited participation in the activities of everyday life, in all their 
varied forms‘ DES, 1978, p99. This included the right to be educated in ordinary schools.The report emphasised the 
need to adopt a more positive conceptualisation of individuals with a disability. Warnock proposed that the statutory 
categories of handicap be replaced with a continuum of ‗need‘ and that all teachers (specialist and mainstream) 
were to look to the curriculum and their own teaching methods as the source of difficulties. 
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The analysis shows that most of the educational provision for disabled children although 
more inclusive, still reflects the flaws of the models of disability, citizenship and human rights 
for disabled students, which remains basically segregative and is dominated by traditional 
medically-influenced attitudes, and commands a low priority within the education system as 
a whole. The limits of the social model reflected in the Warnock report and the disjuncture 
between first- and second-generation rights manifests in antidiscrimination laws and policies 
that do not link socially contingent exclusion in diverse sectors with artificial exclusion from 
mainstream schools.  
 
I conclude chapter Six and Seven with the view that major limitations in the models of 
disability, citizenship and human rights resulted in education policy that had significant 
shortcomings in relation to equality for disabled children, and that the models of disability 
and citizenship that underpin the Warnock Report, the subsequent legislation and education 
provision for the disabled need to be rethought with a more inclusive model of human rights 
as a possible way forward for disabled people.  
 
The Role of Specific Disabilities and Social Class in Education 
Throughout the history of special education, disability policy in Britain has expressed several 
different objectives: the desire to contain, compensate, and care for disabled people, and to 
help them achieve eventual citizenship. Disability legislation as existed before the turn of the 
century was devoted principally to the segregation and containment of disabled people.647  
This chapter critiques the models of disability and citizenship as theoretical/political 
foundations for policies to achieve equality and inclusion for the disabled in education. 
Although this and the next chapter deal with the education of the disabled as a group, they 
will mainly look at the provision and policies for the education of the people now known as 
‗children with learning/intellectual difficulties,‘ and at the discourses which influenced these 
policies and citizenship status for such children. They will focus on state policy and what the 
provisions which, in the case of educational provision, implies for policy for England. This 
necessarily means focusing almost wholly on working-class children.648 The children of the 
middle classes were not to be found in great numbers within the state system until the 
second half of the twentieth century. Private provision, whether in schooling or otherwise, 
was the norm for all able middle and upper class children.  
 
                                                             
647 Swain, J. (2005) Inclusive education: readings and reflections (Book review), Disability and Society, 20(7), 787. 
Swain, J., & French, S. (2000). Towards an affirmation model of disability. Disability and Society, 15(4), 569-
582.see also Thomas, C. (2002). Disability theory: Key ideas, issues and thinkers. In C. Barnes, M. Oliver & L. 
Barton (Eds.), Disability studies today (pp. 38-57). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press in association with Blackwell 
Publishers 
648 HC Deb 06 March 1856 vol 140 cc1955-2015 
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It was surprising to find how class and capital were issues running through the analysis. 
Attention is drawn to the interaction of multiple sites of systemic inequality—including gender, 
class, race and perceived ability—and in producing the conditions through which individual 
agency is exercised. This chapter considers the intersections of class and ability with these 
other features of what is essentially a capitalist and patriarchal society. But the evidence 
suggests that, in the period in question, class and capital were indeed the major players in 
the game.  
 
The division between working class and middle and upper class children, which has endured 
since the mid-twentieth century, must continue to be read into any analysis of education in 
England. In other words, it must be read into any analysis of the production of intellectual 
and physical subordination up to the present. The picture has changed over the years but 
the social structure of society of class divisions and education remain.  
 
In a recent conference in July 2012 the Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, 
confirmed this view in a speech to Brighton College. He said of the seven percent of the 
population who are products of independent schools in comparison to those who attend 
state schools, and the small population who are products of independent schools, himself 
included, are ‗handsomely represented‘ in politics, the judiciary, the media, business, acting 
and sport.649 650 
                                                             
649 . (Michael Gove , Minister of Education, Department of Education 10 May 2012). 
650 ‗I can‘t help reflecting on some other facts about our society which the excellence of the education offered in our 
independent schools underlines. It is remarkable how many of the positions of wealth, influence, celebrity and 
power in our society are held by individuals who were privately educated. 
  
Around the Cabinet table – a majority – including myself – were privately educated. Around the Shadow Cabinet 
table the Deputy Leader, the Shadow Chancellor, the Shadow Business Secretary, the Shadow Olympics 
Secretary, the Shadow Welsh Secretary and the Shadow Secretary of State for International Development were all 
educated at independent schools. 
  
On the bench of our supreme court, in the precincts of the bar, in our medical schools and university science 
faculties, at the helm of FTSE 100 companies and in the boardrooms of our banks, independent schools are – how 
can I best put this – handsomely represented. 
  
You might hear some argue that these peaks have been scaled by older alumni of our great independent schools – 
and things have changed for younger generations. But I fear that is not so. 
  
Take sport – where by definition the biggest names are in their teens, twenties and thirties. As Ed Smith, the 
Tonbridge-educated former England player, and current Times journalist, points out in his wonderful new book 
―Luck‖: 
Twenty-five years ago, of the 13 players who represented England on a tour of Pakistan, only one had been to a 
private school. In contrast, over two thirds of the current team are privately educated. You‘re 20 times more likely to 
go on and play for England if you go to private school rather than state school. The composition of the England 
rugby union team and the British Olympic team reveal the same trend. Of those members of England‘s first 15 born 
in England, more than half were privately educated. 
  
And again, half the UK‘s gold medallists at the last Olympics were privately educated, compared with seven per 
cent of the population. It‘s not just in sport that the new young stars all have old school ties.   
It‘s in Hollywood, Broadway and on our TV screens. Hugh Laurie, Dominic West, Damian Lewis, Tom Hiddleston 
and Eddie Redmayne – all old Etonians. One almost feels sorry for Benedict Cumberbatch – a lowly Harrovian – 
and Dan Stevens – heir to Downton Abbey and old boy of Tonbridge – is practically a street urchin in comparison. 
  
If acting is increasingly a stage for public school talent one might have thought that at least comedy or music would 
be an alternative platform for outsiders. But then – 
  
Armando Iannucci, David Baddiel, Michael McIntyre, Jack Whitehall, Miles Jupp, Armstrong from Armstrong and 
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The evidence suggests that in the UK class and capital continue to be the major factors in 
the game. This does not mean the analysis presented here is wholly a Marxist one, though it 
is undoubtedly concerned with the social relations of capital. If the able-bodied population 
are thought to be short-changed in a country where citizenship is accessed through work 
and education. What hope do disabled people have? 
 
What is The Warnock Report 1978? 
In England the 1978 Warnock report is the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry 
into the Education of Handicapped Children and is considered a watershed and the most 
powerful report on Special Educational Needs (SEN) and inclusion in recent English 
history. 651  The Report, followed by the 1981 Education Act, radically changed the 
conceptualisation of special educational needs,652 it shifted the focus from a medical model 
of disability to a social model.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
Miller and Mitchell from Mitchell and Webb were all privately educated. 2010‘s Mercury Music Prize was a battle 
between privately educated Laura Marling and privately-educated Marcus Mumford. 
  
And from Chris Martin of Coldplay to Tom Chaplin of Keane – popular music is populated by public school boys. 
Indeed when Keane were playing last Sunday on the Andrew Marr show everyone in that studio – the band, the 
presenter and the other guests – Lib Dem peer Matthew Oakeshott, Radio 3 Presenter Clemency Burton-Hill and 
Sarah Sands, editor of the London Evening Standard - were all privately educated. 
  
Indeed it‘s in the media that the public school stranglehold is strongest. The Chairman of the BBC and its Director-
General are public school boys.  And it‘s not just the Evening Standard which has a privately-educated editor. 
  
My old paper The Times is edited by an old boy of St Pauls and its sister paper the Sunday Times by an old 
Bedfordian. The new editor of the Mail on Sunday is an old Etonian, the editor of the Financial Times is an old 
Alleynian and the editor of the Guardian is an Old Cranleighan. Indeed the Guardian has been edited by privately 
educated men for the last 60 years… 
  
But then many of our most prominent contemporary radical and activist writers are also privately educated.  
George Monbiot of the Guardian was at Stowe, Seumas Milne of the Guardian was at Winchester and perhaps the 
most radical new voice of all --Laurie Penny of the Independent – was educated here at Brighton College.  
  
Now I record these achievements not because I wish to either decry the individuals concerned or criticise the 
schools they attended. Far from it. It is undeniable that the individuals I have named are hugely talented and the 
schools they attended are premier league institutions. 
But the sheer scale, the breadth and the depth, of private school dominance of our society points to a deep problem 
in our country - one we all acknowledge but have still failed to tackle with anything like the radicalism 
required.(Department of education May 10 2012) and  
We live in a profoundly unequal society. More than almost any developed nation ours is a country in which your 
parentage dictates your progress.Those who are born poor are more likely to stay poor and those who inherit 
privilege are more likely to pass on privilege in England than in any comparable county.For those of us who believe 
in social justice this stratification and segregation are morally indefensible. 
And for those of us who want to see greater economic efficiency it is a pointless squandering of our greatest asset - 
our children - to have so many from poorer backgrounds manifestly not achieving their potential.When more 
Etonians make it to Oxbridge than boys and girls on benefit then we know we are not making the most of all our 
nation's talents. 
When hundreds of primary schools allow children to leave not able to read, write or add up properly we know we are 
indulging in a form of national self-harm so profound as to be disabling.Even when disadvantaged children attend 
schools which perform well overall, they continue to lag behind their wealthier, luckier peers(Michael Gove , Minister 
of Education, Department of Education 10 May 2012). 
651 See Gipps et al, 1987; Wedell, 1992; Visser, 1993  
652 The Warnock Committee was not the first to advocate inclusive education for disabled people. The move 
towards inclusion in England can be traced back to the Wood Committee, which emphasized the unity of ordinary 
and special education for disabled people and the 1944 Education, which acknowledged that education for some 
children with special needs, should take place in ordinary schools652 while wholly excluding others deemed 
uneducable. 
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The Committee was established by Margret Thatcher as Secretary of State for Education, 
and taken on by the Labour government of 1974. The committee was chaired by Mary 
Warnock (now Baroness Warnock) and started work in the summer of 1974. One of the 
reasons for setting it up was that in 1972 two years earlier, legislation had been introduced 
giving all children an entitlement to education, however severe their disabilities, and 
abolishing the category of the ‗ineducable child.‘653 The 1972 Education Act gave all children 
a right to education, the concept of the uneducable child was abolished, and new principles 
of universal education was needed. Since 1972 Local Education Authorities had been 
struggling without much systematic guidance to provide school education, mostly in existing 
special schools, for the most severely disabled with whom they had not had to deal with 
before. A new principle of genuinely universal education had to be formed. The committee‘s 
task was to articulate a concept of education that could make sense in the context of any 
child, anywhere on the continuum of ability or disability.654 
The Warnock Report made a key change by abandoning the eleven categories of handicap 
established by the 1944 Education Act which used to identify those children who can benefit 
from an education and those thought to be uneducable. Which was allied to the shift in policy 
that ‗wherever possible‘ children should be educated in mainstream schools.  
The progress of special education and the inclusion of all disabled people in education was a 
considerable step forward yet the theory and practice of ‗special educational needs‘ 
continued to sustain and construct exclusionary practices within education and render 
disabled people second-class citizens. The flaws of the medical and social model and the 
models of citizenship are clearly expressed in the 1978 Warnock Report both within its text 
and the way it has been implemented. It is argued here that the limitations of the models of 
disability and citizenship and traditional UN human rights expressed in the Warnock Reports 
can be enhanced by the UNCRPD both in theory and practice in education and give disabled 
people full citizenship status.  
The chapter is divided into four main sections: 
1. Background of The Warnock Report as the Focus of the Analysis in this Chapter 
2. The Warnock Report‘s Expression of the Medical Model and its Problems and 
Limitations 
3. The Warnock Report‘s Expression of the Social Model and its Problems and 
Limitations 
4. Warnock, Special Educational Needs the Conflation of the Medical and Social Model 
of Disability and its Problems 
5. The Warnock Report 2005 Critique of the Implementation of the 1978 Report  
                                                             
653 Lady Warnock, in Special educational needs a new look,Warnock, Norwich, Tenzi,continuum international 
publishing group, 2010 London,p.15 
654 Lady Warnock, in Special educational needs a new look,Warnock, Norwich, Tenzi,continuum international 
publishing group, 2010 London,p.16 
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1. Background of The Warnock Report as the Focus of the Analysis in this Chapter 
The Warnock Committee on the education of disabled children in England 1978 was the first 
Committee to advocate educating all children.655 It produced the report (The Report of the 
Committee of Enquiry into the Education of Handicapped Children and Young People) and 
abolished definitions of the 1944 Education Act where children with special educational 
needs were categorized mainly by their disabilities defined in medical terms.656 The Warnock 
Report was not the first official report or legislation to advocate inclusion of disabled people 
in education, rather it was the first to advocate inclusion for all disabled people.657 This 
notion of inclusion started to take shape in the 1944 Debate, on the 1944 Education Bill 
which explained the limited adoption of the inclusive philosophy of the 1944 Education Bill, 
by the Parliamentary Secretary (Mr Chuter Ede) in these words:  
May I say that I do not want to insert in the Bill any words which make it appear that 
the normal way to deal with a child who suffers from any of these disabilities is to be 
put into a special school where he will be segregated. Whilst we desire to see 
adequate provision of special schools we also desire to see as many children as 
                                                             
655 Due to society‘s shift from a medical model approach for disabled people to a social model approach, there is 
widespread agreement within the UK that the Warnock report represented a watershed for special education in 
educating all children and that no child was eneducable. 
656 The 1944 Act brought significant reforms to the education system. While most of these reforms were directed at 
mainstream education and the provision of free secondary education for all, the Act also addressed certain aspects 
of education for children with special needs. However, its approach to, and definitions of children with special needs 
was not as liberating as its prescriptions for education in general. Special educational provisions were re-enacted in 
sections 33 and 34 of the Education Act 1944 and modified in subsequent Acts of 1948 and 1953.  Children 
identified under Sections 34 would need ‗special educational treatment‘. Under Section 33, LEAs had to see that 
severe cases received appropriate help in special schools, but where this was impractical or where disability was 
less serious, ‗in any school  maintained or assisted by the local education authority'. This reversed the 1921 Act‘s 
stipulation that special education was to take place in special schools. A continuum of need was thus recognized 
which logically required close cooperation between special schools and mainstream education. However, most 
contemporaries complained that this close relationship could not be achieved and, therefore, special education 
continued in to be viewed as special provision. (Cole,1989; 100) the stigmatizing ‗certificate‘ which had drwn an 
arbitrary line between the official handicapped and the normalk was abolished along with the  label ‗defective‘. A 
continuum of need was therefore recognized which logically required close cooperation between special schools 
and ordinary schools and the inclusion of special schools within the mainstream education. However, most 
contemporaries explained that this close relationship could not be achieved and, therefore, special education 
continued to be viewed in terms of special provision.The growth of the welfare state during the postwar period, with 
the provision of services which were seen as a common social good—rather than a national economic drain on 
resources signaling economic and social dependency—also marked changes in perceptions of disability. As in the 
cases of illness, poverty and housing, rather than being a purely private and personal problem impairment and 
disability came, to some extent, to be regarded as a social issue legitimately requiring state support and intervention. 
At the same time, the legacy and continual refinement of systems and procedures concerning the diagnosis, 
categorization and medicalization of impairment and the important role played by professionals in these processes 
led to a continued isolation of disabled children in the education system. In the past, members of the medical 
profession were the main arbiters of special education provision. The 1944 Education Act formalized the role of the 
medical profession by giving them a statutory right to diagnose handicap and prescribe treatment (both medical and 
educational). The need for co-operation between medical and educational professionals was noted by Frizell (1947) 
as having ‗the makings of dissension and rivalry‘ (p7). 
657 ― The principle is not new to education. It has been long-standing government policy, confirmed in numerous 
official documents, that no child should be sent to a special school who can be satisfactorily educated in an ordinary 
one. There has in fact been a steady increase over time in the number of children ascertained as handicapped who 
have been placed in designated special classes and units in ordinary schools. It rose from 11,027 in 1973 to 21,245 
in 1977, that is from 6.8% to 12.0% of all children ascertained as requiring separate special provision.The children 
placed in these classes and units have been mainly those with moderate rather than severe disabilities, but all 
categories of handicap are represented. They still form quite a small proportion of all handicapped children for 
whom special education is provided, but the trend is likely to continue. Although the existence of such classes and 
units does not necessarily entail integration in any complete sense, nevertheless it is a proof that segregation is 
diminishing. Moreover, although figures are not available, placements of children with disabilities in ordinary 
classes, of which we give examples in paragraph 7.12(i), are becoming more frequent.‖ Warnock report 1978 p.113, 
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possible retained in the normal stream of school life.658  
Accordingly, Section 33(2) of the Act provided for the less severely handicapped (the great 
majority of all handicapped) to be catered for in ordinary schools, and the ensuing 
departmental guidance to local education authorities contained detailed suggestions as to 
how this might be achieved. The post-war planning of special educational treatment thus 
proceeded on two main assumptions: first that special educational treatment would be 
required for up to seventeen percent of the school population; and secondly, that ordinary 
schools would have the major share in providing it.659 
However, many children in the 1944 Education Act were exclude from education and 
considered to be ‗uneducable‘, and pupils were labelled into categories such as ‗maladjusted‘ 
or ‗educationally sub-normal‘ and given ‗special educational treatment‘ in separate schools. 
It was not until the 1970 Education (Handicapped Children) Act that ‗ineducable‘ children 
ceased to be the sole responsibility of the health service, and were brought within the 
services of Local Education Authorities (LEAs) shifting from a medical model approach to a 
social model approach in education. The 1970ss was a time of political and social change for 
disabled people in England, with the rise of the disability movement; the introduction of the 
social model of disability; and the journey and desire to achieve full citizenship. It marked a 
change in attitudes towards ‗handicapped‘ children and pressure grew for a committee of 
enquiry into their education.660 The pressure to create legislation fundamentally to shift the 
focus of change away from the ‗individual‘ to the ‗social‘ model and other influences had 
created pressures for a disability civil rights approach. The result of this pressure for a civil 
rights approach 661  was the creation of the Warnock Committee in 1974 to examine 
educational provision for ‗handicapped‘ children in England, Scotland and Wales. The 1978 
Warnock report constitutes a major watershed in educating all disabled children. The 
Warnock Framework was later introduced under the 1981 Education Act.662 The Warnock 
Report in 1978, followed by the 1981 Education Act,663 changed this conceptualization of 
                                                             
658 Parliamentary Debates: Hansard Vol 398 Col 703 .21 March 1944 
 
659 Warnock Report 1978 p.31-32 
660 Evans & Varma, 1990 
661 The fight for disability rights has a long history which, the disability rights movement as it is now exists, was 
shaped in the second half of the twentieth century. see Oliver, 1993, also See Pfieffer, 2001. Activists brought forth 
a challenge to devaluation based on their personal experience, while highlighting barriers and confronting 
conventional thinking in Barnes, Oliver & Barton, 2002. This activism, has sought empowerment and emancipation, 
and the ability to influence policy decisions seeWard & Flynn, 1994. Since the 1960s, the disability movement has 
progressed in the fight for disability rights. From this activism, disability studies developed, fighting for societal 
inclusion and value. In an analysis of the development of this movement, Shakespeare (1993) cites Ethel Klein‘s 
(1984) identification of the stages of political consciousness in the women‘s movement, which have also been 
shown to be reflective of the disability movement. Klein identifies: affiliation through group membership, rejection of 
traditional definitions and the recognition of personal problems as political and systemic issues as the basis for a 
movement. The disability rights movement is argued to have followed a similar trajectory in its pursuits. Providing 
various understandings and approaches to disability, this movement has challenged negative conceptions and 
denials, attempting to replace constructions of passivity and objectification with autonomy and inclusion 
(Shakespeare, 1993). 
662 However, it was not until 1994 that the Warnock Committee‘s commitment to education within mainstream 
settings was translated into the Government‘s support for inclusive education. 
663 The 1981 Education Act was a limited measure which only addressed some of the recommendations of the 
Warnock committee. It offered nothing specifically to help meet Warnock‘s priority needs. a)Disappointingly, for 
many observers, the government was to make no additional funding available to help implement the Act. During the 
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special educational needs and declared no child was uneducable thus expressing social 
model views.664 Furthermore, instead of the medical categorizations and labels previously  
used to describe disabled children in education, the term ‗special educational needs‘ was 
used by the Warnock committee to describe all children who may have ‗individual‘ 
educational needs shifting from a medical perspective to a social model. 
Disability rights advocates have successfully invoked the social model‘s view that disability-
related exclusion is an avoidable and remediable social construct. The report concluded that 
this exclusion arose from unwarranted prejudice.
 
Hence, the Warnock report was premised 
on the social model‘s belief that peoples‘ functional limitations are caused by the socially 
constructed environment, such that the repercussions of having a disability are mutable:  
Special means of access to the curriculum may be required by children with 
impairments of sensory or motor functioning, including visual, hearing, speech and 
physical disabilities. For example, children with severe visual disabilities may need 
reading material translated into braille. A special or modified curriculum is likely to be 
required by children who are currently described as educationally sub-normal.665 
The influence of the social model is clearly reflected in the Warnock report. The social model 
influenced legislation for the disabled and aimed to guarantee them full citizenship but failed 
many disabled students by excluding them from ordinary education. 
The major problem for inclusive citizenship as advocated by Warnock was the contradictions 
in the report about inclusive education. The Warnock committee never advocated that all 
children should attend mainstream schools. The point has been very clearly stated by the 
Secretary of State for Education and Science at the time: 
 
The new law ... does not herald the precipitate dismantling of the very valuable work 
                                                                                                                                                                            
ensuing years this was often seen as the major reason for the limited advance towards integration. 
b)Implementation of the Act was also hampered by the difficult practicalities involved in altering traditional 
organizational structures and preparing and training staff in schools receiving the children with special needs. 
c)Successful integration was always thought to depend on welcoming good teachers, the preparation of teachers 
were thought to be good in only some areas, in some schools, through local effort, it is probable that many staff did 
develop greater expertise and understanding for children with special schools. However, preparation of the majority 
of teachers for grater integration continued to be scarce. d)Unfortunately, the training of teachers to work with SEN 
children had always been low on local and central government agendas and, historically, had contributed much to 
the low status of special schools or special class teachers. 
The Warnock Framework was introduced under the 1981 Education Act but with no additional funding for the new 
processes involved in statementing or teacher training, despite the closure of many special schools. The 1988 
Education Act then established the National Curriculum and a system of league tables where schools competed 
based on academic attainment. Baroness Warnock described things as getting: ―far worse from 1988 onward (for 
children with SEN) who were not going to help the league tables‖. The Warnock framework remained firmly in place 
through the 1980s-90‘s. During the 1980s and 1990s there was a considerable decline in the number of children in 
special schools and a gradual increase in the proportion of children both identified as having special educational 
needs (SEN) and given statements of SEN . As Brahm Norwich, Professor of Educational Psychology and SEN at 
the University of Exeter, identified to the Committee in evidence:  
―there has been quite a sizeable decline in the total population of special schools. That was greatest in the 1980s 
and flattened out somewhat in the 1990s.‖Educational reform (such as the Education Act of 1993) continued to push 
for an inclusive approach. 
 
664 However, it was not until 1994 that the Warnock Committee‘s commitment to education within mainstream 
settings was translated into the Government‘s support for inclusive education. The various Acts and legislation that 
have followed demonstrate the progress in attitude that has taken place since the Warnock report towards the aim 
of trying to include all children in a common education framework and away from categorising children with SEN or 
disabilities as a race apart. This has been representative of a broader international trend. 
665 Warnock Report1978 p.41 
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of special schools, particularly those for children with severe disabilities. . . a minority 
of handicapped children will always need the help that only a special school can 
give, and it will be important to ensure that integration does not force them into 
isolation.666 
The Warnock report confirms this position regarding special schools as follows: 
We are in no doubt whatever that special schools will continue to feature prominently 
in the range of provision for children with special educational needs. This view was 
supported by the weight of the evidence submitted to us, which was in favour of a 
continuing place for special schools, alongside a move in the direction of educating a 
greater proportion of handicapped children, including more severely handicapped 
children, in ordinary schools. The Inner London Education Authority in its evidence 
to us affirmed that ‗in many respects, the special school represents a highly 
developed technique of positive discrimination.‘ We believe that such discrimination 
will always be required to give some children with special educational needs the 
benefit of special facilities, teaching methods or expertise (or a combination of these) 
which cannot reasonably be provided in ordinary schools. In this chapter we 
consider the organisation of special schools and of other forms of special 
educational provision located outside the ordinary school.667 
We consider that both day and boarding special schools will continue to be needed 
for children with moderate learning difficulties, although the numbers required may 
decrease as ordinary schools acquire greater expertise and experience in this field. 
We envisage that the special schools will provide for children with more complex 
learning problems combined with other disabilities and emotional and behavioural 
disorders.668 
And: 
Young people at the age of 16 who are currently described as severely educationally 
sub-normal may be at a critical stage in their development, both educational and 
social, and unless suitable educational provision is made for them they may not only 
fail to make any further progress but actually fall back. Continued education in a 
special school will be right for some, but it may be difficult for others to mature in 
such a setting, particularly if the school caters for children of all ages.669 
Although education for all is a positive step forward the Warnock Report continued to employ 
the old notions of citizenship rather than notions of universal human rights.  
Throughout the history of special education, disability policy in England has expressed 
several objectives: the desire to contain, compensate, care, and achieve eventual citizenship. 
Disability legislation as existed before the turn of the century was devoted principally to the 
segregation and containment of disabled people.670 Cultural understandings of difference are 
reflected not only in the beliefs and attitudes of people, but also in the reactions and 
behaviors of individuals and in social policy. The educational system is constructed to 
include some children and not others. For decades, this separation of students has meant 
                                                             
666 Warnock Report 1978p. 135, see also Speech by the Secretary of State for Education and Science, Mrs Shirley 
Williams, at the opening of Inkersall Green Special School at Staveley, Derbyshire on 21 January 1977. 
667 Warnock 1978 report p.135 
668 Warnock 1978 p.234 
669 Warnock 1978 Report p.192 
670 Warnock 1978 Report 1978 
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that some children with individual deficits could not succeed in an ordinary educational 
system.  
The Limits of Education Policy Analysis 
It would be difficult to analyse the cause or reason for a specific policy or Act. Do models of 
disability and models of citizenship, as reflected in watershed education policies, move 
things forward or simply reflect? This is an interesting question and it can be said that what 
these policies reflect is the change in understanding notions of disability and citizenship. 
Disability policies are not solely the result of social definitions or categorizations of who the 
disabled are; rather, it is the conceptions and models of disability which can be seen as a 
key administrative category in the historical and contemporary development of social policy.  
 
This thesis is not an examination of how ideas shaped policies, but an analysis of how 
disability education policies express models of disability and citizenship for the period 1978-
2005. This is a more reliable analysis of the education policies in this thesis because it is 
tricky to try and analyse the rational or perceptions behind a specific policy, due to the fact 
that most policies have a number of differing justifying rationales and supporting arguments 
in their favour.671  Policymakers and legislators can agree on a policy without agreeing on 
the underlying rationales for that policy. Any policy can have multiple objectives and be 
informed by multiple, and even competing, ideological perspectives. Thus when analysing 
education policies for the disabled in England we should take these limitations into account.  
672  
 
The Process of Policy Making and Disabled People in Britain  
The fundamental premises on which UK governments base their policies on disability 
depend largely on how governments define disability. The way that a government conceives 
of disability has a great effect on the country‘s laws and institutions, as well as the quality of 
life that disabled people can enjoy. 
                                                             
671 Adapting the work of Bramely et all (1995), we may theorize policy making in four main ways: 1) A ―welfare 
economics‖ account has been proposed by writers like Le Grand et all (1992), Walker (1981) and Jenkins (1978) 
Put simply, any economic and other advantages would be measured against any costs in bringing them to fruition. A 
decision would be therefore based on a view of whether the overall benefits outweighed the liabilities or vice versa; 
2) A second model of the policy process accords with analysis by sociologists such as Dahl (1961) and Ham and 
Hill (1984), and economists like Laver(1979). This ―pluralist‖ politics account assumes that policy implementation 
takes place within a decentralized, democratic system of government. Decisions are therefore taken by politicians 
who bear in mind the impact of such choices on their subsequent electoral chances. They may be especially 
sensitive to the views and wishes of voters in marginal constituencies. If there is that natural conservatism and 
wariness of innovation, the likelihood is that the political instinct is for resistance to change; 3) Neo-Marxist in origin, 
this account stresses the power of ―elites‖ who have privileged positions in the political process. If this theoretical 
model is correct and certain groups exercise a predominant influence over policy planning, then these groups may 
wish to see development rather than the preservation of the status quo, in which circumstances the balance shifts 
away from inactivity towards change in some specific direction; 4) Finally the fourth theory of policy formation and 
implementation is the bureaucratic model. This model is based on the premise that policy is made and carried out in 
the interests of politicians and bureaucrats themselves. Tullock argues that bureaucrats are ordinary people and as 
such. The constant aim of bureaucrats is the accretion of power. Accordingly administrations seek to secure their 
own positions, increase their staffing, enhance their budgets and extend their sphere of influence. 
672 Lindblom, 1979: 523; Lindblom, 1982: 135 
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Throughout history, children with disabilities were considered almost in all countries in the 
world as ‗invalid‘ or inferior. This perspective led to their exclusion, at best, they were 
concentrated into institutions to accommodate them.673 Seen as needing special protection 
and as not able to benefit from education, children with disabilities were the last to be offered 
access to education in England.674 
 
Whichever model of the state proves to be nearest the truth, it is evident that none of these 
accounts is particularly helpful to disabled people. The policies reinforced and reflected 
existing relations between the powerful and the powerless. Policies towards disabled 
people, as a marginalised group, were unlikely to enfranchise them. In a pluralist state, 
where policy is the product of competing interests and power blocks, disabled people, as a 
minority group, are likely to command influence and individual input on policy. Disabled 
people experienced a spectrum of responses, ranging from the very negative through to the 
guaranteeing of citizenship. 
The British experience has consisted of a trend starting with policies intended to isolate 
disabled people from society and from each other, and moving gradually through a 
piecemeal service approach slowly towards inclusive citizenship. The encapsulation of 
disability within a medical context is critically important because this interconnection has 
been paramount in the formulation and implementation of policy. From Victorian times 
through to the present day, policies have reflected four successive (but overlapping) kinds of 
objective, and medicine has provided the main context for the first three of these. The policy 
goals have been: 
1. To effect the containment or segregation of disabled people; 
2. To provide redress for social exclusion, and especially to compensate disabled 
people for injuries received in war or at work; 
3. To provide welfare through social services, ostensibly as an attempt to reintegrate 
disabled people into society and also as an attempt to ‗normalise‘ or control them; 
4. To secure rights and citizenship, and where necessary, reconfigure the social and 
built environment.675 
The way society views people with disabilities is, in a general sense, constructed by the 
internal logic and assumptions of definitions, views and ‗models‘ of disability and models of 
                                                             
673 http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/file_download.php/4af79d6b0090ec99b5656ac9efa387e1Balescut_J.doc 
 
674 Thomas, C. (2002). Disability theory: Key ideas, issues and thinkers. In C. Barnes, M. Oliver & L. Barton (Eds.), 
Disability studies today (pp. 38-57). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers. 
675 Vernon, A. (1998). Multiple oppressions and the disabled people's movement. In T. Shakespeare (Ed.), The 
disability reader : Social science perspectives (pp. 201-210). London: Continuum. Walmsley, J. & Atkinson, D. 
(2000) Oral History and the history of learning disability, in: J. Bornat, R. Perks, P. Thompson & J. Walmsley (Eds) 
Health, welfare and oral history.y (London, Routledge). 
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citizenship and human rights, one of which tends to be dominant in a particular society at a 
particular time. Policy and resulting legislation flows from that model, giving effect to one or 
other particular ideological stance that determines the overall relationship of the state to 
people with disabilities. Each ideological stance tends to reflect those views. For example 
after the industrial revolution disability emerged as a social category which linked those who 
were impaired, to growing systems of medical care and excluded them from access to 
education and the labour market.  
 
Relationship Between Policy and Disability, some Historical Examples of Exclusions 
based on the Medical Model and its effect on full Citizenship for Disabled People in 
Education 
An example of this relationship between policy and models was demonstrated in lack of 
policies prior to the nineteenth century when most Western countries did not have any 
clearly defined policy for people with disabilities. Salisbury indicated that ‗in Britain, no 
attempt was made to respond systematically to the problems of the disabled population.‘676 
The reason for this lack of policy was due to policy approaches where the government did 
not have any active policy and it was seen to be the role of charities to look after people with 
disabilities, reinforcing the association of disability with tragedy and loss. This 
medical/individual model focused purely on how a person with a disability compared to what 
might be perceived as a ‗normal‘ individual.677 
 
The principle of state intervention was established more firmly during the period between 
1914 and 1945. During the Second World War, for example, the government introduced free 
school meals and milk. In addition to the Beveridge Report, it also sponsored in the 1944 
White Paper on Education, strategies for achieving full employment, and the creation of a 
national health service. These changing attitudes to social policy in wartime Britain were 
reflected in the series of reforms introduced by the post-war Labour government under 
Clement Attlee (1945-51). Examples are the National insurance Act 1946, the NHS Act and 
the 1944 education Act. 
The National Insurance Act (1946), for example, created a comprehensive system of 
unemployment, sickness, maternity and pension benefits funded by employers, employees 
and the government. Most famously of all, the National Health Service (NHS) Act instituted 
for the first time in Britain a universal state health service. The Act, which came into force in 
July 1948, provided free diagnosis and treatment of illnesses at home or in hospital, 
including dental and ophthalmic treatment.  
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Changes in social life brought about by the First World War have also influenced perceptions 
concerning impairment and disabled people and, in turn, have influenced the development of 
special education. During the Second World War the infrastructures of ordinary schooling, 
special education and residential institutions, were profoundly affected by the blitz, the 
evacuation of children from the cities, the widespread disruption in education services and a 
massive reduction in human resources and basic amenities. In 1941, for example, the 
number of disabled children attending special schools in London was reduced by fifty 
percent and many attended ordinary schools.  
Primary education was to be followed by free compulsory secondary education starting at 
age eleven in either grammar, technical or secondary modern schools for the vast majority. 
For some, however, where the LEA saw fit, education was to be continued in multilateral 
schools. For a small minority whose placement was to be decided by the LEA rather than by 
its medical officers, an expanded system of special schooling would be needed. 
The post-war period marked a shift in emphasis in terms of the power and responsibility of 
different agencies in the governance of social life and how citizenship was defined. 
Education authorities took on the role of coordinating the assessment process and making 
the final decision regarding special education placements, although medical professionals 
have continued to perform an important role in assessment procedures and outcomes. 
Improved economic and social conditions, the end of empire, membership of the European 
Union and the impact of increased immigration all contributed to conditions which followed a 
greater inclusivity of citizenship and rights for all members of society. Up till the 1944 
Education Act, mainstream secondary education, like special education, was not really 
considered a major area for government intervention. Most schools, both mainstream and 
special, were run by private or church charities under the supervision of local government 
boards. The 1939-45 war, however, changed this situation. Recruits to the armed forces 
were tested for general ability, and the authorities were startled by the results, which showed 
widespread ignorance. Concern about postwar economic recovery prompted the 
Government to rethink its education policy. The Education Act of 1944 was steered through 
Parliament by the Education Minister, R.A. Butler, and was followed by a similar Act for 
Scotland in 1945. This Act provided free secondary education for all pupils. Butler stated the 
changes to education as follows; 
Clause 34 says: It shall be the duty of the parent of every child of compulsory school 
age to cause him to receive efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability 
and aptitude, either by regular attendance at school or otherwise. And thus, instead 
of ‗the rudiments of letters,‘ we offer in Clause 7 and onwards an opportunity to 
every child to pass through the primary and secondary stages. Butler added that the 
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educational system is important to making better citizens, which this Bill attempts to 
do.678 
He went on to say: 
Further, if these children are not educable, then how would they be employable? 
I think it is time to say that education should be the ally and not the dreaded 
competitor of employment. To the question ―Who will do the work if everybody is 
educated?‖ we reply that education itself will oil the wheels of industry and will bring 
a new efficiency, the fruit of modern knowledge, to aid the ancient skill of farm and 
field. 679 
Butler added that educational system is important to making better citizens who participate 
and would be employable.680 Disabled individuals who would not achieve this aim were 
excluded from education. Local Education Authorities were required to submit proposals to 
the new Department of Education for reorganising secondary schooling in their areas. 
Therefore the advent of elementary mass, and then compulsory schooling at the beginning 
of the period in question, was predicated both on the needs of industrial capitalism to 
reproduce an appropriately skilled workforce and upon the humanist ideal that education 
would produce ‗civilised‘ individuals for a civilised society.  
 
Those children and adults who were never going to be able to compete in the labour market, 
and who were never going to be able to produce themselves as the liberal humanist version 
of learned individuals, became marginal to the endeavour of compulsory schooling from its 
beginnings.681 This was particularly true for those with intellectual disabilities. There can be 
no absolute notion of what constitutes intellectual disability, since the means of coming to 
know about it is historically and socially situated. Unlike some physical and sensory 
impairments, a learning or intellectual impairment cannot be discerned in the absence of 
instruments of normalisation 682This is not to argue that intellectual impairments, whatever 
we choose to call them, do not exist. But the means of separating those who can be 
categorised as intellectually disabled from the general population has been produced 
through a discursive field in which the (political) imperative to separate out the economically 
unproductive from the productive has prevailed. The policies expressed medical model of 
disability and exclusionary models of citizenship and they continued to exclude disabled 
people from mainstream education. 
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Education, the Medical Model and Normalization In England 
This medical deficit perspective continues to exist in the current educational system and 
continues to influence society‘s beliefs and assumptions relative to many students with 
disabilities. Poplin contended that the deficit perspective continued to result in the emphasis 
of deficits over strengths and focus on the teaching of discrete, task analyzed skills in the 
absence of context, meaning, and relevance.683 
Deficit thinking can take on different forms to conform to what is politically 
acceptable at the moment, and while the popularity of different revisions may 
change, it never ceases to be important in determining school policy and 
practices.684  
Justice is relevant in all contexts, especially in the context of teaching students with 
disabilities. All students have the basic human right to have access to equitable learning 
opportunities, such as allocation of resources and challenging curriculum. These 
opportunities evolve and unfold based on the present belief systems and principles that exist 
in our society and educational system. According to Carrier, our knowledge and 
understanding of academic success and failure and ability and disability can be considered 
as cultural constructions. 685  Gliedman, Roth, and Children assert this is because the 
dominant group in a society defines the features of the culture that differentiate ‗those who 
can and those who can‘t.‘686 
England began to integrate students with disabilities into mainstream classrooms in the mid-
1970s after almost a century of educating many students with disabilities in segregated 
settings since 1870. This was in response to both research findings about the relative 
effectiveness of special education settings, and a shift in attitudes in the Western world 
towards how people with disabilities should be educated, and indeed, live their lives 
alongside non-disabled people. A significant factor in the changing of attitudes was the 
principle of ‗normalisation‘—the right of people with disabilities to learning and living 
environments as close to normal as possible—developed by Bank-Mikkelson and Nirje.687 688 
Wolfensberger also wrote extensively on this subject, coining the term ‗social role 
valorisation‘ to highlight the right of all individuals to be valued equally, and to have the 
opportunity to contribute meaningfully to their communities.689 
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The legacy of the 1944 Education Act continued until the early 1970s where many disabled 
children continued to be considered as ‗uneducable,‘ and ‗unsuitable for education at 
school.‘690 Some 32,000 disabled children attending junior training centers, special care units 
and hospitals were denied an education until the 1970 Education (Handicapped Children) 
Act, which outlawed the practice of classifying children as uneducable. 
In 1970 children who hitherto had been viewed as uneducable and designated ‗severely 
subnormal‘ after 1959 were integrated into the special education system. The Mental Health 
Act of 1959 had suggested that these children should receive education and training but the 
1970 Education (Handicapped Children) Act made this compulsory.  
The 1971 Department of Education and Skill‘s (DES) report The Last To Come In was 
decidedly positive about the proposed integration of children previously termed ineducable 
with those who were designated Educationally Subnormal (ESN). This created a further 
distinction, with the former referred to as ‗ESN severe‘—or ESN(S) as opposed to ESN(M). 
For the latter it emphasized the idea of the inclusion of mentally handicapped children within 
the category of educationally subnormal recognizing the fact that mental handicap is a 
continuum, which will allow disabled children to be moved from one type of school to another 
if their development requires a need for it.691  
Since the mid-1970s, the policy in England has been to integrate students with disabilities for 
part or all of the day in regular classrooms wherever possible, but specialized segregated 
facilities remained an option for children with severe disabilities. Students who were 
integrated often, but not always, had some level of curriculum modification and teacher aide 
support. Because some children required specialized adjustments, such as ramps, modified 
toilets, large print or Braille materials, students with similar disabilities were often transported 
to a school where such resources could be centralized. Therefore many students were not 
able to attend their local neighborhood school, although they may have been located in a 
more normalized environment. 
The shift from a medical model in education to a social model was evident but not for all 
children in the DES report on special education of April 1973, which re-examined the 
categorization, and education of children with impairments. It was critical of the use of 
categories of handicap but did little to implement their abolition. A shift of emphasis was 
evident in DES Circular 2/75, which introduced new education-focused forms to replace the 
previous medical assessments (HPI forms). An educational approach to assessment was 
now deemed preferable to a medical one, although medical concerns were still considered 
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important.692  
In 1976 the Labour Government incorporated a section on special education in the 1976 
Education Act, which was intended to implement ‗comprehensivisation‘ (the introduction of 
comprehensive schools supposed to accommodate all children regardless of academic 
ability) in England and Wales.  
Section 10 of the Act was included as a substitute for Section 33(ii) of the 1944 Education 
Act, a clause which was intended to change the legal emphasis of special education 
treatment in special schools to provision for all categories of disabled children in the 
mainstream sector. Section 10 stated that children should be educated in special schools 
only if they could not receive adequate tuition in ‗ordinary‘ schools, or if the cost of that 
instruction would cause ‗unreasonable public expenditure.‘693 
This is reflective of the dilemma liberal citizenship has been posing for disabled people. 
Either disabled people are taken to be equal to able bodied students, in which case their 
specific capacities as ‗disabled‘ are unrecognized and their citizenship is substantively 
unequal; or else the disabled are taken to be different, with the consequent risk that the 
rights citizenship allows and the obligations it imposes will again be substantively unequal. 
While the critique of liberalism in relation to disability is important to analyzing the logic by 
which the disabled have been positioned outside full citizenship rights, in practice, as 
reflected in the report, disabled people have made some gains by reconfiguring the terms of 
liberalism around this undecidability.  
The problem with the medical model along with the 1944 Education Act is that both suffered 
from a lack of inclusivity and precision in failing to treat many intellectually disabled people 
as full citizens. The Warnock Report changed this by including many provisions delineating 
the specific needs of mentally disabled children and made space for addressing their needs. 
Although the shift toward comprehensive education implied an end to segregation for 
disabled children, there was little evidence during the 1970s that these schools were any 
better than their predecessors at integrating children who required ‗special treatment.‘694 
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2. The Warnock Report‟s Expression of the Medical Model and its Problems 
and Limitations 
Problems with Labelling and Categorisation of Disabled Children in the Warnock 
Report 
Drawing on Michel Foucault‘s concept of the term discourse, this section takes as a premise 
that there is a complex relationship between words themselves and the real world as it is 
experienced: ‗Discourses,‘ in the form in which they can be heard and read, are not, as one 
might expect, a mere intersection of things and words: an obscure web of things, and a 
manifest, visible, coloured chain of words. Discourses are practices that systematically form 
the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are composed of signs, but what they 
do is more than use these signs to designate things. 
 
Put simply, Foucault argues that the words we use do not designate material objects, 
including people, in a straightforward way. Words have more power than this – they are a 
mode of practice, and they construct their objects. A child with ‗special needs‘ thus becomes 
such a child precisely because it is said of that child. That there are pedagogical, 
psychological, political, or medical reasons behind this naming matters because the authority 
of those subject positions—the teacher, the psychology researcher or practitioner, the 
disability activist, the doctor—constructs the child within a specific framework, what Foucault 
calls a ‗discursive formation.‘695  
 
All this is to say that the words we use matter, not just as window dressing, politesse, or 
‗political correctness‘—it is not appearance that is at stake in the language chosen to talk 
with and about young people with special needs, and, importantly, in the choices these 
young people make in representing themselves in language. Words matter precisely 
because they are matter—a crucial part of the material experiences of children with special 
needs, their communities and families, and the policymakers, legislators, service providers, 
educators, and others who have responsibilities to children with special needs. On one hand, 
words are what make funding schemes for support services possible. On the other, they are 
a means for people to fashion a subjectivity that appropriately represents not just their 
experience, but also the grounds of their political engagements. A central concern of 
Warnock was the negative effect that the existing statutory categories of handicap had on 
the identity of the individuals they defined. The concern is with how Warnock regarded the 
effects of these categories. They were seen as pinning a single label on a child, which could 
be difficult where children had multiple difficulties. Labels were irreversible and likely to 
stigmatise the child throughout his or her school career and beyond. The most damming 
indictment of categorisation was the confusion it promoted between the child‘s disability and 
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the form of special education required. The Warnock Report set out an alternative vision of 
special education which shifted the space of identification:  
 
we have adopted the concept of Special Educational Need, seen not in terms of a 
particular disability which a child may be judged to have, but in relation to everything 
about him, his abilities as well as his disabilities which have a bearing on his 
educational progress.696  
 
This view of children with special educational needs has rendered them ‗objects‘ of the 
rational knowledge of special education, bringing more factors into the field in which the 
objectifying gaze operates. This could legitimately focus on all aspects of the child‘s 
existence, including their personality, behaviour and even their parents. This constitutes 
evidence of the social model where the integrity of the whole person is considered 
holistically. 
 
An important feature of the shift away from the statutory categories of handicap, advocated 
by Warnock, was the separation of the delivery of special education provision from the 
special school as the locus of that delivery. The former categories, for instance blind and 
partially sighted, educationally subnormal, maladjusted and delicate, defined clearly 
particular kinds of children and identified them with particular kinds of special schools.  
 
The function of ascertainment (under the Education Act, 1944) was to pronounce children as 
not fit for ordinary schooling and to establish which form of special schooling was 
appropriate. The new conceptualisation of special education provision, which the Warnock 
Committee provided, was one, which need not take place in special schools.  
This can only have limited success because it does not focus on systemic change—which 
raises concerns that a special education approach for example, by having students‘ 
educational difficulties measured in a clinical and medical way and the reflection about the 
school‘s inability to teach the student are rarely considered. Other concerns are that special 
education reinforces social prejudice. As a matter of course, education must cater to a 
diverse range of students‘ learning styles and academic ability. Schools‘ acceptance of these 
differences tacitly benefits one group and disadvantages children who are labeled as having 
‗special‘ educational needs. 
From a social model of disability, the term and concept of ‗special‘ accommodation needed 
for some students to participate in education further perpetuates their disability. The term 
‗Special Needs‘ that was coined by the Warnock committee can be seen as a ‗pejorative 
descriptor that creates a powerful attitudinal barrier to the inclusion of individuals who are so 
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described.‘697  
Inclusive education is regarded as preferable because it enables avoidance of some 
practices that are central to special education, such as the identification of SEN categories 
and the setting up of Individual Education Plans. On the other hand practices of labeling 
children with SEN can be seen as stigmatizing them and therefore, should be avoided. 
There is then a dilemma, since if children are identified as having SEN, there is a risk of 
negative labeling and stigma, while if they are not identified there is a risk that they will not 
get the teaching support they require and their special needs will not be met. This confusion 
is referred to as the ‗dilemma of difference‘ by Norwich. 698 However, children with SEN 
should not necessary attract labels from other children and teachers if they are not formally 
identified as having SEN. So being stigmatized is necessarily a result of the identification 
and labeling of disabled children which is related to the fact that their SEN mark them out as 
different in some way. Therefore, as a remedy, avoiding identifying SEN will prevent children 
with SEN from being stigmatized. Which may help allow them to get the education that they 
need without being labeled. 
This approach of medical model labeling in the Warnock report has been insufficient to meet 
the educational and social requirements of many students with impairments and their status 
as citizens. Some say it has been detrimental to social inclusion, and places students with 
impairments further at risk of marginalization and exclusion.699  
Problems with the Limited Implementation of the Warnock Report 1978  
The Warnock Report said that legislation and structures alone cannot guarantee good 
quality education for the disabled. It also envisaged that resources were needed for good 
quality education and implementation of the recommendations of the report for special 
education. 
The quality of special education, however, cannot be guaranteed merely by 
legislation and structural change. The framework provides the setting within which 
people work together in the interests of children, and the quality of education 
depends essentially upon their skill and insight, backed by adequate resources—not 
solely educational resources—efficiently deployed. Our report is pre-eminently about 
the quality of special education.700 
Even though the report made clear the importance of resources to the quality of special 
education the Warnock framework was introduced under the 1981 Education Act but with no 
additional funding for the new processes involved in statementing or teacher training, despite 
the closure of many special schools. Although the Warnock Report gave the right to all 
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disabled students to an education, the implementation was incomplete. Structures will not be 
specified by rights, hence, problems over how the disabled are to be ‗included‘ that are 
identified by them are not easily resolved. This is clearly reflected in the implementation of 
the 1981 Education Act and subsequent education policies for the disabled in England.  
The Warnock report emphasized that funding was crucial to the successful implementation 
of the report‘s recommendations and the two pieces of legislation implemented those 
elements of the Warnock Report which the Government accepted and the 1980 and 1981 
Education Act. The 1980 Education Act and the 1981 Education Act but it was clear where 
the Government's priorities lay in terms of policies of integration: 
In present economic circumstances there is no possibility of funding the massive 
educational resources ... which would be required to enable every ordinary school to 
provide an adequate education for children with serious educational differences.701  
There was landmark legislation to support this view. The 1981 Education Act, which received 
all-party support in Parliament, placed inclusive education within a legal framework for the 
first time. 
The 1981 Education Act imposed two duties on local authorities: firstly to identify, assess 
and arrange appropriate provision for children and young people with special educational 
needs; and secondly, to give greater weight to parental preference when choosing school 
placements. This second duty was subject to three conditions: whether the disabled child 
can be educated in a mainstream school, whether the education of other children will be 
adversely affected, and whether there is an efficient use of resources.702 
Whilst the 1981 Education Act was a significant step forward, there was only really a ‗moral‘ 
duty to provide supported mainstream provision for children with SEN. Initially there was no 
legal mechanism to enforce children‘s rights to attend a mainstream school with appropriate 
SEN provision. It was not until the 1993 Education Act that children and young people with 
SEN had an increased, but still qualified right to mainstream education. This is because 
parents could challenge decisions made by local authorities and schools through an 
independent tribunal process. The tribunal panel were able to order local authorities to place 
a child with an appropriate support package in a mainstream school. 
The 1981 Education Act initiated what are now generally seen as major changes in this area. 
The 1981 Education Act became law on 3 April 1983.703 Under Section 1, SEN are defined in 
terms of children who have a significantly ‗greater‘ learning difficulty than the majority of 
children of a similar age, or children with impairment or impairments preventing them from 
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making ‗effective use' of mainstream provision within the local area. Special educational 
provision in relation to a child over two years means services, which are additional to, or 
somehow different from those provided generally for children of the same age in schools 
maintained by the LEA. For children under two years the Act covers educational provision of 
any kind. 
Under the Act LEAs in England and Wales have a ‗duty‘ to identify, assess and provide full-
time free education for all children with SEN from the age of two to the end of compulsory 
schooling and up to nineteen if they remain in school. LEAs must also provide facilities for 
children with SEN from birth. Local health authorities are compelled to tell LEAs and parents 
if they believe a child has, or may have, SEN, once s/he starts school at the age of five. 
Moreover, following a formal assessment an LEA may issue a child with SEN with a 
‗statement.‘  
This document describes the child‘s particular needs and recommends how they should be 
met. If the child leaves school at sixteen and goes on to college, LEAs are still bound to 
provide free full-time education, but the ‗additional protection‘ provided by the Act is lost. 
The Act underlines the importance of professionals—particularly doctors, educational 
psychologists, speech therapists, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, health visitors, 
school nurses—in the determination of SEN. It formally abolishes the categories of handicap, 
although it does not rule out their use. ‗Diagnostic terms‘ may be necessary in the 
‗attainment of support services.‘704  
Legally, however, parents have more involvement in the assessment of their child‘s needs. 
They can demand an assessment if they feel that these are not being met, and the LEA is 
bound to respond. Parents have access to more information and, theoretically at least, a 
larger say in the type of education to be provided, and where it should take place. They can 
contribute written information to the assessment process, and they have rights of appeal if 
they do not like the provision being proposed. The Act also suggests that the child‘s feelings 
should be considered during the examination process. 
Although the 1981 Education Act clearly recognizes the discriminatory policies of the past 
and, like its predecessors, endorses the general principle that children with impairments and 
learning difficulties should be educated in mainstream schools, it sets conditions for 
integration which allow LEAs to continue to segregate at will.  It states that a child with SEN 
maybe integrated into an ‗ordinary‘ school so long as this is compatible with the child 
‗receiving the special education‘ that s/he requires; the ‗provision of efficient education for 
the children with whom s/he will be educated‘; and ‗the efficient use of resources.‘705  
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Another threat to the development of the integration of disabled children into mainstream 
schools is contained in the Education Reform Act of 1988. Briefly, this legislation allows 
schools to opt out of LEA control and become self- governing. It also introduced the national 
curriculum and encourages competition among schools through open enrolment.706 
Up to September 1989 schools in the state sector were able largely to devise their own 
syllabuses, define their own attainment targets for individual children, set their own tests and 
choose which external examinations to prepare for. The new Act enables the Government to 
prescribe compulsory courses of study and to dictate examination arrangements and 
attainment targets in all state schools, except special schools in hospitals. Why these 
schools are excluded is not clear. In addition, the new curriculum can be ‗modified‘ for 
children with SEN. Indeed, pupils may be excluded from all or part of the new system if they 
are members of defined group or pupils with a particular kind of special need; pupils with 
statements; or children whose special needs are likely to be temporary.707 
It has been noted by several sources that the mainstream sector‘s inevitable preoccupation 
with meeting the new requirements will make provision for disabled children an even lower 
priority.708 In order for mainstream schools to concentrate on the national curriculum it is 
probable that children with a ‗modified‘ curriculum will increasingly be placed in a separate 
unit or school. Disabled children will be identified by their inability to cope with a curriculum 
designed for the majority, namely the non-disabled majority. 
Given the increased pressure on mainstream schools to achieve specified attainment targets, 
schools which are unable to meet these targets will be labeled accordingly. Competition 
between schools will intensify, and teachers keen to maintain their own and their schools' 
reputation may see full assessment and statementing as a means to exempt children who 
are unlikely to do well. Moreover, if special schools are able to offer a 'modified' version of 
the national curriculum, they might well appear more attractive to parents of children who 
have been categorized with SEN, particularly if it is evident that their needs are not going to 
be met elsewhere. The 1988 Act could squeeze disabled children out of the mainstream 
sector altogether. 
Children and young people with SEN are still perceived as different from the rest of the 
school population. Whilst all schools are expected to assess children‘s abilities and to 
provide written profiles, reports or statements of their educational needs and progress, LEAs 
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are bound by law to mark pupils with SEN out for special treatment through the assessment 
and statementing process.  
The integration and inclusion of disabled children and their status as full citizens is far from 
complete. Despite the UK government‘s commitment to removing barriers to learning and 
increasing staff training in mainstream schools so disabled students can be educated 
alongside their non-disabled peers, 709  progress has been hampered by opposition at 
grassroots level.  
An analysis by Croll and Moses suggests that although some of the teacher unions believe 
children should be in the mainstream wherever possible, they also argue that an inclusive 
policy both puts impossible pressures on teachers and ignores the superior educational 
placements which special schools offer to children with certain kinds of impairments. Further, 
many educationalists concur that the lack of adequate resources in mainstream schools 
means that special schooling is rated over inclusion for young people with severe physical or 
learning impairments 710 
Research, including the European Social Fund study Future Selves, suggests disabled 
young people have not been given the same educational opportunities, or been expected to 
achieve the same, as their nondisabled peers.711 However, according to official statistics 
from the Disability Rights Commission Educational Research Study,712 many young disabled 
people in England and Wales feel marginalized and excluded at mainstream schools. 
Moreover, a report in the Times Educational Supplement headlined ‗Inclusion is Just an 
Illusion,‘ stated that while schools are ‗talking the talk‘ they are still not ‗walking the walk.‘713 
In 2004 OFSTED found that while there was a growing awareness of the need to treat all 
pupils equally, there was still a mismatch between schools‘ aspirations and reality. This has 
been echoed by MacBeath et al in their recent report, The Cost of Inclusion. They argued 
that mainstream schools often could not provide the facilities and expertise required for 
teaching some young disabled people. This inevitably led to the young people‘s exclusion 
within the school and put a strain on their parents and teachers.714 
What Does This Mean for SEN? MacBeath et al gave a description of some of the prevailing 
problems in schools‘ attempts to implement inclusion. Their conclusion was that the current 
education system itself made it difficult to implement inclusion.  
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The House of Commons Education and Skills Committee (2006) in its report on SEN, 
reflected the general conclusion that ‗the government‘s changing definition of inclusion is 
causing confusion,‘ and that implementation required a higher level of flexibility in schools. 
Commentators now generally recognize the need for greater flexibility in the education 
system, and that the Government‘s espousal of inclusion is itself stymied by its overarching 
emphasis on accountability in terms of ‗standards.‘ It is evident that those schools that are 
successful in implementing inclusion achieve this despite the system, rather than because of 
it. In other words, the occurrence of ‗good practice‘ does not validate the existing system, but 
rather indicates the need for system change. Consequently, Baroness Warnock‘s latter-day 
recantation is relevant only in terms of the system as it currently exists. 
Most commentators now acknowledge that efforts to ‗patch up‘ the system in order to 
achieve effective inclusion are destined to fall short of what is needed. It is necessary to 
devise an educational system that starts from an acknowledgement of the diversity of the 
learning needs of all learners. The further evidence for this lies in the continuing criticism of 
the limitations of the current education system for all learners, not just those with special 
educational needs. 
Medical Model Problems for the Citizenship of Disabled Children as Reflected in the 
Warnock Report‟s Assessment and Statementing Process 
While it may be argued that assessment and statementing in relation to SEN is a form of 
affirmative action, it can also be used to place children and young people with SEN in 
separate groups, classes or schools. Although lip-service is paid to the notion of parental 
and children‘s rights, education within the mainstream sector for a child with SEN is still not a 
right in the same way that it is for able-bodied children or children who do not experience 
learning difficulties. Integration is provisional, and is acceptable only as long as it does not 
interfere with the smooth running of the mainstream sector. It is a privilege, which can be 
awarded or withdrawn by LEAs at, will. 
The procedures for assessing SEN required by the 1981 Act are highly discriminatory and 
complicated, and take time. One study estimated that the full assessment process can last 
as long as 67 weeks.715 This can have serious negative implications for a child‘s education. 
Swann has noted that it has been hard to discern anything that could be termed a national 
integration policy since 1981. No clear steps have been taken by the DES to reduce the 
numbers of pupils going to special schools. They have not issued guidance to LEAs on how 
they should interpret the integration clauses of the 1981 Act. This point was taken up by the 
House or Commons Select Committee Report on the implementation of the 1981 Act. The 
DES also came under criticism from the same source for failing to monitor the consequences 
of the Act. Moreover, although the Committee called both for more effective monitoring and 
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guidance from central Government there has been no response.716 
Table 1  Numbers of Children in Special Schools in relation to School 
Population as a Whole 
 No. of children in school* No. of children in special schools + 
 
% 
1977 9,278,268 131,151 1.41 
1978 9,915,672 132,384 1.44 
1979 9,094,150 131,688 1.45 
1980 8,933,033 129,724 1.45 
1981 8,720,123 128,125 1.47 
1982 8,501,527 126,487 1.49 
1983 8,276,185 124,811 1.51 
1984 8,096,233 120,097 1.48 
1985 7,955,879 116,273 1.46 
1986 7,832,067 113,554 1.45 
1987 7,721,209 100,865 1.41 
1988 7,610,240 105,070 1.38 
1989 7,553,484 102,064  
1.35 
* Includes full- and part-time pupils in nursery, primary, secondary and independent 
schools.  + Includes full- and part-time pupils in maintained independent schools. Source: 
Adapted from Table A30.89, pp. 175-6, DES, 1990. 
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Although Table 1 suggests that segregation declined during the 1980s it is important to note 
that in 1989 it stood at only 0.06 percent below that of 1977, the year when the Warnock 
Committee was finalizing its report which endorsed the need for integration. It should also be 
noted that these figures are misleading. Local education authorities vary greatly in their 
levels of segregation. While many LEAs have reduced their level of segregation, others have 
increased it. Recent evidence from the Centre for Studies on Integrated Education (CSIE) 
shows that since 1981 fifteen English LEAs have increased the proportion of children they 
send to segregated special schools, and three of them, Doncaster, Rotherham and St 
Helen‘s, did so by more than twenty-five percent. 717 
Also, the age structure of pupils in segregated schools is cumulative. More children are 
directed into special schools as they grow older.718 As Swann points out, a more accurate 
picture of segregated schooling could be seen by looking at the numbers of children 
transferred each year from mainstream to segregated provision. This is referred to as the 
inflow rate. It has been shown that there was a fall in the inflow rate in 1983, but it increased 
in the following two years. Later figures for the annual rate of inflow into special schools for 
each LEA are not yet available.719 
Another important factor which needs to be borne in mind in relation to the rhetoric of 
integration is that there has been a considerable reduction in the child population during the 
1970s and 1980s. This is clearly reflected in the numbers of children attending school. 
Disabled children are marginal members of school communities. When mainstream school 
places are in short supply, segregation is the order of the day. When registers are empty, 
schools are less reluctant to exclude pupils with SEN. 
Since the 1981 Act it has often been argued that progress on integration is slow because of 
the cost involved. According to estimates,720 LEAs in England and Wales spend more than 
£820 million a year on special education. A vast amount of this money is spent on special 
education rather than integration. The main problem is not simply a lack of resources but a 
lack of commitment to transfer resources from segregated provision to the mainstream 
sector. It is not a lack of funds which is the key to integration but unwillingness to change.721 
The directive for change must come from Government. It is unlikely, however, that 
integration was helped by Government reforms carried out in the late 1980s, an example the 
1988 Education Reform Act. 
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Problems with the Medical Model‟s Differentiated Curricular expressed in the Warnock 
Report  
The national curriculum had several problems from its idea, structure to its implementation. 
Warnock represented a clear shift from the advocacy of special education as something that 
was distinctive from ordinary education. However, as Marks notes, integration has emerged 
as part of the ‗new binarism‘ in which integration signals progress and its antithesis, 
segregation, does not.722 As Corbett says, Warnock even uses the metaphors of travel and 
track to signify progress.723  
 
Another problem with the Warnock report‘s recommendation has been the confusion 
surrounding entitlement and the appropriateness of curricula for children with SEN. The 
1988 Education Act established the National Curriculum and a system of league tables 
where schools competed based on academic attainment. Baroness Warnock in 2005 
described things as getting: ‗far worse from 1988 onwards ...(for children with SEN)... who 
...were not going to help the league tables.‘724 
 
The lack of additional funding in this area is also problematic for disabled people‘s 
citizenship. From when a national curriculum was first proposed in the U.K. the SEN field 
supported the government‘s intention to include children with SEN in this curriculum to the 
greatest extent possible. There was, some ambivalence within the Warnock Report about 
whether integration could be realistic for all children, especially in relation to the curriculum. 
The three tiers of integration (locational, social, functional) objectified the individual with 
special educational needs by requiring him or her to be placed in ascending degrees of 
proximity to school, peers and curriculum.  
 
Professionals were required to scrutinise this proximity and to make judgements about the 
success or failure of integration according to ‗where‘ they found the child. Obtaining 
locational inclusion was contingent on connected factors such as the availability of a 
modified curriculum, accessible buildings, and specialist teaching.
  
 
This process of categorisation reinforces the discriminatory categories of normality and 
abnormality. Disabled students identified as abnormal were therefor placed in segregated 
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schools and provided with special education.725 This nature of categorisation is certainly 
problematic for equal citizenship, especially when referred to education and when 
concerning those categories arising from medical definitions and connected to the area of 
intellectual disabilities.  
 
Differentiation of the curriculum was also identified as the key to pursuing the same 
curriculum goals, but few specific recommendations were provided as to how this might be 
achieved and schools were left to devise their own solutions. Learning support teachers 
were called upon to be the most imaginative of all, and suddenly found themselves thrust 
into a new pedagogic (or consultative) role with their mainstream colleagues.726  
 
That all children with SEN should be entitled to have access to the same curriculum as other 
children was seen as being a step forward. This was in fact the case for many children with 
SEN, for example, those with severe visual impairment who, in the past, may have been 
denied opportunities such as taking science subjects. However, for the majority of children 
with SEN, who have learning or behavioral difficulties, Warnock said it has been a backward 
step. National curricula, with their associated national assessments and their consequences, 
such as league tables of schools, have emphasized academic achievement much more than 
other aspects of the curriculum such as personal, social and vocational education.  
Therefore, having a national curriculum as the whole curriculum is not appropriate for 
children with moderate to severe learning or behavioral difficulties and leads to many of 
them becoming disaffected.727 Inclusion in an unsuitable curriculum directly contributes to 
the development of emotional or behavioral difficulties for many children, which leads them 
to be disruptive and eventually results in the exclusion of some of them from schools. As 
argued by Farrell, the priority for children with SEN must be that they have access to 
curricula which are appropriate for them, not that they are fitted into a national curriculum 
which was designed for the mainstream population.728 
 
                                                             
725 A blunt version of the social model is that of feminist disability rights advocate Susan Wendell, who avers that 
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al. eds., 1998).She argues that being biologically anomalous is only viewed as abnormal due to unjust social 
arrangements, most notably the existence of a hostile environment that is ―artificial and remediable‖ as opposed to 
―natural and immutable.‖ 
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Problems with a Medical Model view in Education  
There are a number of problems with the above medical model in education. The first 
problem is that education policies were embedded in the eugenic729 notion that there are 
those in society who are ‗able‘ (or normal) and those who are not. This dualism segments 
society into two groups: those, who are whole and able and those who are less than whole, 
(disabled) who are imperfect and to be kept apart from the ‗able‘. As a result ‗disabled‘ are 
rarely treated as ‗normal people.‘730 
This concept of normality has been central to much of the traditional thinking and practice of 
SEN. At the heart is the negative perception that to be ‗normal‘ is to be measured by the 
behaviours, performances and interactions of society as a whole. While some interpretations 
of ‗normalization‘ link to the concept of equality, there has been a widely held but misguided 
belief that disabled people want to be ‗normal‘ rather than how they are. This is described as 
one of the most oppressive experiences to which disabled people are subjected. It is argued, 
with a great deal of justification, that the quest to be normal is simply reinforcing stereotypes 
of what comprises ‗normality‘ at the expense of others who are different. Again Morris states 
that; ‗I do not want to have to try to emulate what a non-disabled woman looks like in order 
to assert positive things about myself. I want to be able to celebrate my difference not to hide 
from it.‘ 731 
 
Normality is powerfully linked with social acceptance. A pupil is more likely to be included 
within the social and educational processes of a school if he or she is socially aware, knows 
the rules of engagement, succeeds in learning and does not stand out as physically, 
emotionally or mentally different. There are numerous examples of how the quest for 
normality has resulted, historically, in educational, social or even medical interventions, 
which are designed to reduce the outward signs of difference—to make a person appear 
‗normal‘. Thus there are examples of children with Down‘s syndrome having plastic surgery 
or of blind people who are taught to use certain facial expressions in order to give the 
impression that they are engaging with others in ‗normal‘ ways. 
                                                             
729 At the opening of the twentieth century, the eugenic movement which was based on Charles Darwin‘s theory of 
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The second problem with this concept is that after being labelled as disabled (for example, 
deaf, learning disabled, dumb, blind or physically impaired) the label tends to become the 
defining feature of the person. The person becomes ‗the disabled‘ or ‗the deaf‘ or ‗crippled‘ 
rather than being varied as a complex multifaceted, fully human person. 
 
The third area of concern with the medical model (or the personal tragedy concept) relates 
more specifically to education systems and the manner in which they deal with difficulties, 
problems or failures. A disability or disorder is an inherent characteristic of the individual and 
consequently attributes student failure to a deficit or inadequacy within the individual. 732 
However, it can be argued that student disability results from organizational pathology rather 
than student pathology.  
 
Because the medical concept locates the cause of failure within the individual student, it 
masks the role which education systems play in creating and replicating failure. A disability 
implies a non-problematic pathological condition intrinsic to the individual; it fails to recognize 
that the concept of disability is socially constructed. Rather than being a non-problematic 
feature of the individual, it occurs as a consequence of diverse student characteristics 
interacting within highly constraining demands of the classroom. Because of the manner in 
which school function is taken for granted and seen as unproblematic, the source of students‘ 
difficulties is seen to reside in their disabilities and defects rather than the limitations and 
defects of schooling. Thus it could be argued that schooling is itself disabling, that lack of 
flexibility in accommodating a diverse range of student attributes creates disabled students. 
 
There have also been criticisms of the concept of normalization. Not the least of these have 
been problems with the concept of ‗normality.‘ Some have interpreted the concept as 
meaning that people with disabilities have to change to be more normal to be accepted. This 
led to debate between the interpretations of Wolfensberger and Nirje about whether we 
should be seeking to ‗normalize‘ people or should be celebrating their differences.733 
Furthermore, in the early part of the twentieth century, ideas about the provision of education 
for children with special needs continued to be based on a medical model of ‗defects‘. This 
model continued to focus on difference rather than normality, on illness rather than wellbeing, 
and particularly on the ‗problem‘ with the child.734 Therefore, it is hardly surprising that edu-
cation for children with special educational needs originally took the form of separate, special 
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schools for those who were thought to need them. Psychometric testing by early 
psychologists (such as Cyril Burt) also confirmed this type of approach to disability and 
difference. School practice is largely a result of the values of people who engage in the 
practice.735 
3.The Warnock Report‟s Expression of the Social Model and its Problems and 
Limitations 
The Shift to the Social Model in the 1978 Warnock Report 
Prior to the Warnock report education for the disabled originated from the development of 
the pathology of difference‘ within medical disciplines.736 As expressed in the medical views 
of the 1944 Education Act where medical model notions were applied to education to locate 
the deficit related to a difficulty within the disabled person, and suggests a compensatory 
model based on medical and clinical intervention.737  
This when translated in education reflects the essentialist view of the medical model where 
the individual possess inherent characteristics, thus leading to definitions in terms of the 
level of intelligence, ability, skills and general capacities in relation to the individual person 
without any considerations to methods of assessment or wider social and educational 
context.  
By 1965 it was the Labour Government‘s declared objective to end selection and separation 
in secondary education.738 These sentiments were reflected by an increasing number of 
people who objected as much to the segregation of the least able and handicapped as to 
that of the most intelligent. The plan was that the comprehensive should strive to be a school 
for all, meeting requirements of the child with special needs as well as those of the average 
or higher achieving pupil. In national terms, integration was much talked about and a small 
group of academics tended to dominate the special education press who reverently 
espoused the cause.  
As late as 1967 handicapped children still faced enormous institutionalised discrimination as 
shown in a 1967 report by the Central Admission Council for Education in the Plowden 
                                                             
735 Skrtic 1991, Hubbard, R. (1997) Abortion and disability: who should and who should not inhabit the world?, in: L. 
J. Davis (Ed.) The Disability Studies Reader. London: Routledge.p.123 
736 see Clough and Corbette, 200, p.11 
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Report.739 The case for segregated education was articulated within a need based approach. 
Special schools were promoted for two reasons: firstly, teaching expertise and materials 
were geared to particular circumstances of impairment; and secondly, they offered a 
sympathetic environment where disabled pupils could acquire the interpersonal skills 
necessary for adult life.740 Ordinary schools were not deemed appropriate because the use 
of clinical referrals was seen as the appropriate response.741 
In 1967, there was about the same percentage of English schoolchildren in special schools 
as on the eve of the Second World War.742 This was partly due to the government‘s new 
accepted view which was ‗no child is ineducable.‘  
Stanley Segal wrote that the idea that ‗no child is ineducable‘ influenced perceptions of many 
people.743 This view was translated and expressed through the 1970 Education Act and in 
1971, over 30,000 severely ‗subnormal‘ children were added to the Educationally Sub 
Normal (ESN) category.744 
The expansion also reflected an increased provision for ‗maladjusted‘ children and an 
increase in their numbers until a decrease occurred in the early 1980s.  These factors are 
reflected in the table below, which gives the number of children identified under the 1944 
Education Act and those under the 1981 Act and designated special schools, special 
hospital school and designated special classes as well.  
 
Table 2 
Year               no. In SEN schools        total school population          percentage 
1957                           60417                        7467585                                0.8 
1967                          78256                         7980940                                 0.98 
1977                           135261                       9663978                                1.40 
1987                          107126                      7450127                                   1.44 
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The Department of Education and Science (DES) statistics did not indicate substantial 
movement towards inclusion beyond what already existed in 1965. The continuing pressure 
to exclude many disruptive children from the ordinary classes, probably exacerbated by the 
breakdown in stable family life in a permissive society of the sixties, led to an explosion in 
provision for the maladjusted. New schools continued to open and many special schools 
continued to flourish, while others, with the active support of the parents of the pupils, fought 
off attempts to close them.745  
Problems with the Social Model and Inclusion in The Warnock  Report 1978  
Disability rights advocates have successfully invoked the social model‘s view that disability-
related exclusion is an avoidable and remediable social construct, through a sustained 
commitment to inclusivity. Their influence is clearly reflected in the Warnock Report and its 
recommendations.
 
The report concluded that this exclusion arose from unwarranted 
prejudice.
 
Hence, the Warnock Report was premised on the social model‘s belief that 
peoples‘ functional limitations are caused by the socially constructed environment, such that 
the repercussions of having a disability are mutable.746 
The introduction of the social model changed legislation for the disabled and aimed to 
guarantee them full citizenship and this is reflected in the recommendations of the Warnock 
Committee. Warnock also identified three ways in which integration might be achieved: 
locational, social, and functional. 
 
a) Locational integration refers to a situation in which a special school or class and a 
mainstream school share the same site 
b) Social: Opportunities for social integration could enable children with special 
educational needs to interact socially with their mainstream peers, possibly at 
intervals, lunchtimes or school assemblies.  
c) Functional integration, the most demanding, takes place when pupils with special 
educational needs ‗join, part-time or full-time, the regular classes of the school and 
make a full contribution to the activity of the school.‘747  
 
Each of these forms of integration locates the child with SEN in different relations to his or 
her school, peers and the curriculum. They each imply that integration is something done to 
the child to move him or her closer to so-called normal schooling. In short, integration is 
normalising. Warnock made it clear that the educational goals for all children were the same, 
regardless of the severity of need. They are: 
 
                                                             
745 Oliver, M., J. (1999). Disabled people and the inclusive society or the times they really are changing. Public 
Lecture, Strathclyde Centre for Disability Research.67 
746 Warnock report 1978, p.42 
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a) First, to enlarge a child‘s knowledge, experience and imaginative understanding, 
and thus his awareness of moral values and capacity for enjoyment;  
b) and secondly, to enable him to enter the world after formal education is over as an 
active participant in society and a responsible contributor to it, capable of achieving 
as much independence as possible.748  
 
Such educational development would make the child more able to participate in society and 
to be accepted inclusively in it. The child is in a position to be accepted as a citizen under 
the citizenship models by virtue of his/her ability to participate from receiving educational 
development.  
 
One of the problems the report has is that the Warnock Committee appeared never to 
reconcile its desire for all pupils with special educational needs to pursue the twin 
educational goals of knowledge and understanding and independence. It recognized that: 
‗For some, independence may in the end amount to no more than the freedom of performing 
a task for oneself rather than having someone else do it, even if the task is only getting 
dressed or feeding oneself.‘749 Children with SEN were seen by Warnock as requiring one or 
more of the following:  
 
a) Providing special means of access to the curriculum through special equipment, 
facilities or resources, modification of the physical environment or specialist teaching 
techniques. 
b) Providing a special or modified curriculum. 
c) Paying particular attention to the social structure and emotional climate in which 
education takes place.  
 
The second of these is the most important, since it specifies the need to change the 
curriculum and raises the question of whether the same curriculum goals can be maintained. 
This is somewhat ambitious, given the difficulties, which some children experience. Most 
examples of claims that alternative methods can achieve the same goals turn out to have 
addressed different goals for different levels of activity.  
All children, according to Warnock, were travelling along the same path towards these two 
goals, but some would meet obstacles, which were so daunting that their progress would 
inevitably be limited. The implied paradox here of the impossibility of all children attaining the 
same goals along the same route, has subsequently been questioned more explicitly, not 
least of all by Warnock herself in 2005, who has described the Committee as having been 
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naïve.750  This may be because the Warnock Committee viewed second-generation type 
rights as beyond their political mandate. They may not of been aware that some people with 
disabilities are able to perform essential functions but cannot do so because of extreme 
external limitations; or that some disabled persons fall beyond the reach of sameness criteria 
but that their inclusion would nonetheless be valuable both for them as individuals and for 
society at large. 
A common confusion occurs among educators influenced by the rhetoric of full inclusion, 
despite its contrast with the reality of the situation in schools. The rhetoric of full inclusion 
suggests that it is possible to effectively educate all children with SEN in mainstream 
classrooms. However, the reality of the situation in mainstream schools is that many 
teachers do not feel able or willing to implement this scenario.751 
Limits of a Social Model Perspective in the Warnock Report on Special Education 
There are several problems with the social model perspective and inclusive education in the 
Warnock report. Inclusive education is primarily political as it is concerned with the inclusion 
of all citizens in a democracy. Its political dimension stems from its commitment against 
exclusion both in policy and practice and from its convergence with the social model of 
disability and disabled people‘s civil rights movement. Some of the important elements of 
inclusion are: the challenge to the social and educational conditions defining difference as 
disadvantage and abnormality, and overcoming oppressive power relations which through 
medical professionals, medical categorisations, regulate the identity of disabled people to 
the ideology of need and care.  
The political aim of inclusive education is that difference should be respected and promoted. 
These elements, furthermore, contribute to the understanding of inclusion in terms of 
entitlements of disabled people to the benefits and opportunities entailed by rights of 
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education of disabled children, their access to society and their status within it. However, although the concept of 
inclusion has fundamentally changed the foundations of special education, the very apparatus of what legitimates 
special education as a field has been called into question. Two government bodies, The Audit Commission and Her 
Majesty‘s Inspectorate, issued a severe indictment on educational provision for pupils with ‗special educational 
needs‘ in England and Wales. Their national investigation on this area of education was the first since the 
implementation of the 1981 Act in 1983 and amounted to finding ‗serious deficiencies in the way in which children 
with special needs are identified and provided for‘. In 2005 in a second Warnock Report (2005) on education titled: 
Special Educational Needs: A New Look, Warnock herself criticized how the system of education operates in theory 
by retracting old recommendations for inclusion for children with SEN. The 2005 report presented a thorough 
critique of the issues of SEN amounting to the idea that the whole system has to be re-examined.  This includes: the 
growth of disability categories and their reification; the separate education and certification of teachers; academic 
journals devoted to specializations; the burgeoning industry of professionals to serve the disabled (therapists, 
counselors, evaluators, school psychologists, etc.); separate schools; segregated programs within existing schools, 
different funding sources.  
751 (Croll & Moses, 2000; Scruggs & Mastropieri, 1996). 
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citizenship. Inclusive education as a matter of rights, and specifically human rights are 
central to the debate on inclusion.  
Warnock‘s central message was libertarian, proclaiming the ‗right of the handicapped to 
uninhibited participation in the activities of everyday life, in all their varied forms.‘752 This 
reflected the social model‘s view, which exerted a powerful influence in revising legal 
regimes affecting disabled persons in education.753 These measures are crucial but limited. 
Because social model advocacy is grounded exclusively in formal equality notions, 
legislatures have promulgated civil rights protection; by definition these antidiscrimination 
legislations do not encompass positive rights such as equality measures. Put another way, 
disability civil rights are directed at ensuring equal treatment but not equal opportunity. As a 
result, the formulated statutes are not adequately empowered to bring about disabled 
citizens‘ full social inclusion.  
Founded upon egalitarian principles, comprehensive schools were envisaged as catering for 
all children with regard to their education. While the demedicalisation of the labeling of 
disabled individuals within the educational context must be viewed positively. The concept of 
SEN retains the assumption that people 210rganizatio in this way are somehow ‗less than 
human.‘ The emphasis is still on the inadequacy of the individual: it is s/he who is different; it 
is s/he who is at fault; and, most importantly, it is s/he who must change. 
The Committee did not seriously question the general philosophy and 210rganization of the 
education system although by implication it acknowledged that it is incapable of meeting 
adequately the educational needs of up to a fifth of its users. Their solution to the problem of 
SEN was a further expansion of professionally dominated support services. Within the 
present educational context this can only reinforce the perceived difference between pupils 
and students with SEN and the rest of the school population, as well as the general view that 
people with impairments are incapable of looking after themselves without professional help. 
Further Problems With the Social Model in Education in Practice 
The report made 225 recommendations, one of which was to abolish the use of categories 
which it saw as damaging and irrelevant. The medical model was now being criticized for 
                                                             
752 DES 1978, p99 
753 Flaws in the 1981 Act were cured by the 1993 Act. It took more than ten years before provision of the 1993 Act 
which was implemented in September 1994.  This Act gave a better appeal process for parents, especially with the 
establishment of the Special Educational Needs Tribunal.  The 1993 Act  represented a step in the right direction, 
as it took appeals out of the virtual control of LEAs and it brought with it time lines which demanded more rigorous 
responses from LEAs with regard to the procedures. The central issue of integration was maintained in the 1993 Act, 
and so were the three earlier conditions from the 1981 Act limiting progress with integration and inclusion; however, 
integration was further qualified by the new phrase, unless that is incompatible with the wishes of his parent‘.  It 
wasn‘t until The Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) in 1995 that aimed to end discrimination that many disabled 
people face and to establish a National Disability Council. The provisions of this Act make it unlawful to discriminate 
against disabled persons in connection with employment, provision of goods, facilities and services or the disposal 
or management of premises; and to make provision about the employment of disabled persons.  This was a move 
towards an international shift towards a human rights approach towards disabled people as drawn by the United 
Nations. 
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being dehumanising, treating children like objects.754 It groups vague symptoms together 
and assumes they can be treated in the same way. This move towards inclusion by the 
Warnock committee was an advance but not all encompassing. 755  There has been 
inadequate scrutiny of the motives behind integration which is rooted in ‗economic, 
professional and social interests.‘ 756  The notion of integration itself is unsatisfactory, 
suggesting that ‗something is done to pupils with difficulties‘ and that success is measured in 
terms of how well they have been absorbed into the mainstream. It also implies that 
integration is a once only event. The social model‘s notions of formal justice as sameness 
also limit its application in two respects. First, the social model argues that people with 
disabilities would not be marginalized if prevailing social convention used inclusive concepts, 
for example the altering of the physical environment (Universal Design). Yet, while Universal 
Design continues to evolve, it does not include all disabled persons because some have 
environmental restructuring needs that surpass current parameters. 
Second, social model advocates have relied exclusively on the provision of reasonable 
accommodations in education as an equalizing inclusion measure. These ‗reasonable‘ 
parameters do not embrace all individual differences among disabled persons. Reasonable 
accommodation requirements mandate environmental restructuring to the level of equal 
treatment but not to the level of extra-reasonable accommodations that some individuals 
may require. Thus, disabled students are not entitled to collective accommodations that 
could achieve equal educational opportunities or to a variety of measures that could 
ameliorate historic discrimination. 
Despite the success of the Warnock report and subsequent legislation in invoking the social 
model, the full inclusion of a socially marginalized group requires invoking both negative and 
positive rights; education-related antidiscrimination legislation can prospectively prevent 
prejudicial harm, while equality measures are needed to remedy inequities that exist due to 
past practices. Moreover, failing to counteract the unequal position of people with disabilities 
perpetuates their social stigma and the attitudes that maintain subordination. Thus, 
education-related anti-discrimination legislation is only effective when linked with equality 
                                                             
754 Historically, society viewed persons with disabilities through a medical model that considered ―handicapped‖ 
individuals as naturally excluded from mainstream culture. Due to this medical based pathology disabled persons 
have been either systemically excluded from social opportunities, or have been accorded limited participation in 
those opportunities, for example by having their education circumscribed to separate schools. See Kenny Fries, 
Introduction to Staring Back: The Disability Experience From the Inside Out 1, 6–7 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997) (noting 
that ―this view of disability . . . puts the blame squarely on the individual‖); Claire H. Liachowitz, Disability as a Social 
Construct 11 (1988) (averring that the ―medical/pathological paradigm‖ of disability, which stigmatizes the disabled 
by conditioning their inclusion only ―on the terms of the ablebodied majority‖). 
755 Although the medical model approach prior to the Warnock report has previously informed special education, its 
effects are still currently relevant, a clear example relates to the continuing segregation of special education. In 
terms of inclusion in education provision, the 1976 Education Act, Section 10 decreed that all children were to be 
educated in ordinary schools, at a date to be fixed later, but subject to practicability, efficiency and cost. This was 
never implemented755 and was superseded by the 1981 Education Act, which likewise decreed that children with 
special needs should be educated with non-disabled children in ordinary schools but, as the 1976 Act, subject to the 
same constraints. These constraints would seem to have been powerful deterrents to the advance of integration. 
LEAs preferring the special school can always use them as an excuse for inaction. 
 
756 Barton and Tomlinson, Tomlinson, S (1982) A sociology of special education. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. p.65 
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measures (such as inclusion preferences) that alter educational frameworks, hierarchies and 
cultures.  
Unfortunately, the disability rights agenda has not embraced both first and second-
generation rights.757 This is because the social model has been proscribed to a rigid concept 
of formal justice that narrowly treats similarly situated people as alike. And so long as the 
extent of disabled versus non-disabled equality is assessed in terms of sameness, it cannot 
adequately account for programmes seeking to raise the group to an equal level through 
treatment that is more than equal. By limiting itself to the boundaries of the social model, the 
Warnock committee agenda has neglected these complementary means of institutional 
restructuring. In consequence, although the social model seeks to remove institutional 
barriers, a central means of achieving that goal has been neglected. 
The position enforced by the Warnock report endorsing social model perspectives in relation 
to inclusive education express two further limitations of the social model of disability. 
1. First insisting on the social construction of special education needs presents obvious 
elements of over emphasising of the socialization;  
2. Second, the rejection of any concept of normality and the assertion of the 
celebration of difference as main educational aim is in itself problematic. Social 
model views theorising the construction of the social model in special education 
needs, in overlooking the experience of impairment, and in deconstructing and 
rejecting definitions of functioning, present a strict socialisation of impairment itself.  
 
Moreover, in identifying the oppressive nature of professionals, as the medical model does, 
social perspectives in education may lead to an underestimation of the important contribution 
of professional expertise in children‘s development. Further many disabled children require 
an inclusive culture and ethos, a differentiated curriculum and assessment methods and they 
might also need additional resources and special aids. Furthermore the social model, with its 
strong emphasis on self-advocacy and collective action, is inadequate for some children with 
profound or multiple impairments who, even with the maximum access to resources and 
inclusive education, are largely reliant upon others.  
Inclusive education is primarily political as it is concerned with the inclusion of all citizens in a 
democracy. Its political dimension stems from its commitment against exclusion both in 
policy and practice and from its convergence with the social model of disability and disabled 
people‘s civil rights movement. The political aim of inclusive education is that difference 
should be respected and promoted. These elements, furthermore, contribute to the 
                                                             
757 Broadly stated, first generation rights are thought to include prohibitions against State interference with rights that 
include life, movement, thought, expression, association, religion, and political participation. They are often referred 
to as ―negative rights.‖ Second generation rights focus on basic standards of living that States must ensure, such as 
the availability of employment, housing, and education. These are frequently thought of as ―positive rights.‖ 
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understanding of inclusion in terms of entitlements of disabled people to the benefits and 
opportunities entailed by rights of citizenship. Inclusive education as a matter of rights, and 
specifically human rights are central to the debate on inclusion.  
But perhaps the most glaring indictment of the Warnock Committee‘s position with regard to 
SEN and the role of disabled people within the community can be found in its discussion of 
what it terms ‗significant living without work‘: 
The problem of how to accept life without employment and how to prepare for it, 
faces people with a variety of disabilities, including those who are of the highest 
intelligence but very severely handicapped. We believe that the secret of significant 
living without work may lie in handicapped people doing far more to support each 
other, and also in giving support to people who are lonely and vulnerable. 758 
Although the Committee acknowledged the economic, social and psychological significance 
of paid employment for individuals within our society it is clear that it had accepted 
unequivocally the orthodox view that disabled people would be excluded from the workplace. 
This has salient implications for the perpetuation of this myth. The most obvious of these is 
that professionals, themselves in secure employment, will determine when a child is young 
that s/he is unsuitable for paid work. The child‘s subsequent education will be organized 
accordingly. This results in a self-fulfilling prophecy, producing a downward spiral in 
professionals‘ expectations about the child‘s potential for achievement.759 It is not surprising 
therefore that since the 1980s there has been a proliferation of life and leisure skills teaching 
for children and students with SEN throughout the education system. 
4. Warnock, Special Educational Needs the Conflation of the Medical and Social 
Model of Disability and its Problems 
 
Warnock, Special Educational Needs the Conflation of the Medical and Social Model 
of Disability 
Warnock sought to dislodge the vice-like grip in which medical discourses have held 
disabled children. The Warnock Committee took exception to the system of ascertainment, 
under the 1944 Education Act, which sought to classify children into particular kinds of 
handicaps and to associate them with particular kinds of schools. Here, medical practitioners 
were the principal arbiters and the system of classification of conditions they used had much 
in common with medical nosology (the science of classification of diseases). Warnock aimed 
to replace this system with a conceptualisation of a ‗continuum of special educational 
needs,‘760 which seemed simply to shift onto another branch of medicine, epidemiology. 
Warnock proposed to tackle what was seen as an unhelpful bipolarity: ‗we have made very 
                                                             
758 Warnock Report, 1978, p.202 
759 Kent and Massie, 1981, Radford, J. P. (1994). Intellectual disability and the heritage of modernity. In M. H. Rioux, 
& M. Bach (Eds.), Disability is not measles : New research paradigms in disability (pp. 9-28). North York, Ont: 
Roeher Institute.p.67 
760 Warnock Report 1978 p94 
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clear our determined opposition to the notion of treating handicapped and non-handicapped 
children as forming two distinctive groups, for whom separate educational provision has to 
be made.‘761  
 
The proposal of a continuum of special educational needs was a significant displacement 
from a system of classification towards an epidemiological model. This ‗new view‘ 
empowered professionals to search for causes of a disability, or at least contributory factors, 
that were found outside the person. It began to map out new trajectories of special 
educational needs, rather in the way of the development of medical knowledge of the early 
eighteenth century—a symptom was situated within a disease, a disease in a specific 
ensemble, and this ensemble in a general plan of the pathological world. Special educational 
needs, in a similar way, became situated within a map which related the child‘s disability to 
other features (for example, behaviour, personality, attitude). These could be found by 
extending the focus to the child‘s immediate environment (the parents and family) and the 
wider locale of the school. This new way of speaking legitimised extensive surveillance of 
the child.  
 
The progressive specificity of medical knowledge, located within the clinic, opened up to the 
‗gaze‘ a ‗domain of clear visibility.‘ All aspects of a patient‘s disease could be subject to 
scrutiny, for example through the practices of immunology or radiology. As a result, medical 
perception was: ‗freed from the play of essence and symptoms, and from the no less 
ambiguous play of essence and individual.‘762 
 
The disability of the child, whilst at the centre of the special needs map, is circumnavigated 
within Warnock and the focus is instead on the rest of the child—his or her characteristics 
and the environment inhabited by the child. The system of classification, which Warnock 
proposed to leave behind, had been crucial in separating children who could be educated, 
from those who were required to be cared for throughout their lives. Great efforts were made 
to ensure that this system of ascertainment, managed largely by the medical profession, was 
accurate. This was significant, given the pressure from those proposing birth control or 
sterilisation (arising from notions that mentally handicapped were excessively fertile) and 
from eugenicists, looking to inhibit the birth of defectives.  
 
Classification clearly had an important role in distinguishing educable from ineducable 
defectives. Warnock saw no need for such a distinction, since all children were to be 
educated. However, the attempt to replace categories with the notion of a continuum was 
problematic. It encouraged professionals to see the causes of disability as being outside, 
rather than within, the child. This opened up to the ‗gaze,‘ among other things, the child‘s 
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parents, invoking them as a cause of disability. Attempts to demedicalise disability appear 
instead to have shifted the way in which the diagnosing ‗gaze‘ operated. This took place in 
an epidemiological rather than an ontological domain and still involved the attribution of 
causal factors. It also legitimised maximum surveillance of pupils with special educational 
needs.  
 
Problems with the Conflation of the Medical and Social Model in the Warnock Report 
In the Warnock Report there is a conflation of the medical and social model of disability, 
which can be problematic. Education systems and policies have been instrumental in 
building and sustaining the current citizenship regimes in England. There was no question 
raised within the Warnock Report as to the ‗educability‘ of all children, regardless of the 
severity of their needs. ‗Special educational treatment‘ was to be replaced by ‗special 
education,‘ asserted Warnock. The Warnock Report was also famous for attempting to shift 
the medical model way of thinking in education provision to a social model of disability in its 
march towards inclusive education. 
Inclusive education was not seen an end in itself, rather it was a means to an end, that of 
establishing an inclusive society. Thus the role of education was seen as central to that 
achievement.763 The Warnock Report‘s adoption of the social model of disability and a more 
inclusive notion of citizenship with its emphasis on disability as primarily caused by social 
structures is evident in it‘s definition of ‗inclusivity‘ as the process of removal of all 
exclusionary and disabling barriers in education. And in the important role inclusive 
education plays in the achievement of an inclusive society.  
The Warnock Report challenged the medical model‘s individualized approach to the problem 
of disability and special educational needs to a view that locates the difficulty or the deficit 
within individual school structures. Special education developed from pathology of difference 
within medical disciplines.764  
However the Warnock Report continued to reflect medical views which when applied to 
education locates the problem within the child and suggests cure and compensation based 
on medical interventions. Translated to education this implies that disabled people possess 
inherent characteristics that are graded based on intelligence, skills and abilities. This 
medical approach as reflected in the Warnock Report has previously informed special 
education, a clear example is segregated education and special schools which are still 
                                                             
763 Inclusive education is not an end to itself but a means to an end, that of establishing an inclusive society. Thus, 
the notion of inclusivity is a radical one that it places the welfare of all citizens at the center of consideration. It is not 
merely about providing access to disabled students, who have been previously excluded, or about closing down 
special schools and including them in an unchanged mainstream school system. Inclusive education is about the 
participation of all children and the removal of all forms of education. See Barton, 1998, p.84-85 
764 see Clough and Corbett, 2000, Clough, P (1995) Problems of identity and method in the investigation of special 
educational needs in P Cough and L Barton (Eds) Making difficulties: research and the construction of SEN. 
London: Paul Chapman.p:11 
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available today. The clinical and medical assessment of disabled students introduces 
categories of normality and abnormality. Students identified as abnormal are therefore 
placed in segregated special institutions and schools.  
The shift to the social model expressed by the Warnock Report was not translated into an 
automatic right for all children to be included in a common education with other children. 
Children with severe difficulties would continue to need separate special schooling. An 
important confusion with inclusive education that has been addressed in 2010 by Warnock is 
whether inclusion is a means to an end or an end in itself.765 Proponents of full inclusion 
argue that segregated SEN placement is wrong because a key goal of education should be 
to fully include children in the community in which they live. Therefore, they ought to be 
included in their local mainstream schools. However, as suggested by Warnock, inclusion in 
the community after leaving school is actually the most important end that educators should 
be seeking. Inclusion in mainstream schools may be a means to that end but should not be 
an end in itself. For some children with SEN, segregated SEN placement may be the best 
means to the end of eventual inclusion in the community when they leave school. In 
contrast, inclusion in mainstream schools which does not fully meet children‘s SEN may be 
counterproductive in that it is likely to reduce their potential for full inclusion in the community 
as adults. 
This conflation of the medical model approach and the social model approach expressed in 
the Warnock report is problematic and exclusive for many disabled people, particularly those 
with intellectual and complex disabilities. The application of medical definitions in the case of 
physical disability has different interpretations that definitions applied to intellectual 
disabilities.766 This negative social interpretation of intellectual disabilities is reflected in the 
historic changes both in the descriptors and use of these categories.767 This medical model 
                                                             
765 Warnock in Terzi, 2010 
766 For example paralysis is a category that is agreed by professionals and can be readily applied to education 
settings, but categories used to identify and classify intellectual disabilities are subject to the cultural and structural 
factors according to social interpretation. This is due to the fact that there are no adequate measuring instruments 
or criteria in society of intellectual limitations. 
767 In the mid 1950s some LEAs objected to boarding schools and the drying up of the supply of buildings led to the 
building of large numbers of day schools after 1955. By then the Chief Medical officer‘s annual Reports and 
government circulars were reminding LEAs that special education should not be equated with provision in special 
schools. Sending a child away from home should only happen if there was no other practical alternative:  ― a child 
has a mental handicap does not necessary involve his withdrawal from normal environment but, if he has to be 
withdrawn at all, that withdrawal should not be further or greater than his condition demands. Handicapped children 
have a deep longing to achieve as much independence as possible within normal community instead of being 
surrounded by an atmosphere of disability‖ (Report for 1952 and 1953 of the CMO of the Ministry of education, 
HSMO, 1958,p.6) In 1964 the new Department of Education and Science (DES) said of the slow learner following 
the ordinary timetable:―his failures are exposed many times a day. In such a situation his self-respect is undermined 
and he quickly loses heart, so that the way is wide open for the development of anti social conduct‖ This the 
perceived  unsuitability of the normal curriculum, ethos and organizations of many ordinary schools for SEN, 
placement for as many as possible in special schools or classes was seen as being necessary to help children 
escape from experiencing repeted failure, and its consequent damaging effect on their self concept and attitudes to 
education. Most leading educationalists considered this to override any considerations of the stigma attached to 
segregation. An element of social control in the selection of children in special schools was openly admitted by the 
ministry in 1946 (in 1946, a ministry pamphlet indicated that the first group of children with low IQ, should attend the 
new ESN schools, rather than the relatively brighter ‗remedial‘ children). The 1959 Mental Health Act contained a 
provision within the community for severely subnormal children. Eugenic fears had now largely been dispelled and 
there was a growing pressure for children to live at home and attend health authority junior training centers rather 
than stay in subnormaility hospitals. Section 57 of the 1944 Education Act was the legal mechanism by which 
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view expressed in the report can actually become deterministic, especially if the emphasis is 
placed on individual causation.  
The radical changes in the Warnock Report expressed unequal citizenship status of disabled 
children, many were still educated separately and excluded from mainstream education. This 
relates consistently to the critical analysis of the medical model provided by the social model 
of disability. The relationship of power between social groups and the dominant, hegemonic 
imposition of some groups on others, in this case medical and educational professionals on 
disabled people and their parents. The traditional special education discourse in the 
Warnock report is one in which the voices of the professionals continued to dominate.768  
Furthermore, the implementation of specific school structures, curricula, and standards of 
achievement act as disabling barriers excluding de facto a wide number of children from 
mainstream schools. It is through these positions that issues of inclusive education widen 
from considerations referred primarily to disabled children and special education needs to a 
more general perspective that encompass a response to students‘ diversity in an 
inclusionary way. This situates inclusive education in a larger political movement, which 
questions the organisation of society and declares the positive celebration of difference as 
its fundamental political aim, and the realisation of an inclusive society which values 
difference. 
5. Warnock 2005 Critique of the Implementation of the Warnock Report 1978 
In the second Warnock Report (2005) on education titled Special Educational Needs: A New 
Look, Warnock criticized how the system of education operates in theory by retracting old 
recommendations for inclusion for children with SEN. The 2005 report presented a thorough 
critique of the issues of SEN amounting to the idea that the whole system has to be re-
examined.769 
 
The Warnock Report 2005 made it clear that the way schools care for children with special 
needs has caused a disastrous waste of money and has to be completely overhauled and 
replaced by a process for meeting pupil‘s social and educational needs. Moreover, it decided 
that SEN should only be catered for in mainstream schools when it can be supported from 
within a school‘s own resources.  
The report recommended that the Government has to recognise that the whole idea of 
inclusion should be rethought, and a new commission is needed to look into the whole area of 
SEN provision. Warnock‘s 1978 call for the greater integration of children with special 
                                                                                                                                                                            
children believed to have an intelligent quotient of less than 50 were excluded from the education system. Parental 
hatred of this was increasingly recognized and the justice of their view more widely appreciated as is evident in the 
next section where the issue was debated in parliament. 
768 See Corbett and Slee, 2000, p.135, Slee, R (1993) The politics of integration - new sites for old practices? 
Disability, Handicap and Society 4 (2) pp351-360. 
769 Warnock report 2005 
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educational needs into mainstream schooling has been embraced to a level that has resulted 
in Baroness Warnock recently expressing concern that it may be being employed in ways that 
are unhelpful for some children.770 However, a more subtle challenge to the philosophy behind 
the Warnock Report has been the resurgence of the medical model in identifying and 
assessing children with special educational needs. There appears to be a growing emphasis 
upon categorical diagnosis and classification that can distract clinicians, teachers and parents 
from the primary purpose of the assessment, finding ways to help children learn more 
effectively.  
In 2005 around eighteen percent of all pupils in school in England were categorized as 
having some sort of special educational need (SEN) (1.5 million children). Around three 
percent of all children (250,000) had a statement of SEN and around one percent of all 
children were in special schools (90,000), which represents approximately one-third of 
children with statements.771 Warnock criticized the government‘s policy of inclusion and the 
confused and changing definition of inclusion which caused the closure of special schools 
and forced some children into mainstream schools when it is not in their best interests to be 
there, resulting in distress for pupils and parents.772 
 
There is no single solution to providing education for children with disability. However there 
are now some valuable lessons which have been learned which other disability initiatives 
can draw from. In July 2005 Baroness Warnock wrote an article on SEN in which she called 
for the Government to set up another commission to review the situation. In her 2005 report 
Special Educational Needs: A New Look, Warnock expressed regrets about how the system 
of education operates in practice: 
Unless someone is brave enough to bring an end to what I regard as our—my 
greatest mistake, namely statementing, money will still be squandered in the same 
way as now, the problems to do with statementing are almost insoluble and very 
expensive. The only way to solve it is to cut through the whole thing.773 
She concluded that there was an urgent need to review SEN, particularly the concept of 
inclusion, the process of statementing, and to gain a better understanding of the link 
between social disadvantage and SEN. Warnock went on to cause great consternation by 
saying   
… one of the major disasters of the original (Warnock, 1978) report was that we 
introduced the concept of special educational needs to try and show that disabled 
children were not a race apart and many of them should be educated in the 
mainstream… But the unforeseen consequence is that SEN has come to be the 
name of a single category, and the government uses it as if it is the same problem to 
include a child in a wheelchair and a child with Asperger‘s, and that is conspicuously 
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untrue.774 
Warnock argued that there is an underlying problem, in that the premise on which models of 
SEN provision have progessed to in recent times is premised upon a ‗single category‘ of 
children with SEN which she argues is fundamentally flawed. Warnock suggested that 
children exist on a broad continuum of needs and learning styles but do not fit into neat 
categories of different sorts of children—that is, those with and those without SEN. As such 
Warnock advocates that the categorization of SEN is an arbitrary distinction that leads to 
false classifications and, it can be argued that, this is what is causing the high levels of 
conflict and frustration with all those involved in relation to modeling who should/should not 
be included in mainstream schooling and what strategies and models to adopt to support 
children with SEN. 
According to the Warnock Report (2005), children with special needs in mainstream schools 
have not benefited from the best teaching and they have been taught almost entirely by 
teaching assistants who are not fully qualified.  Accordingly, it was envisaged that there is 
need to deploy the expertise of teachers from special schools to support and train teachers 
in mainstream schools. In 2004 Ofsted reported that one of the weaknesses of inclusion 
preventing disabled students reaching their full potential, is the use and quality of teaching 
assistants.775 Priestley found that for some young disabled people, the physical proximity of 
the helper could work against social processes of acceptance among other children in the 
class.776 Consistent with this, Allan suggests that all aspects of the child‘s interpersonal 
relationships can be brought under the vigilance of the staff, as disabled children are more 
comprehensively observed than their non-disabled peers.777 This promotes a divide between 
young disabled people and their nondisabled peers. Further, the former, who are the 
minority in mainstream schools, are perceived as ‗different‘ and therefore a legitimate target 
for bullying.778 
The 2005 Warnock Report indicated that, while the situation for inclusion was not so bad in 
primary schools, pending provision of the necessary support, more acute problems were 
identified in secondary schools. Inclusion was seen, in practice, often to mean that children are 
physically included but emotionally excluded. With respect to bullying, the 2005 report sees 
children with SEN are not as vulnerable to bullying in special schools as they inevitably are in 
mainstream schools (particularly secondary schools). Warnock calls for addressing the 
tendency of children to bully those they see as different, and also notices that some parents 
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see attendance at a special school as a bad thing which is likely to expose their child to 
abuse.779 
Baroness Warnock realised that inclusion must embrace the feeling of belonging which is 
necessary for well-being and successful learning. It also criticized the practice of SEN is 
lacking due to budget inadequacies and lack of planning. She also noted that the lack of 
special equipment that might make it possible for some children with sensory deprivation to 
be taught in the ordinary classroom deprives many children of inclusion when they are 
educated in mainstream schools. 
The access and resource limitations of several mainstream secondary schools may also 
mean that young disabled people have to move to designated schools, with suitable facilities 
for disabled people, several miles from their home while their local nondisabled peers can 
make a straight transition to their local secondary school.780 This is not only tiring for the 
young disabled people, as they needed to travel long distances, but also means that they 
may be separated socially from friends made at school and peers from their home locality. 
The above factors led Lady Warnock in her 2005 commentary to say: ‗the idea of inclusion 
should be rethought insofar at least as it applies to education at school.‘781 This statement 
raises the crux of the issue. The Government recognised the barriers to inclusion that exist 
in schools in its statement in 2004 and set out its proposals about how the barriers should be 
tackled. 782  OFSTED, in its report in 2004, found that more mainstream schools saw 
themselves as inclusive, but that only a minority met special educational needs very well. 
Members of the SENCo Forum (an electronic mailing list for SENCos) responded to the 
consultation on the government‘s Special Needs Action Plan by stating that schools would 
have to provide a much higher level of flexibility in the way that learning and teaching take 
place, if the aims of inclusive education are to be realized.783 
A number of arguments have been used by policymakers, professionals and parents to 
argue that segregated special schools are the best option for some disabled students, with 
their supportive barrier-free environment and specialist resources and support to meet the 
students‘ needs. They criticize mainstream schools for failing to adequately prepare for a 
disabled child‘s care, educational and social needs.784 Further, they believe that too often, 
only lip service is paid to ‗integration‘—whether in the classroom and curriculum or in wider 
social activities. 
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Evidence that inclusion in Education Can be Positive: Studies on Inclusive Education 
In a study on the effects of school inclusion programs on male and female non-disabled 
students‘ stereotypes, their attitudes toward people with Down's syndrome were studied. Non-
disabled students (11–15 years of age) from schools with and without inclusion programs 
reported positive and negative attitudes toward people with Down‘s syndrome. As 
hypothesized, girls and students attending schools with inclusion programs showed more 
favourable attitudes toward people with Down‘s syndrome than did boys and students 
attending schools without inclusion programs, respectively. Interaction effects of the school 
system and the sex of participants suggest that boys' attitudes, in particular, benefit from 
inclusive schooling.785  
Moreover negative attitudes can be changed as seen in a German study where an 
experimental study was designed and tested to change negative attitudes towards the 
physically disabled. A pre-test intervention was conducted including three conditions: (a) 
cognitive intervention; (b) cognitive and behavioural intervention involving equal-status 
contact with the target group; (c) no-intervention control. The sample consisted of seventy 
ninth-grade students. Following baseline assessments of attitudes, attitude change was 
measured immediately following the intervention and at a follow-up three months post-
intervention. The cognitive intervention provided information about physical disability and 
challenged stereotypic conceptions about the physically disabled. The behavioral 
intervention consisted of engaging in three Paralympics disciplines under the instruction of a 
group of disabled athletes. The cognitive intervention alone did not result in significant 
changes in attitudes towards the physically disabled. However, the combined cognitive-
behavioral intervention resulted in greater attitude change than the no-intervention condition, 
both immediately post-intervention and at a three months follow-up.786 
Therefore, the weakest points of full implementation are seen to be negative attitudes and 
perceptions of disabled people. The solution could be summarized in: (a) financing which 
need a large input from government to cater for establishment of primary infrastructure; (b) 
special facilities and continuous teacher training; (c) teachings about equality and respect for 
difference etc. A 1995 study by Hastings and Graham maintains that educational integration 
assumes that heterogeneous grouping will increase the extent to which the disabled are 
accepted by peers. Reports on a study of 128 adolescents in integrated and nonintegrated 
schools find that the frequency of contacts, not the type of school attended, led to more 
positive expectations. 787  I also suggest here that knowledge learned within the private 
sphere can contribute to more inclusive forms of care that do not construct difference as a 
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problem or an abnormality to be resolved through technical and assimilation programs. If 
negative perceptions and attitudes towards disability can be addressed and combated, then 
inclusion in a homogeneous society would not be far behind. As it stands at the moment, 
legislation alone without a societal shift in understanding about disability and disabled people 
will only go so far.  
Although legislation has laid the foundation for the fair and equitable treatment of people with 
disabilities, yet their unemployment rate remains far above that of people without disabilities. 
Schools, employers, agencies, and other entities may not be predisposed to provide equable 
treatment and equal access to individuals with disabilities. If people have negative attitudes 
toward people with disabilities, discrimination can result. Individuals‘ behaviours may be 
influenced more by attitudes and beliefs than by legal mandates. Attitude change is essential 
to creating a society and workforce of equal opportunity. Education and training programs at 
schools through citizenship lessons may be a simple, low cost method for changing beliefs 
and attaining equality. 
Recommendation of the Warnock report; Mainstream schools vs. Special schools for 
Disabled People 
Warnock 1978 identified three groups of children for whom provision in special schools is 
particularly likely to be needed in future. These are: 
(i) Children with severe or complex physical, sensory or intellectual disabilities who 
require special facilities, teaching methods or expertise that it would be impracticable 
to provide in ordinary schools; 
(ii) Children with severe emotional or behavioural disorders who have very great 
difficulty in forming relationships with others or whose behaviour is so extreme or 
unpredictable that it causes severe disruption in an ordinary school or inhibits the 
educational progress of other children; and 
(iii) Children with less severe disabilities, often in combination, who despite special 
help do not perform well in an ordinary school and are more likely to thrive in the 
more intimate communal and educational setting of a special school.788 
The report stats:  
The groups of children identified above provide a broad indication of those children 
who are likely to attend a special school, some of them on a residential basis, at 
least for a period of their school life. Some may need to attend a special school all 
their school life; others may, after a period in a special school, be able to pursue 
their education in an ordinary school. Special schools will thus have a continuing and 
important function in offering separate special educational provision for certain 
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groups of children with special needs. Further, we recommend that their facilities 
and expertise should be more widely available to provide intensive specialised help 
on a short-term basis and sometimes at short notice.789 
Although in the mid-1990s, the Salamanca Statement focused the majority of Western 
countries on the need to include students with special educational needs as the core agenda 
of broad-based educational innovation. Inclusion opponents decried the resource limitations 
of the general education classroom, arguing that specialized instruction and other services 
were best provided in separate settings where the specific amount and type of student deficit 
and disability could be matched to appropriate services.790  
Without one-to-one specialized instruction, opponents argued, disabled students would 
simply not learn and futures would be sacrificed. Debates over where students with disability 
should be educated grew, as more and more disabled students were in fact integrated into 
general education classrooms, to debates over time: should ‗all students‘ spend ‗all of their 
time‘ in general education classrooms? 791  Or is there a continuing need for separate 
environments for many students for at least part of their school day?  This argument was 
addressed by Baroness Warnock in her 2005 report.  
Warnock‟s 2005 Argument For Keeping Special Schools 
One of the proposed hallmarks of inclusion is that children with SEN are educated along with 
their peers in mainstream classrooms. However, Warnock points out, ‗Inclusion is not a 
matter of where you are geographically, but where you feel you belong.‘792 Many children 
with SEN are more comfortable with peers who have similar disabilities and interests to 
themselves, rather than peers of the same chronological age. So for these children a sense 
of belonging, and therefore being included in a learning community, is more likely to result 
from placement in a special class or special school than a mainstream classroom. 
As Warnock puts it, ‗What is a manifest good in society, and what it is my right to have... 
may not be what is best for me as a schoolchild.‘ 793 
Warnock here reflects a critical confusion, which concerns the rights of children with SEN. A 
typical argument put forward in favor of full inclusion is that it is a basic human right of all 
children to be educated along with their mainstream peers. To segregate children for any 
reason is considered by many inclusionists to be a denial of their human rights.  
Warnock here assumes two main issues. First she differentiates between human rights and 
moral rights. She argues that just because someone has a human right to a certain option 
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doesn‘t necessarily mean that it is morally the right thing for them to do. Thus, although their 
human rights allow children with SEN to be educated alongside their mainstream peers, for 
some of them this may not, morally, be the right or best option.  
Secondly she states: ‗It is their right to learn that we must defend, not their right to learn in 
the same environment as everyone else.‘794 Which is a second aspect of the rights confusion 
and concerns priorities. According to Warnock as well as their right to be included, children 
also have a right to an appropriate education suited to their needs—that is, the right to an 
appropriate education which meets children‘s specific needs which is more important than 
the right to be educated alongside their mainstream peers. Therefore, it cannot be morally 
right to include all children in mainstream schools if this means that some of them will not be 
able to receive the education most appropriate for their needs.  
In recent years there has been increasing emphasis on academic achievement as the 
primary goal of education in the UK. The government has focused their attention on the 
improvement of academic standards by various means including the establishment of 
national curricula and national assessment regimes. This has deflected attention away from 
the broader goals of education, such as those concerned with the development of life and 
social skills. All children in mainstream schools are driven by the need to achieve high 
academic standards results. These goals of education for many children are inappropriate. 
This confusion applies to all children including children with SEN.  Because an important 
confusion that impacts on the issue of inclusion concerns the goals of education.795 The 
major goal of education for many children including those with SEN must then be to produce 
happy, well-adjusted and productive citizens. As stated in the Salamanca Statement on 
Special Needs Education: ‗Schools should assist them to become economically active and 
provide them with the skills needed in everyday life, offering training in skills which respond 
to the social and communication demands and expectations of adult life.‘ 796 
 
Arguments Against Warnock‟s 2005 Position Regarding Special Schools 
Warnock‘s recent argument regarding education in England as reflected in her statement 
has medical connotations and major limitations. The medical and social model resulted in 
education policy that had significant  shortcomings in relation to equality for disabled children, 
and the models of disability that underpin the Warnock Report need to be rethought. Both 
the medical and social models of disability have limits to the achievement of equal 
citizenship for disabled people, and that inclusive education is about a positive definition of 
difference. It asks for a celebration instead of a medicalization perpetuated by the 
oppressive ideology of normality. Defining difference on the basis on which to establish 
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equal entitlements for all groups in society is a mater of human rights. This is evidenced 
empirically by the fact that post the Warnock Report disabled students continue to 
experience disproportionately high rates of segregation in special schools. The problem is 
heightened in the most socially marginalized among disabled people—those with intellectual 
and complex disabilities.  
Special schools have their own shortcomings and have been criticised for restricting 
disabled students‘ options in other ways. Disabled young people who attend the same 
school from their early infancy to early adulthood are being denied the experiences 
considered essential for the transition from childhood to adulthood, and thus shielded from 
the realities of society.797 This will only serve to reinforce the commonly held conception that 
individuals with impairments are eternal children. Dr John Mary and the British Council of 
Organisations of Disabled People believed that the special education system is one of the 
main channels for disseminating able-bodied minded perceptions of the world and ensuring 
that disabled school leavers are socially isolated.798  
This isolation results in disabled people passively accepting social discrimination, lacking the 
skills necessary to pursue the tasks of adulthood successfully, and not understanding about 
the main social issues of our time. As well as reinforcing the myth that disabled people are 
‗eternal children,‘ segregated education ensures disabled school leavers lack the skills for 
overcoming the myth.799 This is supported by Jenkinson and Fuchs and Fuchs, who believe 
that the lack of appropriate behavioral role models, the lack of feedback from non-disabled 
peers, and the removal from the common culture of childhood and adolescence, contributes 
to later isolation in the community.800 801 
Mulderij agrees that the experiences of mainstream situations are essential during school 
years if disabled children are to develop the skills required to be successful in adult society. 
Furthermore, disabled young people need to be in an environment where their career 
aspirations are fed, and not suppressed by a system that lacks encouragement and flexibility, 
or a system that makes them feel they do not fully belong.802 
A further major criticism of special schools is of their isolated curricula which focus 
disproportionately on specific educational needs, and prevent students from learning the 
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wide range of subjects that are offered in mainstream schools and are perceived to be 
important to successful economic participation. Furthermore, Jenkinson offers the opinion 
that the small number of staff in special schools, coupled with their significantly limited, if not 
deficient, curricular expertise, undeniably serves to restrict the range and content of the 
curriculum.803 
The above are ethical, social and educational arguments for and against inclusive education, 
although not by disabled young people themselves. This study highlights disabled students‘ 
experiences and opinions of special and mainstream education, therefore bringing their 
perspective to the segregation versus inclusion debate.  
A 1997 comparative study by the OECD‘s Centre for Educational Research and Innovation 
found that disabled students in the UK were significantly under-represented in science and 
teacher training courses.804  This is often related to a number of factors connected with 
disability and how society reacts to it. Some young people are not able to access all school 
resources, and may have to forego certain activities and classes. Burgess maintained that 
despite the ongoing policy drive towards inclusion, mainstream schools are not fully 
accessible, as those responsible for developing inclusion still think of accessibility in terms of 
ramps and rails. In her study of disabled secondary school students throughout the UK, 
Burgess found that their curriculum choices were severely curtailed: 36 percent of young 
disabled people she talked to could not study subjects of their choice due to poor access to 
the curriculum and the disabling environment, including attitudes of teachers.805 
It can be argued, that as long as mainstream schools do not embrace the full process of 
inclusion, young disabled people still may have no real choice in deciding where to continue 
their education or what to do after school. According to a survey commissioned by the DRC 
(2002–2003) on the aspirations of young disabled people, 24 percent of disabled people 
aged 16–24 have no qualifications compared with 13 percent of non-disabled people of the 
same age, bringing exclusion throughout their lifetime. As early as 16 years of age, disabled 
young people are twice as likely to be out of work, education or training as their non-disabled 
peers (15 percent compared with 7 percent). 
Evidence suggests that young disabled people feel they receive insufficient support in school 
and are discouraged from taking standard educational qualifications required for university 
entrance.806 Too often, disabled students in secondary schools are taught almost entirely by 
teaching assistants, not fully qualified teachers, while non-disabled students are taught by 
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the teacher.807 According to MacBeath et al, there is also a tendency for teaching assistants 
to isolate ‗their‘ child from group learning situations. This means there could be very little 
interaction between the teaching staff and the disabled students, again reinforcing the 
disabled/non-disabled divide. Further, disabled students may not receive the same standard 
of tuition as their non-disabled peers.808 
Should Special Education be Reconsidered?  
Barnes has argued that inclusion is imperative in the fight towards the elimination of 
discrimination and towards disabled people being accepted as citizens by the social 
majority.809 Cooperative learning can promote greater interpersonal attractions between the 
disabled and their non-disabled peers, and more positive interactions, with social benefits 
extending beyond the classroom and becoming long-term.810 Being educated in an inclusive 
environment is positively correlated with the successful transition of individuals with 
disabilities into employment and wider society.811 Further inclusive education can (for some 
people) facilitate the establishment of social relationships between disabled and non-
disabled peers, as awareness and understanding of disability is said to engender an 
increasing acceptance of it.812 Moreover, it presents disabled people with a training equal to 
that of their non-disabled counterparts and, therefore, with qualifications to compete with 
them in mainstream economic society. There is general agreement that the experiences of 
disabled children in the UK have changed rapidly as a direct result of social transformation in 
the past two decades.813  
 
Historically, disabled children were perceived as unnatural and undesirable. This justifies 
significant medical intervention, their abandonment into special institutions away from 
mainstream society, or their death. However, since the emergence of the disability 
movement and the social model perspective, the disadvantage encountered by disabled 
children has increasingly been seen as the result of social structures failing to include them, 
rather than as the result of their impairment. These political claims, coupled with human 
rights discourse, have played a considerable part in the government‘s recent commitment to 
promote and accommodate human diversity in education and general society.814 
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Integration for the disabled has many connotations. It means the absence of 
segregation, social acceptance, and being able to be treated like everybody else; the 
fight to contribute materially to the community, to have the usual choices of 
association, movement and activity, to be educated up to university level with one‘s 
unhandicapped peers, and to travel without restriction on public transport.815 
 
The rights of the ‗handicapped‘ person to the same education as their peers was a central 
theme of the Warnock Report. Yet, integration, it was warned, had to be ‗compatible with the 
Interests of other children in the class.‘816  This suggested that the rights of pupils with 
special educational needs to integration were capable of being removed just as readily as 
they had been granted.  
 
The education of disabled people, for most of this century, appeared to serve mainly social 
and economic interests, by striving for independence (reducing the obligations of the state) 
for as many as possible. Warnock's principle of education for all was founded principally on 
humanitarian concerns of equality and rights. These rights ushered into the general 
population a group of pupils who would have been confined to hospitals and pronounced 
unworthy or incapable of being educated a process which affirmed their ‗non-being.‘ Yet, 
these new rights were fragile, capable of being removed if they infringed those of the general 
population.  
 
Priestley found that for some young disabled people, the physical proximity of the helper 
could work against social processes of acceptance among other children in the class.817 
Consistent with this, Allan suggests that all aspects of the child‘s interpersonal relationships 
can be brought under the vigilance of the staff, as disabled children are more 
comprehensively observed than their nondisabled peers. 818 This promotes a divide between 
young disabled people and their nondisabled peers. Further, the former, who are the 
minority in mainstream schools, are perceived as ‗different‘ and therefore a legitimate target 
for bullying.819 
A number of arguments have been used by policy makers, professionals and parents to 
argue that segregated special schools are the best option for some disabled students, with 
their supportive barrier-free environment and specialist resources and support to meet the 
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students‘ needs. They criticise mainstream schools for failing to adequately prepare for a 
disabled child‘s care, educational and social needs.820 
The New Labour Government‟s Response to the Dilemma of Special Education 
The Third Report of the Committee of Education and Skills was set up to review these 
concerns. Having received over 230 written submissions, taken evidence from over forty 
witnesses in oral evidence, made visits to schools, and having considered the recent 
Warnock report, as well as Ofsted and Audit Commission reports, it was clear that there are 
significant problems with the current system of SEN provision and high levels of 
dissatisfaction amongst parents and teachers. In their written memorandum Ofsted have 
said that ‗SEN is becoming more of a confusing and litigious area than ever before.‘821 In oral 
evidence the Kids First Group, a parent-representative organisation, described a situation 
where: ‗too many of our special needs children are severely let down.‘822 
In its submission to this inquiry the DfES recognised that ‗the current system is not working 
perfectly.‘823 Lord Adonis, then Under Secretary of State for Schools and the Minister with 
responsibility for SEN, told this Committee that: ‗I would be the last person to claim that all is 
well in the system.‘824 
The DfES went on to say in their memorandum that ‗for the great majority of families the 
system is operating effectively to meet their children's needs.‘825 This does not, however, 
take away from the significant difficulties faced by a large number of parents for whom the 
system is failing to meet the needs of their children causing frustration and conflict.  
In her 2006 submission of evidence to the House of Commons Committee on Education and 
Skills minutes of evidence, Baroness Warnock said that a radical review of SEN policy is 
needed. In their submission the DfES said that ‗It (The Government) does not believe that a 
major review of policy on SEN would be appropriate at present ...what is needed now is 
change on the ground. Any new review would simply delay progress in making this 
happen.‘826  
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Lord Adonis told this Committee that ‗the case for a wholesale replacement of the local 
authority system and statementing does not appear to us to have been made 
convincingly.‘827 The Minister went on to say that: ‗Ofsted has been critical of the SEN in the 
past, but … we know the challenges, we know what works, we know the conditions that 
make things work and we know what does not work. Ofsted's view would be: ―Let us focus 
on those things and change them.‖‘828 
In their memorandum to this inquiry, the DfES argued that it is precisely because of the 
Ofsted and Audit Commission reports that the issues are known and, therefore, a major 
review of SEN policy is not needed. The Audit Commission has, however, specifically called 
for a review of policy on the issue of statements. It published a briefing entitled Statutory 
Assessment and Statements of SEN: In Need of Review in June 2002 which highlighted 
claims the following issues: demand for statements was rising; statutory assessment was 
costly and bureaucratic, stressful for parents and added little value in meeting a child's 
needs; and that statements were leading to an inequitable distribution of resources, and 
failed to support early intervention and inclusive practice.829 
Despite the Audit Commission specifically calling for a review of the statementing process in 
2002, it is only now, ten years on, that the Government has acknowledged the need to 
review the statementing process.  
At the time when asked about SEN policy during Prime Minister‘ Questions on 2 November 
2005, however, the former Prime Minister Tony Blair said ‗I accept there is room for 
improvement and we are keeping SEN provision under review.‘ 830  Along with the DfES 
innovations unit, Lord Adonis held a private ministerial seminar on ‗Next Practice in SEN‘ in 
November 2005 which involved a wide ranging discussion with experts—particularly on 
proposals surrounding ‗third way provision‘ on which a paper was provided.831 
Furthermore, the Treasury was undertaking a ‗root and branch‘ review of funding for children 
with complex needs. David Singleton of Children Now reported that  
the DfES has identified this area as the one in which it would most like funding to be 
increased in the next spending review [...] The Treasury will now begin a process 
called ―zero-base budgeting‖, in which it calculates the amount of funding required 
from a base level of zero (or from first principles). This could lead to a significant 
increase in the level of funding directed towards children with complex needs—an 
area that includes looked-after children, children with special educational needs and 
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those with severe disabilities.832 
The DfES told the Committee that this is a joint review with the Treasury and will report 
through the Comprehensive Spending Review either in November 2006 or March 2007. 
Ofsted did not believe a major review of SEN was necessary, but Eileen Visser, Area 
Division Manager, Ofsted, did say to the Committee that: 
Some aspects of the structural provision need more than a tweak. They do need us 
to sit down together, across the political dimension, the inspection dimension and 
the professional field, and say, ―What is it that we need to do?833  
 
Whilst the then Government said it did not wish to undertake a major public review of its 
policy on SEN, it did seem to be reconsidering its policy in private. In addition, the fact that 
the DfES has identified SEN as the area it would most like significant additional funding for 
was an encouraging sign of progress. The Minister said that the Government: 
would look very carefully at anything you recommended to us in this area or other 
areas.‖ The Committee believes this is a critical time to be publishing the results of 
the inquiry. We would urge the Government to give most careful thought to our 
recommendations and consider a completely fresh look at SEN. We look forward to 
constructive and vital progress for children with SEN and disabilities.834  
 
Although one cannot deny the positive change in education polices for the disabled since the 
1944 Education Act there continue to be problems. It seems that the New Labour 
government started to recognize this but no real change followed.835 Indeed real change 
cannot happen if new policy and practice do not reflect new models and ideas. In the next 
chapter it is argued that the UN CRPD offers a positive way forward for the education of the 
disabled.  
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Chapter Seven 
Models of Citizenship as Expressed in The Warnock Report 
A Case Study 
 
This chapter takes the Warnock Report on ‗special education‘ and the resulting legislation as 
a case study and examines how models of citizenship and human rights prior to 2006 have 
flaws which are expressed in the twin goals of the Warnock Report. These flaws failed 
disabled people in education both in theory and practice.  
This chapter offers an alternative rights-based discourse. The experiences of the disabled 
people‘s movement suggest that an ‗educational rights‘ discourse could enhance the 
provision and practice of education for the disabled and non-disabled alike creating an 
inclusive structure of education. 
 
The models of citizenship and UN human rights prior to 2006 examined in the previous 
chapters of this thesis all aim to respect difference while promoting forms of equality. But 
they did not achieve this aim. This chapter analyses how the failure of the models of 
citizenship is reflected and expressed in education policies for the disabled and it is 
proposed here that the CRPD could perhaps provide the necessary scope and content from 
which to derive a blue- print that will secure their rights in future. 
 
The Chairman of the negotiating Committee has conceptualised the CRPD as ‗an 
implementation convention‘; one that ‗sets out a detailed code for how existing rights should 
be put into practice‘ with respect to persons with disability.836 The CRPD does not create any 
new rights or entitlements, rather it expresses existing rights in a manner that addresses the 
needs and situations of persons with CPRD disabilities.‘837  
 
Inclusive Education as Reflected in the Warnock Report 1978 
In endorsing the principle that handicapped and non-handicapped children should be 
educated in a common setting so far as possible, the Warnock Committee proposed three 
progressive stages of integration: locational, social and functional integration. The least 
ambitious, ‗locational‘ integration meant that handicapped and non-handicapped pupils 
shared the same site. ‗Functional‘ integration was seen as the ultimate aim, where they 
shared the same curriculum. The mainstream classroom was to become the main site where 
                                                             
836 UN Press Releases,‗Chairman says draft convention sets out ‗detailed code of implementation and spells out 
how individual rights should be put into practice‘, 15 August 2005, SOC/4680, available at: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/soc4680.doc.htm 
837Frequently Asked Questions regarding the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, available at: 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid1⁄422&pid1⁄4151#qg 
 
 
 233 
mainstream and learning support specialists tackled learning difficulties. This required them 
to develop a completely new professional relationship and the report elucidated these 
demands. The report, then, seeks to reconstruct the child with SEN within more positive 
discourses.  
 
 Deep-seated difficulties deriving from the structure and vocabulary of the language 
employed in teaching, or of a conceptual nature, require to be dealt with in the class 
or subject context in which they arise. Class and subject teachers cannot escape 
their responsibility for dealing with them.838  
 
Warnock addresses issues in a cleansing tone of elimination and abolishment, and asserts 
the Committee‘s intention to establish a new way of speaking. The report shifts the locus of 
the difficulty away from the child and alters the space in which this identification takes place. 
The child, in this new way of speaking, is constructed as a victim, no longer just of 
biologically determined circumstances, but of the ineptitudes of teachers and other external 
perpetrators.  
 
Reflecting on how the identities and experiences of disabled people have been constructed, 
it appears that the Warnock report represents a disjuncture. They appear more libertarian 
than past economic discourses which dehumanised individuals, by classifying them 
according to their potential to function independently and earn a living. The report issues the 
imperative to abandon categorisation in the 1944 Education Act and labelling, yet seem 
effectively to have shifted the labels and the space in which this naming takes place. In other 
words, the system of differentiation, which ‗constitutes individuals as effect, and object of 
power, as effect and object of knowledge‘ has simply been relocated. 839   
 
Implication for Citizenship for Disabled people as expressed in The 1981 Education 
Act and Warnock Report 1978 
In November 1973 the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, then Secretary of State for Education 
and Science, announced that she proposed, in conjunction with the then Secretaries of State 
for Scotland and Wales and after consultation with the then Secretaries of State for Social 
Services and Employment, to appoint a Committee with the following terms of reference: 
To review educational provision in England, Scotland and Wales for children and 
young people handicapped by disabilities of body or mind, taking account of the 
medical aspects of their needs, together with arrangements to prepare them for 
entry into employment; to consider the most effective use of resources for these 
purposes; and to make recommendations.840  
This section is about the twin goals of the implementation of the Warnock report 
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recommendations through the 1981 Education Act. There is an assumption about citizenship 
in the recommendations of the report and the implementation of the Act that is consistent 
with the British government‘s definition of citizenship, which has at various points, promoted 
different definitions of the term ‗citizen.‘841  
The revision of education in England and the objectives of the Warnock Report can be seen 
as part of the government‘s identification of what are perceived to be the social, economic 
and/or political problems of the day.  The term ‗citizen‘ has been used in the promotion of 
policies as solutions to these problems. Reflected in the above quote the Warnock report 
required education for the disabled where they could be autonomous, participate in the wider 
community and to contribute to his/her community via employment. 
The Warnock Report and Problems with Linking the Twin Goals of Disability 
Education to Autonomy, Participation and Contribution  
Sometimes policies have involved the rights of individuals but more often, and more recently, 
it is individuals‘ behavior that has been the focus in terms of both problems and solutions. It 
is also the tradition of communitarianism that has clearly influenced government policy on 
citizenship. Communitarianism emphasizes that cultural solidarity amongst individuals 
creates communities and social stability and that it is this community identity that is the basis 
of citizenship.842 
Here I examine two contradictory statements from the 1978 Warnock report. The first is 
perhaps the most direct quote on equal citizenship expressed in the Warnock report: 
There is in our society a vast range of differently disabled children, many of whom 
would not have survived infancy in other periods of history. In the case of the most 
profoundly disabled one is bound to face the questions: Why educate such children 
at all? Are they not ineducable? How can one justify such effort and such expense 
for so small a result? Such questions have to be faced, and must be answered. Our 
answer is that education, as we conceive it, is a good, and a specifically human 
good, to which all human beings are entitled. There exists, therefore, a clear 
obligation to educate the most severely disabled for no other reason than that they 
are human.843 
The second statement sets out two twin goals for education:  
We hold that education has certain long-term goals, that it has a general point or 
purpose, which can be definitely, though generally, stated. The goals are twofold, 
different from each other, but by no means incompatible. They are, first, to enlarge a 
child‘s knowledge, experience and imaginative understanding, and thus his 
awareness of moral values and capacity for enjoyment; and secondly, to enable him 
to enter the world after formal education is over as an active participant in society 
and a responsible contributor to it, capable of achieving as much independence as 
possible.  
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The educational needs of every child are determined in relation to these goals. We 
are fully aware that for some children the first of these goals can be approached only 
by minute, though for them highly significant steps, while the second may never be 
achieved. But this does not entail that for these children the goals are different. The 
purpose of education for all children is the same; the goals are the same. But the 
help that individual children need in progressing towards them will be different. 
Whereas for some the road they have to travel towards the goals is smooth and 
easy, for others it is fraught with obstacles.  For some the obstacles are so daunting 
that, even with the greatest possible help, they will not get very far. Nevertheless, for 
them too, progress will be possible, and their educational needs will be fulfilled, as 
they gradually overcome one obstacle after another on the way. The criterion by 
which to judge the quality of educational provision is the extent to which it leads a 
pupil towards the twin goals which we have described, towards understanding, 
awareness of moral values and enjoyment and towards the possibility of 
independence.844 
While the Warnock report‘s march towards inclusive education is clear in the first statement, 
in the second statement the twin goals expressed by Warnock are problematic for disabled 
people. In the first statement Warnock asserts disabled people‘s rights to freedom and 
autonomy while at the same time identifying the action required to achieve it. As a result the 
rights-based approach, which has been seen as necessary by Warnock not only for pupils 
‗with special educational needs‘ but for all children, and the report stresses the value and 
strengths of all learners and is key to constructing an inclusive educational environment.  
 
However, the concept or SEN in the second statement retains the assumption that people 
who are not able to function in this way are somehow ‗less than human‘ if unable to attain 
the twin goals. They shift the focus onto an individual child‘s perceived deficits: the emphasis 
is on the inadequacy of the individual who is different, who is at fault, and, most importantly, 
who must change. In spite of Warnock‘s professed commitment to equality, the twin goals 
demonstrate how she is wedded to a liberal citizenship discourse—a discourse which (as 
has been shown in Chapter Three) excludes disabled people from full citizenship. 
Experience leads us to consider what the impact of the adoption of a rights-based discourse 
that excludes disable people might have on education. Autonomy, freedom and 
independence are about making decisions for yourself. For example, in making the case for 
people with learning disabilities‘ rights to citizenship, Simon Duffy states, ―Put simply, if you 
have autonomy then this means you are in charge of your own life. If you do not have 
autonomy then other people are in charge of you‖845. To illustrate lets refer back to John 
Locke‘s analysis, which offers a key to the puzzle of the concept of person through his 
analysis of personal identity.  
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Locke, incorrectly I believe, insisted on viewing personhood as a matter of possessing 
certain capacities, and not of membership in a particular species. In other words, we 
consider human beings to be persons because of their capacity for self-consciousness and 
development of a concept of right and wrong, rather than because they possess a body of a 
particular form or genetic composition. This characterization makes it clear that Locke‘s 
concept of a person (also expressed by Warnock‘s second statement) is not by merely 
existing, since it states that ‗personhood consists of the complex activities (or capacities to 
engage in them) such as thinking, reasoning, feeling, which makes humans different from, or 
superior to, animals or things‘. 846 
 
Thus when we move from the question of what makes a person to the question of what 
makes a person at time x the same person at time xx, Locke finds unpersuasive the answer 
that it is the possession of the same human body. It is, Locke maintains, not the same body, 
but the same continuing consciousness, which constitutes the criterion for the identity of 
persons. When used in this sense, consciousness denotes more than simply the sensate 
awareness of one‘s surroundings that all animals have to one degree or another. In order for 
there to be a sameness to consciousness, it must be of a higher order, i.e., self-
consciousness. On Locke‘s account, some human beings have irretrievably lost or will never 
have the capacity for personhood at any given moment, or for personal identity over time. 
Obvious cases would be some mental health patients, learning disabled people or people 
being in a persistent vegetative state. If the brains of such people will never develop, or have 
if they have suffered sufficient trauma or degeneration so as to preclude self-consciousness 
and rationality.  
 
Thus these categories of people are permanently unconscious because they have no 
functioning higher brain and will thus never have a capacity for personhood. If this is true, 
then many disabled people never stood a chance at full citizenship, and if persons had 
irretrievably lost their capacity for personhood then their citizenship status is irretrievably lost 
as well. Furthermore, when Locke turns to the possibility of innate ideas in the much earlier 
Essays on the Law of Nature, he similarly sets up a dualistic divide between the wise and 
the stupid:  
 
‗If this law of nature were written in our hearts, why do the foolish and insane have no 
knowledge of it, since the law is said to be stamped immediately on the soul itself and this 
depends very little upon the constitution and structure of the body‘s organs? Yet therein 
admittedly lays the only difference between the wise and the stupid.‘847 
 
In the first half of this quote, Locke regards the foolish and insane as both oblivious to the 
law of nature, but by the end, the latter have disappeared from Locke‘s analysis. Instead, 
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Locke only differentiates between the wise and the stupid, which suggests he only attributes 
bodily difference to the idiot, and not the insane. Locating idiocy in the body‘s organs is 
consequential for Locke because it signals permanent difference. This permanency is 
important and unique to the idiot. Unlike children who grow into adults or mad men who 
recover, idiocy is forever. Next in the chronology are idiots. 
 
In the Essay, Locke speculates into the ―great difference in men‘s intellects, whether it rises 
from any defect in the Organs of the Body particularly adapted to thinking; or in the dulness 
or intractableness of those faculties, for want of use.‖ Locke differentiates between the few 
who cannot think clearly because of bodily difference – such as idiots – and the dull who 
simply lack the desire to think. The permanency of bodily difference is important to Locke, 
not only because it separates the wise from the stupid and the defective from the dull, but 
because it draws the boundaries of human equality.  
 
According to Locke, idiots ―cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able 
to understand and make use of Language, or judge or reason to any tolerable degree.‖ Idiots, 
like brutes, possess minimal language, are unable to think abstractly, and rely primarily on 
their senses for information, comparable to brutes, or perhaps even less. Instead, their 
chronological position is primarily due to their outward shape as the body of the idiot is more 
human than beast. Yet, Locke delineates clearly between idiots and madmen.  
 
Thus the defect in Naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion, 
in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of Reason; whereas mad Men, on the 
other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme for they do not appear to me to have lost the 
faculty of reasoning: but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them 
for truths; […] In short, herein seems to lie the difference between Idiots and mad men, that 
mad Men put wrong Ideas together, and so make wrong Propositions, but argue and reason 
right from them: But Idiots make very few or no Propositions, and reason scarce at all.848 
 
This passage makes clear that idiots possess no capacity for reason, repeatedly evident in 
Locke‘s statement that idiots are ―deprived of reason‖ and ―reason scarce at all.‖ Mad men, 
however, are rendered very close to full personhood, as they have the ability to reason, but 
do so mistakenly.   
 
At the time formal education was not seen as appropriate for ‗defective children‘, and in large 
part they were consigned to special settings, asylums or mental institutions. Bodily difference 
is a recurrent theme throughout Locke‘s Essays on the Law of Nature and in his later Essay. 
In the Law of Nature, Locke distinguishes between the dull ―who make no use of the light of 
reason but prefer darkness‖ and those ―through natural defect the acumen of the mind is too 
dull to be able to bring to light those secret decrees of nature.‖ Locke‘s occupation with 
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bodily difference of the mind is not only categorical, but functions historically in the Essay in 
which he attempts to chronologically order the degrees of human and nonhuman 
understanding. His description of brutes, idiots, and madmen provides a ―true History of the 
first beginnings of Humane Knowledge‖ and functions as a powerful tool to both disprove 
innate ideas and normatively rank different kinds of species. 
 In the beginning of Locke‘s history of knowledge are nonhuman animals: ―Brutes come far 
short of men‖ because they cannot put simple ideas together and have no capability of 
composition. While brutes possess some minimal powers of reflection and perception, they 
are incapable of recognizing complex ideas and lack completely the faculty of abstraction. 
Although Locke‘s political exclusion of idiots is explicit, it somewhat undermines Locke‘s 
commitment to human equality. Drawing primarily on An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, I argue that Locke‘s concept and treatment of idiocy is central to his theory 
of knowledge, personhood and political equality.  
 
Locke repeatedly uses idiots to define and delimit the category of personhood in An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding. Personhood is essential to Locke‘s social contract: only 
persons can consent to be governed and consent transforms the state of nature into civil 
society.  
 
The idiot, incapable of consent, upturns the terms of the contract, undergoing an inverse 
metamorphosis from man to subhuman species, and thus, undermines the universal terms 
of the contract. Because Locke‘s theory of personhood is foundational to the development of 
liberal political thought, his exclusion of idiocy threatens liberal egalitarianism more broadly.  
 
The idiot figure, so often conjured by Locke, functions like a distorted mirror image: devoid of 
reason and reflection, the idiot face looks out at the citizen, and in turn, exaggerates the 
citizen‘s rational capacity. The citizen‘s gaze does not center on the idiot alone, but is cast 
upon a collection of marginalized subjects, including the lunatic, savage, criminal and child. 
Idiocy is distinct, however, because it signifies the complete and permanent absence of 
thought. Locke‘s treatment of idiocy, by creating a subhuman population permanently denied 
entry into the public political sphere, thus justifies within liberalism a method to promote and 
conceal abuse.  
 
Locke‘s exclusion of idiots is indispensable to his theory of personhood, and yet, detracts 
from Locke‘s commitment to human equality. The fact that liberalism‘s best theory of equality, 
as reflected in the Warnock Report fails to encompass all human beings in the same 
education should be a problem for egalitarians. 
 
Problems with Autonomy in Citizenship as reflected in the Warnock Report and the 
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Subsequent Education Act 1981 
Disabled people concern with freedom echoes the concept of autonomy within the literature 
on citizenship. Autonomy refers to ‗the ability to determine the conditions of one‘s life and to 
pursue one‘s life projects.‘ 849 If the Warnock Report regards autonomy and participation as 
its twin goals then this is problematic for disabled people. The concept of autonomy or 
freedom is to the fore in the neo-liberal perspective on citizenship. An autonomous citizen is 
an individual who is empowered by the availability and exercising of choice.  
The analyses of the Warnock Report could see the focus on autonomy and participation and 
the citizen as consumer as belonging within the neo- liberal, which sits alongside a civic 
republican and communitarian concepts of citizenship. Moreover, public services are seen 
as essential to tackling inequality and, in this respect, there is recognition ‗that people do not 
start off with equal chances in life, so it is essential that specific support is provided for those 
who are particularly disadvantaged.‘ 850  The government‘s promotion of choice and 
consumerism is, to a large extent, about models of service delivery and the key question is 
whether the market is the most effective delivery mechanism and whether the private and 
voluntary sectors should play a bigger role in providing publicly funded services. However, 
the issue for disabled people is not only about service delivery mechanisms but also about 
whether levels of resources are sufficient to deliver autonomy. 
For example, the Warnock Report and the subsequent Education Act 1981 had the 
necessary guidelines for the inclusion of disabled children in education without the resources 
for implementation. But have not delivered the choice that they were intended to because of 
their limited value. This is reflected in a statement during the period of the implementation of 
the Warnock Report, where it was clear where the Government‘s funding priorities lay in 
terms of policies of integration: 
In present economic circumstances there is no possibility of funding the massive 
educational resources ... which would be required to enable every ordinary school to 
provide an adequate education for children with serious educational differences. 851  
The confusion the 1978 Warnock Report‘s recommendation for funding for inclusive 
education created is also evident here: 
… the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure — will obviously have different 
applications at different times according to the state of national prosperity and the 
ordering of priorities. If resources were unlimited it would theoretically be possible for 
all schools to be enabled to cater for all children in the catchment area, whatever 
their special needs might be. In practice resources have to be deployed with 
economy insofar as this is consistent with good standards. Moreover, public 
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spending on education cannot be determined independently of other public sector 
needs.  
The provision of special facilities of a comparable standard to those in the best 
existing special schools will involve a very considerable amount of public 
expenditure and whether or not such expenditure is justifiable will be a matter of 
judgement by those responsible for the allocation and management of public 
resources. Moreover, the costs involved will have different implications depending 
on, for example, whether a particular area is sparsely or densely populated, rural or 
urban. At some stage it maybe desirable to develop guidelines of reasonable cost in 
relation to different forms of special provision.852 
But then she points out:  
However, it would be short-sighted to judge a particular proposal solely on an 
immediate cost-efficiency basis. Section 10 of the 1976 Education Act refers to local 
education authorities‘ arrangements as a whole, and this implies a general plan or 
scheme of future provision into which the separate proposals fit. We have urged that 
local education authorities should prepare such a plan. The cost of each proposal 
should therefore also be looked at in terms of its contribution to the general plan, 
since it might well facilitate the later introduction of other components of the plan, 
with compensating savings at the later stage.853 
Therefore, an assessment according to Warnock which combines professional expertise with 
the disabled individual‘s knowledge and experience can, if the resources are available, result 
in the provision of the education recommended in the report—for example speech and 
language therapy, physiotherapy, ramps, hearing aids etc., that would empower the person 
to exercise more control over their life through better access to education. This is not the 
case in practice as too often resources are not provided at a level sufficient to deliver full 
choice and control, and the assistance, people, need and the support required is not always 
available. Giving people only ‗choice‘ is therefore not sufficient to enable disabled people to 
exercise autonomy choice has to be backed up by sufficient resources. 
While the government‘s promotion of education as a choice for the ‗citizen consumer‘ it is set 
in the context of (and to some degree in conflict with) the civic republican and communitarian 
agenda, a consumerist approach to public services is more unequivocally part of the liberal 
tradition of citizenship.  
It is argued that the education of disabled children is part of this tradition and that enabling 
disabled people to become consumers (by giving them choice and control through their 
education promotes the notion of citizens as ‗atomized individuals‘. In fact, in education 
settings this is the reverse. Disabled people in education depend on the support of disabled 
people‘s need for specific extra support in school. Moreover, the extra support is itself part of 
collective provision and redistribution of resources in order to address inequality and 
promote social justice. They are the result of positive action by the state. 
In fact, the liberal political tradition of citizenship, poses considerable problems for disabled 
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people. As it defines freedom and autonomy as the absence of coercion of or interference 
with individual action, and the state‘s role is the limited one of protecting such freedom.854
 
However, the issue for disabled people is that such negative rights are not sufficient to 
deliver even simple autonomy. Impairment and disabling barriers impose limits on freedom 
of action and positive action is therefore required to deliver opportunities for autonomy. 
A minimal role for the state—as envisaged within the liberal tradition of citizenship—means 
that any additional assistance and resources that disabled people require in education could 
only be provided voluntarily or privately. Traditionally that has been the role of charitable 
organizations. Yet the ideologies and values that underpin charitable activity in Britain treat 
impairment as personal tragedy and disabled people as ‗dependent people‘ who need 
looking after. Within the Christian concept of disabled people are to be the subjects of good 
deeds and have no contribution to make themselves. None of this is compatible with the 
concept of autonomy for disabled people. A minimal role for the state also means that it 
would be left up to individuals as to whether they changed their attitudes towards impairment 
and mental illness. 
For disabled people therefore, autonomy cannot be achieved without social rights. However, 
neither can it be achieved if we are merely passive recipients of social rights. For disabled 
people, the extension of social rights in the post-Second World War period was very limited 
and resources were used in ways which restricted their autonomy, namely by incarcerating 
people in various forms of institutional provision. Unless disabled people are key participants 
in the evolution of social rights it is unlikely that they will achieve autonomy. 
Problems with TH Marshall‟s Limitations for Inclusive Citizenship 
Another way of looking at the limits of citizenship for disabled people in education is to take 
TH Marshall‘s postwar writings on citizenship as a starting point. Marshall maintained, 
‗Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who 
possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is 
endowed.‘855 
A common criticism of Marshall‘s model of citizenship is that he did not place sufficient 
emphasis on the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. Given the current political 
dominance of the civic republican and communitarian tradition of citizenship, it is probably 
not surprising that the aspirations for disabled people have been framed within a vision of 
citizenship as participation and contribution. While earlier debates about citizenship have 
tended to focus on rights (whether for individuals or for particular groups such as minority 
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ethnic groups), current debates have been much more concerned with obligations and 
responsibilities. These concerns arise, not only from the identification of problematic 
behavior within some communities, but also from the current political dominance of issues 
which juxtapose state and individual. Education policy debates are also informed by the 
liberal concept of the autonomous citizen, whose main requirement of the state is the 
protection of negative freedoms, thus allowing the exercise of individual choice and 
responsibility. 
Perhaps most importantly, it is Marshall‘s concept of social rights that is currently seen as 
more contentious than civil or political rights. 
Civil rights are relatively easy to enact since ‗there are few costs and great gains to be made 
by the average citizen‖ from the introduction of rights such as freedom of speech and 
impartial justice.‘856 Political rights may be resisted by vested interests but once universal 
suffrage is achieved they are taken for granted. It is social rights that are the hardest to 
enact, ‗since redistribution means that one person‘s benefits are another person‘s taxes.‘857 
For the same reason, they can be harder to defend. 
Faced with a situation where most theoretical and empirical discussions about citizenship fail 
to consider disabled people, and where human and civil rights have yet to be fully extended 
to this group, it is also clear while addressing the problems of education faced by disabled 
people, that we need to look more fundamentally at the whole question of citizenship and 
what it might mean for disabled people. 
In talking about social rights to citizenship, Marshall's own definition is an appropriate 
yardstick to consider whether disabled people can claim to be social citizens: 
By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage 
and to live the life of a civilised being, according to the standard prevailing in the 
society.858  
Hence there are a number of elements to Marshall‘s notion of social citizenship; notably the 
right not to be poor or live in fear of poverty, to use social facilities in the same way as 
everyone else and to have a standard of living or lifestyle compatible with current social 
expectations.  
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In none of these elements can it be argued that disabled people share the rights to social 
citizenship. In terms of poverty, the Government's own figures show over four million 
disabled people being reliant on social security benefits and hence living below the official 
poverty line.859 Further it has been suggested that these figures substantially underestimate 
the nature and extent of poverty amongst disabled people.860 Hence, when freedom from the 
fear of poverty is considered to be an element of social citizenship, then very few disabled 
people would be in this position.  
On top of this, social rights to use the same facilities as everyone else are not accorded to 
disabled people, whether these are rights to the same education, to move around the built 
environment, to travel on various transport systems which claim to be public or to have 
access to employment. Finally, in many areas of their lives, disabled peoples‘ experiences 
do not accord with the lifestyle expectations of their contemporaries. For example, many 
disabled adults do not have the right to decide what time to get up or go to bed, or indeed 
who to go to bed with, when or what to eat, how often to bath or even be in control of the 
times when they empty their bladders or open their bowels.  
For Marshall, civil rights went beyond a narrow conception of legal rights and included not 
only property rights and the right of contract but also rights to the freedoms of thought and 
speech, religious practice, and of assembly and association. In theory, disabled people are 
accorded these basic civil rights although in things like the right to the same education or the 
right of contract, they may experience severe difficulties: for example, in attending the same 
schools as non disabled people, in buying goods on hire purchase, taking out a mortgage or 
obtaining life insurance.  
Problems with a Civic Republican Notion of Citizenship as reflected in the Warnock 
Report 
Perhaps the most glaring indictment of the Warnock Committee‘s position with regard to 
SEN and the role of disabled people within the community can be found in its discussion of 
what it terms ‗significant living without work‘: 
The problem of how to accept life without employment and how to prepare for it, 
faces people with a variety of disabilities, including those who are of the highest 
intelligence but very severely handicapped. We believe that the secret of significant 
living without work may lie in handicapped people doing far more to support each 
other, and also in giving support to people who are lonely and vulnerable.861 
Although the Committee acknowledged the economic, social and psychological significance 
of paid employment for individuals within our society, it is suggested that it had accepted 
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unequivocally the orthodox view that disabled people would be excluded from the workplace. 
This has salient implications for the perpetuation of this myth. The most obvious of these is 
that professionals, themselves in secure employment, will determine when a child is young 
that s/he is unsuitable for paid work. The child‘s subsequent education will be organised 
accordingly. This results in a self-fulfilling prophecy, producing a ‗downward spiral‘ in 
professionals‘ expectations about the child‘s potential for achievement. It is not surprising 
therefore that since the 1980s there has been a proliferation of life and leisure skills teaching 
for children and students with SEN throughout the education system. 
This view also reflects the civic understanding of citizenship, where constructs connected to 
the states‘ obligations to individuals based on international law (for example, protection of 
human rights and non-discrimination), and a de-coupling of the state from nation-building. In 
civil society many loyalties and affiliations are tolerated or encouraged (including family, 
cultural and religious denominations), but difference appears through individual rather than 
through group rights.862  Through education such states seek to maximize individuals‘ 863 
future choices without prejudicing children towards any conceptions of a good life.864 At the 
same time, it recognises the impracticability of neutrality in education and seeks to prepare 
its citizens for membership in a society committed to a ‗conscious social reproduction‘ by 
collective decision-making, which includes the question of what values to promote through 
education. 
This civic conception of education adopts Rawls‘ conception of citizenship in a constitutional 
democracy, which regards its citizens as free and equal. According to Rawls two layers of 
citizens‘ identity can be distinguished: a political identity based on the rights and duties of 
sustaining fair social cooperation over time, and citizens‘ ‗deeper aims and commitments‘—
their non-institutional, moral identity.865 Citizens must adjust and reconcile these two aspects 
of their identity in order to affirm the values of justice and see them embodied in political 
institutions. The main purpose of education is preparation for citizenship where 
governmental control can be considered legitimate when it refers to their political identity.  
Education‘s task then is to prepare citizens to take on their fair share of the responsibility for 
maintaining equal rights, the principles of justice, and equality of opportunity. Children need 
to become cooperating members of society, ready to ‗propose fair terms of cooperation it is 
reasonable to expect others to endorse‘, and be ‗willing to abide by these terms provided 
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others can be relied on to do likewise.‘866 
Further Problems with the Civic Republican Model Reflected in the Warnock Report 
and Subsequent 1981 Education Act 
While the demedicalisation of the labeling of disabled individuals within the educational 
context must be viewed positively, it represents little more than a cosmetic exercise. The 
concept or SEN retains the assumption that people categorized in this way are somehow 
‗less than human‘. The emphasis is still on the inadequacy of the individual: it is s/he who is 
different; it is s/he who is at fault; and, most importantly, it is s/he who must change. 
The Committee did not seriously question the general philosophy and organization of the 
education system although by implication it acknowledged that it is incapable of meeting 
adequately the educational needs of up to one-fifth of its users. Their solution to the problem 
of SEN was a further expansion of professionally dominated support services. Within the 
present educational context this can only reinforce the perceived difference between pupils 
and students with SEN and the rest of the school population, as well as the general view that 
people with impairments are incapable of looking after themselves without professional help. 
Although the Committee acknowledged the economic, social and psychological significance 
of paid employment for individuals within our society, it is clear that it had accepted 
unequivocally the orthodox view that disabled people would be excluded from the workplace. 
This has salient implications for the perpetuation of this myth. The most obvious of these is 
that professionals, themselves in secure employment, will determine when a child is young 
that s/he is unsuitable for paid work. The child‘s subsequent education will be organized 
accordingly. This results in a self-fulfilling prophecy, producing a 'downward spiral‘ in 
professionals' expectations about the child's potential for achievement.867  
Thus in response to concerns that, in certain areas and situations, many disabled people 
have become idle and are producing behavior that is damaging to the wider social interest 
(as well as to the individuals and communities involved). This approach to citizenship is 
within the civic republican tradition of Aristotle‘s polis, where political participation was the 
means by which the citizen role was fully expressed. 
This can be seen in the report‘s two goals: 
We hold that education has certain long-term goals, that it has a general point or 
purpose, which can be definitely, though generally, stated. The goals are twofold, 
different from each other, but by no means incompatible.  
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1) They are, first, to enlarge a child‘s knowledge, experience and imaginative 
understanding, and thus his awareness of moral values and capacity for enjoyment; 
2) and secondly, to enable him to enter the world after formal education is over as an 
active participant in society and a responsible contributor to it, capable of achieving 
as much independence as possible. The educational needs of every child are 
determined in relation to these goals.868 
Here, while also emphasizing consumer choice in the context of public services, the 
committee has in addition aimed at encouraging disabled children to be ‗active citizens.‘ 
Here the emphasis, rather than being on the rights of individuals, is on the obligations that 
must be fulfilled in order to assure the health and stability of local communities and the wider 
society. 
Moreover there are some children with disabilities who, through education along the 
common lines we advocate, may be able to lead a life very little poorer in quality 
than that of the non-handicapped child, whereas without this kind of education they 
might face a life of dependence or even institutionalization.869 
Communitarians are concerned to reduce dependency on welfare and to encourage 
individuals to take responsibility for themselves and their families. Both traditions have 
debated the relationship between rights and responsibilities and whether rights are separate 
from, or contingent upon, responsibilities. The revised Clause 4 of the Labour Party 
constitution represents the unresolved conflict that persists within the Centre Left, in its 
somewhat vague (and ungrammatical) statement: ‗Where the rights we enjoy reflect the 
duties we owe.‘870 
Perspectives on citizenship can also be divided into those that take an individualist approach 
and those taking a structuralist approach. For the former, it is the individual‘s capacity to 
make choices that determines the nature of citizenship; for the latter individual action is 
much more influenced by social and economic factors. As Pattie et al explain, ‗Choice based 
theories are exemplified in their purest form by economics.... In this world, individuals seek 
to maximise their utility by obtaining the highest return at the minimum cost from any course 
of action which they undertake.‘871 Citizenship therefore emerges ‗from the choices which 
agents make, and these reflect the costs and benefits of the choice situation.‘872 New Right 
theories of citizenship are heavily influenced by this perspective, but so too is New Labour—
although to what extent is a matter of contention. 
On the other hand, structuralist approaches to citizenship place more emphasis on social 
norms and values, and on individual behavior being shaped by social and economic forces. 
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Citizenship is therefore rooted within communities and society. Communitarian and civic 
republican perspectives of citizenship place more emphasis on these structural influences 
than do either classical or modern liberal theories of citizenship. 
What Does a Citizenship of Duty Mean for Disabled People in Education  
Participation is a concept often used by disabled people when engaging with the debate on 
social exclusion. In terms of wider citizenship debates, the concept includes the civic 
republican concept of political participation but also encompasses the broader concept of 
community participation. A common theme for disabled people and their organisations has 
been the promotion of the right to be included in mainstream society and to participate in 
family, community and national life.  
Such inclusion requires that disabling barriers are removed and needs relating to impairment 
are met, thus making possible disabled people‘s full involvement.  
Problem with Participation in Citizenship Reflected in the Warnock Report and 1981 
Education Act 
Participation is key to the civic republican concept of citizenship—membership of a political 
community, joining with others to make decisions which are then respected by all, and by so 
doing achieving true freedom. Indeed, the tradition makes the case that citizens are only 
truly free when they participate in shaping the political decisions that affect their lives.  
Concepts of ‗civil renewal‘ and ‗active citizenship‘ have been used in the promotion of 
policies aimed at changing people‘s behaviour. It is argued that antisocial and criminal 
behaviour will only be reduced by increasing people‘s commitment to their local community, 
and that unless political apathy and disaffection is replaced by community and political 
engagement then our democracy is undermined. The idea of civil renewal has been around 
for centuries but it is, increasingly, being taken up by public bodies, people working in the 
voluntary and community sector, and active citizens in their own communities, as the 
effective way to bring about sustainable change and improve the quality of people‘s lives. It 
can happen anywhere, from the most deprived communities to the most affluent. It takes 
place when people become actively engaged in the well being of their communities and are 
able to define the problems they face and tackle the together with help from the government 
and public bodies.873 
So where are disabled people in all of this? While the government is concerned that certain 
groups in society are not fulfilling their role as active citizens and that this is undermining our 
democracy and the viability of some communities, disabled people may be more concerned 
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that they are denied the opportunity to be active citizens and that this is undermining the 
rights of disabled people. 
In a complex society such as ours civic participation takes many different forms and 
opportunities. However, initiatives to encourage ‗active citizenship‘ tend not to treat disabled 
people as potential active citizens. If participation both requires and gives expression to 
autonomy and autonomy is an integral part of being a citizen, then disabled people cannot 
be full citizens with out the extra resources that facilitate participation. 
Although the Department for Work and Pensions has the target of ‗working to improve the 
rights of disabled people and to remove barriers to their participation in society,‘ this target 
does not seem to be reflected in any of the initiatives for promoting ‗active citizenship‘ that 
ODPM and the Home Office are responsible for. Indeed, sometimes these initiatives have 
reaffirmed the assumption that disabled people are passive recipients of care rather than 
active citizens.  
Barriers to Participation 
Nevertheless, in spite of these manifestations of disabled people‘s participation, there 
remain significant barriers and there is a continued struggle for acceptance and for the 
resources that would enable them to participate on an equal basis. Methods of participation 
are often themselves excluding: for example, lessons relying on the spoken word and on 
printed material (and often involving jargon particular to a subject or context) are the most 
common method of participation in the classroom. The basic form of political participation—
voting in local and national elections—is still not accessible to all disabled people.874 In 
addition, many people are excluded (by design or by default) from jury service. 
In discussing some of the key barriers to disabled people‘s participation the intention, as with 
the discussion on autonomy is not to provide a comprehensive analysis but a brief 
discussion of issues in the Warnock report and 1981 Education Act which need to be tackled 
to enable disabled people to participate as full citizens. 
Just as social rights are necessary to enable disabled people have autonomy, so they are 
also necessary to enable them to participate. Yet the legislative framework through which 
such social rights are delivered creates barriers to participation. Not only are there 
inadequate resources made available, but also the legislation through which such resources 
are delivered is based on assumptions of dependency.  
Problems with Contribution in Citizenship Reflected in the Warnock Report and 1981 
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Education Act 
Disabled people have emphasized the value of contribution to economic and social life when 
they make the case for both anti-discrimination legislation and the resources required for a 
reasonable quality of life. Such arguments dovetail with the communitarian emphasis on 
responsibilities and reciprocity, and with debates on the limits to social rights.   These three 
different concepts all engage with Marshall‘s three concepts of civil, political and social rights. 
For disabled people (perhaps more than for any other group) there are close relationships 
between civil, political and social rights. Ruth Lister is unusual in that she identifies current 
debates and definitions as excluding disabled people but her alternative framework still fails 
to include people for whom impairment or illness has a fundamental impact on how they 
experience family, community, economic, social and political life.875  
Problems with Contribution as a requirement of citizenship in the Warnock Report 
Current debates on citizenship focus on the need for individuals to fulfill certain 
responsibilities and there is a strong assumption that it is the fulfillment of these 
responsibilities that qualifies them for full citizenship. This assumption is articulated not only 
in the debate about what and whether conditions/obligations should be attached to the 
receipt of benefits, but also in the encouragement of active citizenship as reflected in the 
Warnock report and the 1981 Education Act.  
Thus participation, an important element of citizenship in its own right, is also a form of 
contribution, of fulfilling the responsibilities of citizenship. Indeed, current debates perhaps 
focus more on the responsibility to contribute than on the value in itself of people‘s 
contribution to the social good—or indeed on the right of people to contribute. 
Concepts of equality and reciprocity are also important here, thus promoting greater equality 
and the extension of assets. Firstly, the question needs to be raised as to whether there are 
  some disabled people who, whatever action is taken to address disabling barriers, are still 
likely to be heavily dependent on others. And if this is the case, does this mean that these 
disabled people cannot access full citizenship?  
The second problem is that to follow the arguments put forward by Kant, Rousseau Hume 
and Rawls and Locke would be to accept that disabled people will not achieve social rights 
without fulfilling the responsibilities of citizenship. Yet for disabled people, social rights are 
necessary in order to fulfill these responsibilities. There is an assumption that once someone 
needs support to go about their daily lives, they are passive recipients of care. The only 
contribution that those who receive such support are expected to make is a monetary one 
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through the charges that are made for community care services.  
Finally, current debates on the responsibilities of citizenship tend to assume that the only 
educational responsibility at issue for disabled people is that of taking up opportunities to 
move from being dependent and out of work to becoming autonomous and earning a living. 
When the wider concept of active citizenship is discussed, the only place for disabled people 
seems to be as recipients of other people‘s citizenship responsibilities. The limited right to 
participation  in education limited by inadequate funding which is necessary to enable them 
to participate as autonomy, participation and contribution all need to be achieved if disabled 
people are to have ‗equal opportunities‘ to be ‗equal citizens.‘  
In exploring these concepts we have also asserted that it is not impairment that determines 
whether disabled people can be full and equal citizens, but socially constructed barriers. The 
disadvantages experienced by disabled people are examples of social injustice and it is 
therefore impossible to address disabled people‘s potential for full citizenship without 
discussing values. Just as social rights are necessary to enable disabled people have 
autonomy. Yet the legislative framework through which such social rights are delivered 
creates barriers to participation. Not only are there inadequate resources made available, 
but also the legislation through which such resources are delivered is based on assumptions 
of dependency.  
 
Loophole in the Law, SENDA 2001, an Inclusive Approach to Citizenship? 
From 1996, disabled children‘s entitlement to mainstream education was no longer 
dependent on the ‗efficient use of resources‘ condition. But it was not until 2001, with the 
Special Educational Needs and Disability Act (SENDA), that schools were prohibited from 
discriminating against disabled children. Schools were now required to make reasonable 
adjustments for their disabled pupils.  
The Special Educational Needs and Disability Act (SENDA), 2001, strengthened the right to 
mainstream schools for disabled children by repealing two of the provisions in the 1996 Act, 
and made educational discrimination unlawful. Nevertheless, two conditions limiting the 
progress with inclusive education are still left on the statute book: a disabled child can go to the 
mainstream provided that it is compatible with the parent's wishes, and there is an efficient 
education of other children. The Special Educational Needs and Disability Act (2001) stipulates 
that: ‗A student with a disability  must be educated in a mainstream school unless that is 
incompatible with the wishes of his parent or the provision of efficient education for other 
children.‘876  
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However, in this case, ‗the provision of efficient education for other children‘ is a significant let-
out clause which would allow schools to refuse entry to a student with a disability if it was 
considered that the student would disrupt the class and interfere with the education of other 
children. 
Although the Special Educational Needs and Disability Act 2001 legislation made access to 
mainstream schools easier, it did not guarantee this as an equal right for all students. On one 
hand the Government still sanctioned the exclusion of significant numbers of children, while 
segregation into separate special schools breached the underlying principles of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). This contradictory situation presented a 
barrier to mainstream schools for the assumption of full responsibility for all students in their 
areas. To meet the education standards, education providers are expected to make 
‗reasonable adjustments‘ to meet the needs of students with a disability. In doing so they are 
expected to consider the views of students and the family; the effects of the adjustment on the 
students and on others in the school; and to utilize a cost–benefit analysis.877  
By contrast, ‗unreasonable‘ adjustments are not mandated. A provider can offer a defense that 
adjustments are unreasonable if they produce unjustifiable hardship. In judging whether the 
adjustments are reasonable or unreasonable, consideration can be given to the financial 
circumstances of the provider and the cost of the adjustment. For example, a small private 
school is likely to be more able successfully to plead hardship than a large state system. 
Under the DDA, ‗unjustifiable hardship‘ was a defense against non-enrolment, but could not be 
used as a reason not to provide services once the student was enrolled. However, since the 
adoption of SENDA, ‗unjustifiable hardship‘ can be considered in relation to provision of 
ongoing services. Proclamations were made by the then Education Secretary, Charles Clarke 
that: ‗All children have the right to the best possible education, the opportunity to fulfil their 
potential and play a full part in the life of their school and their community.‘ 878  However, 
headteachers complaints of limited resources, excessive bureaucracy, and the impact of 
school league tables, exposed the deficiencies in the system. Illustrative of this were variations 
noticed to exist in provision of SEN to those who needed it in different parts of the country. 
Official statistics showed that 4.2 percent of children in Rotherham, for example, had formal 
‗statements‘ of special educational needs (SEN), while the prevalence in Hull, a similar-sized 
authority, was 2.4 percent.879 The education authority stressed that, ‗This situation, where 
                                                             
877 DfES (1994) The SEN Code of Practice. Nottingham: DfES publications  DfES (2001) The Revised SEN Code of 
Practice. Nottingham: DfES publications  DfES (2003) Every Child Matters. London: The Stationery Office  DfES 
(2003) Primary National Strategy: Excellence and Enjoyment. Nottingham: DfES Publications 
878 DfES (2005) Primary National Strategy. Excellence and Enjoyment: Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning 
(SEAL). Nottingham: DfES publications 
879 DfES (2007) Policy Review of Children and Young People (PRCYP): A Discussion Paper. Norwich: HMSO 
 
 
 252 
children still face real barriers to learning and parents lack confidence in the commitment and 
capacity of our schools to meet their child's needs, cannot be allowed to continue.‘880 
Measures for reform were set in the consultation service called ‗Every Child Matters,‘ with its 
focus on early intervention, preventative work, and integrated services would ‗deliver real 
and lasting benefits‘ to children with SEN and their families.881 As disabled young people and 
children often require additional facilities and support to function successfully, they are often 
considered to be disruptive and difficult to educate. 882  In the regime of the ‗education 
market‘,883 where one policy is to attract the ablest pupils, who are perceived to contribute 
the most to the wealth of the nation, the disabled child/young person may be perceived as 
having low value, or considered 'damaged goods.‘884  So although there is pressure for 
schools to follow an inclusive agenda, they are also expected to meet statistical targets and 
normative comparisons. This conflict not only caused educationalists to have ‗sleepless 
nights,‘885 but more importantly this continued the practice of informal exclusion of disabled 
children from mainstream schools.  
Davis and Watson found one head teacher from a mainstream school who suggested that 
he could only have 15 percent of children with a learning difficulty in any year if the school 
was to meet its national targets.886 Thus exclusion within mainstream schools, on the basis 
of academic and other criteria, often continued to lead disabled children being educated in 
separate ‗learning support units‘ or ‗impairment special units.‘  
Burgess maintained that despite the ongoing policy drive towards inclusion, mainstream 
schools are not fully accessible, as those responsible for developing inclusion still think of 
accessibility in terms of ramps and rails. In her study of disabled secondary school students 
throughout the UK, Burgess found that their curriculum choices were severely curtailed: 36 
percent of young disabled people she talked to could not study subjects of their choice due 
to poor access to the curriculum and the disabling environment, including attitudes of 
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teachers.887 It can be argued, then, that as long as mainstream schools do not embrace the 
full process of inclusion, their citizenship status is compromised. Furthermore, young 
disabled people still may have no real choice in deciding where to continue their education 
or what to do after school. 
According to a survey commissioned by the DRC (2002–2003) on the aspirations of young 
disabled people, 24 percent of disabled people aged 16–24 have no qualifications compared 
with 13 percent of non-disabled people of the same age, bringing exclusion throughout their 
lifetime. As early as 16 years of age, disabled young people are twice as likely to be out of 
work, education or training as their non-disabled peers (15 percent compared with 7 
percent).888 Evidence has suggested that young disabled people feel they receive insufficient 
support in school and are discouraged from taking standard educational qualifications 
required for university entrance.889 Too often, disabled students in secondary schools are 
being taught almost entirely by teaching assistants who are not fully qualified teachers, while 
non-disabled students are taught by the teacher.890  
According to MacBeath et al, there is also a tendency for teaching assistants to isolate ‗their‘ 
child from group learning situations. 891  This means there could be very little interaction 
between the teaching staff and the disabled students, again reinforcing the disabled/non-
disabled divide. Further, disabled students may not receive the same standard of tuition as 
their non-disabled peers. 
The evidence then, that disabled people are denied the full rights of citizenship is persuasive: 
it is not unreasonable to agree that this denial constitutes a denial to disabled people of their 
basic human rights. Given this evidence, it is perhaps not unreasonable to suppose that the 
current political fashion for talking about citizenship in general offers the opportunity to put 
disability rights back onto the political agenda.  
Education for the Disabled and Human Rights a way forward? 
Given the Problems of the medical and social models of disability, the classic and 
contemporary notions of citizenship and UN human rights regimes prior to the 2006 CRDP, 
is the CRPD the way forward for disabled people? The idea that political morality and social 
choice can be based wholly or partly on some sort of account of the rights of individuals is 
familiar. Theories of rights can be found in the work of John Locke and Thomas Paine, as 
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well as in that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill.892 However, the idea that 
there might be human rights valid for all peoples in all times and places is controversial and 
has been challenged by the claim that to assert something as a right is no more than an 
expression of emotion. 893  There is a sense in which the language of rights has been 
manipulated by political groups. Nevertheless, the use of rights-based models has been 
used successfully to challenge exclusionary practices. The disabled people‘s movement has 
drawn heavily on a rights-based discourse. Indeed, the development of a disability rights 
movement has had benefits for disabled people in the form of anti-discrimination legislation 
and opportunities to participate in mainstream life in general.894 
 
A rights discourse is also evident in international law. Not only has the United Nations 
adopted a Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN, 1989), but on 13 December 2006 the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (UN, 2006). In education, rights based discourses have also played their part, as 
the Centre for the Study of Inclusive Education claims inclusive education is a ‗human 
right.‘895 Indeed, UNESCO has invoked a Human Rights Action Plan to address education 
and training. 896 
 
Despite the philosophical difficulties of a rights-based discourse, it is suggest that the 
assertion of ‗educational rights,‘ not ‗special educational needs,‘ may prove to be a powerful 
tool to support all children in their education and for equal citizenship. 
 
The debate regarding the education of students with disabilities was taken to mean full 
inclusion.897 Full inclusion enthusiasts seek to completely remove the distinction between 
special and regular education, and to provide an appropriate education for all students, 
despite their level of disability, in their local school. It involves a complete restructuring of the 
educational system so that all schools would have the responsibility of providing the 
facilities, resources, and an appropriate curriculum for all students irrespective of disability. It 
is a philosophical move away from the accommodation of students with special needs into a 
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‗normal‘ system, towards a full inclusion model where everyone is considered normal, and 
where the needs of all can be met.  
This trend is situated within a broad social justice agenda, which argues that equality for all 
must include access for all students to their local school. This trend has been supported by 
United Nations policies which affirm the rights of children: the United Nations Convention on 
the rights of the Child, 1989; the United Nations Standard Rules for the Equalisation of 
Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, 1993; the UNESCO Salamanca Statement, 1994.  
In England, the Warnock Report (1978) led directly to the Education Act (1981), and the 
subsequent amendment to the Education Act (1993) and Special Educational Needs and 
Disability Act (2001) were a step in this direction. They established the rights of students with 
disabilities to be included in regular schools but there were limits to their inclusion. 
Inclusive Education departs from Special Education by focusing on the transformation of 
education systems to increase their ability to respond to the diversity of all learners in both 
formal and non-formal education. The basis of inclusive education philosophy is threefold; 
firstly it is based on the premise that exclusion is a social process; secondly, that each 
student must be viewed holistically; and thirdly on the principle of non-segregation.898  
Inclusion is seen as a process of addressing and responding to the diversity of 
needs of all learners through increasing participation in learning, cultures and 
communities, and reducing exclusion within and from education. It involves changes 
and modifications in content, approaches, structures and strategies, with a common 
vision which covers all children of the appropriate age range and a conviction that it 
is the responsibility of the regular system to educate all children.899  
As discussed in the previous chapter on human rights, inclusive education has explicit links 
to the international human rights framework. The right to education was established in the 
initial inception of the international human rights framework in the 1948 UDHR and was 
reiterated in the 2006 CRPD. The conceptualisation of Inclusive Education is that it is a 
rights-based process of decreasing exclusion from, and increasing participation in, the 
culture, curriculum and community of mainstream schools.900 Therefore, inclusive education 
is a vital tool for mainstreaming a human rights approach to development.901  
 
Educational Rights as an Alternative to the Dilemma of Difference 
 
                                                             
898 (UNESCO, 1994). 
899 (UNESCO, 1994). 
900 KIESLER, D.J. (2000) Beyond the Disease Model of Mental Disorders (Praeger Publishers). LOW, C. (1997) Is inclusivism 
possible? European Journal of Special Needs Education,12 (1), 71–79. 
901 Swain, J. (2005) Inclusive education: readings and reflections (Book review), Disability and Society, 20(7), 787 
 
 
 256 
Warnock drew attention to the binarism associated with the notion of handicap, which meant 
that ‗there are two types of children.‘902 The Committee sought to eliminate this notion and 
proposed replacing the statutory categories with the notion of a continuum of need. However, 
at the same time as arguing for the abandonment of categorisation, the Committee defended 
the retention of categories for some pupils:  
 
We have found ourselves on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand we are aware 
that any kind of special resource or service for such children runs the risk of 
emphasising the idea of their separateness, an idea which we are anxious to dispel, 
and of limiting the notion of special education to the provision made for such children. 
On the other hand, unless an obligation is clearly placed on local education 
authorities to provide for the special needs of such children, there is a danger that 
their requirement for special resources will be inadequately met.903  
 
The attempt to resolve this dilemma merely replaced one set of categories with another and 
that this was inevitable:  
 
The use of categories is an inherent part of the practical administrative 
arrangements for special educational needs. What has changed with the 1981 Act is 
the terminology used and the way categories are used in the context of 
integration.904  
 
Children continued to be assessed by clinically based procedures and medically 
categorisation. This process of categorisation reinforced the discriminatory categories of 
normality and abnormality. Disabled students identified as abnormal were therefore placed in 
segregated schools and provided with special education.905 This nature of categorisation is 
certainly problematic for full citizenship, especially when referred to education and when 
concerning those categories arising from medical definitions and connected to the area of 
intellectual disabilities.  
 
In effect little appeared to have changed. The Committee acknowledged the risk that it was 
merely replacing one label with another, but defended their alternative and euphemising 
conceptualisation:  
 
The term we have proposed, which will be used for descriptive purposes and not for 
any purpose of categorisation, is preferable to the existing label because it gives 
more indication of the nature of the child's difficulties and is less likely to stigmatise 
the child.906  
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It is not clear what distinction was being made between description and categorisation, but it 
appears that categorisation had the function of removing a child from mainstream education 
into special schools which matched the category to which they had been assigned. Warnock 
offered two concepts, 
 
a. special educational needs  
b. and learning difficulty.  
 
The latter referred to those who had previously been categorised as ‗educationally sub-
normal‘ and those who were the objects of ‗remedial education.‘ The term special 
educational needs has come to include only those with ‗severe complex and long-term 
difficulties,‘ whom Warnock saw the need to protect and for whom Records of Needs have 
been opened. It was suggested that these would account for approximately two percent of 
the school population, while the others, within Warnock‘s notion of ‗one in five,‘ would be 
considered to have learning difficulties.  
 
The necessarily arbitrary nature of the cut-off point of ‗special,‘907 and the influence of social 
interests and vested power on the consideration of ‗special‘ presents an apparently 
implacable paradox.908 
 
While the demedicalisation of the labelling of disabled individuals within the educational 
context must be viewed positively it represents little more than a cosmetic exercise. The 
concept or SEN retains the assumption that people categorised in this way are somehow 
‗less than human.‘ The emphasis is still on the inadequacy of the individual: it is s/he who is 
different; it is s/he who is at fault; and, most importantly, it is s/he who must change. 
The Committee did not seriously question the general philosophy and organisation of the 
education system although by implication it acknowledged that it is incapable of meeting 
adequately the educational needs of up to a fifth of its users.  
Their solution to the problem of SEN was a further expansion of professionally dominated 
support services. Within the present educational context this can only reinforce the 
perceived difference between pupils and students with SEN and the rest of the school 
population, as well as the general view that people with impairments are incapable of looking 
after themselves without professional help. 
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The affect this had on the language of current policy which focuses on children who are 
‗special‘ and in ‗need‘ emphasises individual deficits and, therefore, plays a part in 
constructing and sustaining exclusionary practices. Research continues to show that, within 
schools, practices operate that exclude pupils described as having ‗special educational 
needs.‘ 909 Indeed, the term ‗special educational needs‘ can be seen to contribute to the 
exclusion of children so labelled as they are ‗othered‘ by professionals and, in turn, by 
children who see ‗the special needs‘ as different and deficient. 910  From my personal 
experiences, having a child with ‗SEN‘ I have regularly heard children described by teachers 
and teaching assistants as ‗the special needs‘ (for example, ‗we‘re taking the ―special needs‖ 
to the supermarket tomorrow‘). 
 
I have also heard this language adopted by children within schools where they asked my 
daughter, ‗Is your brother a special need?‘ It is not surprising that this is the language of the 
classroom and the playground, as this is also the language adopted in the popular press. A 
2007 article in The Times described how children born in the summer can be ‗wrongly 
classed as special needs.‘911 The book Balderdash and Piffle, which accompanies the BBC 
television series of the same name, includes the term ‗special needs‘ in the chapter entitled 
‗Put-Downs and Insults.‘912 ‗Special needs‘ is sandwiched in between ‗plonker‘ and ‗Joey‘, a 
term used in the 1980s to described disabled people following Joey Deacon‘s appearance 
on the children‘s television programme Blue Peter. The evidence from the classroom, the 
playground and popular culture suggests that the term ‗special needs‘ cannot be seen as 
benign or neutral. The term ‗special needs‘ contributes to the loss of a child‘s identity behind 
the veil of a syndrome or condition. Just as the Warnock Report in 1978 rejected the 
language of the 1940s and the classification of children by their handicap, thirty years later it 
seems timely to consider rejecting the term ‗special educational needs‘ as outdated and 
exclusionary language. Having rejected the term ‗special educational needs‘, it may be that 
the work of early educators in Reggio Emilia in Italy offers a way forward and, perhaps, an 
alternative. 
 
Lessons from Reggio Emilia 
 
The Reggio Emilia philosophy and approach to early childhood education evolved within a 
system of municipal infant-toddler centres and pre-schools in Reggio Emilia, in northern Italy. 
Parents, who started the schools in the 1940s, continue to participate fully in the life of the 
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school in order to ensure the schools reflect the values of the community. From the 
beginning, Reggio Emilia schools were guided by the late Loris Malaguzzi, a young teacher, 
who directed the energies of parents and teachers in the development of an education 
based on relationships. 913  The Reggio Emilia approach draws upon the work of early 
childhood psychologists and philosophers, including Dewey, Piaget, Vygotsky, Garner and 
Bruner, in conjunction with extensive experience. However, supporters of the Reggio 
approach do not claim that it is either childhood method or a set curriculum, ‗rather it is a set 
of community-constructed values.‘914 Significantly, the pre-schools in Reggio Emilia operated 
inclusive practices in education before it became a legal requirement in Italy in 1971.915.  
 
Fundamental to the Reggio approach is the relationship between the child, the teacher and 
the knowledge to be learned.916 All children are viewed as having the ability to construct 
knowledge, and, crucially in this case, as having rights. The Reggio approach draws on the 
concepts of children‘s rights as described within the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.917 The United Nations‘ convention groups children‘s rights under four 
categories: prevention, provision, protection and participation. It is the right to participation 
that the Reggio approach sees as crucial for the inclusion of all children.918 
 
As a result of the rights-based approach, children in Reggio schools have ‗special rights,‘ not 
‗special needs.‘ In contrast to the system of pupils‘ Individual Education Plans (IEPs) in 
England, Reggio school pupils have a ‗Declaration of Intent,‘ which includes ideas and 
materials to be used for learning as well as suggestions for how the work is to be carried 
out.919 Individualised targets are set without reference to normative standards in the early 
years.920 
 
Whereas in England, the IEP has been seen as necessary only for pupils ‗with special 
educational needs,‘ the Reggio approach emphasises the value of documentation of all 
children‘s experiences and learning, assuming a multidimensional view of intelligence that 
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focuses on the child‘s strengths.921 The Reggio Emilia approach highlights The Hundred 
Languages of Children so that children are encouraged to draw, sculpt, paint, dramatise or 
write to demonstrate their understanding.922 The Reggio approach stresses the value and 
strengths of all learners and celebrates a breadth of learning styles. In Reggio schools, 
documentation is collected not only to inform practitioners about children‘s learning, but to 
allow practitioners to reflect on their own practice. 
 
The concept of ‗special educational rights‘ is key to constructing an inclusive educational 
environment. The ‗Declaration of Intent‘ shifts the focus onto what can be done to facilitate 
children‘s learning, away from a focus on an individual child‘s perceived deficits. Valuing 
multiple forms of intelligence and giving practitioners time to reflect on their own practice are 
key to the schools‘ inclusive approach.923 The use of the term special rights, not needs, is 
consistent with the Reggio approach to valuing all children.924 The Reggio Emilia experience 
leads us to consider what the impact of the adoption of a rights-based discourse might have 
on the special education system in England.  
 
Educational rights – more than a discursive turn 
 
Reggio educators have been keen to stress that the Reggio approach cannot simply be 
transplanted into another culture and that the context of education is key.925 It is argued here 
that, in England, the word ‗special‘ has also been used to maintain a deficit or medical 
discourse in education.926 So we suggest that the language of ‗need‘ and the term ‗special‘ 
be rejected in favour of the term ‗educational rights.‘ The above discussion of inclusive 
practice in Reggio Emilia schools reveals that inclusive practice is about more than the 
adoption of a rights-based discourse. However, it is worth considering for a moment what the 
impact would be on the English education system if the term ‗special educational needs‘ 
were replaced by the phrase ‗educational rights.‘ The consequence of children having 
‗educational rights‘ would be wide-ranging. The Code of Practice for the Identification and 
Assessment of Special Educational Needs would become the Code of Practice for the 
Affirmation of Educational Rights. Parents would find themselves campaigning for their 
children‘s rights (not needs) to be met at the Educational Rights and Disability Tribunal, not 
the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal (SENDisT).  
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A brief review of the impact of a rights-based discourse on the language of the policies and 
systems of special education suggests that a change in the use of language may impact on 
the policy and practice of education. Claiming ‗educational rights‘ may be seen as a big 
statement and some may question whether the word ‗right‘ is being used appropriately here. 
 
The CRDP as a Way Forward? 
To remedy the limitations of the models of disability, models of citizenship and human rights 
prior to 2006 and thereby ensure social inclusion and equality, perhaps adopting the 2006 
Convention of the Rights of People with Disabilities as a Framework for inclusion is a better 
way forward in education. This framework moves beyond the social model‘s emphasis on 
formal equality by acknowledging that disabled persons are entitled to equality by virtue of 
their equal humanity, not because they satisfy sameness norms. Consequently, it 
acknowledges that variation exists among all individuals, including those conventionally 
categorized as disabled. Under this CRPD approach, all individuals with disabilities are 
entitled to civil rights measures combined with equality measures. 
As seen in the Warnock Report, to access ordinary schools a disabled person requires 
levels of minimal function as a condition precedent to acknowledging an individual‘s equal 
humanity and social participation, it is fundamentally under-inclusive of some people with 
intellectual disabilities and those with complex disabilities, which conditions the inclusion of 
others through proxies, and inadequately accounts for the development of individual talent.  
There is a continued debate about whether special schools or regular schools are the best 
option for educating children with additional needs. Vygotsky
 
believes that all children, 
regardless of ability, can be educated through existing educational pedagogies and asserts 
that special schools are inherently antisocial and isolating.927 Others state that as well as 
social benefits, it is economically more viable to include children with disability in regular 
education.928  Inclusive Education advocates for children with disability to be included in 
regular or mainstream schools. This is seen as the best way of ‗combating discriminatory 
attitudes, building an inclusive society and achieving education for all.‘929 Farrell believes that 
an inclusive orientation can also be characteristic of special schools and that parents ought 
to be able to choose their preferred option.930 
There is confusion about the research base for inclusive education with many inclusionists 
appearing to believe that an adequate research base for inclusion is unnecessary or already 
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exists. However, Lindsay‘s 2007 review concluded that the research evidence in support of 
inclusion to date have been inconclusive, suggesting that an adequate research base for 
inclusion has not been established. 931  Farrell in his recent book cites a raft of relevant 
studies, many of which report negative findings regarding the impact of inclusive education.  
932 Norwich concludes that there needs to be more intensive research to provide evidence 
regarding the policy and practice of inclusive education.933 Such research needs to take a 
long-term view of outcomes for children with SEN who experience either inclusive or 
segregated schooling. The findings of two long-term follow-up studies of children with SEN, 
who were ‗included‘ in mainstream schools following periods of time attending special 
schools, suggests that children with SEN who experience inclusive education may often be 
disadvantaged in the long term.934 
As Warnock has concluded, ‗What we really need is evidence of where different children 
with different disabilities thrive best, and how the pitiful casualties of some inclusive 
comprehensive schools can be best avoided.‘935 
By harnessing the assets of the social model and the CRPD the Convention overcomes the 
foregoing limitations. It both acknowledges the role that social circumstances play in creating 
disabling conditions and insists on the inclusion of all individuals in social settings based on 
their humanity.936 A positive example in the Reggio schools which were a result of the rights-
based approach, all children have ‗special rights,‘ not ‗special needs.‘ If contrasted with the 
education policies and reports discussed in this thesis, the Reggio approach emphasises the 
value of documentation of all children‘s experiences and learning, assuming a 
multidimensional view of intelligence that focuses on the child‘s strengths.937 The Reggio 
approach stresses the value and strengths of all learners and celebrates a breadth of 
learning styles. The concept of ‗special educational rights‘ is key to constructing an inclusive 
educational environment. These positions situate inclusive education in a larger political 
movement, while questions the organisation of society and declares the celebration of 
differences as its fundamental political aim. 
 
This is not to argue that the social model is redundant, rather the social model positively 
stresses society‘s role in constructing disability and its responsibility to rectify disability- 
                                                             
931 Lindsay‘s (2007), Barnes, C. (December 9, 1999). A working social model? disability and work in the 21st 
century. Disability Studies Conference and Seminar, Edinburgh p.21 
932 Farrell (2010), Barnes C (1991). Disabled People and Discrimination in Great Britain. London: Hurst and Co. 
p.91  
933 (Terzi, 2010 p.130 
934 (Hornby & Kidd, 2001; Hornby & Witte, 2008). 
935 Warnock (Terzi, 2010, p. 139). 
936 UN CRPD Article 24 supports inclusive education for all children in the same education setting. 
937 Gardner, H. (1993) Frames of Mind, London: Fontana Press  Geddes, H. (2006) Attachment in the Classroom. 
London: Worth Publishing 
 
 
 263 
based exclusion. Yet, because advocates have justified this scheme exclusively though 
formal justice notions, the model has neglected economic, social and cultural rights. The 
CRDP seamlessly combines first- and second- generation rights, thus avoiding a major 
shortcoming of the social model of disability. At the same time, this framework is as 
vulnerable to monitoring, content, and resource prioritization concerns as are more 
traditional versions of human rights. This creates a fertile space within which to understand 
the reach and content of the human right to access schools for all and equal outcome of 
education opportunity for disabled children.  
Can inclusion actually work?  
Inclusion by Warnock 1978 is regarded to be very expensive and impractical to apply she 
states: ‗Nevertheless, we recognize that some of our key proposals will require substantial 
additional expenditure over the next few years and beyond.‘938 
She went on:  
Thus we are proposing a general framework of special education which is much 
wider than the present statutory concept, and within that, though an integral part of 
it, the means of safeguarding the interests of the minority of pupils whose needs 
cannot be met within the resources generally available in ordinary schools. This 
framework is intended  to establish once and for all the idea of special educational 
provision, wherever it is made, as additional or supplementary rather than, as in the 
past, separate or alternative provision.939 
Other views conceive that inclusive educational systems are less expensive than 
maintaining two systems; a segregated and an inclusive one. This last view is based on 
observations of the success of many countries in developing cost effective programmes 
using limited available resources. It is generally accepted that denying inclusive education of 
funding will have an adverse impacts on both individuals and the policy of inclusion. 
Experience indicated that up to ninety percent of children having SEN could be integrated 
into regular schools and classrooms under the provision of support for their inclusion.940 
International work by both the World Bank and OECD has shown that it is far more 
expensive to operate dual systems of ordinary and special education than it is to operate a 
single inclusive system. In Reykjavik, Iceland, local authority staff calculated that the cost of 
educating a child requiring the most intensive support in a mainstream school was no 
greater than the average cost of sending students to special schools.941 
Apparently the real problem implementing inclusion is a conceptual one which has led to the 
historical investment in separate, segregated systems of special schools, the lack of political 
will to make inclusive education available to all, and the uncertainties of some parents that 
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inclusion will benefit their children. Overcoming these conceptual problems is only possible 
through debates and deliberation that take it to change hearts and minds, encourage 
openness to the values and aims of inclusive education and a commitment to the human 
rights of all children and young people. Non-government organisations and individuals must 
also continue to lobby governments, and raise awareness among teachers and parents of 
the advantages of inclusion. People directly involved in inclusive education need to share 
their knowledge and experiences with those just starting out. The approach to inclusive 
education is regarded not only as the provider of the best educational environment but also 
the best way to break down barriers and challenge stereotypes. When children with and 
without disabilities are offered the chance of growing up and learning together they would be 
in a better chance to develop greater understanding and respect for each other.942 
To achieve objectives, progress needs to be established on fronts including legislation by 
government, policy formulation, professional educators and concerned public organizations.  
As expressed by one school director in Swaziland:  
I had thought the problem of integration of children with difficulties was difficult to 
solve, and a problem of the state. But all my conversations have now confirmed my 
opinion that someone had to start, to break the mould, and fight against the isolation 
of children with special needs.943 
Exchange of information pertaining to examples of good practice in the restructuring of 
mainstream schools in the UK and overseas is seen as an essential step towards modelling 
and devising strategies for ending discrimination in education.  
Although a big gap separates contemporary society from the days of eugenic thinking, mass 
sterilizations and other forms of acutely discriminating practices, there is a long road to walk 
to reach total acceptance, inclusion and citizenship. Despite the fact that the UK Disability 
Discrimination Act (DDA) (1995) and its amendment in the DDA 2005 Act have alleviated 
some of the grievances of disabled persons there is still a lot to be done to ensure their full 
social acceptance, full citizenship and inclusion. The state‘s commitment in insuring legal 
and formal rights for disabled people is evident in policy measures, for example the 
government has well acknowledged that the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) needs 
further support if it is to provide reasonable opportunities for disabled persons. Therefore the 
Disability Equality Scheme has been devised and fully incorporated since April 2007 to bring 
in the needed support to the DDA. Yet despite these measures and legislative actions, the 
gap remains between disabled and non-disabled persons in terms of employment and 
education. 
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Conclusion 
Chapter Six looked at how models of disability are expressed in the 1978 Warnock Report. 
The report conflated the social model and the medical model, but failed to escape the 
deficiencies of either. In the decades which followed, disabled children continued to be 
denied full inclusion in schools. In 2005, Baroness Warnock revisited her 1978 report and, 
while accepting the need for some rethinking, argued that the failures and half-measures in 
education for the disabled during the intervening years were the result of poor 
implementation and misunderstanding of her original position. However, the analysis in 
Chapter Six shows that the understanding of disability which underpinned the report was 
equally insufficient. Indeed, that conflation—specifically the failure to move away from the 
medical model in education—contributed to the policymaking and practice that followed.  
In Chapter Seven the report‘s reliance on exclusory citizenship models was demonstrated. 
The report is wedded to a discourse which takes autonomy, rationality, participation and 
contribution as the requirements of citizenship. Hence the inclusionary vision is undermined 
by notions of citizenship which exclude many disabled people from the outset, consigning 
them to the domain of charity, to the domain of needs and not rights. Given the shortcomings 
of all the models of citizenship and disability discussed in this thesis, a human rights 
approach was considered as a possible way forward. The CRPD, especially Article 12, 
grants unprecedented legal rights to the disabled, filling the gap left by the models discussed. 
And in filling that gap, and providing full equality before the law for disabled people, we 
should ask if it supercedes them. Article 24 addresses educational rights. As demonstrated 
by the case of Reggio Emilia, such a human rights approach has the potential to transform 
the education landscape for disabled people. If Article 24 of the CRPD were implemented by 
the British government without reservations, education for the disabled in the UK might be 
similarly transformed. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to analyse the watershed Warnock Reports 1978 and 2005 
and subsequent education policies by relating them to models of disability and models of 
citizenship. Such an analysis necessitated first highlighting and analysing models of 
disability, models of citizenship and human rights, which were subsequently used as tools of 
analysis. 
The failure of the models of disability, models of citizenship and UN human rights prior to the 
2006 CRPD identified in the thesis are all reflected in the policy and practice of education for 
the disabled in England. The 1978 Warnock Report and subsequent reports and legislation 
expressed how the limits and failure of the models of disability and citizenship expressed this 
in theory and practice. Further the thesis identified the UN Human Rights framework 
particularly the CPRD as a way better forward for disabled people. Yet the CRPD is not 
without its challenges. 
Given the problems identified in the thesis, – the problems of the medical and social models 
and the problems in formulating and applying liberal and civic republican models of 
citizenship and human rights conventions to disability – if disability varies and we cannot 
essentialise it, can we say there is a clear-cut path to citizenship for the disabled? The 
paradox is the more progress in terms of refinements on notions of disability, citizenship and 
human rights in trying to make citizenship more inclusive, the more problems have arisen 
regarding disability.  
Some old problems return, others continue, and still new ones arise. Efforts by legislation 
and these evolving models to remedy have produced a series of ongoing and new issues 
regarding disability and the place and accommodation of the disabled in society. The more 
things change and improve the more they morph into both ongoing old and new problems. 
In conclusion, one can discern a number of linkages and overlaps in theory and practice 
among the notions of disability, citizenship, and human rights. These connections have been 
increasing as models of disability, citizenship and international human rights legislation has 
become more sensitive to the difficulties of disabled people in their societies. 
Consequently, this increased awareness has been reflected in the evolution of the models of 
disability, citizenship and international human rights legislation to accommodate the disabled. 
While many inconsistencies remain among and between the medical and social models of 
disability and result often in a fragmentation of rights for the disabled community through 
either confined medical diagnostic practices and regulations versus social legislation based 
on the social model for disability, significant efforts at improving the understanding of 
disability in both models has occurred in the past several decades. Still, large gaps and 
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inconsistencies exist. The social model succeeded the medical model, and was more 
efficacious in progressing and highlighting the abilities of disabled persons rather than their 
limitations. 
However, the social model also has its limitations. Firstly, it must overcome inaccurate 
notions that the world invariantly excludes disabled people. Secondly, the social model is 
prevented from developing on first-generation rights to invoke second-generation rights. 
Hence, these models are not sufficient on their own in differentiating between some major 
aspects of disability, such as the cultural, social and political aspects. More important to 
viewing disability through the perspective of these models is the removal of barriers and 
social change. This is not to say that either the social or medical models are too flawed to 
exist independently, rather that they complement each other and rely on each other to 
further improve the understanding of the disabled community‘s issues and, together, help set 
out how to deal with them. 
Further, as chapter 3 discusses regarding models of citizenship, there are many ambiguities 
in the definitions of citizenship in the classical and liberal schools on citizenship, which limit 
comprehensive application to disabled communities and to the disabled individuals within 
them. The classical liberal notion of citizenship and its rational clause formulated by Locke 
excludes many people with cognitive disability and it remains unclear in the writings by 
Locke, Kant, Hume, Rawls and Marshall that the other forms of disability qualify for full 
citizenship. Both classical and contemporary models of civic republican and liberal notions of 
citizenship are restrictive for disabled people. As Lister notes, because the disabled are not 
able fully to participate in the key areas of mainstream society as able and participatory 
citizens, they inherently remain on the periphery. Said notes that members of society are no 
longer defined by one single label, rather, people are now a mixture of complementing and 
coexisting labels. This highlights a limitation in the difference model; the breakdown in the 
borders between labels, leading to a salient amalgamation of facets to form the ‗person‘. As 
such, any individual disabled person may contextually identify, at different times, as a person 
with a particular impairment, as a disabled person, or by their particular gender, ethnicity, 
sexuality, occupation, religion, and even down to preferences such as the football team they 
support. 
The equal but different model of citizenship is also problematic because liberal societies do 
not differentiate between citizens. Because the notion of the citizen is universal and 
therefore to incorporate difference potentially conflicts with the core liberal notion of the 
universal citizen, this can be troublesome on many theoretical and practical levels for 
disabled individuals and in the ways and the extent that society can accommodate them 
without trampling on the rights of other citizens. An alternative framework is offered by which 
to re-consider disabled people‘s citizenship rights through application of both a liberal notion 
of citizenship - largely as an extension of human rights. A synthesis of the rights and a 
redefined participatory tradition is recommended, linked through the notion of human agency 
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which can stay true to the wider definition of citizenship underpinned by a wide notion of 
human rights.  This alternative is not seen as being definitive; it comprises a starting point in 
a discussion which hopefully will be generative in re-envisaging disabled people‘s citizenship 
rights.   
Chapter 4 raises the limits in human rights as a framework for the disabled and sets out the 
limitations which remain to be filed regarding the application of human rights theory and law 
to classical and liberal notions of citizenship so that they may be harmonized towards 
establishing clear standards for disability rights. The human rights regime is seen as a 
development of contemporary citizenship, in that it is spelling out the requirements of 
inclusion in communities. It build on the classical liberal regime of natural/human rights, but 
is more specific in spelling out the needs of defined individuals, such as the disabled, who 
have been left out of the picture. Hence, UN human rights advocates lead to a focused way 
of theorizing what the disabled require. The chapter compares human rights to citizenship, 
and while superficially they share many qualities and characteristics, they have subtle and 
nuanced differences. Chief among these is the fact that human rights apply on an 
international scale, while citizenship applies to a domestic front. The former has its limit in 
the form of a lack of consistency between nations. The latter, however, weakens national 
identification in its cosmopolitan guise. 
Similarly, chapter 5 which examines CRPD shows that the development of disability rights 
specifically Article 12 and Article 24 of the CRPD, and the attempt to harmonize these with 
human rights in international law is a laudable effort tackled by the General assembly of the 
United Nations, but the CRPD legislation still possesses large gaps. The underpinning of 
human  
  
Chapter six and seven consider how in education the Warnock report expresses the flaws of 
the models of disability and citizenship showed how all groups are not accorded the full 
rights of citizenship in education and accepting that particular groups are denied their basic 
human rights. Disability is a human rights issue and to be a disabled student in Britain today 
is to be denied the rights of citizenship. The reality of the denial was demonstrated with 
ample evidence throughout this chapter in how the Warnock report and subsequent 
legislation express failures of disability models and citizenship models to provide equal 
citizenship rights in education both in theory and practice. In contrast to abundant good 
intentions and compensatory investments, special education settings authorized to offer 
different educational opportunities seem to legitimately reduce individual access to 
opportunities to learn and to equal citizenship. These reduced opportunities, may reduce 
educational attainment. Individuals‘ risk of low (or no) attainment increases in special 
education, with its students significantly overrepresented in the group of less educated youth 
in the UK. Ironically, educational expansion has increased stigmatization of less educated 
youth because they constitute the lowest educational category that has become smaller and 
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more socially selective over time while ever more of their peers have earned certificates 944In 
general, there appears to be a cohesive emergent argument about the necessity of creating 
room for children and adolescents with special needs to be able to exercise more agency in 
their daily lives, for those who work with them to be less limited by the individualizing and 
pathologizing discourses that conflict with working toward equity.  
From these chapters, one can conclude that for the several hundred years since disability 
rights have been considered in the context of medical and social models, citizenship, human 
rights and international legislation that there has been a running paradox. From a twin track 
perspective, the more progress is made in terms of revising and refining notions of disability 
and in making citizenship more inclusive, the more issues continue to arise concerning 
disability and the place of the disability community and its disabled individuals within their 
respective societies. As more detailed models and legislation evolve, some of the old 
problems re-appear and some new ones emerge which require further deliberation by State 
governments, disability organizations and by international bodies. The limitations of the 
social and medical models, along with the limited domestic scope of human rights and the 
distortion citizenship theories create on a cosmopolitan scale has meant that while efforts 
have undeniably been made to improve the lives of the disabled, large problems still exist. It 
could be argued that this endless chase involving the development of models and theories to 
mollify discontent and issues regarding disabled people has led to the creation of fresh 
problems. Thus, full citizenship for the disabled, can never truly be completely achieved 
using current models of disability and citizenship, the analysis of the Warnock Report and 
subsequent legislation highlight these limitations. 
This thesis concluded that there are flaws and inadequacies in the way the models of 
disability, citizenship and human rights treat and construct disabled people. Given that a 
rights-based society is meant to effectively support people with disabilities, one should ask if 
society‘s current treatment of people with disabilities is effective in addressing the disability 
divide, and which elements can be improved to significantly reduce the impact of this divide 
and achieve full citizenship. In what is deemed to be an enlightened rights-based society, 
most people, both able-bodied and disabled alike, are willing to accept that the treatment of 
people with disabilities has improved significantly in recent decades. Yet despite these 
improvements, difficulties remain. Disabled people continue to face significant barriers in 
relation to poverty, unemployment and a lack of educational opportunities. A central issue 
presented in the British Social Attitudes (BSA) report of 2007, indicates that despite over a 
decade of legislative action to apprehend discrimination, disabled persons are still struggling 
to eradicate their classification as second-class citizens.945  
 
                                                             
944 Solga 2002: 164, 2005   
945 24/01/2007, 
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Promises of inclusion may give way to a compounding of existing difficulties. This ‗disability 
divide‘ describes the gap between the able-bodied population and people with disabilities in 
gaining access to education and employment. As Barton states, modern disability is, in itself, 
‗an exploration of issues of power, social justice, citizenship and human rights.‘946 
Sir Bert Massie, chairman of DRC (Disability Rights Commission) declared that: 
The DRC‘s Disability Agenda calls on the government to introduce policies aimed at 
integrating disabled people more closely into society. This will not only help disabled 
people themselves, but serve to reduce prejudice and combat ignorance about 
disability in the long term by fostering greater contact between disabled and non-
disabled people. I believe this approach is vital for the future and should be a key 
aim of the new Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR) when it comes 
into being later this year.947 
Furthermore, it was stressed by Sir Bert Massie that: ‗We have brought in legislation to help 
end this, but legislation can only go so far.‘948   
Disabled people have always believed that social change is needed to achieve full rights for 
them. And the disability movement has aspirations. Because any development of disability 
theory requires disabled people to ask fundamental questions about the origins of their 
oppression, including cultural and physiological definitions of human nature. 
It has been suggested in the British Social Attitudes (BSA) report that knowing disabled 
people has a consistent impact in reducing prejudice against them. People who have first or 
second hand experience of disability tend to hold less negative attitudes towards disabled 
people. Another major study in citizenship in contemporary Britain, has recently found that 
citizens have worryingly low level of political knowledge and lack trust in the democratic 
process.949 A voter turnout of just 61 percent at the 2005 general election is a stark reminder 
of the high levels of disengagement with traditional political institutions.  
Further, as models of citizenship continue to become more reliant on employment and 
participation as prerequisites of citizenship, there is a dangerous probability that a key 
disability group will find it increasingly difficult to operate equitably in society. Promises may 
give way to a compounding of existing difficulties. This ‗disability divide‘ describes the gap 
between the able-bodied population and people with disabilities in gaining access to 
meaningful employment and education. Although the issue of the disability divide revolves 
around the exploration of issues of power, social justice, citizenship and human rights. The 
                                                             
946 (1996, p14) 
947 Sadlers Wells, London, January. Available online at: http://www.drc-gb.org (accessed 10 October 2004). 
948 United Nations (1989) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Geneva: Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. 
949 (Pattie et al., 2004). 
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perception of disability in the community, along with the provision of resources, corporate 
motivations and government policies, all contribute to the ways in which people who are 
disabled might gain access to education and employment. For the position of some disabled 
people at work was in part shaped by their early education, which limited them in competition 
for jobs and tended to direct them towards traditionally lesser, low status types of work.  
 
Marshall‘s analysis becomes of interest to this study not because it is the definitive 
statement upon the structures of UK citizenship, but since it may be argued to be a litmus 
test not only of the underlying philosophies which have helped to shape relations between 
citizens and their state, but also of certain of the institutional facets of UK citizenship. It is 
primarily reflective of the vital role played by a desire for social order in the history of UK 
citizenship evolution, but also hints that the interests of the state are neither logically nor 
immediately commensurate with those of the national community or individual citizen.  
One could then argue that, we cannot understand variations in access to rights through 
simple dichotomies such as male/female, disabled/non-disabled. These categories often fall 
apart in the practice of rights, and persons within each category may experience significant 
variations in access to rights. In fact, it would seem that not all persons with disabilities 
experience the same level of restriction or exclusion. Perhaps economic power mediates 
such vulnerability so that those who are economically independent avoid threats or, on the 
other hand, perhaps those with economic power are most likely to be subject to control in 
order to ‗protect‘ them from exploitation. Perhaps those with strong family networks are 
shielded from stigma, or perhaps those with strong family networks are the most isolated 
from social systems that could have liberated them from patriarchal domination.  
Drawing upon mainstream citizenship theory to examine disability, however, does not 
necessitate ignoring the unique historical path or squeezing disability into a mold that is 
designed for another population. Optimally, broad theoretical concepts can expose common 
processes and dynamics, while allowing for historical variation such that the significant 
history of disability can be meaningfully included in retaining its distinct history. Furthermore, 
an examination of broader institutional and relational contexts allows us to move beyond the 
‗unique‘ history of people with disabilities to conceptualize this history in terms of a greater 
history of national citizenship development. In doing so, we begin to see many parallels, 
such as the impact of the legal system on minority groups portrayed as incompetent and 
dependent, and the role of relational vulnerability to exclusion.  
We also see the impact of citizenship development for people with disabilities on other 
populations. For example, because the category of ‗handicapped‘ provided a secure and 
flexible basis for exclusion, potentially this category made it more feasible to extend the 
rights to citizenship to the ‗fit‘ among marginalized populations. To speculate further, it may 
well be that the exclusion of people with intellectual disabilities from citizenship was central 
to the inclusion of other marginalized populations. As women and African-Americans fought 
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for the rights of citizenship, in general they did not fight to overturn the liberal narrative. 
Rather, they argued that definitions of incompetence had been misapplied to their population; 
the liberal narrative could remain dominant as long as some populations, including those 
with disabilities, remained defined as incompetent and outside the realm of practicing 
citizenship. The perception of disability in the community, along with the provision of 
resources, individual and corporate motivations and government policies, all contribute to the 
ways in which people who are disabled might gain access to inclusion and full citizenship.  
In conclusion it is suggested here that the medical and social models and both classic and 
recent models of citizenship are reductionist in their interpretation of disability and SEN. 
Thus a UNCRPD human rights alternative model has been proposed that suggests a 
combination of biological, psychological and social factors all play a significant role in human 
functioning. Also for the first time in history the UNCRPD extends equal rights to people with 
intellectual disabilities as a matter of law and grants equal legal capacity and recognition for 
all disabled people. It has been further argued that, in England, the word ‗special‘ has also 
been used to maintain a deficit or medical discourse in education.950 So perhaps that the 
language of ‗need‘ and the term ‗special‘ be rejected in favour of the term ‗educational rights.‘  
 
The Reggio approach draws on the concepts of children‘s rights as described within the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). The United Nations‘ convention 
groups children‘s rights under four categories: prevention, provision, protection and 
participation. In a departure from classic models of citizenship ideas about personhood and 
citizenship, it is the right to participation that the Reggio approach sees as crucial for the 
inclusion of all children. 951  As a result of the rights-based approach, children in Reggio 
schools have ‗special rights,‘ not ‗special needs.‘ The UK could benefit from adopting the 
Reggio approach, which is seen to benefit all children, not only disabled people.  
 
The limitations of the social and medical models, along with the limited domestic scope of 
human rights and the distortion citizenship theories create on a cosmopolitan scale has 
meant that while efforts have undeniably been made to improve the lives of the disabled, 
large problems still exist. It could be argued that this endless chase involving the 
development of models and theories to mollify discontent and issues regarding disabled 
people has led to the creation of fresh problems. Education in England serves as a case 
study to show the failings of these models both in theory and in practice and indeed of 
society regarding the lack of inclusivity for the disabled. Efforts at most or all levels of 
education historically has fallen short, just like the efforts in other fields in establishing full 
rights of inclusivity for disabled people. 
From these chapters, one can conclude that for the several hundred years since disability 
                                                             
950 see(Philips, 2001). 
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rights have been considered in the context of medical and social models, citizenship, human 
rights and international legislation, there has been a running paradox. From a twin track 
perspective, the more progress is made in terms of revising and refining notions of disability 
and in making citizenship more inclusive, the more issues continue to arise concerning 
disability and the place of the disability community and its disabled individuals within their 
respective societies. As more detailed models and legislation evolve, some of the old 
problems re-appear and some new ones emerge which require further deliberation by state 
governments, disability organizations and by international bodies.  
The thesis structure is organized by looking at medical and social models of disability, and 
how they advance yet do not fully address the issues of the problems of disabled people. 
Both classical and contemporary models of citizenship exclude disabled people from full 
citizenship. Human rights do advance the models of disability and human rights by according 
disabled people legal protection. However, UN legislation prior to 2006 fails to achieve this 
aim. The 2006 UN CRPD attempts to bridge these gaps by legally binding legislation 
particularly Article 12 and Article 24 but leaves us with the question of how important are 
models of disability and models of citizenship after the CRPD highlighted their limitations? 
Should we abandon all models of disability and citizenship--perhaps yes, and the CRPD is 
all we need to empower disabled people in achieving full citizenship rights? The CRPD, 
especially Article 12, grants unprecedented legal rights to the disabled, filling the gap left by 
the models discussed. And in filling that gap, and providing full equality before the law for all 
disabled people, the CRPD appears to supersede them. An alternative framework is offered 
here by which to reconsider disabled people‘s citizenship rights through an application of the 
CRDP. A synthesis of the rights and a redefined participatory traditions, linked through the 
notion of human agency. This alternative is not seen as being definitive; rather, it comprises 
a starting point in a discussion which hopefully will be generative in re-visioning disabled 
people‘s citizenship rights. Many of the limitations of the models of disability and citizenship 
can potentially be resolved by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with 
Disabilities (CRPD), particularly Articles 12 and 24 which deal with legal capacity and 
inclusive education respectfully. While the thesis identifies the CRPD as a starting point we 
have to do so with the shortcomings of the CRPD in mind. For example the reservation the 
UK government put on Article 24 could make the full realization of citizenship rights in 
education problematic. This reflects the general criticism of UN legislation that structures 
cannot be specified by rights which is also problematic in according disabled people their 
CRPD rights in practice. 
Although there have been significant advances for disabled people and their specific legal 
rights have been greatly strengthened, these gains are, however, still precarious and there is 
still a long way to go before disabled people achieve full equality and secure policies which 
meet their particular needs in practice. Indeed with poor education, low wages or inadequate 
benefits the position appears not to be getting better. Many disabled people still face great 
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problems in their citizenship status. Thus, the plight of the disabled, while being recognized, 
can never truly be completely solved using current models of disability and citizenship and 
this is evident in what is expressed and reflected in education policies for the disabled in 
England. 
This thesis concludes with the view that disabled people have progressed in achieving rights 
of inclusive citizenship, but that the medical, social, political and legislative efforts have 
consistently fallen short in remedying significant defects. 
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